But then when you were pressed on what a sentence or a linguistic entity is, metaphysically speaking, you threw up your hands as if there is nothing to talk about. — Leontiskos

There is no deeper metaphysics. We say things, we write things, we sign things. There's no need to overthink this.

So the argument treats accuracy as all-or-nothing. One could not have an otherwise accurate painting in which the hair was pink when it ought be black. "Accurate" is somewhat problematic in this regard. — Banno

Well so is truth.

As an example, "the painting is accurate" is true if and only if the painting is accurate.

I don't see as the change makes the argument clearer. — Banno

You don't understand P2? You don't know what it means for a painting to exist?

Why IFF? Why not "The painting is accurate if the woman has red hair"? — Banno

Because if the woman does not have red hair then the painting is inaccurate.

Why IFF when you say that "it is raining" is true iff it is raining?

My quibble with the argument you gave earlier is much the same. — Banno

Perhaps this makes it clearer:

P1. The painting of the woman with red hair is accurate if and only if the woman has red hair
C1. Therefore, the woman has red hair if and only if the painting of the woman is accurate
P2. If the painting of the woman with red hair is accurate then the painting of the woman with red hair exists
C2. Therefore, if the woman has red hair then the painting of the woman with red hair exists
C3. Therefore, if the painting of the woman with red hair does not exist then the woman does not have red hair

Like with the previous example I think the issue is with P1, not with P2. It should be:

P1. If the painting of the woman with red hair exists then it is accurate if and only if the woman has red hair

Then we no longer derive the bizarre C1 and C2.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/32/Donald_Davidson

Do you consider yourself a philosopher who works beyond the distinction of realism/anti-realism?

There isn’t one clear distinction. If by realism you mean the idea that entities, perhaps facts or states of affairs, make our sentences true, then I think nobody has ever succeeded in giving a clear account of how that should work. If that is realism, I’m not a realist. But what’s an anti-realist? One form of anti-realism is Dummett’s. For Dummett, one is an anti-realist in some area if one thinks some sentences in that area are neither true nor false. This may be right. It may well be that the most appropriate semantics will declare, say, that some sentences with non-referring names are neither true nor false. I don’t think of this as a deep metaphysical issue, but as a matter for semantic engineering. On the other hand if anti-realism means that a sentence, the truth value of which we have no way to determine, lacks a truth value, then I think anti-realism is false. There are lots of sentences we know for certain we’ll never know to be true or false, those about the distant past for example. There’s no way we can check up on these things. So I’m not an anti-realist but neither am I a realist in the only clear senses I understand.

It turns into this: If minds (or else truth-bearers) do not exist, does truth exist? The idea is that the state of affairs is left intact. The focus is on the mind or truth-bearer. You yourself hone in on this exact same thing: — Leontiskos

What I’ve been trying to explain is that it’s not at all clear what you mean by saying “truth exists” without minds given that truth is a property of sentences.

I would just say that if minds did not exist then stars and planets and gold would still exist. The existence of physical objects does not depend on the existence of a mind or a true sentence. Unless you’re an idealist this is not a controversial claim.

...you were literally presenting arguments about the existence of sentences, so it is not realistic for you to go on to deny that the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is irrelevant.

(And of course you were presenting this argument as a sort of dilemma for Banno, not for your own position, but the metaphysical status of truth-bearers is nevertheless central to the discussion.) — Leontiskos

I was presenting it as a peculiar consequence of the biconditional “‘X’ is true iff X”, and I resolved it myself by amending the premise to “if ‘X’ exists then it is true iff X”.

This whole discussion is directly related to the metaphysical status of truth bearers — Leontiskos

I think it’s directly related to the metaphysical status of truth makers.

Are the things that make a sentence true mind-independent or not? Are they verification-transcendent or not?

Clearly. It was a kind of placeholder "I don't know what to put here" word. But it is the natural word, in one sense, since you intend to attribute properties to these whatever-they-ares. So why are you backing away from it? — Srap Tasmaner

I’m not. There’s just nothing special going on when I say that the sentence “it is raining” is written in English, contains three words, is true, and is my preferred example case when doing philosophy.

There is no need to read into this some deeper metaphysics.

I think Wittgenstein has a point here. Some are being bewitched by language about language.

Would you prefer it if I said “truth bearers are features of language”?

I didn’t mean anything special by the term “entity”.

I'm curious whether you have anything to say about these entities. — Srap Tasmaner

We make sounds or draw symbols and these sounds and symbols mean something to us. I don't think there's much else to add, other than to reject any kind of Platonism.

But I don't think this has anything to do with metaphysics at all. Metaphysics concerns the nature of truth makers, not truth bearers. Is rain a mental phenomenon, à la idealism, or physical, à la materialism? Can an unknowable event occur, something Dummett's anti-realism rejects? Do counterfactual truth-makers exist?

I'm not saying that truth is vacuous.

1. "it is raining" is true
2. it is raining
3. it is the case that it is raining
4. it is true that it is raining

(1) describes a sentence using the adjective "true". This, I think, is the proper use of the word "true", and is meaningful.

(3) means the same thing as (2) and so the phrase "it is the case that" is superfluous, saying nothing that isn't said without it.

(4) either means (1), in which case it is describing a sentence using the adjective "true" but doing so without the use of quotation marks, or it means (2), in which case the phrase "it is true that" is superfluous, saying nothing that isn't said without it.

So we can reduce the above to simply these two sentences without losing anything:

1. "it is raining" is true
2. it is raining

Truth and falsehood are properties of the sentence. The sentence is true if it is raining, otherwise it is false.

I'll quote from the SEP article on truth:

One of the important themes in the literature on truth is its connection to meaning, or more generally, to language.

...

We thus find the usual candidate truth-bearers linked in a tight circle: interpreted sentences, the propositions they express, the belief speakers might hold towards them, and the acts of assertion they might perform with them are all connected by providing something meaningful. This makes them reasonable bearers of truth.

My point is simple: truth-bearers are linguistic entities, and so if there is no language there are no truth-bearers and so nothing has the property of being either true or false.

I'm not saying that the existence of rain depends on language.

"Greater than" (>) is a relation. — Leontiskos

4 is greater than 3.
3 is smaller than 4.

The same relation is described even though "greater" does not mean the same thing as "smaller". Being greater than 3 is a property of 4 and being smaller than 4 is a property of 3.

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate. — Richard B

Just say "it is raining".

Phrases like "it is the case that" and "it is true that" don't add anything to the above; they're vacuous, not actually referring to some entity ("it") having some property ("true"/"the case").

Truth is about what is the case. — Apustimelogist

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain.

Aren't numbers the sorts of abstract objects you wanted nothing to do with? — Srap Tasmaner

I want nothing to do with mind-independent abstract objects à la Platonism or mathematical realism.

Well, yes. A sentence about it raining is only true if there is rain, and a painting of a landscape is only accurate if there is a landscape. But truth and accuracy are properties of the sentence and the painting, not properties of the rain or the landscape.

As in, as a straightforward account of English grammar we say “the sentence is true” and “the painting is accurate”; we don’t say “the rain is true” or “the landscape is accurate”.

My point is that talk of truths without sentences is a category error, just as talk of accuracies without paintings is a category error. Without sentences and paintings there’s just rain and landscapes.

To say that a painting is accurate in itself makes no sense without reference to something outside the painting. — Leontiskos

Sure, and being an integer greater than the number 3 makes no sense without reference to the number 3, but being an integer greater than the number 3 isn't a property of the number 3; it's a property of the numbers 4 and 5 and 6 and so on.

So if you set up your easel in front of my house and make a lovely painting of it, will it seem, even to you, to be accurate if you look at my house from the back? (Or after dark? Or in the rain?) — Srap Tasmaner

It's an accurate painting of the front of your house on a rainless day.

Is it? — Srap Tasmaner

I think so, much like accuracy is a property of paintings (that resemble their subject).

I certainly don’t think that accuracy is a property of the landscape being painted, and I don’t think we need some intermediate thing that sits between the painting and the landscape.

That's all fine. There is very little that can be said about truth. — Banno

But presumably more can be said about whether or not aliens exist, whether or not dinosaurs existed, whether or not I will win the lottery next week, and whether or not Hitler would have been assassinated had he not killed himself.

What I don't think is that this poses a problem for realism. — Banno

It wasn't meant to be. It was meant to be an examination of "p" is true iff p. I think it's both problematic and impoverished.

It's problematic in that it appears to entail an absurd conclusion – but as mentioned in my earlier comment we can at least address this by amending the premise to if "p" exists then "p" is true iff p.

It's impoverished in that it only says that "if Hitler had not killed himself then he would have been assassinated" is true iff if Hitler had not killed himself then he would have been been assassinated, but this says nothing substantial about whether or not such a counterfactual can be true or about the ontology of counterfactual truthmakers (i.e. the consequent of the biconditional) – concerns that have merit regardless of truth deflationism. And these concerns also have merit when discussing non-counterfactual claims about the past, the future, and even the present.

So whether you're a realist or an anti-realist or an idealist, the bare assertion that "it is raining" is true iff it is raining says nothing to address any metaphysical issues – or even issues about truth. It's just a rather vacuous aphorism.

Maybe, but then is there a future actuality if eternalism is not the case? Is there a past actuality if presentism is the case?

Does it make sense for a true sentence to have a non-existent truthmaker?

But I think there’s a more interesting approach to this topic.

We start with the counterfactual sentences “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would have been assassinated” and “if Hitler hadn’t killed himself then he would not have been assassinated.”

The counterfactual-realist would say that one of these sentences is true, but then that would seem to require the existence of a counterfactual truthmaker. Can we make sense of such a thing? Is there good reason to believe that there is such a thing?

With this consideration in mind, we can ask the same thing about sentences about the future. Such sentences being true would seem to require the existence of a future truthmaker. Does this require eternalism to be the case?

And the same questions can be asked about sentences about the past. Does them being true require presentism to not be the case?

Sentences have no existence or meaning apart from minds. — Leontiskos

I know.

Truths and sentences are about things, not sentences. — Leontiskos

Truth is a property of a sentence that correctly describes these other things. Truth is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

Falsehood is a property of a sentence that incorrectly describes these other things. Falsehood is not a property of these other things and it is not identical to these other things.

You want to say that a claim about the future involves no claim about what will be true in the future, and that's not coherent. — Leontiskos

A claim about the future is a claim about what will exist in the future and about what will happen in the future. We don't need true sentences to exist in the future for rocks to exist in the future.

If you assert "there are dinosaurs at t", where t is a time when there are dinosaurs... It's true. But "there are dinosaurs at t" cannot be true at t, since there were no truthbearers at t. — fdrake

I wouldn't say "there are dinosaurs at t", I'd say "there were dinosaurs at t", and in saying it (now) I am speaking the truth.

This perhaps ties into something I said earlier:

1. "Languages will die out" is true
2. "Languages are dead" will be true

(1) is true but (2) is necessarily false.

That's just a matter of tense.

"there were dinosaurs" is true.

This doesn't require someone to have truthfully said "there are dinosaurs".

It's complicated by the fact that any theory of truth worth its salt should evaluate "There were rocks before the advent of humans" as true — fdrake

I don't see why that's a complication? Let's just replace "is true" with "is a correct description of the world".

Can there be a correct description of the world without someone saying something? No.
Can rocks exist without someone correctly describing the world? Yes.
Is "rocks can exist without someone correctly describing the world" a correct description of the world? Yes.

Seems simple to me.

In which case my description of your illustration is perfectly accurate, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

No it's not.

I'm not refusing to talk about truth. I am only talking about truth. Truth is a property of sentences. Sentences do not exist as mind-independent Platonic entities. If nothing is said then there are no sentences, and if there are no sentences then there are no true sentences.

And the existence of gold does not depend on us saying "gold exists".

Can there be truth without a truthbearer? Seems to me a different question to whether there can be rocks on earth without humans. — fdrake

Which I thought I made very clear here, but I guess not.

Sure you have. — Leontiskos

1. Gold exists in universe B but nothing true or false is said in universe B
2. That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B

I said (1). You accused me of saying (2). (1) and (2) are not the same thing.

Try addressing my actual words and not the word you're putting in my mouth.

You seem to continually misunderstand what I am saying.

"it is raining" is a correct description of the world (if it is raining).

The property of being a correct description of the world is a property that only sentences have. If there are no sentences then there are no correct descriptions of the world. But there's still rain.

Now just replace "is a correct description of the world" with "is true".

You seem to be reading something into my words that isn't there.

What began as a simple contradiction, "It is true and not true that gold exists," ended as a more complex contradiction, "That gold exists in universe B is true in universe A and neither true nor false in universe B." — Leontiskos

I haven’t said either of those things.

There are two planets, A and B. I live on planet A. Planet B is uninhabited and rich in gold. I say "gold exists on planet B but nothing true or false is said on planet B". What I say is true, and is being said on planet A.

There are two possible universes, A and B. I live in universe A (the actual universe). Universe B is uninhabited and rich in gold. I say "gold exists in universe B but nothing true or false is said in universe B". What I say is true, and is being said in universe A.

See Truth in a World vs. Truth at a World for a more in depth examination.

Here are three sentences:

1. "Gold exists" is true
2. It is true that gold exists
3. Gold exists

(1) and (3) do not mean the same thing; (1) describes a sentence as being true but (3) doesn't.

To me, (2) and (1) mean the same thing; they both describe a sentence as being true – (2) just does so without the use of quotation marks.

But perhaps you want to say that (2) and (3) mean the same thing? If so, the phrase "it is true that" is vacuous, adding nothing to the sentence that isn't already given in (3). The word "it" in the phrase "it is true that" doesn't refer to anything, and it doesn't make sense for some non-existent entity to have the property of being true.

In fact, I think "is true" can be replaced with the phrase "is an accurate account of the world" without issue. So, we have:

1. "Gold exists" is an accurate account of the world
2. It is an accurate account of the world that gold exists
3. Gold exists

My claim is that in a world without language gold exists but there are no accurate accounts of the world. Which is true; there can't be an accurate account of the world if nobody is saying or writing or signing or thinking something about the world.

the non-existence of a sentence doesn't affect the truth — Apustimelogist

There's no such thing as the truth; there's only the truth of a sentence, so this remark doesn't make much sense.

What you should say is that the non-existence of a sentence doesn't affect the existence of rain.

I think truth possibly would make sense as more like a condition that asserts what those sentences are about — Apustimelogist

I don't understand what this means.

The sentence "it is raining" is a sentence about the weather and is true if it is raining and false if it isn't.

Nothing more needs to be said about truth and falsity. We don't need them to be both properties of sentences and properties of something else.

This notion that the existence of rain either entails or requires that something has the property of being true is misguided.

If we uploaded your consciousness to a self repairing robot and checked back in 10,000 years from now and asked you about the sentence thing, we'd find your view had not changed at all. Gotta respect that. — frank

What is so problematic about my view?

Sentences are true and cardboard boxes have 8 corners. Your claim that sentences merely express (abstract) propositions and that it is these (abstract) propositions that are true is like the claim that cardboard boxes merely exemplify cubes and that it is these abstract cubes that have 8 corners.

If you want to talk about things in terms of abstract objects then go ahead, but I'm quite happy in saying that sentences are true and that cardboard boxes have 8 corners. Abstractions might be conceptually useful, but given that they lead some to Platonism I'd rather just not give them much significant thought.