I suspect Cannon’s decision will be overturned in the court of appeals, but instead of the Mueller case, will reach the Supremes where the final decision will come through. No more unlawful appointments. — NOS4A2

The Supreme Court already ruled on this in Morrison v. Olson.

Held:

It does not violate the Appointments Clause for Congress to vest the appointment of independent counsel in the Special Division.

Although admittedly the current court doesn't seem to give a damn about precedent. But as no justices concurred with Thomas's opinion on the matter in the recent immunity case, I doubt enough of them would even agree to hear it.

Special prosecutors were appointed under Trump as well, by both Rosenstein (Mueller) and Barr (Durham). One has even been appointed by Garland (Weiss) to investigate and prosecute Hunter Biden.

They've been used for a long time, with their constitutionality confirmed in Morrison v. Olson.

Here's a list.

Cannon is just an idiot. Or corrupt. Or a corrupt idiot.

But it's a useful decision. Now it can be appealed, overturned, and the case assigned to a competent judge who doesn't act as Trump's lawyer.

How is entering directly into full-scale war preferable over striking a deal with the Russians which they have been signaling is their intention since the March/April 2022? — Tzeentch

Good question, Chamberlain.

Duties are indeed something like the "imperative demands" of society as a whole, or of institutions, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And I'm fine with that. We understand that a phrase such as "you ought do this" just means "do this", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole (or some other authority) and not just the individual speaker.

And also the phrase "you ought do what society tells you to do" just means "do what society tells you to do", with the additional understanding that it is the will of society as a whole and not just the individual speaker.

It's not divine command theory, but it is a command theory. Ought-claims are commands phrased as if they were truth-apt propositions.

They are not just like imperative demands though because they define normative goods like "being a good citizen" or "being a good basketball player." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't quite understand what is being said here. To be a good basketball player is just to be a successful/talented basketball player, i.e. being able to dribble, pass, block, and shoot, scoring points, helping teammates score points, preventing opponents from scoring points, and so on.

Being a "good" citizen is a little more vague. Does this just mean that the citizen obeys society's commands?

Anyhow, you didn't answer the questions above. If duties are just imperative statements, who is making these statements? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I answered it before. Parents, teachers, government, society, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

I didn't say that. Consequences and obligations are related. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Okay, I understand that. But I don't care about consequences. I only care about obligations. Please just tell me what "you ought" means. Everything else is a red herring.

So who can go up to a lifeguard and say, "see that drowning kid? You don't have to save them," such that no one will hold them responsible for not saving the child? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You're bringing up consequences again. Why do you keep doing this when you say that consequences have nothing to do with the meaning of "you ought"?

But to make it simple, are you actually claiming that "Orestes had an obligation to avenge his father's death because that was a norm in ancient Greek culture," is a false statement? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I am saying that I don't know what "Orestes had an obligation" means. I am asking you what it means and you appear to be doing everything in your power to avoid answering.

I could perhaps interpret it as "the Greeks demand that people avenge their father's murder, and Orestes' father was murdered", which is true. Beyond that I don't know what else it is saying.

You are bound means that there is an outside authority to which you have submitted by following its procedures — Tobias

Which just means that I agree to do what some outside authority says.

that exert some sort of legitimate power over you that compels you to do x — Tobias

I don't understand what this means. Is this a physical compulsion? A psychological compulsion?

I keep telling you and you keep running around in circles. — Tobias

Because you engage in the circular claim "you ought do what this authority tells you to do". I want to know what the "you ought" part of this sentence means. A reference back to this authority is no explanation at all.

All I understand by the phrase "you ought do what this authority tells you to do" is "do what this authority tells you to do".

You will be imprisoned because you violating a certain obligation (not all) which is laid down in law, under which you are bound by participating in society and in a democratic society at least, is legitimized by democratic procedures, hence is not arbitrary. — Tobias

I addressed this here. All this talk of "violating obligations" and "being bound" is vacuous and superfluous. It is just the case that the law says "anyone who is found guilty of murder is to be imprisoned". We then choose to murder or not with this knowledge in mind, and will inevitably face whatever consequences follow if we choose to murder. There's nothing more to it.

No. Are people widely accepted to have a duty to give a mugger their money when they demand it? Nope. Might they face harm if they refuse to do what the mugger demands? Yes.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? Who tells Orestes "avenge your father's murder or else?" What explicit threat does he face?

The fact that Orestes had this duty, that it was socially recognized in his culture, is a historical fact. His obligation emerges from his culture and his social role, not from any particular person saying "do this or else." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Then why did you bring up undesirable consequences when I asked you to make sense of obligations?

I just want to know what "you ought" means. You keep asserting "you ought do this" and "you ought do that", and now you're asserting that "you ought" doesn't just mean "do this or else".

I need an actual explanation.

If obligations and duties are the same thing as "someone saying do this or else," who exactly is doing the saying? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Your parents, your teachers, your employer, your government, FIFA, FIDE, etc.

I've never suggested that there won't be undesirable consequences to not doing what one promised to do. In fact I've explicitly accepted such things.

Are you now saying that "you ought do this" just means "do this or you will face undesirable consequences"? Because I have no problem with this latter claim.

... you ought to do what you are told ...

... I am bound by the terms of it ... — Tobias

What does "you ought" mean? What does "I am bound" mean?

Whenever someone uses such phrases, all I understand is "do this" (or at best "so-and-so says to do this"). I might even understand it with an additional "or else".

If they mean more than this then I need it explained. I keep asking for someone to make sense of these phrases and nobody ever does. They just reassert the claims "you ought do this" and "you are bound by this". You might as well just replace the terms "ought" and "bound" with "floogle".

If it was pragmatism, 'efficient breach of contract', would be a legal thing to do. It is not.

...

The "I do" actually has large scale legal consequences. — Tobias

What does the law have to do with obligation? Does "you ought do this" just mean "do this or you will be fined/imprisoned"? I have no problem with this latter claim.

That this authority is recognized as legitimate. That you yourself has submitted to this procedure, or in any case, that by participating in the social fabric of society you accept the rules of the game. — Tobias

So I agree to do what I'm told. That's fine. But what does it mean to say that I ought do what I'm told?

We all tacitly assume and subscribe to the principle that promises need to be kept and that therefore a: "but you promised!" is a reasonable reproach. — Tobias

Do you just mean that it is pragmatic for us to do what we promise to do? That's fine. But what does it mean to say that we ought do what we promise to do?

And what special relevance is the verb "promise"? If instead of saying "I promise to do this" and "but you promised", what if we said "I will do this" and "but you said you would"? This certainly seems like the ordinary thing we do. Does this then entail that we enter into an obligation every time we assert our intention to do something, irrespective of whether or not it's a promise?

An obligation is simply something you ought to do. — Banno

The "something you ought to do" is what needs to be explained. I understand what I've been told to do and what I've been advised to do, but beyond that nothing.

Your inability to make sense of obligation is not our problem. — Banno

But your inability to explain or justify obligations is – especially when you don't even try. It's telling. It suggests that Anscombe was right.

Again, if you think a young man saying "I don't intend to get married," and a monk vowing to never marry are functionally equivalent I don't know what to tell you. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You could tell me what the difference is.

But I should point out that you are misrepresenting my position. Here are two propositions:

1. I intend to find your cat
2. I will find your cat

There is something of a difference between these two. The first just expresses my intentions whereas the second (also) predicts the future. But in both cases the propositions are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. And then the same principle with these two propositions:

2. I will find your cat
3. I promise to find your cat

Such statements are sincere if I intend to find your cat. No further conditions are involved. The second no more requires or entails an obligation (whatever such a thing is) than the first. Especially as, as previously mentioned, whether or not I will find your cat is beyond my control alone. I may in fact be incapable of finding your cat because it has already been killed and incinerated.

If you think the obligation is bullshit then how can you tell me that it was rational to pay him $975? — Leontiskos

Because he told me to, and it's rational to pay less if the person asking you for money asks for less.

These questions are getting tiresome. If this is your desperate last attempt then it's an utter failure.

That's right, and so I ask again: would it be rational for you to invoke his promise when he tells you that you underpaid? — Leontiskos

If there's reason to believe that it will work then yes. Much like it would be rational for me to appeal to the Bible if he were a Christian. But the Bible is still bullshit.

Right, but how would it be rational to depend on his promise if obligations don't exist? — Leontiskos

He told me to only pay him $975. So I believed that he is only expecting me to pay him $975. So I only pay him $975.

This isn't rocket science.

Aka: everybody is a realist when they walk out of the door. — Lionino

Relevant:

Here is a kind of puzzle or paradox that several philosophers have stressed. On the one hand, existence questions seem hard. The philosophical question of whether there are abstract entities does not seem to admit of an easy or trivial answer. At the same time, there seem to be trivial arguments settling questions like this in the affirmative. Consider for instance the arguments, “2+2=4. So there is a number which, when added to 2, yields 4. This something is a number. So there are numbers”, and “Fido is a dog. So Fido has the property of being a dog. So there are properties.” How should one resolve this paradox? One response is: adopt fictionalism. The idea would be that in the philosophy room we do not speak fictionally, but ordinarily we do. So in the philosophy room, the question of the existence of abstract entities is hard; outside it, the question is easy. When, ordinarily, a speaker utters a sentence that semantically expresses a proposition that entails that there are numbers, what she says is accurate so long as according to the relevant fiction, there are numbers. But when she utters the same sentence in the philosophy room, she speaks literally and then what she asserts is something highly non-trivial

So was it irrational to write the check for $975 rather than for $1000? — Leontiskos

No. I was told to only pay $975 by my landlord, so that's what I did.

And why is it plausible that it might work? Why would this move plausibly convince him to do as you wish? — Leontiskos

Because, like you, he might believe in obligations.

I don't know why you are appealing to human psychology and the pragmatics of interpersonal relations. None of this proves your assertion that there is more to a promise than just the use of the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so" with the honest intention to do so-and-so. And none of this is you making sense of obligations.

It's all just red herrings.

You conclude that there are no such thing as obligations. — Banno

No, I conclude that obligations are commands fictitiously treated as if they were truth-apt propositions.

You and others are claiming that obligations are more than this, but are refusing to make sense of them or justify their inclusion despite repeated requests.

Compare:
1. You were asked to give an answer to what we get when we add six and five.
2. What is six and five?

...

Or this:
1. She greeted you
2. "Hello" — Banno

So the proper comparison would be:

1. You were given an order
2. Do this

I have no problem with (1). Is this all "you ought do this" means?

So you would invoke his promise in order to convince him that he should not require an additional $25? — Leontiskos

Yes, if I thought it would work. And if he's religious I might appeal to Christian charity, even though I'm an atheist.

I am wondering if I have recourse. What would you do in that situation? — Leontiskos

I just told you; I'd speak to a lawyer.

Would you invoke the promise he made? Why? — Leontiskos

Perhaps, and to convince him not to ask me for more money? I don't know why you think asking for the pragmatic course of action has any relevance to the philosophical dispute regarding the existence of abstract entities like obligations.

Whenever your position falls apart you bury your head in the sand. — Leontiskos

My position hasn't fallen apart and I'm not burying my head in the sand.

I don't understand what kind of answer you want to a question like that.

Do I have recourse? — Leontiskos

Speak to a lawyer.

Honest intentions to do what!? — Leontiskos

To do what was promised. In using the phrase "I promise to find your cat" with the honest intention to find your cat I have promised to find your cat. That's all there is to the matter. All this further talk of "obligation" and "being bound" is vacuous.

You seem to be clueless as to what a promise is. — Leontiskos

People use the phrase "I promise to do so-and-so". That's all a promise is; the use of those words with honest intentions.

I am not sure what the relevance of the question is. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, Kant said "ought implies can". If this is correct then one cannot be obligated to do what one cannot do. But one can promise to do what one believes one can do, even if in fact one cannot do it. Therefore, one can promise to do what one cannot do. Therefore, promises do not entail obligations.

Can I be obligated to do something that I am incapable of doing?

And they all just baselessly assert "promises are more than just intentions". There's no justification for this assertion, or an explanation of what else there is.

You say "it is also false because he has not bound himself". But what does "bound himself" even mean? It's just more vacuous phrases.

The thread is filled obvious refutations of all of these bizarre ideas. — Leontiskos

No it isn't. There is just the bare assertion that if I sincerely use the phrase "I promise to find your cat" then I am obligated to find your cat, without any explanation of what "I am obligated" means. And when I ask what "I am obligated" means I am not given an explanation but am instead given different examples of things that I am said to be obligated to do.

And it's all nonsense.

There's just me using a certain verb, intending to find your cat, possibly looking for your cat, possibly finding your cat, and possibly being told off if I don't. This simple, straightforward, parsimonious description of what actually happens (or doesn't happen) provides an exhaustive account of the reality of the situation, without the need for nebulous, abstract entities.

This is all just meaningless word games, like when I asked you to explain the difference between "he is more likely to fulfil his obligations" and "he is more likely to complete the contract".

So I stand by what I have previously said. A sentence like "you ought not do this" is just a command (or, as someone else mentioned, advice) that is fictitiously phrased as if it were a truth-apt proposition. Any attempts so far to show otherwise have amounted to nothing more than the bare assertion that "obligations exist".

I can only take the unwillingness of anyone to actually make sense of obligations as evidence that Anscombe was right.

You're missing the word "wrong" at the very end of your sentence. — Leontiskos

Criminals have punished witnesses who testified against them in court. Was it wrong of the witnesses to testify against the criminal in court? What does "wrong" even mean?

As I've said, taking away something you value is not punishment. If it was then the thief who stole your car has necessarily punished you. — Leontiskos

It's a punishment because it was done in response to something I did. If the thief stole my car because I insulted him then it could be construed as punishment.

And by "punished" you presumably do not mean what every dictionary in the world says, because then we would be right back to the equivocation on "penalty." — Leontiskos

I mean that I will be put in prison or executed. It's right there in the text of the law.

Let's take 18 U.S. Code § 1111 - Murder as an example.

It starts by explaining what counts as murder:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.

Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

It then describes how anyone found guilty of murder is to be punished:

Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,

Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life;

Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

Nothing in here implies or entails or requires anything else, e.g. "obligations", whatever they are.

It is just the case that if you murder then you will be executed or imprisoned. There is no need to imagine phantom abstract entities.

Michael will sooner deny every form of future accountability rather than abandon his strange [dogmatic] position. — Leontiskos

I don't deny future accountability. I have repeatedly said that if I don't do as I'm told, whether it be by some authority figure or by the terms of a contract, then I will be penalised.

You are the one claiming that there is some additional thing involved – the "obligation" – which you refuse to make sense of.

A contract establishes an obligation, and therefore someone who is more likely to fulfill his obligations is more likely to fulfill his contracts. — Leontiskos

A contract tells the party what he is to do, and therefore someone who does what the contract tells him to do is more likely to fulfil his contracts.

So, again, how is my phrasing different from yours?

Like Count Timothy von Icarus, you're not explaining what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all. As it stands, what they are hasn't been explained, what purpose they serve hasn't been explained, and what evidence there is for them hasn't been explained.

They just seem to be meaningless and superfluous.

Again, you're not telling me what obligations are. You're just insisting that they exist. That's no explanation at all.

So I'll try to make this very simple. Please explain to me the difference between these two propositions:

1. According to the law I have an obligation to pay income tax
2. The legislature has passed a bill that says that I am to pay income tax

I can't tell what you mean by obligations being "incoherent." I presume that when your mechanic finishes working on your car and hands you receipt stating that you are obligated to pay him some amount you don't stand in front of him dumbfounded, unsure of what is being said to you, nor that your annual tax bill provokes complete puzzlement. — Count Timothy von Icarus

He fixes my car in exchange for money. It's a trade we agree to. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

And obligations are clearly not the same thing as all imperative statements. "Watch out, those stairs are icy," is an imperative statement with no obligation. — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is "do this" as a command and there is "do this" as advice. Something like "brush your teeth" can be one or the other depending on whether it's your mother telling you or your dentist. What additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

The terms of a loan, by contrast, will speak about obligations.

They can speak of whatever they want; it doesn't then follow that there are such things.

Loans are simple; the bank gives me money and I pay them back with interest, else I will be prosecuted. So what additional thing is this "obligation", and what further purpose does it serve?

So I assume you mean something like: "there is no reason why people should honor obligations outside of individual preferences," or something to that effect. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I mean exactly what I have said very clearly. Here are two sentences:

1. You have an obligation to do this
2. Do this

I cannot understand (1) except as (2) treated as if it were a truth-apt proposition.

If (1) means something else, or something more, then please tell me. Nobody is ever explaining this. Whenever I ask someone to explain what an obligation is I am only ever told "obligations exist" or "you have an obligation to do this". Why is that? I suspect it's because Anscombe is correct; it's a word with force but no substance.

Yes, but the naturalistic frame begs some sort of explanation for obligations, not claiming they "don't exist," which is clearly not the case. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Why is it clearly not the case? Because we use the sentence "you ought not kill"? I think it's far simpler to just interpret this as the phrase "don't kill". You haven't actually explained what makes the former any different, you just reassert the claim that we ought (not) do things.

It wouldn't make sense to say "Babe Ruth was good as baseball," has no truth value. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said that. I haven't mentioned anything about success at hitting a ball at all. I've only questioned the coherence of obligations.

Nor would it make sense to say "in chess the bishop can change what color square it is on," simply because it is physically possible for a player to violate the rules of chess and switch their bishop onto a new color with an illegal move. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I haven't said anything to suggest otherwise. The rules tell you not to move the bishop to another colour. If you do then your opponent tells you to move it back, and then either you do or he declares victory.

As for the "if... then" phrasing, this is just confusing things. In natural language if/then stands in for all sorts of entailment and implication, e.g. material, casual, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

How is "if you are playing chess then don't move the bishop onto another colour" more problematic than "if you are playing chess then you ought not move the bishop onto another colour"?

Hence why I cannot make sense of obligations (if something other than a command fictitiously phrased as a truth-apt proposition). I understand being told to do something, I understand either doing as I'm told or not, and I understand being punished if I don't do as I'm told. But that's it. I don't understand what else there can possibly be, or why something else is necessary, or what evidence there is of something else.

I mentioned Anscombe before, and so I'll quote more from her:

This word 'ought', having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could not, in the character of having that force, be inferred from anything whatever. It may be objected that it could be inferred from other "moral ought" sentences: but that cannot be true. The appearance that this is so is produced by the fact that we say "All men are φ" and "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is φ." But here "φ" is a dummy predicate. We mean that if you substitute a real predicate for "φ" the implication is valid. A real predicate is required; not just a word containing no intelligible thought: a word retaining the suggestion of force, and apt to have a strong psychological effect, but which no longer signifies a real concept.