Where would one place the notion of a "concept" with the above about "sense-data" in mind? — Shawn

Well that’s a pretty fuzzy word**, but if we are dealing with “feeling, hearing, seeing”, and so tangential to ‘meaning’, ‘understanding’, ‘thinking’, where ‘thought’ is considered like an object as well, then there is a traditional interpretation of ‘concept’ as an ‘idea’, then an ‘idea’ is in the same placeholder as ‘appearance’ or ‘representation’.

Witt uses the word ‘concept’ but it is an individually-defined term for him, which is just a grouping of activities and practices, like: pointing, or following a rule, or identifying pain, etc. So he will talk about the concept of playing a game, but he does not mean: the ‘idea’ of playing, but the criteria and steps etc. that fall under the umbrella of that activity.

**Idea could also be an image for, or speaking to, yourself.

@Banno @Sam26 @Paine @Ludwig V @Jamal @Manuel @Astrophel @Joshs @Kurt Keefner

Since sense data (what Witt takes as “feeling, hearing, seeing” p.1) is not a simple philosophy-101 idea, I feel I should offer a brief overview (outside the text, so without defense, to be taken or left).

The idea and framework come from something very old and fundamental in philosophy: skepticism.

For Descartes it came from doubt; in response he divided everything into reality and ‘representation’. “…the things which are represented to us in sleep are like painted representations which can only have been formed as the counterparts of something real and true…” (1st Med, p.7)

Plato pictured a “shadow” (Republic ln. 515) to save the possibility of something true in comparison.

Ayer’s idea of ‘perception’ is that the world always appears different (we read Austin's response here).

and Kant internalized into each of us the paranoia that ‘appearances’ “to every different eye, in respect of its colour, …may appear different.” (Crit. Of Pure Reason §§4).

‘Sense data’ is an amalgamation of all these constructions.

As mentioned, I am going to put together a reading of the first section that I will post after Nov 5.

It would seem as though the world could not be understood as philosophers would have wanted it to. If so, then where does one go from here? — Shawn

If we are to cure the urge for perfection—in this instance, as we will have to in other instances—then maybe we have to turn away from it, figuratively, say, from Plato’s sun, and take his shadows seriously, take his interlocutors as speaking truly. Emerson says if the world is surfaces (appearances), we should skate them well. Wittgenstein looks at our expressions to learn about the workings of each thing, because, he says, that shows what is essential about that practice/thing (PI, #371). This is not mathematical certainty, crystalline purity, nor universal, predictive, foundational, normative, etc., but it is precise, specific, rational, workable, flexible, extendable, capable of encapsulating error.

What I meant by “internal” logic was that each practice has a true/false kind of rationality that is based on its own criteria, and so not judged by a standard from outside it, but that its logic is self-referential, or “internal”. An apology has certain criteria by which we judge if it was done correctly (truly) or not (was false, as an apology). This is in the league of identity, as we judge a dog from a wolf, with there being a grey area in between, even as an apology can be incomplete, yet accepted (the ultimate means of judgment).

I don't think he thought of the Tractatus as entirely a mistaken work; but, certain elements of it, such as the picture theory of meaning, were not adequate to answer the questions that occupied Wittgensteins mind. — Shawn

I would not call the work in the Tractatus a waste. Of course we could call the picture theory a “mistake”, but I’m thinking more of the mistaken desire for purity that that theory, or any theory, would try to satisfy. If we call that a desire for pure (singular, universal) logic, then he does abandon that goal in the PI, however, the varied grammar he sees in each concept has its own internal logic, though not foundational, so he does continue a rigorous, precise, intelligibility in the PI.

Yes, although it would seem as though that the mechanics of what concepts are, are to this day a point in question. As I already stated, grammar seems to be the path to greater understanding rather than route logic which had been trying to solve as Wittgenstein sought out. — Shawn

You’d have to explain why there is a question of the mechanics of concepts, though I would say the criteria of how to judge, say, a correct apology, or distinguish between a mistake and an accident, are part of the fabric of our history and lives together. And I don’t think we can say that there isn’t a logic to those criteria, though not formal logic (I don’t know what would make it “route” logic). The point of the PI is that we don’t need pure formal logic to have a workable rational world.

Yet, I feel as though it was a work guided by sheer intelligence, to state what was said. — Shawn

He definitely pushed the experiment of the Tractatus—basically to only state what can be said with absolutely certainty—as far as he could, which demonstrated his intellect but also persistence to carry a line of thought all the way through, past where everyone else might rest on a first impression. Only such a thorough “mistake” (if we would even call it that) could lead to such a monumental revolution as the Investigations.

So, how can a concept stand for a word? This strikes me as pragmaticism. Is this really an implicit reference to pragmatism in the Philosophical Investigations? — Shawn

“Concept” for Wittgenstein is just a term for any practice: pointing, following a rule, noticing an aspect, seeing, understanding, apologizing, naming, knowing, etc. What he claims is that we can look at what we say and learn from that how we judge what it is. The “use” he is referring to of a word is the sense that it makes in a situation, what we would identify it as, when it is said, where, to whom (“I'm sorry” as an apology, an overture, a threat). That “I know” has multiply senses: “I know my way around” is judged differently than “I know your pain” than “I know what is best for this company”. “Use” is not how a word is wielded (as if we use words), like a tool, for its consequences, its practical outcomes. Wittgenstein is looking at the mechanics of our interest and judgment through a concept—how it is identified, distinguished, satisfied.

What do you mean by "its own criteria"? — Shawn

In comparison to the Tractatus, which, as you point out, held everything that could be said to make sense to a generalized standard for truth (based on nominalism, or reference), in the PI, each practice is true to the extent it, internally as it were, meets its own different criteria, e.g., for an apology, for acknowledging pain, for following a rule, continuing a series.

In your other post you ask “what is the difference here being made about 'phenomena' and 'concepts about phenomena'?” It is explaining his method, not a different approach to the world. He is not avoiding phenomena, but he is looking at what we say about something because that tells us how we judge it. Elsewhere he will call this the “possibilities of phenomena” (PI 90) as Kant will talk about a thing’s “conditions”.

why philosophers are in need of therapy — Shawn

We could also call it a logical error that philosophers make, and that philosophy itself (its method) is always in a state of revolution or self-criticism, but I take it that traditional philosophers create a requirement beforehand, what is sometimes called “objectivity” or “knowledge”, and then try to find a way to force the world into that mold. Wittgenstein starts with this kind of singular logical standard in the Tractatus, what he later will call purity, and then in the Investigations he realizes that each different thing has its own criteria. To call it a therapy maybe records that it takes self-reflection and growth (that PI is an argument for philosophers to act a certain way ultimately), and also because there are reasons why we want that kind of answer. As @Banno points out—Wittgenstein is interested in what motivates philosophers; why they are “inclined” to say this or that, and then learn from the contrast with what other contexts we say the same things.

You say that a part of philosophy is to change oneself. Change oneself in the sense of changing our knowledge of certain topics or maybe giving us a new perspective? — Jafar

A lot of people take philosophy as a set of problems to be answered. Originally, Socrates was asking questions to make us better people, and unfortunately he equated virtue only with a certain kind of knowledge, and ever since we have been thinking of philosophy as deciding what to think (theories and conclusions) rather than changing how we think (rigorous, empathetic, without presumption). As a bit of both, for example, in understanding Kant, you might see how the subjective-objective framework is still deeply ingrained in modern culture and how people consider judgment.

why do you advise against reading summaries? — Jafar

If the goal is to better ourselves, change how we think, then tackling the actual texts is the mechanism. A lot of the summaries are over-simplifications that will not only block you from having to work through your own thoughts first, but don’t draw out the implications, and many of them are just wrong.

How do you engage with philosophy, whether when you're reading or discussing/debating with others? — Jafar

The most important thing I realized is that when you are reading, pay attention to what jumps out for you and make notes about your thoughts to yourself, the questions you have, because, although you have to work to get past your first impressions (no real philosophy is immediately understood because the idea is to change you), what you are interested in is the starting point. That, and don’t dismiss anything because there is a part that you don’t agree with or that is wrong. And never read summaries. Good luck.

@Banno @Ludwig V

The word 'shoe', for instance, obviously gets its meaning from the fact that it refers only to things that are shoes, and not to things that aren't. — cherryorchard

The need to take a static snapshot and exclude other things is why we can picture language as violence. That our expressing something, in response to a situation, to someone, making distinctions, etc., is to cut off other possible things to express (not precluding ongoing clarification, correcting mistakes, etc). And the criteria for identification, categorization, creative application can be fuzzy and general without being flawed.

One thing Gellner is claiming OLP does not allow is that our forms of expression change, but it is because they contain the rationale of the world, the form and workings of each being different, say, as an apology is different from justice, that they have the possibility to be extended, to die off, become superficial, or are given new life. Wittgenstein specifically addresses and allows for this in discussing “continuing a series”. The claim to what criteria there are for a practice does not preclude that practice from changing, or the criteria we use to judge it. What they take philosophy to do is draw out those ordinary criteria (explicitly), which actually allows for the discussion of their applicability, our failure to apply them, the need for change, etc.

to make the criteria for what falls under a concept either so severe, or so loose, that either nothing at all can, or everything must, fall under it. The term then loses any contrast… [ Philosophers ] do it, from the essentially philosophical desire to say something wholly all-embracing, not realizing that this ambition is incompatible with saying anything at all.

If I would claim that there are terms or concepts that have no antithesis, it would be the manufactured criteria that Descartes, Plato, and Kant create and project. Plato can come to no conclusion in the Meno about virtue through knowledge, Descartes can’t prop up anything that avoids doubt, and Kant can only come up with self-referential axioms that meet the desire to be imperative. I believe Gellner is recording this as OLP’s claim that this move (requiring certainty) “loses any contrast” or is not “saying anything at all” despite recognizing they come from philosophy’s desire to have something “wholly all-embracing”, which is what Wittgenstein is trying to pinpoint why we do that and unravel it in the PI, termed “purity”.

Perhaps this puts us in the position where we can now say Gellner misconstrues Austin and Wittgenstein, thinking they are saying we MUST have an antithesis, but what they are actually doing is redirecting our attention from the all-consuming desire for certainty (“direct” perception) to examples that contrast against that metaphysical criteria with ordinary ways we judge a situation, in this case, only coincidentally, pointing to the opposite, where we say “indirect”.

@Banno @Ludwig V @Joshs

'Words function through contrast with an antithesis' seems like a perfectly valid and meaningful theory of how words function. — cherryorchard

This might be the place to unravel a common mischaracterization of Austin and Wittgenstein. What they are doing is using the method of looking at the expressions and situations surrounding “indirect” and making claims about the criteria that make it work (because our interest in it and the ways we make judgments about it are reflected in our expressions). They imagine a context for philosophy’s (contrasting metaphysical) criteria as well. These are not claimed as “theories” as Gellner takes it, they are proposed as agreed upon (PI #128), as premises. If we do not agree with (see) “I believe” as a hypothesis (PI, p. 190), there is no force to the argument (though we can specify more context, alternate examples), but then we won’t follow Wittgenstein in contrasting its metaphysical use in relation to knowledge.

Thus, pointing out how “indirect” works (in agreed-upon ways) is an example to contrast with how philosophy is trying to remove it from any context and impose criteria and judgments. Again, it is a logical argument from premises that we must all take as how the world works. It is not an argument for how the world works (that is the starting point), nor how all language must work.

Can anyone think of any word that is meaningful without a contrast? I haven't seen an example yet. — cherryorchard

Maybe it’s important to separate a logical contrast, as in an opposite, from simply making a distinction at all, like a bush from a tree (and that these criteria blur). As I said above, Austin takes the example of the philosophical framing of “voluntary or not?” and shows that it is manufactured as the opposite of voluntary is not lacking intention, but compelled (Shanghai-highed).

So meaning is based on the distinctions it has been important for humanity to make in each instance, some of which are contrasts (opposites). Some contrasts are important to us (how indirect is opposed to direct), but some philosophical contrasts are created, e.g., belief always contrasted with (defined by) knowledge, or doubt as always opposed to certainty (even in instances where we want certainty even where doubt is not a consideration).

Phhtt.

@Banno @Ludwig V - Austin readers

We all understand and accept that different creatures with visual organs perceive the world differently. Only certain wavelengths of light are perceptible to human eyes, etc. So of course there is no 'one' objectively correct way of seeing the world. — cherryorchard

The mitigation of “perception” of indirect-realism preserves the possibility of certainty, however limited. As Kant did, it kills off the world (the thing-in-itself) in order to keep our manufactured standards for “Knowledge”. The modern story is that science can know the brain (predictably, consistently), and we can rest unmistaken on that, rather than having the constant shadow of skepticism and doubt lurking on everything else we decide to do and say. We want to only accept fore-knowledge, universality, and the “crystalline purity” of (math-like) “Logic” so, if we can’t have that (certain knowledge), we take the world as unknowable at all. Wittgenstein is showing that we have numerous ways of understanding the world other than objective certainty. Austin is just burning down the (manufactured) house.

Also, what are matters of interest and focus and differentiation, are turned into the constant, unique, individualization of our brain, and so my brain makes me constantly different from yours. The picture is: I “perceive” the world differently (always) from how you perceive it, and we use language to try to overcome our ever-present division, fraught with skeptical failure from the beginning. What internalizing our separateness (our possible difference) does is save “me” (always, rather than by non-conformity). And, yes, we are separate, but by default we are intelligible, and, when that sometimes fails, the responsibility falls on us (does not destroy our ability to connect with the world).

Whoops

Austin spends quite a lot of time in 'Sense and Sensibilia' explaining that there is no point in claiming that we only ever see things indirectly, just precisely because, if that is the case, we no longer have any idea what seeing directly would even mean — cherryorchard

We read through Sense and Sensibilia here, and I believe what Austin is doing is showing how “indirectly” actually works (seeing someone in a mirror, speaking by phone, etc), to show that the opposite “directly” does not have the same power philosophy wants it to—objectivity, certainty—against which “indirectly” is then only imagined as illusion, mitigated, or something we overcome or see through, casting us out from the world. The other point is, as you say, that we don’t mention that we see “directly” unless there is a question of whether we are or could be doing so indirectly. “I saw the moon directly, not through this telescope.”

I think Gellner is taking the point Austin is making in this case, and trying to make it a position of OLP, and, even more, a position to all language, which is an ad naseum argument. Austin is merely being logical. The same is the case when Wittgenstein points out that we don’t “know” we (or you) are in pain (as a claim to knowledge), we just “are” in pain, we have it. The claim is that pain is expressed to request a response to the pain (to my having it—to me), for it to be accepted or rejected. “I’m in pain.” “I know.” “Then why aren’t you doing anything?”

Austin's argument is about what he sees as the misuse of particular words in philosophy. — cherryorchard

This is a common minimization of Austin, though understandable. He is looking at what we say in order to learn about what we do (it is a means, not “about” it). He is not defending correct usage; he is leveraging it because what is normative about words, is our lives, which are captured in them. Unfortunately, he doesn’t talk much about why someone would claim indirect realism, nor why it is important to tear it apart (and “realism”).

The larger question then, is why would anyone claim they can only see, perceive, or experience the world indirectly? Cavell points out the inference that we want to remain special in the face of our perhaps not being so, that we want to necessarily be a self (that mitigates the world). Also, as with Descartes, we want to account for being wrong by internalizing it so we can control it (and still possibly be infallible, certain) because the fear of always possibly being wrong is worse (that we may never come to moral agreement).

@cherryorchard

I believe most of this is a misunderstanding of the method of OLP, and also maybe assuming it has certain premises it needs and/or conclusions it wants.

But: there is one kind of shift of meaning which is both disastrous and characteristically philosophical, and that is to make the criteria for what falls under a concept either so severe, or so loose, that either nothing at all can, or everything must, fall under it.

If anything the above would be a fallacy that Wittgenstein is trying to point out. He refers to philosophy’s desire for “crystalline purity” which shows in its manufacturing and imposing rigid criteria for knowledge, truth, etc.—to be logical and certain—which constrains their ability to capture the world at all (not that they need an antithesis). Also, one of Austin’s moves—in order to show that philosophy gets too wrapped up in wanting something to be a particular way—is to point out that there are not the dichotomies that philosophy imagines, such as when it asks if an act is voluntarily or not, which it thinks creates a question of intention, when an opposite of voluntarily is not necessarily determined or unconscious, but forced.

@Richard B sets out further language of Gellner’s and the concern that OLP takes regular language as superior and not claiming any impact (“normativity”).

thought is not bound and enslaved by any of the language games it employs, but on the contrary that a most important kind of thinking consists of reassessing out terms, reassessing the norms built into them and reassessing the contrast associated with them.

This assumes that OLP wants philosophical thought to be done in regular language, which overlooks Wittgenstein’s extensive use of his own terms: “use”, “sense”, “grammar”, “criteria”, “ordinary”, and his pointing out how dichotomy and analogy (or forms of expression) in everyday language create expectations that allow our desire for certainty to even get a handhold at all. The confusion I think is that Wittgenstein is not using or exalting ordinary language (the moniker is disastrous for understanding the method), but looking at the expressions we say in certain situations because they reveal our ordinary criteria of judgment, which can be contrasted with manufactured “philosophical criteria”, like Plato’s for knowledge. This does not provide a better answer, but reveals why we want to abandon the world (because it fails us, is not predictive, not stable, etc).

What is conspicuous about Linguistic Philosophy is its abdication of any kind of normative role, both in its practice and in its programmatic announcements. — Richard B

When Wittgenstein claims that philosophy should only describe and not explain (#109), he is only contrasting it to science’s hypothesizing, or imagining something hidden #126. He is not trying to claim that philosophy can’t or shouldn’t say anything or argue for anything. The whole of PI is one claim after another about how our ordinary criteria work, for all of us, and he is absolutely trying to make (and “explain”) multiple points and in a way in which we might convince ourselves, changing how we act. What constrains philosophy is not the ordinary, but what always has: what turns out to be useless, what is made ridiculous, illogical, etc.

Well, if we are only discussing language/confusion generally then I apologize, but if it is specifically Wittgenstein’s famous quote in the Philosophical Investigations, then it might help to see the context:

[ Philosophical problems ] …are solved …by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: despite an urge to misunderstand them. …Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. — PI, #109

It is not language that “bewitches” us; we already have “an urge” (for purity, certainty) which is the cause of our being charmed out of thinking clearly. Language is the “means” by which we “battle against” focusing only on a response to doubt. It is a reference to his method of looking at examples of what we say in specific situations (in a sense, what @Shawn proposes as: “the study of logic”, though more, studying the logic of our ordinary language). The reason it works is because language and the world are tied together (except when that breaks down) in a way that examining what we say, shows us (it is a record of) our interest in each thing, the criteria we use to judge it (the “workings”).

Now of course he does also point out that our forms of expression get us into problems. One is that we use analogies that make things look simple. The relationship between a noun and an object (see @Joshs above) makes us imagine a framework where all words refer to (point to) objects, and then we force the framework onto everything else that isn’t an actual object, like imagining “ideas”, “sensations”, “meanings”, or “reality” as things. Also, the desire for simplicity and certainty is the motivation of @fdrake’s observation that we, for example, want “I know” to have only one generalized sense.

I would only pointedly argue that the answer the PI is fighting against is for philosophy to abandon our regular expressions (to be more certain)—go “outside the box” as @Pierre-Normand’s authors call it—but should, rather, root out the urge to do so itself in appreciating the ways language is rational, clear, and precise enough in a multitude of ways.

once you've learnt the skill, it's too late to ask questions — Ludwig V

Yes we are born into a history of ways of doing things, but Witt’s method is exactly to make explicit the criteria for a practice (through looking at the things we say when we do it). Also, because we have a practice is why and how it can be rational to question, push back, live differently, etc.

It's the idea that you can (should) present examples and observations and leave the reader to work out their significance — Ludwig V

As well, the part people skip over is that his examples (rule-following, pointing, “seeing”, etc.) are practices that everyone can weigh in on (we each have an equal right to claims/there is no privileged position), so the proposed criteria we use, and the “grammar” of how they work, have to be accepted (by you) for it to be philosophical worth drawing conclusions from (as evidence).

I am going to start a read-though of The Blue Book soon, but the Anscombe sounds interesting.

agreement is different from agreeing with someone else where we shall go for lunch — Ludwig V

Yes, a “form of life” is not a conclusion or argued, etc (though “acquiesce” implies choice; we are indoctrinated, assimilated—Rousseau’s “consent” unconsciously.) That is not to say we don’t have forms of argument or refutation, means of judging loyalty and fairness (“you picked last time”).

I'm not sure that all moral disagreements can be resolved — Ludwig V

Well, you are right that everything may lead to naught. But the point is that that frailty is only a possible occurrence, and so should not be interpreted into a systemic problem (concluding that there is no “rationality”, intelligibility). And Witt’s idea of a moral dilemma is not like a clash of interests about a certain type of topic (say about abortion), but when everyone is at a loss as to what to do, how to go on—which is an event (and could involve any of our practices).

I would add that the wish to step outside any particular practice, however, is incoherent. Any attempt to do simply generates a new context. — Ludwig V

But the metaphysical problem is generalized and abstracted out of time, place, actors, i.e. anything we would call “a context”.

2. Are you suggesting that we could work out the common ground with a lion, but that we choose not to? Which suggests that we could if we wanted to. — Ludwig V

This should probably be under that other post, however, the point of it here is that philosophy imagines a CANNOT situation with rationality, rather than recognizing the possibility yet simply not wanting to be responsible when everything can fall apart, or not wanting to jump in without knowing for sure beforehand that I would not be judged as wrong.

So, to answer: the ones we CAN figure out their practices (where there is a possibility), are the people with the “strange” customs (at the top paragraph of that page).

Are you saying that we can understand lions, but that if a lion could speak to us, we would not be able to understand what was said? Of course, communication would not be instant, but Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that there is some insoluble problem. I can't see why he would think so. — Ludwig V

This is very simple, but hard for people to accept or let go of (especially philosophers, and scientists), mostly I think because it is read without the surrounding text (as if it were a claim). I am saying that Witt wanted to contrast the CAN possibility that we have with the strange people, with a CANNOT situation (where it is actually impossible—not a choice). That contrast is the extent of the purpose of that sentence. He wanted something that would be an uncontroversial “very general fact of nature” (PI #143 and p. 230) that he presumes would be accepted as a fact, such as: parrots don’t talk to themselves (#344). I would say he chose poorly (though perhaps, as worse with Nietzsche, he can’t help poking people in the eye). He is not making a claim or argument nor is it necessary for any greater reason nor within any framework or analogy—nothing matters about it (other than its contrasting impossibility). If you disagree with it as a claim, that is certainly your prerogative and understandable (it is provocative in that way); that is just not what is happening here, neither in purpose nor intent. This is Witt’s arrogant style on full display, as he will even state without argument the implications he posits for, say, “believing”, as if everyone would agree.

Your example of apology is a very interesting one, that I would love to discuss separately; it is very relevant to ethics. — Ludwig V

J.L. Austin’s A Plea for Excuses is a work about ethics in that way.

does [saying disagreements happen at a time and place] mean that such failures can eventually be overcome at other times and in other contexts? If so, then limitation doesn't seem to lie in reason itself, but in people's finite use of it, their patience, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That is exactly the point. If you do not have a preset expectation that the answer MUST ensure agreement, then a failure does not mean there is a problem with the whole system, just this instance (or just because we gave up too soon).

If the lion comment is taken head on it is just stupid. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Sorry, it is not that we cannot understand lions, just not talking ones; it is meant to be the statement of a fact, not a scientific claim (which I try to explain here), because it is said in contrast to when we CAN work out other cultural practices, to show that we sometimes just choose not to.

If we say that rationality is a question of our agreement in ways of life, we seem to eliminate the distinction between those agreements that we call "correct" or "incorrect" by some standard that is not set by our agreement and those agreements that are simply a matter of making a deal, so that "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply. — Ludwig V

This has been historically framed as: if a proposition is not true/false, then it is irrational (also, if not “knowledge” than belief, or, if not “objective” than “subjective”). And Witt’s point is that “rationality” is not just meeting a standard philosophy requires (sets)—like universal, generalized, a hard rule, certain, predetermined, justified, etc. (Witt will call these “metaphysical” criteria)—but that each thing has its own kind. “Forms of life” is not just something different to simply meet the same imposed requirements.

“Agreement” is here not the same either. We come to an agreement on some criteria—like how long one foot will be—but we do not agree “to” our practices (it is “agree” in the sense more of aligning, over our entire history of doing things). Still, we do judge whether, say, an apology, is correct or incorrect, but the criteria for that are different than true and false, as I can accept an apology that you do poorly (“accepting” is part of how it works differently, its “rationality” or “grammar” as Witt calls it).

Thus it seems out of place to discuss whether apologizing, in itself, is correct or incorrect, though not strange to discuss what justice is, its ideal, and yet, differently, its commitments, and, even differently, its current state, all of which we can do intelligibly, though perhaps not conclusively. The force we want of philosophy’s “rational” (justified, certain, determinative, etc.) is what Wittgenstein is claiming is the desire which makes it seem like any other way is a failure and without recourse (leading to relativism). For example:

You will understand, I suppose, that I think that agreements that are correct or incorrect are, by and large, rational agreements and the other kind are, roughly, matters of taste or convenience or pragmatics. (The difficulty of agreements about values sits awkwardly between the two.) — Ludwig V

It is exactly this framework that interprets skepticism as a theoretical “problem”, rather than the discovery that there is no fact that will ensure resolution of our moral conflicts, thus we are responsible for solving our ongoing disagreements, because we do have the means. All criteria reflect our interests in our lives (what and how we value something), it’s only metaphysical criteria that wish to step outside of any particular practice or situation.

Whoops

One way to deal with [relativism/skepticism] would be to posit nested sets of "forms of life" that people belong to. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This is true in that life takes various forms. There is our species (in itself and compared to others), our history, our practices, our cultures, etc. But these are not justification, nor decisions, nor rules we “agree” to; they come out of the fact that we live and have lived in similar ways: judging in the same manner (what an apology consists of, what pointing does), interested to make the same distinctions, anticipating particular implications, etc.

We imagine chaos because we want to only accept undeniable certainty and agreement (as “knowledge”), and cast everything else as “belief” or emotion or persuasion. But Witt shows is that the world has endless ways of being “rational” (having ways to account, though different), and so we can disagree intelligibly in relation from those practices. Ultimately we may not come to resolution, but that does not lead to the categorical failure of rationality, because a dispute also only happens at a time, in a context (which also gives our differences traction).

Now we can NOT understand talking lions, as a physical impossibility, but it is not impossible for us to learn about the gestures of the Chinese, or the traditions of others (PI, p. 223), so to preclude the other is a choice, being blind to the other because of being unable to look past ourselves.

We say we want to know, but what we actually want is for knowledge to take the place we have to be responsible for ourselves, thus accountable for it, known by our words and acts. If we could know what is right, we would not have to make a claim of it in what we do. But what we want is to not been known, to not know ourselves, and thus the allure of drugs that allow me to forget all that.

There are plenty of good reasons, supported by science, to believe indirect realism over direct realism, as I discussed at length here. — Michael

And the science of the brain and its processes is important to understand, but philosophy constructed a particular framework we should be aware of, because it did so for its own purposes. As I mentioned before, philosophy does not like the fact that we are sometimes mistaken. Instead of rectifying our errors with the means and explanations in each case, philosophy problematizes our entire relation to the world as an abstracted case—creating a space between us and the world. As an example, instead of accepting that we just see, however corruptible in particular ways and cases (hallucinating, dreaming, physiological issues, etc), philosophy projects a “reality” that we only see “indirectly” (e.g., that we have to “perceive”, or that we each see differently, or that we only see the “appearance” of, or “sense datum” of, or that create “qualia” for us, etc.), which allows philosophy to control the form of error (as a problem we might solve) or that we see “directly” which is judged by a manufactured standard that philosophy desires, creates, and imposes: a kind of knowledge that is certain, universal, generalized, abstract, etc. Basically, the dichotomy is false and manufactured and the world in all its varied forms and criteria gets abstractly judged as a single form of “reality”.

But I don't understand how we got to this point. You were saying something about us wanting to help each other if we're in pain, and somehow conclude from this that indirect realism is false? Your reasoning is confusing. — Michael

Examining the ordinary criteria and mechanics of pain, of how we judge and respond to another’s pain (acknowledging or denying it), shows philosophy’s desire to instead “know”** another’s pain (partly that it wants to avoid the claim another’s pain makes on us). Philosophy would rather turn it into an intellectual problem that is either equated or not (**subject to knowledge and certainty). This, like the example of “reality”, shows philosophy’s inclination to skip over our human lives and split our relation to the world entirely as an abstract problem.

There are plenty of good reasons, supported by science, to believe indirect realism over direct realism, as I discussed at length here. — Michael

That’s pretty straightforward so maybe we discuss it in that thread.

Are you saying that they're a fiction? — Michael

Well, in the way philosophy pictures them yes. I moved the discussion here because the article above provides some history of the parallel picture that neuroscience labors under. Philosophy has never liked being wrong so the fact that we can be (and that we are responsible for that) leads it to create the conclusion that we must not have direct access to the world (or we are ensured it), that we only see the “appearance” of something, or that our individual perspective is somehow partial or lacking or individual (my “sensation” or “perception”). That way we can have a problem to solve or a kind of knowledge or rationality to find so we will know what’s right, how to settle disputes with others, and we won’t be deceived or mistaken or judged. This is more of a story than an argument, but if there is a particularly egregious dismissal we could take that as a case study.

So because we only care about aspirin when we have a headache then it follows that first person private sensations don't exist, or that if they do exist then they are the same for all people? — Michael

Yes, but it’s not an argument, it’s a shift in perspective. Philosophy wants something with certainty, universality, uniqueness, etc. apart from our fallible, limited human interactions, which the world doesn’t provide, so it creates objects and frameworks that only rely on knowledge and intellectual solutions. At times we do have personal experiences (like witnessing a train crash), which we can keep (private as hidden) to ourselves (until expressed), but our experience and feelings are not always unique. I’m stressed about money like you are. I don’t (always) have an individual experience in going to the store. The ideas of consciousness, sensation, appearance, reality, are all manufactured by philosophy, partly to feel like we are necessarily special, as I discussed above.

Kant had the categorical imperative indeed, but that was faulty from the outset, not because he wanted certainty, but because (in my opinion) it assumes various things and ignores others to get what it wants regarding ethical dilemmas. — schopenhauer1

I don’t mean to harp on about “certainty” as if that is the only desire philosophy has. It’s just Witt’s example, which Cavell characterizes as the removal of the human (voice). Philosophy also desires generalization, abstraction, universality, predetermination, etc. The means of imposing these criteria, is, as you say, that it “assumes various things and ignores others to get what it wants”.

When we're discussing something like the hard problem of consciousness and the ontology of sensations then it very much matters to us if our pains are the same or not. — Michael

Witt would be showing how this “problem” and ontology are manufactured by our human desires. I’m not sure this thread is the place to discuss that controversial a subject. I did address it in this Hard Problem post.

Descartes is taking a pretty common sense position that I cannot LITERALLY know what the other person is thinking inside, but I can judge them to be feeling similar to me. So I don't see the big deal about certainty you (Witt?) is making there. — schopenhauer1

As I mentioned to @Michael above yes, the other is ultimately hidden from us (despite our being able to guess at thoughts or anticipating, etc), but the framework Descartes is using treats them as inhuman, as it were, unless we can “judge” they are people, as if it is a matter of proof rather than taking them to be human, accepting them, acting towards them as if they were.

The way I see those, is they are all different and often self-referential and contained frameworks that don't all have to do with exactly "certainty" in the same way say, that a scientific experiment or a math problem is "certain". — schopenhauer1

They share the desire and thus create and impose a criteria or standard that is like the idea they have of science or math. Thus why Plato discusses math first in the Theatetus, and Descartes wants to be beyond doubt, and Kant requires the imperative.

What they have in common is a construction or positive idea about reality. — schopenhauer1

One point I think Witt is making is that taking our world as, say, mitigated by “appearance” or “belief” is to exactly take a negative view of our ordinary means of seeing and communicating and judging. As if we are never connected to the world, instead of only sometimes not knowing our way about. They in a sense kill the world to save it in the vision they want: the thing-in-itself (which we can’t know directly), or the forms (which we only remember), or God’s knowledge, or only true/false propositions.

I'm not sure what this is saying either. Indeed it is good to be skeptical and try to figure out the world or not I suppose. — schopenhauer1

I’m referring to the radical skepticism that is generalized and creates a gap between us and the world that philosophy turns into an intellectual problem. Not just questioning the status quo.

Or it's because the sensation I have when I stab myself in the arm is unlike the sensation you have when you stab yourself in the arm, and so our pains are not the same and we don't know one another's pain. — Michael

Maybe the way to put this is that equating our pains is not how pain is important to us. If this situation actually did happen, what would matter to us about comparing pains would be attending to one or other of us. Philosophy abstracts this discussion to a place of equating pains, and then creates “sensation” as a kind of object, rather than just me expressing how I feel (which is too vague), so that knowledge might stand in the place of our having to react to someone in pain. What it wants is to be sure of the other person (and what to do), and not have to make the leap of faith of treating them as a person in pain.

Right, but my contention is that this thing he is setting up of "perfect knowledge" and "making due" is a false narrative, and thus a strawman that doesn't need addressing really. — schopenhauer1

That it is a “false” narrative does not explain why Plato, Descartes, Kant, Positivism, etc. got sucked into it (belief or opinion vs knowledge; appearance vs reality; the thing-in-itself; only either true or false). That is what Witt is investigating.

So I am just focusing on this idea of not knowing what someone is really thinking internally, this doesn't seem like something that needs deconstruction because it never was constructed. It's a straw man. — schopenhauer1

However, now I am amazed at how my mind is [weak and] prone to error… I also say I see the people themselves, just as I do with the wax. But what am I really seeing other than hats and coats, which could be concealing automatons underneath? However, I judge that they are people. And thus what I thought I was seeing with my eyes I understand only with my faculty of judgment, which is in my mind. — Descartes, 2nd Meditation

This is a tough one, because it’s easy to dismiss Descartes as delusional or paranoid. The particular instance is not as important as the fabrications that create it, which is not the automaton, but turning our human limitations into a problem, here, only seeing “appearance” because we want to have the certainty of “reality”, when the desire is in reaction to the fear that, in fact, sometimes we don’t know whether someone is lying; that their judgments, their decisions, etc. can exist but be unexpressed; that we may be wrong about them, to trust them, to give our love to them.

why should I care… ? — schopenhauer1

Finding yourself in the grip of skepticism is also tricky (even accepting its truth) because we don’t see that: imagining we live without it (as part of the human condition) or have solved it, is to still be in its snare.

That we say it isn't that it's true. — Michael

Right, but this might be because one is feigning agreement because they are pitying the other, or being stoic, and maybe not some way for our pain to be “truly” the same, which philosophy perhaps simple creates in order to impose the requirement we wanted all along.

And this is part of the problem of Wittgenstein. It denies the reality of reference. Many words refer to things, and the word like pain refers to a sensation. — Michael

He is not denying that we talk about how our pain feels, and, when we do, that there is not a feeling which we are describing. It’s just the framework of a certain correspondence between words and the world (as always objects) needs to be taken apart to show it is made from our own philosophical desires.

point out things as if they are novel when they are pretty readily held by the majority. In this case, the idea that we can never have perfect "certainty" of what others are feeling, so must rely on outward observations and public displays, and then take action from there and believe them. None of this is an uncommon view. — schopenhauer1

But this is not a matter of competing “views”, or explanations, or that we want to know the same thing but we just have to get at it a different way. And he is not contrasting the philosopher to the “majority” as if we were just doing anthropology, a census of opinion. In fact, even our culture pictures some things exactly based on the framework of philosophy (think “objective/subjective”), and even some here imagine “ordinary” is just what they first think of.

He is drawing out (making explicit) the type of criteria in individual cases to contrast them with the philosophical fixation with knowledge as certainty, or that we have to settle for some lesser version in contrast… because we “never have perfect” knowledge.

The point is not the answer, nor to say philosophy is stupid or useless, but to allow for self-reflection, to see our projection into our thinking. The obviousness of our ordinary criteria, once we see them, is uncanny (Cavell’s term) for me exactly because I have been trained so long to think in the frameworks of philosophy.

We are getting rather far afield from Witt’s approachability, however,

Which philosopher(s)?… No one presumably thinks that we actually can feel the same exact thoughts… a much more interesting philosophical point is that of "p-zombies", a thought experiment proposed by David Chalmers. But that is more interesting because it imagines that people don't have any inner sensation. — schopenhauer1

The idea of the automaton (Descartes’ originally I believe) is the same thing (identity) except inverse and to the absurd: the panic that we can’t know (with certainty) what is in the other’s mind, which is the possibility there is nothing; the doubt of the other as created by the desire for certainty (not just, “I can’t read them”).

…the point of it is to prove the weirdness of subjectivity and why it exists at all — schopenhauer1

The desire for certainty also creates the fantasy that I—my “subjectivity” or “consciousness”—am unknowable to others. The need to be special, that I am always inexpressible and innately unique, creates the picture of “internal states”.

…you take it on habit and as a matter of course that people feel similarly when they are in pain or other sensations. — schopenhauer1

I see that before I was falling into the trap of saying “same” and “a matter of identity” which was confusing (thus why Witt says “In so far as it makes sense” (#253), because we would only equate our pain (even in similarity) for specific circumstances, like commiseration**.

We express our pain to call attention to it (the same as a cry of pain #244). I identify it so a doctor can treat it. I identify myself with it perhaps to gain sympathy. I differentiate it because it needs attention compared to yours. “I have a hangover, and mine is bigger and so I need the last four Ibuprofen.” And, even under the ordinary criteria of pain, I can deny that you, or anyone, feels my pain. And it is possible this is not just a desire to be unknown (say I’m the man at the start of Alien, “but it feels weird in my stomach. No, I don’t have an ‘upset tummy’ Ripley!”)

The fact that we use the same word "pain" to refer to your sensations and to my sensations isn't that your sensations are the same as my sensations. — Michael

Again, sorry for the confusion, but saying our pain is the “same” is not the business of equating (or comparing); this is not an agreement on the meaning of the word pain, nor is it really an “agreement” or as @schopenhauer1 puts it “tak[ing] it on habit and as a matter of course”—and thus the importance that we look at specific cases**. We may compare and equate certain occurrences and facets when we talk about the pain of a breakup. Here we say our pain is the same, that we know the other’s pain, as a matter of connection and to identify with the other person—as commiseration. A more philosophical way to say this is that what matters to us about pain, its criteria for identity and its importance to us, is that a person has it, not the sensation itself, though that may play a part, as in location, intensity, etc. This is the “criterion of identity” that we have to be reminded of in #253.

Again, Witt’s point is not to be right about our ordinary criteria and mechanics of pain, but to draw them out to see why we looked at it the way we did in doing “philosophy”, and how that refocuses our philosophical concerns, improves our thinking. The skeptic is not wrong or confused. It is true that we may be wrong about the other, and that I might have something all my own to express, but without the pictures created by the desire for certainty, we may see the need for our relation to others (across our doubt) and our obligation of continued intelligibility for ourselves.

Is there a difference between knowing someone's pain and knowing that someone is in pain? — Michael

Excellent observation. What Witt would do is create a situation and give examples of what we’d say. “I’m in pain” “Me too” “But I have a headache.” “Me too!” “Mine’s a shooting zing behind my ear” “Right! Boy, I know your pain.” Thus why he will conclude that, as a matter of identity, to the extent we agree, we have the same pain (PI # 235).

But when I say “I know that they are in pain” I am acknowledging that the other is in pain. One instance would be someone writhing in pain and I am doing nothing. You say “They’re in pain.” To which I might say “Yes, I know. I like to see my enemies suffer.” This is not the only sense of know than that of certainty, and it is a rare occurrence, but it is knowledge of another person (as @Luke correctly clarifies).

But, as I noted, this contradicts Wittgenstein’s comments. — Luke

P. 246 does not force this realization, but it is an occurrence of the two senses colliding. He is showing that the philosopher would like to “know” another’s pain, as in be certain (identical), and that in regular use, we “know” another’s pain, as in acknowledging (as better addressed on p. 223).

So what I am not a fan of, is when something that is pretty common understanding of things is presented as if it’s profoundly innovative wisdom. — schopenhauer1

Well, if this is meant to say that our regular use is not profound, I agree, as it is meant to be obvious. The wisdom we gain is in the contrast to the philosophical criteria that we now see that we are manufacturing and imposing in approaching the matter in abstraction. The philosopher imagines “knowing” another’s mind as being (requiring) an identical equation, thus the impression you could never know my pain, have the same pain, and why the philosopher comes up with a carrier, an object, for this imagined uniqueness, as a pain “sensation”, pain “perception”.