I was referring to the meaning of the word 'bachelor'. It has no meaning beyond that which it is felicitously used for. — Isaac

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John.

And in the same vein, there's a difference between saying "things that are known are true and justified because the language community uses the term 'known' to refer to things they believe to be true and justified" and saying "X is known because the language community believes that X is true and justified."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about X.

Of course. The same sentence means different things in different contexts. Sometimes "I know x!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that x!" — Isaac

What does "x" mean in this context?

To make it simpler, let's say that sometimes "I know that it is raining!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that it is raining!" and that sometimes it means "I believe that it is raining."

What do the emphasized parts mean? Do all three emphasized parts mean the same thing?

We are quite capable of asserting things that we don't believe. For example; Issac's surname is "Smith". This assertion says nothing about what I believe. It just says something about Issac's surname, and is true if his surname is Smith and false if it isn't.

In fact, as someone who takes part in a weekly quiz, I often assert things that I don't believe. We call these guesses. And, of course, such assertions are about what is the case.

At which point it's no longer true that your entire language community believes John is a bachelor. — Isaac

So? It is still a fact that, prior to me correcting them, John is not a bachelor even though the language community believes that John is an unmarried man.

I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case — Isaac

Yes you are. You said:

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. — Isaac

This is false. John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. John being a bachelor has nothing to do with whether or not you "felicitously" use the term bachelor. You've even accepted that "felicitous" use can be wrong.

As I've said, quite a few times now, I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case, only about what claims that something is the case mean, claims such as "John knows x". — Isaac

And in doing so you continue to conflate the implication of speech acts with the meaning of propositions. If you and I both assert that it is raining then there are two speech acts that share a proposition. Your speech act may imply that you believe that it is raining, and my speech act may imply that I believe that it is raining, but the shared proposition isn't "Michael believes that it is raining" (which is true iff I believe that it is raining) or "Issac believes that it is raining" (which is true iff you believe that it is raining) but is "it is raining" (which is true iff it is raining).

So despite your continued assertion, the emphasized part of "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as "I believe that it is raining." There's no infinite recursion going on here. The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather, i.e. what's (allegedly) the case, and isn't simply a statement that one has a belief (about what, exactly?).

Your entire language community, every single speaker believes John is a bachelor. So to whom are you going to use a sentence in which you use the term "John is a wife"? — Isaac

The language community. They all (incorrectly) believe that John is a bachelor. I correct them to inform them that John is in fact a married woman. They thank me for correcting them. That's what Copernicus did when he corrected everyone's false claim that the Sun orbited the Earth.

To say 'x is a y' is to say something about what it is to be an y (at the least that x is one of the sorts of thing a y is). But what it is to be a y is determined by the community for whom a y is a thing. A y is not a thing outside of a community for whom it is a relevant aspect of their life.

So John is not a bachelor by virtue of properties of John alone. He's a bachelor by virtue of a relationship between properties of John and the role of those properties in the community for whom 'John', 'bachelor', 'wife', 'married', and 'man' mean anything at all. — Isaac

None of this changes the fact that John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. This is contrary to your earlier claim that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is a man and the language community believes that John is unmarried. The language community can be mistaken about John's sex/gender and marital status, just as they were once mistaken about the orbit of the Earth and the Sun, and their mistake doesn't make John a bachelor.

If the entire language community uses the term 'bachelor' of a person, but you use 'wife's, how are you going to make yourself understood? What more is there to the definition of a word than it's felicitous use? — Isaac

I don't understand what you're saying here. I am simply asserting the fact that John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. Whether or not John is a bachelor has nothing to do with what anyone believes about John's sex/gender or marital status; whether or not John is a bachelor depends on what the facts are. Do you disagree? Are you going to continue to say that John, who is in fact a married woman, is a bachelor iff the language community incorrectly believes that John is an unmarried man?

Yes, and if everyone starts using 'bachelor' of John despite his obviously being a woman and married, then it's the meaning of the word 'bachelor that will have changed, not the truth of my statement. — Isaac

Re-reading this properly (I skimmed earlier), I've noticed that you've specified "despite obviously being a woman and married." Now you're changing the argument.

Your original claim was this:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried

Which is false. The language community might believe that John is an unmarried man despite the fact that John is a married woman. According to the above, John is a bachelor despite being a married woman. Obviously that's wrong. The correct definition is the one I gave:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

Yes, and if everyone starts using 'bachelor' of John despite his obviously being a woman and married, then it's the meaning of the word 'bachelor that will have changed, not the truth of my statement. — Isaac

That's not how it works. When the entire language community claimed that the Sun revolved around the Earth, they didn't mean something else by "the Sun revolved around the Earth." They meant exactly what we mean now; they were just wrong. You misunderstand the meaning-as-use interpretation of language.

No. It depends on what the language community around me believes. — Isaac

No it doesn’t. The language community around you can incorrectly believe that I am not married when in fact I am and so incorrectly believe that I am a bachelor.

So even if you and the language community assert “Michael is a bachelor” if you/they believe that I am a bachelor, it doesn’t follow that “Michael is a bachelor” means “I/we believe that Michael is a bachelor” or that your/their assertion is true.

I am a bachelor iff I am an unmarried man, irrespective of what you/they or even I believe.

I'm talking about what the expression "I know x" means. I'm claiming that it means something like "I believe x and most people in my language community would agree with me". I'm making this claim on the basis of the fact that this is how the expression is actually used. — Isaac

I’ve said that this is best understood in the third-person. “John believes X” doesn’t mean “John knows X”. And also "John knows X" doesn't mean "John and I believe X."

It’s wrong because it is a fact that it isn’t raining. Our perspectives are irrelevant.

In this situation, should a moderator judge my belief to be wrong, given that i am employing the word "know" in the same sense in which i always employ it? — sime

Yes, your belief is wrong because it isn’t raining.

As we are both not john, we can both agree that John's beliefs doesn't equal the truth, but that doesn't give John the epistemic warrant to know that fact, because it lies outside of John's cognitive closure.

At most, John can parrot the sentence without any understanding of what reality is like outside of the John's beliefs. — sime

When I'm out in the rain getting wet, I certainly have an understanding of what reality is like outside my belief that it is raining; I have the actual, physical experience of the rain making me wet. The fact that it's raining coupled with the physical experience of the rain making me wet grants me the epistemic warrant to know that it's raining.

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. There's no God of languages checking the 'truly' correct use. — Isaac

Whether or not your use is felicitous does not depend on what you believe. You might only assert that someone is a bachelor if you believe that they are a bachelor, but you can mistake a woman for a man or incorrectly believe that they are unmarried. Your belief that John is a bachelor has no bearing on whether or not John is a bachelor. You can be wrong. John being a bachelor and you believing that John is a bachelor are two very different things, with very different truth conditions.

And you might only assert that it is raining if you believe that it is raining, but your belief that it is raining has no bearing on whether or not it is raining. You can be wrong. It raining and you believing that it is raining are two very different things, with very different truth conditions.

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried

It's just about the correct use of the term 'Bachelor' — Isaac

And that's categorically false. John might be a woman dressed as a man and lying about her marital status. The fact that the language community generally believe that John is a man and unmarried doesn't entail that John is, in fact, a bachelor.

As a simpler example:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

You want to interpret this as the claim that John is a bachelor iff:

1) I believe that John is a man, and
2) I believe that John is unmarried

The fact that I would only assert that John is a bachelor if I believe that he is an unmarried man doesn't mean that my belief has anything to do with whether or not John is a bachelor. Him being a bachelor has nothing to do with what I believe. And him knowing that it is raining has nothing to do with what I believe, for the exact same reason.

How do we not (apart from just never using the expression "John knows that X is true"). The only distinction between me saying "John believes x is true (but it isn't)" and "John knows x is true" is my belief about whether x is true.

Then the entire human race is misusing the word 'knowledge' (as they're using it in case where they merely believe x is true)...or...your definition is wrong. Which is more parsimonious an explanation? — Isaac

I might say "John knows X" if I believe that X is true, but I wouldn't say "John knows X if I believe that X is true."

You're conflating the meaning of a proposition with one's reason for uttering it.

If propositions are not speech acts, then where are they used? Do we mime them? Communicate them through the means of interpretive dance? — Isaac

You're completely missing the point.

Given the proposition "I believe that it is raining", what does the part in bold mean? It doesn't mean the same thing as the entire quoted proposition; "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean "I believe that I believe that it is raining."

The proposition "it is raining" is a proposition about the weather, and is true iff it is raining. The proposition "I believe that it is raining" is a proposition about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining. And this is true even if the act of asserting "it is raining" implies that the speaker believes that it is raining.

This is what I mean when I say that speech acts are not the same as propositions.

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X". This is similar to the mistake that @sime made above regarding "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" – even if asserting the former implies an assertion of the latter, as propositions they mean different things.

That belief and knowledge are different is obvious when we consider it in the third-person: "John believes that Donald Trump won the 2020 election" is not equivalent to "John knows that Donald Trump won the 2020 election." John can believe that Donald Trump won even if he didn't, but he can't know that Donald Trump won if he didn't.

So perhaps this issue is best discussed in the third-person. According to the JTB definition of knowledge, John knows that X iff:

1) John believes that X is true,
2) John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3) X is true

It is important to understand (contrary to @sime's claim above), that we don't interpret this as:

1) John believes that X is true,
2) John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3) I believe that X is true/John believes that X is true

The third condition isn't that I believe that X is true, or even that John believes that X is true (that would be the first condition); it's just that X is true. An independent fact must obtain for us to have knowledge.

The next issue is that you seem to think that knowledge of X depends on first knowing that the third condition is satisfied, but that is not the case. Rather, knowledge of the third condition is entailed by the three conditions being satisfied (indeed; that's exactly the JTB definition).

Now give us that woman who killed Harry Dunn.

If you say "It is raining", i cannot interpret you as saying anything other than " Michael believes it is raining". — sime

You're talking about speech acts, not propositions. If we were simply interpreting speech acts then consider this dialogue:

Michael: "It's raining."
Andrew: "You're wrong."

We could interpret this as:

Michael: "I believe that it's raining."
Andrew: "I believe that it's not raining."

Which somewhat makes sense. However, the proposition "you're wrong" doesn't mean "I believe that it's not raining." We can use the proposition "you're wrong" in many different situations, including ones that have nothing to do with the rain. I'm concerned with the meaning of the proposition "you're wrong", not how to interpret it as a speech act in a specific situation like we've done above.

And when we just consider the meaning of the propositions, "it is raining" is a claim about the weather and is true if it is raining, whereas "Michael believes that it is raining" is a claim about my belief and is true if I believe as such. They are not the same thing. And "you're wrong" is a claim about the truth of something the other person has said, and is true if the other person asserted a falsehood.

If I believe that it's raining then I can't be wrong when I say "I believe that it's raining," but I can be wrong when I say "it's raining."

In your view, is it possible to grasp the meaning of an assertion without understanding the cause of the assertion? — sime

Yes. The meaning of a proposition is one thing, the motivation for a speech act is another. The latter is irrelevant for this discussion.

Just because my assertion "you're a fucking twat" implies that I dislike the person I'm speaking too, and that I am an uncouth person, it doesn't then follow that "you're a fucking twat" means "I dislike you and I am an uncouth person."

Just because my assertion "it is raining" implies that I believe that it is raining, it doesn't then follow that "it is raining" means "I believe that it is raining."

But since you cannot ascertain whether it is an independent fact — Isaac

You can, that's what the justification does. If you have justification that X is true, and if X is true, then you have ascertained that X is true.

So according to us? — sime

No, not according to us. It's not according to anyone. It's about what actually is the case. I don't understand what's difficult about this.

An independent fact according to whom? — sime

It's not according to anyone. It's about what really is the case, irrespective of what anyone believes.

I asked how you ascertain whether I had toast this morning and your answer requires that you first know whether I had toast this morning. — Isaac

No it doesn't.

Michael has ascertained that Issac had toast this morning if 1) it is an independent fact that Issac had toast this morning, 2) Michael has seen that Issac had toast this morning, and 3) Michael believes that Issac had toast this morning

I don't need to first know that 1) is true. 1) just needs to be true, independent of what I believe. Then, assuming I believe 1) and am justified in doing so, it then follows that I know 1).

If 3) refers to your belief that it is raining — sime

It doesn't. It refers to the independent fact that it is raining.

How would you ascertain I had toast for breakfast, other than by your justifications for believing I had toast for breakfast, — Isaac

1. if you had toast this morning and if I saw you eat toast this morning and if I believe that you had toast this morning then I have ascertained that you had toast this morning

2. if you didn't have toast this morning and if I saw you eat toast this morning and if I believe that you had toast this morning then I haven't ascertained that you had toast this morning

3. if you had toast this morning and if I didn't see you eat toast this morning and if I believe that you had toast this morning then I haven't ascertained that you had toast this morning

I have ascertained that X is true if 1) X is true, 2) I believe that X is true, and 3) I have justified in believing that X is true.

And do we know the rules of the game of life? Chess is an abstracted and bounded category not an unknown quantity. There is a difference between abstracted truth and applying truth to reality right? — I like sushi

I honestly don't know what you're saying any more. Your original claim was that the JTB definition of knowledge entails that flat-Earthers have knowledge that the Earth is flat. I am simply arguing that it doesn't. I am arguing that 1) they only have knowledge if the Earth is in fact flat, and 2) the Earth isn't flat and so they don't have knowledge.

If you want to argue that I can't be certain about 2) then that misses the point. 1) is the relevant counter-claim. Knowledge, according to JTB, requires more than just a justified belief; it requires that the justified belief is true.

But...

if one has a justified true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true.

...unarguably. — Isaac

It is arguable. If you had toast for breakfast this morning and if I believe that you had toast for breakfast this morning, it would be false to say that I have ascertained that my belief is true. I require justification for that. I need to have seen you eat toast this morning.

So it is a justified belief NOT a justified true belief — I like sushi

No, it's a justified true belief. Obviously if bishops can actually move vertically as well then they don't know the rules of the game.

OK, so

1. if one has a justified true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true

2. if one has a justified true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true

You're saying that 1 is false, but 2 is just a tautology. — Isaac

I'm saying:

3) if one has a justified true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true

if one has a true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true.

The above is a meaningless tautology, yes?

So the only thing added is the justification.

Yet you say that it's not the justification which makes a belief true. — Isaac

Justification isn't what makes a belief true, it's what makes a true belief count as knowledge (as opposed to a lucky guess).

Are you saying that someone, in the real world, can know (with certainty) what the rules of a game are without ever being told what the rules are? — I like sushi

I don't know about with certainty, but they can know the rules of a game by watching the game and learning how it's played. If they watch the bishops only ever moving diagonally then they are justified in believing that bishops only ever move diagonally, and if bishops only ever move diagonally then they know that bishops only ever moving diagonally.

So a belief that's well justified is 'true'? — Isaac

No, but if one has a justified true belief then one has ascertained that one's belief is true.

Go on... — Isaac

What’s there to say? I believe that it’s raining because I’m outside, getting wet, and can see the water falling from the clouds. That’s the justification for my belief and how I’ve ascertained the truth that it is raining.

The justification for a true belief is how the truth is ascertained.

Note the position of the quotation marks. — Isaac

I did, and they still don’t mean the same thing. A claim about the weather is not a claim about one’s belief.

But this latter state cannot ever be ascertained — Isaac

It can, given the JTB definition of knowledge.

If it is raining and if I believe that it is raining and if I am justified in believing that it is raining then I know that it is raining. If I know that it is raining then I have ascertained that it is raining.

Which is the case precisely raised by Moore's paradox. — sime

Moore's paradox has nothing to do with this discussion, and was only brought up because of Isaac's misleading question. Given the JTB definition of knowledge:

John knows that it is raining if:

1) John believes that it is raining,
2) John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3) it is raining

It would be a mistake to interpret this as saying that John knows that it is raining if:

1) John believes that it is raining,
2) John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3) I believe that it is raining

This latter argument is obviously fallacious.

But that doesn’t make them true. Truth is not, as far as we know, existent in reality. It is an abstract concept. — I like sushi

Whether or not the Earth is flat is not an abstract concept. Whether or not the Earth is flat "exists" in reality. Whether or not the Earth is flat is independent on what anyone believes.

You appear to be talking about facts rather than what is true. — I like sushi

If you're drawing a distinction then you're missing the point. If you prefer it can be rephrased as:

X knows that Y if 1) X believes that Y, 2) X is justified in believing that Y, and 3) it is a fact that Y.

I claimed "it's raining" means the same as 'I believe "it's raining" — Isaac

It doesn't. The former is a claim about the weather, and is true if it is raining. The latter is a claim about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining.

The same way most people do. The world isn't just what I believe it to be. Sometimes the things I believe turn out to be wrong.

If you want to argue for subjective idealism or some other metaphysics then this isn't the discussion for that. This discussion takes some form of objective realism for granted.