@Joshs@Ludwig V

Sec. 13 Personal experience and skepticism (p. 45-48]

At a certain point in the next section (“It seems to us… p. 47 ), he lands on the question of whether it is possible for a machine to think, and he submits that it is “not really that we don’t yet know”, because the question is mistakenly framed from our desire for personal experience to be “the very basis of all that we say with any sense about [being a human]” (p. 48). He also says we are “tempted to say that these personal experiences are the material of which reality consists.” (p. 45)

Of course Descartes will want to rely on our certainty in ourselves to justify the world, but, with Wittgenstein’s ordering, we seem to put ourselves first, perhaps out of self-preservation; that if anything needs to be certain, it’s “me”, even as a product of our doubt about others. “There is a temptation for me to say that only my own experience is real: ‘I know that I see, hear, feel pains, etc., but not that anyone else does. I can't know this, because I am I and they are they.’” (p. 46)

Ironically, our confidence in our personal experience leaves us without a shared world, only “a lot of separate personal experiences of different individuals”, which gives us a sense of “general uncertainty” (radical skepticism), and a belief that we need a “firm hold”, e.g., “How could I even have come by the idea of another's experience if there is no possibility of any evidence for it?” (My emphasis) I take this desire for “reliability, and solidity” to be the motivation for a (certain) solution to this “problem”, analogous to an object or biological mechanism.

If we are right to say we have been looking for a why to our forcing the analogy of objects, this seems to be the start of an answer.

I have the impression that these writing do not pay attention to the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. That allows the argument that there must be certain processes going on that we are not aware of - i.e. unconscious processes. — Ludwig V

I don’t take this work as an argument for a conclusion, such as that there are no processes of the brain of which we are not conscious. He implicitly acknowledges (p.6) that our brain is, of course, unconsciously doing all the things it does do (remembering, focusing, deciding, using language) while we are thinking or understanding. But I take him to be examining thinking, understanding, and meaning because these are examples that are just not independent mental mechanisms of the brain (but activities we work through; judgments we come to). The point of drawing out how they work is not to prove that (or prove that there are no unconscious brain processes), but to learn why we nevertheless want to force that framework on them, why we want to require the issue be a problem.

Similarly, his consideration of the possibility of a private language in the PI is superficially taken as just an argument against it (that the point, elsewhere, is that there are simply no “beetles” in us). As here, I take that section as an investigation of why we would want a private language (and that he finds reasons).

@Joshs @Ludwig V

Sec. 12 Expression and its accompaniments—memory, judgment, thinking (p. 40-43)

the experience of thinking may just be the experience of saying, or may consist of this experience plus others which accompany it. — After “Let us sum up”, p. 43

And so we are adding layers back in, and I think we’re left to contemplate rather than being told, what “others”? Obviously we do many things along with saying things (Austin would even say “in” saying them), and it is just a matter of not getting caught in the old traps while looking into them.

At p. 40 I take him to be differentiating my “expression”, in the sense of “by me”, from me describing a mental object that I have. The analogous “tune”, which he divorces from the mechanism of the phonograph, is from the world (before us) and is not “kept, stored, before we express it”. We perform the tune, as we go. Now beforehand, or when that retelling is interrupted, we may search our memory, but not necessarily, as we may just start off (or continue).

We might exhibit pain or describe a vision because these are actual—though not necessarily unique—physical states. But I would venture that expecting is just the label for a judgment we make from the evidence of our response to anticipation (fear of the past, in the case of a gunshot). The answer to: “Why are you tense, steadying yourself, holding your breath?” is not: “I have an expectation.”

As well, I see “groping for a word” not as putting a word to something “already expressed” internally (p. 41), but as an activity (though perhaps just passive waiting). In this sense, the expression is only in having found the word, in the saying of it (to you or myself).

I see his use of “expression” as meant to capture the event of that initial introduction of a thought, hope, or wish to the world, to, as he says, “existence” (p. 40), without the need for any “independent” process or thing in a “peculiar medium” (p. 43). The “sentence” is “reality”. (p. 37, 41)

This, of course, doesn't mean that we have shown that peculiar acts of consciousness do not accompany the expressions of our thoughts! Only we no longer say that they must accompany them. — p. 42

(The power of this “must” I take as very important to why all the forced analogies and “fixed standards” (p.43), but so far he only goes so far as to blame our forms of speech—not yet seeing the need driving it).

I think it is worth noting that he wants to add back in a sense of “private” thinking and experiences, as I take all this here (and in the PI) to be for much more than just a conclusion about “private language”. Here he acknowledges certain senses of privacy, such as being hidden from others, like a secret we tell to ourselves in an aside; as we could reveal (and thus hide) the “muscular, visual, tactile sensations” of my body, in the sense of bringing attention to (like admitting) the fact that I have them.

His method allows us perspective on thinking as the assumption that we just speak our “thoughts” (not in the sense of voicing our inner dialogue), by asking “what do we say if we have no thought?” and then pointing out the sense of speaking thoughtlessly as simply not considering beforehand the consequences of saying something in a particular context.

Next, personal experiences, I think.

There's an interplay between what we are aware of, what W calls a mechanism of the mind - I think of it as the unconscious. — Ludwig V

I take his point to be that we create the idea of a mechanism. We try to internalize the processes of thinking, understanding, and meaning to imagine we control what the words that we say do (or do not) mean, as if we could avoid the responsibility to make ourselves understood, or not have to answer for what we say.

And the “unconscious” aspect of meaning I would offer is that words have a history and are subject to circumstances, which are either so pedestrian that they operate without our doing (being conscious of) anything, or that at times their possibilities of meaning outstrip our ability to encompass and/or control (be conscious of) how they will come off in a particular (even novel) context.

But it seems odd to say that understanding is not "present" during communication. — Ludwig V

I believe he would say that understanding is not a quality or thing—that is present or not; it is that picture/analogy which leads to the feeling of oddness. I think understanding is more appropriately thought of as a process (not a mental mechanism, but: clarification, explication, distinction, etc.) I only mentioned the “after” version, but of course there is the “before” process as well; e.g., “Tell me your understanding?” or: trying to understand.

Yes, there can be a multiplicity of meaning and complexity “in” communication (the wording here is also misleading), but we are only aware of the need to explain or clarify before or after the expression. Sometimes there is no “understanding”; we don’t speak of it when I ask you to pass the salt, as you say, “trading on shared assumptions and attitudes.”

@Joshs

Sec 11 Our words’ connection to the world (p. 35-39)

The sentence itself can do the work of the shadow, and so no shadow is needed. We can explain what the sentence means, perhaps, by an ostensive definition. That’s how words and things can be connected. — Ludwig V

Nice work; my thoughts are along the same lines. He is showing us examples** of how we can correct the connection of word and world, as you say, by ostensive definition, or, alternatively, by explanation, demonstration, being an example, by force, etc., but words and the world don’t (usually) need to be (re-)connected because, by default, they just are connected (as you say, “no shadow is needed”). “…the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence and “reality” loses all point” (p.37) [my quote marks]. In the PI he will talk of this as there being no space “to get between pain and its expression”. (#245)

Philosophy imagines we make that connection every time (say, to “our understanding”). But there are events (in time, place) where “language” and the world actually do have a disconnect (along our criteria for judgment), but philosophy interprets the sheer possibility of disconnection, and the difficulty of reconnecting, as if the “problem” is in the activity of (always) connecting which is then just a puzzle to “know”, like a “a queer mechanism” (cue some neuroscience).

But in practice we fall back on the many separate ways we have for straightening things out. Philosophy needs to be shown any of these examples of means of reconnection—shown that language and the world “can be” reconnected—to realize the exception means that the word and world are not always mitigated by some object like “perception” or data, or other “shadow” But it then also follows that there is no “object” for there to be a “fact” of it to communicate. There are not certain, fixed, ever-present objects, as if part of “me”, like, “my understanding”, that I simply put into words.

The best juxtaposition is the difference between “…a thing I am thinking about, not 'that [thing] which I am thinking'.” (P.38) In the first, we are perhaps in a discussion (with ourselves even) considering, remarking on, analyzing, etc. a thing/object. Thinking in the second case is just the description of a thing/object which I have, “my thought”, which I take as a fact (as complete and without any need for context). But, like with the Napoleon example, there is no singular fact that is a certain, unique criteria (there, for identification).

Most importantly, understanding is not “present” during communication. Understanding happens after expression, in coming back to it, e.g., when you have demonstrated that you haven’t understood how to do something, or how to continue a series as expected, or that your expression makes it clear that you do not understand what I was trying to say (apart from disagreeing, etc.). We mostly say things that have already been said in situations similar enough to ours that it doesn’t need more elaboration (mostly). This public nature of language is because it is a record of our history, that “The connection between these words and [the world] was, perhaps, made at another time.” (P. 39)


**Sometimes I feel like his examples here are just terrible. I mean is it just me or waaaaay too unnecessarily esoteric for the point he is trying to make, except that he seems to feel he needs to chase the rabbit all the way down the hole to cover as many senses/analogies in which philosophy might frame our thinking as objects, etc.

I've got a bit confused about where we are — Ludwig V

I had already written something up on the section about intention and meaning (which I posted above). I had assumed you were going to pick up the question again on what I have as page 35 with “let us revert to our question” which looks like it goes to page 40.

But, feel free to offer a reading of page 32 to 35 of course as well.

It does rather raise questions about what it means to say that something exists, since the broken or toy watch does, nonetheless, exist - it's just that the description "watch" doesn't apply. — Ludwig V

Yes it doesn’t mean metaphysical “existence”, but I don’t think we should trivialize what it does mean, even in the sense of not being here. Before a watch is put together, it is just watch parts. But it is, decidedly, not a watch. Broken, it is not a watch, it is a broken watch. Now if, in this example, we are simply applying a description (which I don’t know how to take other than as pointing something out), as if labeling it broken is ancillary to it still being a watch, then perhaps we are referring to it as a watch for another reason, perhaps in differentiating it from a clock.

I take it as a re-figuring, but still about what is fundamental, essential, without being metaphysical—what we find essential—for example, about, say, a chair. If it doesn’t have a back, it is not a chair; it does not exist as a chair, which has the meaning, or affect that, if you call it a chair, I am right to correct you in pointing out it is a stool (however didactic that is; however lazy we allow ourselves to be). As well, if you don’t know to (know how to) differentiate sleet from snow, sleet does not exist for you in the world.

The reason I think the private language argument (as with the argument here) is hard to accept is when it is only seen as the negation of mental objects (which here we realize is the analogizing of the framework of “objects”) as it will seem to ignore (he says “deny”): me, thought, meaning, experience; instead of ending with something positive, about what it says about me thinking (through something), me meaning (having a point in saying something), me as someone who can experience something (of note, even unique). This is why he is seen as a negative philosopher. He went straight at tearing done the house of cards and is never seen as building it back up from the rubble that still remained, I would say because he turns to why we (he did) fight so hard against it.

Again, good work; I’ll wait for your continuation of the reading.

@Ludwig V

Sec 10 Intending and Meaning (pp. 32-34)

“To intend a picture to be the portrait of so-and-so (on the part of the painter, e.g.) is neither a particular state of mind nor a particular mental process.” (P.32)

This harkens back to looking at understanding or thinking as a “queer mechanism” (p.3) that happens in the brain. We decided this was an “answer” to what was turned into a “problem” in trying to head off misunderstanding, instead of seeing it as an ongoing situation to understand someone. To imagine intention as a mechanism of the brain seems to mean it is always present, as if it would serve a purpose, such as causality (for action perhaps). But if we use the method, as before, of making the process external, public, as in the case of copying, it turns out the judgment of whether we are copying is based on a number of possible criteria, and we may be judged to have copied something even when we set out [intended] not to, as in “It looks like you copied that.” “Oh, I wasn’t trying [intending] to.” So he concludes that a process, i.e., an action, “can never be the intention itself.” (P.33) Thus we can conclude there is no agent (needed) that intends, as there was not one for thinking.

“…consider what it is that really happens when we say a thing and mean what we say.” (P.34)

He says he wants to take apart the picture of a process accompanying or “run[ning] alongside these words”, as if there is a mechanism to “mean the arrow one way or another”; as if “We mean (our internal object)”. But he points out that to mean what we say is actually a matter of tone and feeling, “expression”. I would also offer that when we claim we mean what we say, we are committed to it, to the consequences; we are making a promise not to go back on having said it.

I take the purpose of the examples to be to show that we don’t “mean” or “intend” what we say “as a rule”, i.e., with everything we say, so it is not a mechanism or process, and so not a part of speaking or the way language works or the determination of what matters in something being said.

@Joshs

Sec 9 Non-existence and Statements without Facts (pp. 30-32)

I shall cover what might be seen as the first phase, — Ludwig V

Thanks for cracking this, well done; I was at a loss (and maybe still am) as to why we imagine a difficulty in picturing what is not. Obviously he points out that part of the difficulty is because of the forced analogy of thought as an object, but I take the confusion that follows to be that: if we are thinking of the absence of something, then how can there be an object that is (not) the thought.

I wanted to offer that Wittgenstein says that imagining it is "easy" perhaps because of the form of the question (not that the answering of it is). Asking "How can one...?" (p. 30, 1965 Harper's Ed.) “beautifully” plays right into his method of drawing out the means for doing a practice—its workings, how we can…. i.e., the “grammar” of thinking, facts, and "existing", etc. He looks at different cases to see that there is not only one way these each work (there are different usages/options/senses, with different possibilities, also qualified by the situation and interest).

If a watch is seen to "exist" because, say, it is completely put together, or functioning, then we might let go of identification by correspondence with an internal object, like an “idea” or visual “sense-data”, and realize it is just meeting the criteria of what is important to us (society) about a watch (tells time; is small, portable, operates by a vibrating mainspring compared to a clock, etc.)

The feeling of “difficulty” in first identifying red I would think comes from the desire to identify color by equating that color, as a “quality”, with an internal “object” of our vision, say, an “appearance” as part of “perception”, from which philosophy would ask: “how could we have that object of red before encountering it?” But I take it the way color works (it’s grammar) is like a pain (PI #235]; it is the “same” for us to the extent we align in a particular case, e.g., “What color would you say that is?” “Red”. “Well, isn’t it more of a rose color.” “Maybe, but all the client cares about is that it’s not blue.” “Yeah right, okay.”

In saying “it is not the fact we think”, I would offer that he is showing that, though something is a fact, like a house is on fire, its “fact-ness” is not an object (of thought, always there), because its expression may not be used as a fact; we are not (necessarily) making the point that, “it is a fact that the house is on fire” (unless of course there is the need for confirmation, some doubt, etc.). The statement might just be to raise alarm, as an expression of realization, shock, etc.

I am at a bit of a loss on the “shadow fact”, but I imagine it plays the same role as “appearance” or “impression”; inserted in between the ordinary process of vision and identification, etc. in order to mitigate all our statements in order to explain (and control) the possibility of error.

@Joshs @Ludwig V

Sec 8 Purpose of Possibilities and Grammar (pp. 28-30)

His hope in pointing out multiple variations of “know” or “longing” (p. 29) is that being aware of “[an]other possibility of expression” (p. 28) would break the hold of projecting the expectations from an analogy.

In their being different possibilities in an expression, we may pick a form of expression to “stress” one part, to bring attention to looking at it a certain way, but he also says we may not even care (don’t always decide, pick), and that mostly we express ourselves along “deeply-rooted tendencies” (p. 30). I wouldn’t say these are necessarily personal tendencies, so much as habitual, conforming to culture, our common phrasings (for a context). I do find it interesting that our form of expression “betrays” us, as if it reveals more than we might want, that others can see more of us in what we express (not meant as just non-verbally).

He spends a minute talking about the nature of a “grammatical” statement. In doing so he says questioning our certainty about what we wish makes “no sense”. I think it is important that this is not in the sense of foolish or absurd, but that there is no context in which we would ask about knowledge because of the way we judge wishing, i.e., what is important to us about wishing is not justification for it, say, against doubt (of course there are the senses of “Are you sure that it is this you wish?” where we are asking for clarity about “this” or whether they have considered the consequences).

I think the importance of the grammatical statement for Wittgenstein will need more work (and text) to draw out, nevertheless, I think saying he is just trying to find a substitute for rules (to enforce), or is simply justifying how our practices work, is to miss the point, which I would preliminarily take, here, as something like being “aware” of our desire to overlay a framework (like knowledge) where it does not belong. In this sense we should think of their claim to be grammatical (provisionally, for us to concur with of course) as just the fact of the matter, e.g. rooms have length (as he looks at “facts of nature” p. 230), and moving on to it being evidence for other purposes, such as highlighting what is important to us (and not) about a practice (PI #143).

I am tempted to skip the discussion “what is not the case” and shadows, etc., and move to the mention of “intention” on p. 32, but if anyone else wants to take up or comment on that section, please do (as anyone can lead the charge at any time).

I've always been a bit puzzled why he didn't take the obvious step from forms or life to historicism, relativism, or even perhaps naturalism. — Ludwig V

This seems to assume this is about justification, and not an investigation of other examples to see why we insist on certain prerequisites (and what we miss in requiring them), instead of just taking them as just different answers to the same issue.

In my book, culture and history come back to people, so, while I wouldn't disagree with you, I don't feel that there's a significant difference between us. — Ludwig V

I only wanted to head off the presumption that this was about individuals, and not a matter, as you say, of our (people’s) culture (our language) coming before us.

@Joshs

I think that there is another motive at work here - the desire to find something surprising and interesting to say, the need to emerge from one's library with a trophy from all those explorations. — Ludwig V

Fair point; after “problematizing” discrepancies (as described early on), we want to find the answer, and not just come to people and say, “Look, it’s more nuanced than we thought”, even if the “answer” is way more complicated, maybe even because it is, and then philosophers can know better than everyone else, be clever.

But we learn to speak a language that already exists, from people who did not invent it…. "A word has the meaning someone has given it." is a misleading way of putting this. — Ludwig V

Absolutely agree; it is very hard to slip out of the picture of “the meaning that I have” that I then (each time) “give” in language, that you then “interpret”, and then your “understanding” may (or may not) equate with “my meaning”—all pictured as “objects”. And, when I saw this part, I immediately thought the “someone” in this situation should be our culture, or the whole of human history, which would be the “us” or “we” like, humanity, from which meaning is not given independently. And an investigation I think can be rigorous like science, but just careful not to assume that, if a tidy definition does not fit, the process is to find what it “really” means—the “exact” use—as when we postulate “appearance” so we can look behind it for a solution, in “unheard-of ways” PI #113.

I did snag on the thought that, basically, we may not be “ready” to give an explanation, which I take to mean we can but we are not always prepared (without reflection, looking at cases), or it is not always necessary (as when we rely on habit when picking flowers), and not that there are things we can’t get into, draw out, intelligibly discuss, such as…

If ethical desire can transcend historical contingency, then perhaps this is why for Witt other kinds of desires as well (desire for certainty, generality, completeness) are not simply ‘what we do’ in the historical sense of contingent discursive practices, but confused expressions of a transcendent feeling. — Joshs

Yes I think he is claiming the confused (metaphysical, theoretical) expressions (driven by a forced analogy) come from a desire, but maybe the desire to transcend is the same as or comes from the desire for, let’s call it, exactness, so it would be to take an ethical situation and abstract from it (transcend it) in order to “solve” it as a (theoretical) “problem” to try to, for example, ensure (justify) agreement rather then accepting that rational disagreement is part of the way ethics works/can end up.

All that to say, we have a sense of what the desire is for, but maybe not yet why we have it, but I think leaving it as a “feeling” is to jump to a conclusion for which we are, as yet, not “ready” (as stated above), and not that we can’t dig into it (that we are only left with the irrational, unintelligible, but not as opposed to, or included in, the theoretical). Based on my story above of how we get to where we want an exact definition (in framing it as “what really is…?), perhaps it is a matter of control, and so anxiety (of being wrong, being judged).

I do believe we have as yet scratched the surface, but that he may not (does not) here explicitly ever get past how we do it and what it is for (its goal)—not that extrapolation is not possible—but I think that next step of why, and the conclusions from that, is leftover and the driving force of the second half of the Investigations, so I will try to keep my comments to the matter (text) at hand, as that is handful enough.

@Ludwig V @Joshs

Sec 7 Puzzling Rules (pp. 25-28)

“…the puzzles which [philosophers] try to remove always spring from this attitude towards language [compar[ing] our use of words with one following exact rules]”. (p. 26) — Witt.

If philosophy’s puzzles “spring” from this desire for exactness, that makes its own expectation the creator of the issues it thinks it sees in the world and wants to solve. I don’t think we yet have a good sense of why it has this desire, but perhaps it helps to listen when he says “We are unable to circumscribe… concepts….” (p. 25), as if we wanted to, but cannot, draw a limit around them that is complete enough, covering or predicting all possible outcomes (and here “concept” is a practice, like identifying or following a rule).

If we are starting from “unclarity” and “mental discomfort”, perhaps we thought (assumed) we knew a thing, and then there was something that happened which made us stop and say “Hmmmm, what is time?” And if we then want to define it in a way to have something definite that will circumscribe all cases, perhaps the “something that happened” was unexpected, unpredictable, surprising, e.g., turns out we were wrong when we thought we were right (where Descartes starts in the 1st Meditations). So then we will want the (form of) answer to be able to never be wrong again.

Now it is ironic that he wants to clear up the puzzle created by trying to define what is measuring time by first wanting to apparently define “measure”, but his method is to look closer at how measuring works, and in multiple different cases, because he realizes that our concepts have “different usages”, as in options and possibilities (that cannot be circumscribed, and may even be “contradictions”).

Previously we saw the framework for objects was forced onto trying to understand feelings because of the desire for a similar direct connection (like when we see/know objects). He called this an “analogy” and here says that “forms of expression” exert a force that “fascinates” us (“the analogy between two similar forms of expression in our language”). I take this as the germ of how people think the PI is just about “language” creating problems. But it is the instinctive need for “consisten[cy]” (p. 27], generality, that forces us to apply something analogously across multiple or all cases. We choose a framework of sense that fits our desire for strictness, but we analogize it because that leverages our craving for simplicity to fill in the blanks of the disparate parts between the two cases with the likes of “sense data”, “appearance”, “reality”, “mind”, “forms”, or telling time using a tape measure.

I thought… that Wittgenstein turns this conventional rock bottom into something real, almost foundational. — Ludwig V

But this doesn’t square with framing it as distinctly not foundational (“loose”, “conventional”, “only co-ordinates… with”, being “unable to answer” what is the defining criteria), despite the desire to know (for sure); and so the (philosophical) point is about the (inappropriate, out-of-context, ad hoc) desire, “particular purpose” (next, for strict rules).

You adopt a possible interpretation of "coincide", but I'm not convinced that it is valid in this context. — Ludwig V

I thought it was interesting (clever?) because philosophers see “always coinciding” and think either: here is a “form of life” that justifies the knowledge! or think: it is uncertain because the “always” could have until now been a coincidence! My point perhaps not being “validity” but just to shed light on the unrelenting nature of the desire for this to be a matter of knowledge (that mere accord wouldn’t stop anyway).

this as a rehearsal of the sceptical attack on, in this case, other minds. — Ludwig V

Yes, and clearly he is not where he gets to in the PI—that the issue is not a matter of knowledge (but treating the other as a person in pain, or not)—but he is honest enough at this point to leave it that: if we wanted a bottom of “rock”-like justification, we are only left with “this is how things are usually done” (a sense of convention).

And, seemingly in response to this, you say “The problem remains... [unresolved]” But, as he discussed previously, “Our problem [what is difficult to understand about thinking]… was… a muddle felt as a [scientific] problem.” P. 6, which I get into here. We formulate someone’s pain as a “problem” because we want it to be an object, so that it will have an “answer” we can know (here, so we don’t have to address the person). But, as you say, my main concern here is just to follow the process of his thought.

the specter of skepticism remains, — Joshs

Yes, though not that it is always about grounding, and here just not determined somehow. In this toothache example there is a desire for knowledge (certainty) in a situation where it has no place (I would say driven by our fear of the other, in our limitation to judge them). The comparison shows that our shared interests (criteria) are overlooked, rejected, and replaced because we want to define the relation (to deny our human fallibility).

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner @Shawn @Luke

I’m tagging those who participated (or had any interest) in this thread previously, though I won’t going forward without further participation. I am going to try to finish going through the Blue Book (even if just for myself). I was daunted by the upcoming investigation of the example of the “owner” of a toothache (which I preliminarily take as examining the desire to identify the self metaphysically). Nevertheless…

Sec 6 Coinciding Criteria (pp. 24-25)

First, another note on his method. When he asks “what do we call ‘getting to know’” (p.24), by “call” he means what “counts as” or matters in determining, in this case, that we “know”. He uses the term “criteria” for what matters and counts in getting to it (for judging we have). Now these judgments are not like decisions, because we normally just employ them (unreflectively) as part of the practices we learn (when not examining them philosophically).

Also, all of this is just trying to draw the text out more, and so stated speculatively and provisionally (strongly held loose opinions)—open to clarification and correction of course.

But when he says our judgments (“A has a toothache”) have “always coincided” with our criteria for them (the “red patch”) it seems to open a can of (skeptical) worms, i.e., like it is a coincidence (that could disconnect at any moment). But I take it to be the sense of “coincide” that they “correspond in nature”; or, “are in accord” (Merriam-Webster) So when the skeptic keeps asking their foundational questions (past even the traditional argument for other minds), there is a point where we are “at a loss” (prescient of PI #217). But what exactly are we at a loss to answer? Even the other’s report that they have a toothache is considered “conventional” (just “saying certain words”), and that is only because it is under the scrutiny of “How do you know…?”, and there are no criteria for knowing (for certain) if the other actually has a toothache (and is not just saying the words). I specifically do not take the point to be that other criteria do justify our claims about toothaches, nor that the correspondence or accord between our criteria and our judgments is “natural” or unbreakable.

The seemingly “arbitrary” (p. 25) nature as to which of our criteria are “defining” is not because of a “deplorable lack of clarity”, but because it is not something that is decided ahead of time for a particular purpose (ad hoc), such as, in this case, with the predetermined desire to know without any doubt. In each case we may highlight one criteria over another depending on our interest (or just arbitrarily), and that gets sorted out after, as we noted previously how reasons do (compared to motives). He will go on to say the biggest ad hoc desire philosophy has, is for “strict rules”, which comes next.

derp

I would think a marine might handle a bad situation very well — Athena

I realize now my examples played on generalizations (and perhaps stereotypes) and not in a necessarily favorable light so that was a mistake. Obviously not every marine (or grandmother) is going to react poorly when they are disrespected, even about their sense of self. I was just thinking of examples where offense might be taken other than those usually thought to be concerned about such things (who are more likely to be dismissed as without cause).

Adam Smith, the father of economics, assumed well-bred men function with a high degree of virtues, and could understand the need to do business with good ethics and good moral judgment. — Athena

I always think of Cicero’s assertion that it is not that others are swayed by a person adept at the tricks of speaking (as Plato warned), but that speaking well is a reflection of one’s character; that thinking, as it were, is an ethical practice (where Heidegger ultimately landed).

@Athena

Offense can be given in many ways—through direct insults, indirect or implied slights, a condescending tone or delivery, hurtful humor, acts of disrespect, deliberate provocation, or insensitivity to someone’s circumstances. — praxis

This is a good list of examples. I noticed that the dictionary divides between objects that offend (smoke, or the smell of fish) and just offending a rule or principle (without an object). I would say yours fall into the first category, although what is disrespectful is perhaps what is commonly accepted (or set) as a “rule”, as are manners, and thus “being rude” (humor of course being a slippery fish here).

What interests me is that the “object” in your examples is the act, identified as what it is without the speaker (though there is the individual to hold to account). We are all able (though some more astutely than others) to judge a slight, an insult, a tone, and what is inconsiderate or provocative behavior. Of course there are tricky cases, and the variables of circumstance, and mistakes (in judgment), but some will take this to the absurd that we can’t decide in any case, and begin to talk about “what I meant” as if it were tied to something inside them. But that is a desire to avoid (as you noted) our ongoing responsibility for (and to) what we say, which also creates the philosophical fantasy that one puts their meaning into words, and the rest is only interpretation and what we “read into them”, say, “take” offense at.

@Athena

I just wanted to make clear that, in my post here, I was only trying to point out what I take as the real problem and the responsible party, which, yes, was also to say that those wrongs have their own separate criteria for identification, and individual redresses, but I did not want to imply that what some call “being offended” is trivial or inconsequential.**

People say “how you feel is your choice”, but that is just biologically impossible (thus the dismissiveness), that is if we take it as if we should, say, choose not to feel anger. I take the point to be that you have (some, sometimes) control to not express your anger, as in: let it get the best of you, dictate your reaction, not hold your tongue, lose your cool, etc. Part of my point above was that we wouldn’t want our being offended to dictate our reaction, or serve as our justification, because, as I pointed out, the punishment should fit the crime. This cold deliberateness is why we hand over dispensing justice to the State—and also so we don’t have the (emotional) blood on our hands.

Nevertheless, I think many other states of being have been lumped together with “being offended” to make them all seem like an overreaction to simply, as it were, being slighted. Obviously, in taking offense, there is the sense of being shocked, affronted, annoyed, or displeased. And this implies that we merely resent our pleasure, comfort, or decorum being upset; that our feathers have simply been ruffled. Thus the pejorative implication that the insult may be simply “perceived”, and such mild reactions imply that the party offended are those that usually “can’t be bothered”, the privileged, the “status quo”, those “easily offended”, and so where is the real harm?

**But sometimes responses are categorized as “being offended” to minimize the offense, say, keep it on the level of a possible insult rather than, say, a personal crime. Acknowledging that we are responsible for our reactions, we are, again, not judging the emotion, say, deciding whether it is true outrage or self-righteousness. The judgment is of the bad act; the first responsibility is the bad actor’s. Being disrespectful or scornful may just be rude (at a dinner party), but it may be a much more serious matter, say, when it comes to someone’s sense of self (try to disrespect a marine, or an abuelita).

Is there a history of philosophers trying to prove each other wrong? — Athena

The most pointed attempt I know to “prove someone wrong” would be Austin’s reading of Ayer in “Sense and Sensibilia” which we read through here. But even there, Ayer is just a straw man of the argument for “sense data” that Austin uses to actually figure it out, not just prove Ayer “wrong”—it is actually fair and (somewhat) understanding. The most generous and in-depth reading that I know of (while still a complete reversal) has to be Wittgenstein’s examination in “Philosophical Investigations” of his own earlier positions. Austin is waaay more readable though (plus it’s only like 70 pages).

Is there a history of philosophers trying to prove each other wrong? — Athena

I think the entire history of philosophy is self-referential and defined against itself. Even someone seemingly unique like Descartes or Wittgenstein are working within and against an established framework. But I would specifically think of Kant and Hume, Marx and Hegel, Hobbes and Locke, and Ayers and Austin (and Austin/Derrida) as examples of direct conflict.

And I think here even there is too much focus on finding something “wrong” and dismissing what someone says, instead of working harder to understand, treating it as if there might be more to it than immediately registered.

I do not understand your post. Isn't what against the forum rules? — Athena

Using AI is either explicitly against the rules, or is simply frowned upon, for the same reasons as using a summary of a topic, such as Wikipedia. Original thought or primary texts are preferred (though this includes one philosopher reading another, like Heidegger on Nietzsche).

I also think @bongo fury was making a joke, in bringing you up short and then apologizing.

Edit: from the Guidelines:

“AI LLMs are not to be used to write posts either in full or in part (unless there is some obvious reason to do so, e.g. an LLM discussion thread where use is explicitly declared). Those suspected of breaking this rule will receive a warning and potentially a ban.

AI LLMs may be used to proofread pre-written posts, but if this results in you being suspected of using them to write posts, that is a risk you run. We recommend that you do not use them at all”

@Joshs @Wayfarer @frank @Ludwig V @Punshhh

Do you think we can discover something new by changing the perspective in this way? — Astorre

I think the opportunity is there. We might take a moment to investigate the specific differences of the individual cultural grammar apart from their relation to, say, in opposition to, the idea of “is” as essence (say, “fixed” vs “moving”). I feel like we may be skipping over that step to jump into a theoretical philosophical discussion that perhaps has more to do with its relation to “essence” than the grammatical/cultural independence. That we might be taking them as justification of something we’ve already decided, or want, or are forced into, rather than evidence of something we may not yet understand, something surprising, unthought before.

@Joshs @Astorre

Your chair, of course, is not a picture. One might point out that it is difficult to interpret it as anything else, so that case is different. As against that, who knows what puzzle pictures of a chair might be created? There is a not dissimilar issue, however, and that is the description under which we recognize it. It is a chair, but it is also furniture, carpentry, wood, a luxury and so forth. — Ludwig V

I take Wittgenstein’s use of the duck/rabbit picture specifically only for him to have a simple, uncluttered, obvious case (like the builders) to draw out how an “aspect” works (analogously as it were, and not literally to only this type of case), which is different than when we discuss “interpretation” as only between options, and perhaps only in certain cases, like in taking an action from the way we interpret something first. I do think your examples are aspects of a chair: as regarding its beauty, and then perhaps only in its relation to the room; and, separately, regarding it as an example of finesse in carpentry; but, also, as a frivolous expense—bourgeoisie; or, becoming aware of it’s possible place in dance choreography.

I realized it was important to see that these are not aspects of the chair (necessarily), but that, in perceiving an aspect, we are regarding the chair as…. Much as we might perceive someone writhing in pain on the ground as a drain on taxpayer’s dollars, or we perceive someone as having a soul (and thus treating them as if they do).

This is to point out that an aspect is not an essential, constitutional part of a chair. Wittgenstein’s modern “essence” of something is the criteria we would use to even consider it one. This also speaks to how we “recognize” it as one, which in this sense would be: (the means by which we judge) differentiating it from something else, say, what we might mistake it for.

For our current purposes, what comes to be important about something for society (forming the criteria for it), here, in the “Western” case, may be more “fixed” or identified with the thing it is said to “be”. “She is a lawyer” is perhaps to necessarily associate them, equate them, and so maybe limit them as only that. Whereas what is done with she:lawyer (which I have claimed may be only to point them out from others, i.e. that person**) is not to necessarily associate them with the kind of person we take lawyers to be. This is not to say that the grammar is actually determinative in this way (even if not as I claim hypothetically), though the strong correlation in the case of “is” framing the picture of “essence” as metaphysical (though whether chicken or egg came first), begs that question, even perhaps to be possibly researched further.

Mir ist kalt," which translates to "Me is cold," where "me" is the dativ case, as in "Give ME the book." This is far closer to "cold is upon me" than "I have cold." — Dawnstorm

**My understanding is that in English this dativ form only remains to point out (identify) the (indirect) object, such as “I gave them flowers”, but nowadays in English we would normally say “I gave flowers to them”.

Calling (some individual) someone out, as a function, is like pointing at them, then simply saying, “lawyer”, as an attribution. And maybe this is like perceiving someone as something, just an aspect of them rather than making it an essential part of their identification. As if we did not control all of Marx’s means of production of the other, so they would not have to answer for all other lawyers, judged as if it were also all of what they are (allowed to be).

Wanted to thread this back to the OP

seeing as aspect" is inherent in perception. …The duck-rabbit can be seen in two ways. But there is a third way, which is neutral between those intepretations and allows us to say that those two interpretations are interpretations of the same picture. I mean the description of the picture as a collection of marks on paper. — Ludwig V

I’m suggesting that to perceive something (about something) is (the same as) to become aware of an aspect of it, regard it as something, as evidenced by the fact that when we say we perceive something, we are pointing out an aspect of a thing. This would mean there is no need for something called “perception” that happens (like vision does), of which seeing aspects is “inherent”.

I’m not sure we would say that seeing the picture as marks on a page is an aspect of it (as it is so generally an aspect of any drawing), or maybe it is, as is our becoming aware of the truth of it, the trick of it, both together as you say. Also, I would think that sometimes a rose is just a rose. In other words, I’m not sure seeing a chair, even recognizing or identifying a chair, would count as perceiving an aspect of it; as if each time we regard it as a chair. I’m not sure whether @Astorre’s pointing out that some countries recognition of a thing’s “presence” is just as mundane as this, but, in contrast to equating a thing with something specific (with “is”), the difference in perspective at least points out that there is at times the occurrence of something surprising us (perhaps our letting a thing surprise us).

When we are offended, what is the best way to handle this — Athena

Thank you for making the effort to try to humanize this group of logicians. I would suggest not looking at it as handling your being offended, but that someone else has done something wrong, say, impugned your character, said something vulgar, etc., and that the appropriate response to each wrong may be different but would probably be specific based on the type of act, possibly also informed by the situation (demonstrated by recent suggested responses to newly-recognized ills). Deciding “what” your response will be based solely on your level of offense may leave you with just self-righteousness and being indignant instead of realizing that what is actually appropriate is an accusation, or reprimand, or refusal of that treatment, or being an ally, or calling HR. Just coming in hot also doesn’t really leave room for a mistake on your part, or the possible mitigating circumstances, excuses, acts of reconciliation, etc. that are baked into calling someone out.

I also believe there are appropriate virtues for philosophers: patience, open-mindedness, being more curious than rushing to judgment, being rigorous but fair, not generalizing, allow for disagreement but don’t find it first before acknowledging common ground, don’t take your annoyance with an issue out on anyone who seems to bring up something similar, don’t attack the weakest part of an argument, try to understand their terms and what interest they have in their point… pretty sure we’ve got these written down somewhere.

I’ll just reply to this via message. I apologize for the “theory” dig; I was just jealous you were being taken seriously I think. I do admit that, in being made to work so hard to explain what I was talking about, I didn’t take the time to address that a debate about ends is inevitable and has its place, and so probably came off as condescending or judgmental or dismissive (or unintelligible it turns out). I thought I turned it about, but the ship has sailed. I would just say publicly that I was not pitting an assumption of “rationality” against the individual, or the personal, or participants. I also don’t take Wittgenstein to be talking about justification or a system or basis of intelligibility (as if it were not an ongoing responsibility). Thus I was not assuming mutual understanding was assured (as if what I was saying was “right”, or simply “common sense”), but I was not assuming (immediate) disagreement. Thanks.

saying [someone with [lived experience] “should not” [have any decision-making authority] or are unimportant, is perhaps to say they do not or should not have value (in deciding), which flies in the face of considering how they might or do in this case if we imagine the board is considering adding lived experience as a criteria for appointment. ( — Antony Nickles

There is absolutely no basis to say the bolded without first giving a reason why, Nothing is valuable tout court. What is it valuable for? I can only surmise you want lived experience to be informative. About what??? — AmadeusD

I should have said “as we are imagining”, but I thought I made it clear that what the board wants was to add another member, and we were considering the criteria they would use, the traditional ones and what would be the criteria to judge how lived experience would have value for the board, how they would decide whether to choose the new member based on it.

Yep, but what you missed from my quote was "now" that I/we have addressed that squarely several times . I can't see why you would run the same stuff when it's been dealt with. — AmadeusD

Yes, you’ve been very generous. The question would be whether we learned anything about what lived experience is, what it applies to (maybe only certain kinds of situations), what not (in comparison to the value from the other criteria), the pitfalls (appearing discriminatory), its corruption (just image), etc. to make a judgment in this case (whether to add it as a criteria here, in this example, or as it might equally apply elsewhere, in other similar contexts). We didn’t get as far as I would have liked (still things to clarify to find out how/when/where/if lived experience is valuable), but I’ve been kinda browbeat on this (e.g. “You're focused on something utterly incoherent”). If this doesn’t help understand the value of the method, I haven’t done my job. I’m sorry if you didn’t get anything out of it, but I stilI appreciate your participation.

Lost my temper here.

My guess is that both of you do not think that moral error is possible (which includes ideological error), — Leontiskos

I feel like I should take issue with the presumption, but the question itself is too broad for me to answer. Nevertheless (stepping in front of the loaded question), what is an example of an error that is moral, say ideological? As, say, opposed to a political one, like dictatorship? which seems hard to call an “error”. Dewey (as I discuss here) will call intolerance a “treason” to democracy, which would cast one out of the polis, not be “wrong” or a mistake.

I am going to point out some of the grammatical problems first, because these seem to be present throughout. What does "it is" refer to? What does "these" refer to? It's hard to follow what you are saying. — Leontiskos

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible. — Antony Nickles

“It” being “the idea of one’s ‘experience’ as unique”, in that it also creates the idea of irrational as individual, emotional (relative to a person). And “these” would be: both these errors.

<We must move beyond fixed standard for knowledge and rationality — Leontiskos

I said, “to ignore… in only recognizing fixed standards”, and this would be preset (created) requirements, not “any standards”, and also in the sense of desiring them to be (as philosophy does) applied generically, uniformly, without any context (or across all). And, anticipating the next bit, I am specifically not talking about errors in logic or grammar I might make here, as it were, philosophically.

I still can't critique them because my critique involves a "fixed standard for [...] rationality." — Leontiskos

you aren't allowed to appeal to fixed standards — Leontiskos

And here, as I have said (quite a few times now), I am not trying to cut off argument or dismiss anyone (not saying “can’t critique” or “aren’t allowed”), only suggesting we find out if our (any) assumptions are getting in the way of seeing things clearly. I think the presumption here—which I am starting to take personally as an accusation based on my desire and repeated efforts to be intellectually forthright and honest (also admitting errors and my own assumptions)—is that I actually do have a position and am either trying to cut off all others philosophically (theoretically as it were), or I am merely being slippery, or trying to hide, which I mentioned above to @AmadeusD, would be the whole point of looking at actual criteria in a case: to investigate them together to sort them from our assumptions, which we all have, and are, categorically, unrealized. Isn’t this what anyone is against, being judged prematurely, say, based on an inappropriate standard?

I am, of course, abandoning that effort here in order to avoid cutting off discussion or appearing dismissive (of anyone), as has been pointed out. If we can get past the skepticism of my “intentions” or the presumption of my goal, I don’t mind discussing the philosophy.

But sometimes we [identify things], as one might say, unconsciously or unaware of the process. In these cases, it is a bit of a moot point whether we should really say "we" identify the specimen. It certainly isn't under our control, in the way that it is when we consciously identify something. — Ludwig V

I agree that how it is done absolutely depends on what you are identifying. And we don’t talk about it because (with most things) we are all trained, told, (but usually just) pick up, our practices (like identifying), but we (like philosophers) are able to stop and reflect on the ways we can tell one thing from another, or we all in any case can ask (and answer) “How are you identifying that Meadowlark? By its feet or wing markings?” Or even, how is identifying different than seeing or perceiving?

You seem to be thinking of witnessing as a preliminary step to the processes involved in perception — Ludwig V

No, I was specifically responding to @Punshhh’s bringing up the sense of mystical witnessing; I believe you’re thinking of the other use, like being a witness to a murder. There is the religious sense also of “bearing witness”, which, even if you couldn’t testify like at trial about the murder, Job and Arjuna could, as it is in this sense, be the testimony of having “felt” or “witnessed” “the power of” God.

Having said all that, there is a paradox inherent in the idea that perceiving something as the result of a process. How do we conceive of the first step in the process? — Ludwig V

Well these words all sound like they are the same thing, but I am thinking of perceiving in its sense of regarding something in a way (like a person as pitiable), or becoming aware of a new aspect of it, which will depend on the thing of course but also where we start with it, our education, our presumptions, etc., or, as Wittgenstein calls it, our “attitude” to it, our (dis)position in relation to it. “All of a sudden, I perceived her entirely differently…” I’m not sure if @Astorre would consider this similar at all to other conceptions of how things “are” (for us), apart from the equating of “is”.

(Philosophically, perception was treated like vision, but some personal version of everything we all had, though, as I said, I don’t really see it as relevant to our discussion here. Though it is the title of literally eight other discussions)

The Italians and Spanish in their use of "being" are able to distinguish between, as you say, a fundamental characteristic of a person's identity (Latin esse) and a person's temporary, transient mood (Latin stare). — RussellA

I wonder if this is similar to Wittgenstein’s seeing someone as something, seeing them as an “aspect”. This would not be essential, but also not temporary, as “He’s angry”, but “Be careful, he’s a grump.” And an important part of this is we are not just seeing them differently, but treating them as that, or switching our regard as we become aware of something else. “No, be kind to him, he’s in grief.”

Redo

@Leontiskos

I can't understand Antony's intention — AmadeusD

It was to try to offer a different way than just a philosophical framework which tends to overlook things based on the terms we bring to something.

if the other party doesn’t appear to agree with you, they must need to reevaluate their whole approach so let’s talk about that instead of whatever thing we both disagree with — Fire Ologist

I was literally not arguing; how can I “disagree”!? And 3/4 of this discussion is y’all and @Joshs bashing on about theories on how we approach things!

We do understand these things, and we do not need to reinvent the wheel. — AmadeusD

I did/do apologize for insinuating that anyone didn’t understand what they were talking about, or that I was trying to slander anyone’s judgment.

You have to make a proposition: Lived experience is a valuable aspect of a person's exploitable wisdom. — AmadeusD

And I will leave y’all to that, because I hadn’t even figured out: “valuable” how?

The veil of ignorance, I suspect, is at play…. I just think Antony is importing (maybe unconsciously) plenty of goals which he/they (others, not a gender joke) implicitly carry, without these base discussions. — AmadeusD

Now I get it. Y’all think I’m trying to sandbag you, or set a trap, etc. If anyone is bringing “implicit” “unconscious” goals—as like implicit premises—the idea would be to realize that, to get a chance to become aware of that, just like a logical error or a contradiction. My whole idea was to come at it open-minded and then figure out what the terms and stakes are. If I realize I have presumptions, prejudgments, a preconceived idea of “rational”, an axe to grind, etc., I could then separate what I am bringing from looking at what is the case here. Thus the idea of jointly brainstorming the criteria so that we keep each other honest to sort out the grounds, yes, on which we might actually (ultimately) disagree. If we assume disagreement, we’re just picking sides and fighting to see whose sword is sharper; I’m good.

If you're talking about how we decide on goals, that's really not what this thread or discussion are about. But it would explain the disconnect. — AmadeusD

I see; sorry I wasted your time with all this.

I think there is some ambiguity around the word perceived. — Punshhh

In philosophy, historically, it is taken as a technical term almost, where our identity is tied to the fantasy that we each (always) “perceive” uniquely (created from/with the idea of “appearance”), which opens a huge can of controversial worms, which I think we need not get into here.

I was thinking of it meaning something is noticed, — Punshhh

As I take “seeing” to be basically the same as noticing something—but not just as (immediate, ever present) vision. And maybe seeing is more about focusing on, pointing out, differentiating, etc. and to “perceive” is more seeing it as something. “Do you see that tree?” “The birch?” “No the pine” but then (so?/why?), “What about it?” “It’s beautiful.” “What? I don’t see (perceive) it’s beauty (see it as beautiful).” All that is to say, being present is perhaps to let, or wait for, more to strike us before we judge a thing to be what it is (by our ordinary criteria), as wording a thing is a kind of violence, closing that off.

In the example I gave the person witnessing the inconceivable is taken out of themselves, — Punshhh

This immediately made me think of Stanley Cavell’s discussion of Thoreau’s use of “ecstasy” in Senses of Walden (p. 100+) , as being “beside yourself”, as if we are two (some would speak of the “God in us”), different than (or beyond) self-consciousness (not just seeing ourselves, listening to our ego), but not as separable, but an activity (edit: or perhaps receptivity) between the two, as @Astorre says:

In Russian, being is present without fixation; in Kazakh, it becomes through a process ("болу"); and in Chinese, it manifests as a temporary presence (有) or the potential of emptiness (无), integrated into the flow of Dao — Astorre

@Astorre @frank @Wayfarer @Joshs

Don’t you mean perceived, rather than identified.
To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed, this does not require identification.
— Punshhh
If you don't identify the object you perceive, how do you know what you have witnessed? — Ludwig V

PI #371 Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. -Wittgenstein

We “identify” based on the criteria (even habitual, unaware) of a specific shared practice (the kind of object), which is different than vision, the biological mechanism. Identification also having to do with which aspect, what you are looking at (on the object) as evidence, and the other criteria for identification (perhaps particular to this kind/type of object), not to mention how “seeing/perceiving” itself works (not immediately, wholey), instead involving focus (where we are looking), that we are usually telling someone else what we see, etc.

So something is witnessed before the mind then processes the sensory information. — Punshhh

But isn’t the whole idea of witnessing that it is without an object? “To be perceived, something merely needs to be witnessed.” @Punshhh But we are not witnessing “something” (even less, some “thing”), and thus not even proceeding to “perceiving”, in terms of “seeing”, and so, far from identifying, right @Ludwig V? Thus the only criteria is “being present” (not, visually), being able to be present, which some would argue is a skill (being able to let go of the desire to identify or even see, much less word), or something we can become lost to. Which makes “awe” more than just a “feeling”, and the reason for the Leviathan’s and Vishnu’s appearance (beyond the embodiment in Krishna); in order to, in that sense, snap Job and Arjuna “out of it”, say, their desire for reasons. All that is to say that we do not witness, say, the mysterious, all the time, or automatically (as part of vision), and particularly not before we “see” something or identify it. However, now I (just) realize why people suggest “putting God first”, which is also not to say, “all the time”, but when we don’t know how to proceed (thus needing to “pray on it”), or to say, “be present”, letting go of, and so allowing more in, than your reasons and goals first (ego). Thus, as Heidegger suggests, in thinking, "Useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart, too"