• Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Luke
    Witt's example is meant to show us something about philosophy; its powerlessness, and hope. — Antony Nickles

    And its recurring, thematic, archetypal problems, which he is attempting to resolve.     — Luke

    Both Kripke and Cavell take Witt as pointedly not trying to resolve skepticism (the "orthodox" view I described earlier), but take it seriously, investigate it, see what it shows about us.

    The issue that Wittgenstein identifies (or forecasts) is that philosophers such as Kripke are sceptical or dissatisfied with any and all justifications of behaving in accordance with, or obeying, a rule. — Luke

    In the passage starting this OP, Witt acknowledges the possibility of the exhaustion of justifications.

    There is no middle ground in obeying the rule for how the knight moves in chess, only conflict or accord. — Luke

    And this would be Kripke's stance. But Cavell is attempting to draw out that there is grammar (not just judgment) in obeying a rule; that there are cases that exhibit what these criteria are (#201); that we can go over these examples and see if the context matches ours, whether it is an example, etc. And that grammar, even that of obeying a rule, is different than rules--even leaves us in a different place in the end.

    For the sake of clarity, let's use the example of a very straightforward rule instead, such as a rule of chess or a signpost. — Luke

    It gets even more straightforward, let's use the example of math. The idea is that things are not straightforward like rules (#426), that our criteria (our lives) are open-ended, unpredictable, etc.

    I disagree that Wittgenstein is inviting a moral discussion at all, nor any further justification in general terms, although he might consider a place for philosophy or justification to intervene in relation to some specific issue. Generally speaking, the matter is fairly black and white: people do manage to follow rules and are able to be judged as following them or not. As W says: "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it” (201). See also 240-241. I view 232 as a continuation of the thread that brings into relief the impossibility of privately determining a rule (see 202). — Luke

    The further point of the passage of the turned spade is that, though I can wield rules the way you point to (as Kripke grabs onto them as finalizing), we do not have to, there is nothing necessary in treating the other on black and white terms--unless you don't want to address the Other (open the moral realm), that you just want, as it were, to apply the rule. On p. 192, Witt calls this a "conviction". I would say #240 clarifies our need to be able to know how to fight well (keep open the possibility for reasonable moral debate), and that #241 does not solve those issues, by pointing to our way of life in the way Kripe takes it as a contractual (enforceable) agreement.

    Pointing to the existing practice that constitutes the rule. "You're not allowed to move your knight like that!" (in chess) because that's not the practice or the way it's done. — Luke

    This is to justify the judgment of not obeying a rule by pointing to our practice. We (teacher-student) are at the moment where I claim there is an attempt to convey what it is to obey a rule, how it is that we obey a rule. That this has an ordinary (non-"mathematical") grammar that is not just pointing to a rule (Kripke as it were, generalizes this practice/picture).

    It's an odd reading to think that Kripke is attempting to resolve this worry, when, by design or by folly, he exacerbates it. — Luke

    Cavell is trying to examine how and why Kripke ends up there.

    Cavell takes Witt as leaving that possibility of failure open, but also continuing a conversation beyond our pre-determined judgment. An ongoing conversation about, say, what constitutes an example (#223)--rationalizing our relationship instead of it relying on, say, violence (understanding rather than just change). — Antony Nickles

    I'm not sure what you mean here [the discussion of what constitutes an example], but I don't see 223 as questioning what constitutes an example.     — Luke

    One might say to the person one was training: "Look, I always do the same thing: I . . . . . — Witt, PI #223

    And the other might claim his is an example, but responsive to a new context. "This is justice, but here we must do harm in this case."

    To make themselves intelligible. They might claim they did obey the rule; or explain their aversion to conformity--examine their "blind" obedience (#219); as normally we do not "follow" rules (#222). — Antony Nickles

    This is not my reading of 219 or 222.     — Luke

    When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
    I obey the rule blindly.     — Wiit, PI # 219

    This is in contrast to the "mythological" description (#221) of "all the steps already being taken". But it is not that we cannot choose to obey a rule (its all about rules), only that when (grammatically) I (choose to) obey a rule (am to be said (judged) to have obeyed), I do not (thereafter) make (further) choices. I do not then "follow" the rule, as in watch it go on ahead of me (#232). Kripke takes it that our justifications end (I act blindly) when I obey the rule, and then as if this is how we are said to act at all, with no space for discussing (justifying) that choice afterwards, for rescission if your suggestion to obey the rule was irresponsible, that I would no longer (morally) say I obeyed the rule, but that I obeyed your intimation (#222).

    I don't see Wittgenstein as talking about ethics or about "what is right" in general (in life) in PI. Or at least, not in relation to his discussion on rule following. — Luke

    It is peppered throughout, in his insistence not to treat our practices mathematically, singularly, but also (albeit cryptically), in Part II, with his discussion of attitudes, seeing aspects.
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Banno
    I remain at a loss to understand the difference between - taking from the thread title - a rule's end for mathematics and an ordinary rule's end; that is, while I understand the difference between mathematics and ordinary language, there is something here that I do not understand. — Banno

    Yeah that was maybe being more poetic than informative. I guess I should have said this is the imposition of the standards for math in place of (sublimizing) those of the rest of language. The desire for our actions to meet the criteria we have for math (or rules) when each action has its own grammar (including that of obeying rules). That math is circumscribed by rules, but that grammar is not.

    You or Cavell seem to want there to be a difference between the spade being turned at the end of an analysis of mathematics, and a spade being turned in ordinary language or something along those lines. Or is that such a distinction might be made the topic here? — Banno

    Perhaps; it is two reactions to the ("mathematical") desire in the face of a skepticism--for some rule or other foundation--that divides the readings to the Witt passage; that for Kripke the criteria is decided (learned or not) before I make my final/initial claim (without further justification) that is then correct, or not. For Cavell, Witt leaves our response open, that we do not point to rules (or not always)--creating a space between skepticism and foundationalism.

    I would have thought that the spade was turned, in either case, when there was nothing more to be said, and only the "exhibition of what we call obeying the rule" as in §210; the point at which every interpretation is no more than the "substitution of one expression of the rule for another". — Banno

    Just that Kripke takes it that an action would be held to judgment of whether the rule was followed, and Cavell reads it that, yes, I can not tell you anything more, that we cannot just explain something (a rule, even its grammar) and you will/must continue. But we can wait; for a response, an inquiry. That we continue to be (exhibit) an example. That to continue a concept into a new context will require more than rules (Cavell refers to this as "the human voice", echoing Niestzche); that in contrast, what it is to be mathematical does not require me (it could be anyone adding).
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Banno
    Are we really aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game?
    — Antony Nickles

    I've bolded the bit that is bothersome.     — Banno

    Yikes, caught me; red-handed. I'm burning all my Austin--shameful.

    Are we aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game?
    Well, yes, we are.     — Banno

    The word I was looking for (maybe) was: are we always aware? aware of every consideration? (not that we can't be, but that the questions sometimes come after the act; the questions can be without end).

    There is a difference between plus and quus. — Banno

    Oh, this looks like a rabbit-hole. I'm not entirely versed in this scenario, but Cavell would acknowledge with Kripke that there is no fact to you/me obeying a rule, or meaning a sentence; nothing in me or about our world. But Cavell takes Kripke to read #201 as a paradox that must be solved--that our relationship with rules must/can be fixed. Maybe too simply, Cavell argues that rules have grammar, and they are (and obeying them is) not more fundamental than the grammar for other actions, and that the "fact" is the requirement (creation) of the skeptic.

    But we fear that I may become, or be seen as, the deviant--that I might mistake plus-ing for quus-ing. The skeptic sees this as eminent tragedy, and scrambles to ward it off. Cavell "wants to say" there is the fact of "me", here, ready to be responsible for my act, or not; to apologize, rescind it, defy your law (ironically, subversively), explain these differing circumstances; stand as an example, waiting...
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Banno
    Cavell [is] differentiating between mathematical rules and grammatical rules. How is this distinction to be made?

    I gather we are talking in terms of the broad notion of "grammar" Wittgenstein used, roughly the way appropriate to a given language game... but isn't mathematics a language game?     — Banno

    This is a good thing to have clarified. You are already aware that Austin provided a lot of examples to show that there are more types of statements than just ones that are true or false (also, this harkens to Kripke's black-or-white treatment of the Other). And that Wittgenstein spent a lot of time showing us that there is not one theory of meaning; that there are many other "games", as you say (he also calls them "concepts"), within which to mean something, then just reference. They showed that we can not think in just one way. They also both showed how each concept--like, pointing, meaning, intending, playing chess, apologizing, marrying, etc--was differentiated from others, what counted for identity, felicity, how we judge, why a distinction here is important, etc. with each concept, and even differences (sense, uses) within one concept in different contexts. Cavell calls these our criteria, Witt calls them the grammar of a thing.

    I gather we are talking in terms of the broad notion of "grammar" Wittgenstein used, roughly the way appropriate to a given language game... but isn't mathematics a language game? If so, there is no prima facie distinction to be made here. — Banno

    What Witt shows is that there is a desire to impose grammar (criteria) on the concepts of which we are skeptical, the criteria/grammar which here Cavell refers to as "mathematical". The term is not meant to imply math is categorically different than a concept (not a "language game"); just that "the way appropriate to" math, its grammar/criteria--certainty, repeatability, universality, predictability, etc.--are similar to the skeptic's requirements for morality, rationality, aesthetics, etc. The "mathematical" is also analogous to the criteria Plato's metaphysical forms have, or Kant's conditions for rationality, or positivism's logic. So in contrast to that are the "ordinary" different, unpredictable, specific grammar of each concept. Now there may not be certainty, or universality, but Cavell's point is that we are left with a rational path when certainty runs out, when we are unsure if our concepts can be, if not universal, at least aligned. Though our actions can not be made predictable, they can be understood as reasonable, taken as good enough (fair, just).
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Banno
    Seems you might set out in some detail what you think is Wittgenstein's orthodoxy, Kripke's variant, and Cavell's reply. — Banno

    This is well-taken; the OP does jump past some groundwork. Broadly, I would say there is the traditional skeptic, who sees that our actions are groundless, and thus "aspires to mathematical rules rather than" what Witt would call a concept's grammar; what Cavell refers to as our "ordinary" criteria, framed as the opposite of the skeptic's imposed criteria of ("mathematical"-like) certainty (also referred to as "metaphysical").

    Then there is the superficial (the "orthodox" perhaps) reading of Witt as solving (or dissolving) the problem the skeptic is reacting to with our forms of life, which they take as grounding meaning, actions, etc. in the same framework, or by calling skepticism nonsense, or a trick of language.

    Cavell and Kripke share the desire not to dismiss or solve the problem the skeptic sees; to acknowledge that there does come a point at which our justifications come to an end. (Here I may get stuck in the same problems I appear to have in the initial reading.) Kripke pictures that we have already (ahead of time) agreed on what the rules are (or practices/criteria/justifications); then I act instinctively yet correctly (without reference to the rules--"as I am inclined to", in his reading), and then I am judged on whether I followed the (circumscribing) rule or not--in or off the island.

    Cavell takes the passage not to be the moment of judgment, but the (at least possible) beginning (at the end) of a discussion of our continuing together in the same moral realm, my understanding of your action without society's pre-arranged consent (our immoral act as Nietszche might say), our furthering justification(s) into un-ventured contexts, etc. He sees this as possible because the type of "agreement" we have is not in rules, as to a contract (though we can), but in the way our lives have (so far) been aligned, the possibilities that affords for development.

    This would be why Witt words it as training, as we are not teaching (telling) rules, but the practice or skill of, here, how to obey a rule (which Austin would say we could further understand in examining how to disobey, how to be seen as obeying, how it differs from being forced, ordered, etc.--Kripke has this all worked out in advance, Cavell is continuing after Austin). Cavell might add indoctrinating (accepted without justification) because we have yet to imagine all the justifications we might have, and thus where we might go (together, alone) once we feel we are at the end of them.

    When, for example, Metaphysician Undercover repeatedly misunderstands certain notions in mathematics, there is a point at which one concludes that he is simply not participating in the game. One might then either turn away or attempt to follow the path of the eccentric. The question becomes one of what is to be gained in going one way or the other. — Banno

    And this is perhaps an example of such a (moral) moment. There are many examples in Philosophical Investigations that verge on insane, alien, strange reactions or responses. If we "conclude that he is simply not participating in the game", we have reached the bedrock--if we follow Kripke, this is the point of judgment, conclusion. But, conclude how? Are we really aware of what matters to considering it part of/not part of, the game? Even granted we have rules for inclusion, do we have answers about their desire to be excluded from those rules? What does it mean for who I am if I measure the other by my gain or loss? These questions can continue or stop. We might then "turn away", but, if we don't, do we only follow another path, having already judged an "eccentric" from without? This is at least possibilities (grounds?) for a discussion, where the skeptic and their nemesis fight over grounds (before) to avoid having the discussion at all (in the future).
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪jgill
    But even the notion of addition was expanded in 1801 when Gauss introduced the modern concept of modular arithmetic. — jgill

    This actually helps to clarify, so thank you. It is not that math cannot change, or be expanded, but there is a structure/conditions to math (as there is a method for what we consider science, why it produces a certain kind of "fact"). We count (pun intended) something as math because it is predictable, universal, eternal, etc., which is unlike our ordinary criteria for how/when something counts as a justification for obeying a rule.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    Calling it language philosophy implies it has a corner it ought stay in which it resents — Cheshire

    This is reserving judgment? What you see as resentment is perhaps a projection of jealousy (enough to want to trivialize OLP as only about words). Not being interested does not make you right.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    Can't I say something without having to imagine 360 degrees of qualifications any given term might entail. I rather be misunderstood than difficult to understand. — Cheshire

    I might put it that, in making a claim about what the implications are of the expressions of our concepts (how we qualify knowledge, intention, meaning), we are saying something; something important to the problems of philosophy. Calling it "language" philosophy is to assume that there is (always) a space between our words and our lives.
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Luke
    We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--it is meant to be a situation which summons skepticism.
    — Antony Nickles

    Is it meant to "summon skepticism", though? Maybe from Kripke's overly philosophical perspective, but I doubt it would summon skepticism from the average person. This is a very alien way of looking at obeying a rule.     — Luke

    Summon the specter of skepticism for the philosopher (reader), yes; the fear that leads to our need to have a foundational bedrock to justify our acts. An average person might feel an inability to communicate, that words/fact/truth lack power, discouraged at the prospect of (or empowered by) not having anything else to say... but, yes, Witt's example is meant to show us something about philosophy; its powerlessness, and hope.

    Kripke's take on the passage is that this leaves us with only the options of following the rule, change the rule, or be excluded--that it is conformity to a rule.
    — Antony Nickles

    So the exhaustion of justifications for how you should obey a rule, make a wish, apologize, mean what you say, etc. can be that you refuse to follow the rules, but it can also be that we have not yet imagined all the implications, shown you how our interests are aligned, etc.--that there is not only force and defiance
    — Antony Nickles

    This seems to fit into the three options cited above.     — Luke

    Maybe not my best work trying to show a distinction (part of the problem is Witt is discussing justification for how we follow a rule; and Kripke is reading that as we act from inclination ("inspiration" #232) and then are judged as right or wrong based on if we follow the rule, conform to the rule (before there is any justifying why/how you did or didn't follow the rule)). Cavell takes Witt as leaving open the judgment/exclusion to begin a conversation about what it means to have followed a rule (what counts, what matters, etc.). One view ends the relationship, the other begins a moral discussion.

    The fear is of the inability to justify obeying a rule or justify how we obey rules.
    — Antony Nickles

    I get that, but you (or Cavell) were instructing someone about what constitutes obeying a rule.     — Luke

    What constitutes justifying that I obeyed a rule. And Kripke wants to resolve the worry that we may not be able to justify how we obey a rule or what constitutes obeying a rule, just between our impulse to act and your judgment and exclusion; Cavell takes Witt as leaving that possibility of failure open, but also continuing a conversation beyond our pre-determined judgment. An ongoing conversation about, say, what constitutes an example (#223)--rationalizing our relationship instead of it relying on, say, violence (understanding rather than just change).

    You say that the teacher is unable to provide sufficient justification to the student about what constitutes obeying a rule. Then you say - crucially - that the teacher does not have to give up on the student because both teacher and student can "resist philosophy's anxiety". I guess I'm asking: what is it that allows the student to "resist philosophy's anxiety"? — Luke

    To make themselves intelligible. They might claim they did obey the rule; or explain their aversion to conformity--examine their "blind" obedience (#219); as normally we do not "follow" rules (#222). Not to take the position that their actions are unable to be communicated--to feel there is something private, unknowable (not just personal). But really this is an examination of the teacher, and the limitation/impotence of our knowledge (what comes after it).

    But teaching (indoctrinating into society) sometimes runs out of ways to convey, in this example: what constitutes obeying a rule (justifies saying how/that we obey/have obeyed).
    — Antony Nickles

    Teaching/indoctrination is training someone how to obey the rules or how to "go on" (or behave) in a particular way(s). You cannot first teach/train someone what it means to obey a rule in order for them to then go on and obey a rule; otherwise, you would not be able to teach them what it means to obey a rule in the first place.     — Luke

    I agree with framing it as training, but I am trying to show two "particular ways" we can be seen as going on--that maybe it isn't (as in teaching math), that we behave (obey) or not, but that we are learning the skill of how to continue, to be able to justify our actions at all--to move forward rather than not be able to "conflict" or "accord" at all (#201) @Banno.

    You cannot first teach/train someone what it means to obey a rule in order for them to then go on and obey a rule; otherwise, you would not be able to teach them what it means to obey a rule in the first place. — Luke

    Maybe it helps that Witt notices that we learn our whole lives in learning something new (or something like that). That we already: follow, explain ourselves, disobey, judge, defend, etc. So we are not teaching "what it means", as if providing the correct directions, delineating ahead of time what it is to "obey", all other actions being judged as incorrect. I may ask why you didn't obey, say, the golden rule, and you may claim that you did, and then go on to try to justify how what you did was still an instance of obeying the rule. If Kripke's reading is correct, the discussion of what is right happens before my personal action, upon which I am judged. If we take Witt to be reserving judgment, then we begin a dialogue of what it is to, say, treat the other as having a soul (p, 152; 3rd 2001), or convince ourselves we can not know them (p. 192).
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪jgill
    Depends on what you refer to as "rules of math". For instance, the Law of the Excluded Middle is useful in traditional or standard math, but not allowed in constructive math. Turmoil in the jungles of the mind. — jgill

    I believe that is a rule of logic, but, yes, I'm thinking more of addition.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Snakes Alive
    It's more that philosophers will read a series of books written in response to each other, and assume that what's talked about in those books must be universally meaningful or interesting, or get at what problems intrinsically confront human beings in some interesting way. The problem is that their scope is typically limited, and so they're typically wrong — Snakes Alive

    Are you sure you're in the right forum...?
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Luke
    Weren’t you instructing me (or “someone”)? How does your not giving up on me in your instruction (about what constitutes obeying a rule) suddenly become you and I both resisting philosophy’s anxiety? How does that help me? — Luke

    The fear is of the inability to justify obeying a rule or justify how we obey rules. Both Cavell and Kripke leave that possibility open, but Kripke's picture pits "what we typically do" against your instincts, in judgment of your authority, in a sense, before our discussion even gets started. This is to cave into the anxiety of leaving it up to us, to the vision that there is more to us than rules and conventions, that such discussions can be reasonable, between conformity and exclusion.
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    What do I mean when I say that the teacher judges that, for certain cases, the pupil must give the 'right' answer? I mean that the child has given the same answer that he himself would give... that he judges that the child is applying the procedure he himself is inclined to apply. — Kripke, p 90 (emphasis added).
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Banno
    I hadn't noticed it, and have not read Cavell, although I have addressed Kripke's Wittgenstein before. But I'm not sure there is more to be said than is set out in §201. — Banno

    This would be the point at #217 where we are no longer looking at interpreting a rule, but examining the act of obeying a rule; how we teach that and the implications when that falls apart. Cavell and Kripke are similar in believing things can still fall apart, but differ in how we keep it (put it back) together.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Snakes Alive
    I'm wary of claims like [ that we are separate and knowledge is limited ] since there is no a priori reason to listen to philosophers about what is or isn't part of the human condition — Snakes Alive

    Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science.

    One of the things I like about OLP is that it is able to treat problems as they arise in their native home. The bad flip side of this is that its refusal to create an abstract theory or set of procedures prevents it from being very effective in a lot of practical environments. — Snakes Alive

    I agree with the globalization of skeptical doubt, but Witt and Cavell uncover a informative reason the skeptic needs/wants that jump (I tried to get into this about Witt's Lion Quote in another discussion). I'm not sure OLP doesn't have a set of practical procedures--it is being used in aesthetics and literary theory and education.
  • Bedrock Rules: The Mathematical and The Ordinary (Cavell-Kripke on Wittgenstein)
    ↪Luke
    Isn’t it just the case that we obey the rule because that’s the practice/convention and that’s what people typically do here? — Luke

    We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--it is meant to be a situation which summons skepticism.

    Or else we don’t follow the rule for whatever reason, yet the rule still exists because that’s how most people do this particular thing, as a rule. — Luke

    Kripke's take on the passage is that this leaves us with only the options of following the rule, change the rule, or be excluded--that it is conformity to a rule. Where Cavell takes Witt as showing that people's judgments are attuned, they share the same interests, etc.--not as an agreement, but because our lives are similar. Because this happens mostly implicitly, he is trying to make explicit a case in which it doesn't happen. And we can do lots of things, but we do not just point to a rule. So the exhaustion of justifications for how you should obey a rule, make a wish, apologize, mean what you say, etc. can be that you refuse to follow the rules, but it can also be that we have not yet imagined all the implications, shown you how our interests are aligned, etc.--that there is not only force and defiance, which says something about knowledge and reason and pre-determined deontological morals (rules).
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Banno
    This thread is now an excellent example of why ordinary language philosophy is both important and useful. Especially the bit about focusing on specifics. — Banno

    Meanwhile this discussion lies ignored with no response. Either way, not winning.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Manuel
    I think that topics like "what it's like", "mind-body problem" and a few others can be, if not solved, then thought about properly using ordinary language. But these issues continue going. — Manuel

    Again, it's not to get to a problem "thought about properly" (with exceptions). And it is not using a certain type of language, words, terms. It is an investigation into the ordinary criteria we have for language that informs us about the criteria we set for philosophy. And the reason these problems continue going is because, for example, one drive of the human is to not need the human--philosophy's problems shed light on the human condition. OLP is just a more productive way of doing that I've found.

    And who belongs in OLP is also a bit messy. As you say, Austin, Strawson and other get grouped under this heading. At the same time, it seems to me as if some facets OLP are be closely related to logical positivism. Carnap comes to mind as someone who tried to use ordinary language to solve "big problems". Also A.J. Ayer. — Manuel

    Because it is not a theory (not knowledge--an explanation) and does not have a common purpose, the method is used for a lot of things. But logical positivism is the exact nemesis of Wittgenstein's later work, and A.J. Ayer is the example Austin uses of a "descriptive fallacy".
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    The belief, I do have, (all the time) is that language intends some coding and decoding of information. The success of the sounds to carry information was successful prior to talking about it in a strange way. — Cheshire

    What if the "coding" "language" "intends" is something hidden, forgotten? That we need to reflect on when it is not successful?

    If we didn't know what we were saying(when you say it), then we couldn't talk about it; could we? — Cheshire

    People mostly don't know what they are saying when they say it. Only the "what you are saying" is not the "meaning" of the words, but their criteria for identity, the way they are judged, the responsibilities we are expected to uphold, etc.--what makes a mistake different than an accident.

    I'm skeptical of claims that regard insight into meaning delivered in the most difficult to comprehend way. — Cheshire

    Some things you can't tell people--or that they are so resistant to, they can only see for themselves. And you better skip Emerson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.

    some how this thread defies a desire to be understood. — Cheshire

    I think you mean a desire to understand; and that is not a desire to force something, constrain it, require of it a basic explanation.

    Or get stuck on a raft with @Banno and mock each other while drifting, slowly, nowhere..
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Snakes Alive


    I'm going to tread lightly here, as all I am trying to point out is that modern OLP is relevant and important to the future of philosophy.

    on inspection, the philosopher is either confused, or is expressing nascently some desire to refer to what is normally called a fox using a different word, 'wolf' – for some reason. Hence the issue, if there is one, is linguistic. — Snakes Alive

    Let's take the example of the skeptic, who wants to say knowledge is essentially groundless. Now most people would put OLP in the camp that says, "No it is not!", only by means of showing that the skeptic is confused about what they are saying (or saying meaning is use). But Wittgenstein (and, after, Cavell) are able to show that there is a truth to skepticism, that knowledge is limited--we are separate (see The Claim of Reason). Now this is not "linguistic"; it is part of the human condition.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Manuel
    Yeah, that could be attempted trying to figure out what are the instances in which people use words to either refer or shout or anything else people do with words. — Manuel

    OLP is not trying to come up with "all the conditions" or instances, but just to compare the ordinary criteria we use in saying something like "I believe it might rain" (a hypothesis), or "I really believe in the Dodgers this year" (feel strongly), compared to the goal of some philosophy to differentiate belief from truth, and comparing the difference in the criteria. And this isn't to say OLP is trying to find or impose the "correct" way, though Austin may feel stronger about that.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    OLP informs what it means to say "I know"? — Cheshire

    OLP makes claims** about the implications of when, for example, we say, "I know your phone number". How it matters, what counts as an instance of it, in what ways it is meaningful to us. Here I am either confirming that you have given it to me, or I am making an assertion for which I can produce evidence to justify; i.e., that I can tell you what it is. But we also say, "I know" when someone makes a claim upon us, like, "I am in pain", which tells us about the problem of other minds, because we cannot confirm with knowledge that the other is in pain; so in this sense we acknowledge it, which also tells us something about our moral lives. **this is a type of claim I explain in an earlier discussion on OLP.

    People have been arguing about what it is "I know" means. — Cheshire

    If you are looking at the criteria for when/why we say it, the implications of saying it, the responsibilities we are expected to answer for; you are arguing about what knowledge is.

    The philosophical problem best addressed by OLP is the phrase "I know". — Cheshire

    I believe, I mean, I think, I understand, I see, I intended, I doubt...
  • What is "the examined life"?
    ↪Shawn
    ...the examined life is of importance to Socrates in that it may lead to various terms that lead to a better life. Such terms can be called, "enlightened", "rational", "virtuous".

    Yet, without context these terms are ambiguous in terms of living an examined life. If we to take what Socrates said as important to ourselves, then what does it mean to live an examined life, as surely it is to our benefit to do so?

    Do you think it boils down to ethics again? How so?

    Or more technically, what kind of analysis or even methodology should a person incorporate when doing this examination? Isn't it really psychoanalysis?

    Contemplation seems to be the natural arising thought in regards to the issue. So, what kind of contemplation?     — Shawn

    Well I hate to bring up a methodology by name being hammered out (upon) elsewhere, but the examination (contemplation) of ordinary thresholds and procedures (criteria) in contexts, for, as an example: an excuse, teaches us about ourselves (our actions) and how we take responsibility and avoid it, etc. The further argument, by Wittgenstein among others, is this makes one a better person, or able to see (be enlightened as to) where our part comes in (what virtue is). Socrates, unfortunately, was only looking for one (kind of) answer, rather than necessary for each practice (concept) in its own way.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Chaz
    "What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

    I guess I got sidetracked by the poor depiction of OLP that I didn't even answer the question (@chad @Manuel @god must be atheist @Amalac @Cheshire @Banno)

    Stanley Cavell examines the Problem of the Other Minds in "Knowing and Acknowledging" and covers a lot of ground on skepticism in his work; Austin examines the standard of true/false statements in How to Do Things With Words; Wittgenstein examines why we want a referential picture of meaning and what that means about the limitations of knowledge, and then the ethical position we are in; Nietszche uses examples of the things we say and do to show that our moral realm is affected by our desires, and how history plays a part, as well as our part; Emerson and Thoreau are drawing out our ordinary criteria from so far inside that it almost doesn't seem like they are doing philosophy, or that it applies, say, to Descartes, when Emerson says "we dare not say, 'I think,' 'I am,' ". I would even argue that Socrates is doing OLP, but that he ignores all the criteria except the ones he has in his back pocket.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    OLP makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. — Tony Nickles

    Look me in the eye and claim this isn't bullshitting. I don't mean can you rationalize it either. Rather, is there really information content that could be further examined? In a meaningful way; as it applies to any philosophical problem called X. X=? — Cheshire

    I edited that comment to say I provided Malcolm's example (about "I know") above, and Austin's as well. Cavell (in Must We Mean What We Say) draws out Austin's examination of "intention": his finding (claim) that one condition is that something has to be "phishy" compared to our ordinary criteria for an action in order for there to be (the possibility of) an intention (see the cows and donkeys above). Now if we have criteria for pulling off an action correctly (felicitously Austin will say), apart from true/false, then we have a rational way to discuss a moral situation (understanding excuses, judgment, etc.), and also a explanation of the "normative" nature of language/our actions--you may say anything you want; at a certain point you are no longer, say, apologizing, or, playing chess (Witt's example). That conversation is the one Socrates started, Kant tried to finish, Nietzsche pried open again; one which we want finished, and ahead of our actions, with certainty, etc. Philosophy itself is under investigation (again).
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Cheshire
    Meta-semantics? — Cheshire

    Semantics smacks of only about words, or limited in importance to language. When OLP examines the criteria of what we say when, we learn about our lives.

    First, words are our tools...

    Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things:...

    ...these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters...     — Austin

    The second [ quote ] both negates it and muddies the water. — Cheshire

    He is alluding to the historical argument that corresponds words to "meanings" or "thoughts", as if these are facts or things--that they refer to/from them.

    The third explains... it's authoritarian dismissal as the emperor's new wardrobe and served to maintain the religious madness we are still trying to cure. Did that make sense? Not asking for agreement; just is it a coherent claim about a thing? — Cheshire

    Austin is defensively dismissive of philosophy's profundity over our ordinary criteria. Wittgenstein does a better job of investigating what philosophy wants in supplanting our ordinary criteria, and what it says about the human condition.

    The point I should be making is that if you can't say something coherent about simply 'words', then stop. — Cheshire

    The desire for "coherency" and the attitude that words are simple, are some of the reasons philosophy has theories of language (all of it), and meaning (in every case, for every thing). Your unwillingness to look further may hide the need for a certain answer.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Manuel
    "I'm only saying that people refer, it's is an act that people do. They can refer with words, as is often the case, or with gestures. — Manuel

    I agree; OLP would be looking into what (ordinary criteria) makes it "referring" in different cases, maybe how it is differentiated from implying, in order to see how "referring" is held to different (metaphysical) criteria at times, such as:

    Either words refer or they don't. — Manuel

    Austin and Wittgenstein's starting point is that, yes, words can refer, but they do not only refer. They marry us, make promises, lie. That not only are things not meaningful in one way, but everything has its own ways; each of: agreeing, condescending, threatening, pointing, playing chess. (Some of these are/can be done with words, some not, of course.) And that maybe there are reasons for this, for us wanting referring to work a particular way.

    @bongo fury
    That Frodo depends on words isn't that "Frodo" refers to words. "Frodo" refers to a hobbit, and hobbits exist only in a fictional piece of writing.     — Michael

    And how OLP might help here is with the criteria for referring as naming; and with how we use "existing" as, say: alive; or: among the records we have but not all that we might find; or: "real" as opposed to literary, but then what if we want to say hobbits have an actual impact on me, as much as people (who can come off as unreal)? or that some people are alive, but lack existence (their self does). I realize these are mostly questions, but part of the point is that you must answer these for yourself for them to be philosophically relevant (they are not statements), that you could continue to answer these types of questions to shed light on why we want a referent to be a certain type of thing.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪god must be atheist
    I see, you did not take my advice on how NOT to explain things with negatives — god must be atheist

    I'm not sure we agree on what the grammar is for advice. When someone doesn't ask questions but just makes blind assertions, one answer is: well, no, not quite, more like....

    You used two negatives with one blurred, muddled, ineffectual, vague positive claim. — god must be atheist

    Well unless you have a counterclaim or a question, this is just rude; and just because you don't understand it, doesn't make it any on those things.

    So... I don't know your point, until you state it in ordinary language. Simple, ordinary, common language. — god must be atheist

    This is the most common misconception--granted, thus, it is a dumb name--but the last thing OLP can do is "state" things "with" "simple" "common" language. It makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. I do provide examples elsewhere in this thread.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪god must be atheist
    Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.
    ***
    After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question     — god must be atheist

    OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. See The Mathematical and the Ordinary.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Manuel
    Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense. — Manuel

    I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivist logic), and Cavell explores what that means for us, our struggle to overcome the fear of our responsibility.

    referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. — Manuel

    Let's try this OLP style: "Referring"--as is promising, indicating, distinguishing--is a concept ("knowing" "intending", say, practices). I would offer that one ordinary criteria of referring is that it is something words can do, that you actually can do it (get the referring done) using only words, that the words are the doing of it--"I refer you to Exhibit A". With those words, the act of referring is accomplished. Well, yes, you said it, but you can (or not) acknowledge that saying: "I convince you" does not make one convinced (but we can talk about what/how words convinced us). And I even do something to you; I have referred you to something, as in: given notice. There is no now avoiding being referred, even if you don't, thereafter, actual refer to whatever someone has referred you to.

    That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements. — Manuel

    My claim is that these are the workings, the criteria for identity, the terms of correctness, of referring; if you disagree (on the features), there may be examples or counter-examples, after which I might: see and grant that something is an important distinction, admit I was thinking of something else, point towards the concept in different contexts, etc.--but we have a process for coming to agreement, call it rational--even if only to learn how we/to disagree. Now can we learn anything from this, or from looking more into this, about the philosophical idea of reference?

    Also, the desire to never have a disagreement, fueled by skepticism, creates the opposite of the kind of "ordinariness" that language has.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Banno
    It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno

    Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out by Cavell into an investigation of our shitty human condition.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪god must be atheist
    Thanks for writing the above, but I actually don't see how it relates to our argument. My position is that a summary may be a good starting point while not being (or else being) a good summary at all, of philosophical (other other types) of enquiry for the otherwise uninitiated. Your counter point was to decry three-sentence or shorter garment label descriptions (so to speak) of any philosophical trend, particularly the trend of ordinary language philosophy. — god must be atheist

    If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than what it is telling you. Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. Not just changing your mind, as in now you hold a different opinion, but changing the actual way in which you think, broadening your sense of the world, realizing a greater version of your self. Wittgenstein does not have a "theory of meaning" anyone (he) can tell you. Even the method of OLP can not be explained by its outcomes (as is being assumed here); there are no conclusions; no "maxim" or answer, e.g., when questions are framed without any sense of the picture itself. Most importantly, the postulations of what is implied when we say ___, are for you to see (come to) for yourself, or they have no force; they are not arguments, not true/false "theories" or statements--what is there to summarize?
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Amalac
    If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so. — Amalac

    The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to come to (uncover) some agreement. It is to shed light on the problems of traditional philosophy, as our language (the criteria for it) reflects our interests, and judgments, and the ways things fall apart, etc. This can be a study, as Austin does, or when we do not know how to continue with a concept, as Wittgenstein examines.

    If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game — Amalac

    And, again, Wittgenstein examined lots of words (and the different but ordinary criteria there are for judging in which of their sense they have been used, in this context) in finding out there is no one way in which words are meaningful to us--that there is no maxim.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪god must be atheist
    Thanks for providing an example of your point: — god must be atheist

    Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept (realizing that a concept can have multiple options--"senses" Witt says--ways they make sense, ways they can be used in different contexts.

    One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept (or ignore or reject) the claim their expression of pain makes on me.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪god must be atheist
    I didn't mean to be condescending, but you are better off diving into the text yourself and making your own mistakes. Especially about a method that is not about arriving at theories or making arguments or explaining. A knee-jerk, superficial, three-sentence takeaway can't be anything but misleading.

    OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself.
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Hanover
    Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. — Hanover

    This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow foundational. This is a cliff-note misunderstanding; like that OLP champions "ordinary language"; which will solve philosophy, or make it irrelevant. I'm sorry, but this is just a jealous dismissal without any real understanding, which unfortunately happens more often than not really though.

    From Wikipedia: — Chaz

    Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries (even mine).
  • What are the "Ordinary Language Philosphy" solutions to common philosophical problems?
    ↪Chaz


    What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

    OLP is not a theory (argument) but a method, though it is working within the analytical tradition (calling it "linguistic" is to dismiss it as not also about our world). Some people say it is a diagnosis, but I resist the conclusive implication of calling it "therapeutic"--that it makes philosophy, or its problems, go away, or treats them as errors or a confusion. It does not pit "ordinary" language ("what words actually mean in everyday use") against philosophical language (though G.E. Moore appears to be a example of that). Moore did want to resolve our skepticism; Austin in a sense ignored it, focusing on the fallout: positivism's rejection of anything but true/false statements. Wittgenstein's later work started with a similar issue (his earlier self) as Austin, in trying to show that there is not one way of how things have meaning, but his "conclusion" is not that language creates skepticism (though its criteria is the means). What he found out, uncovered, learned about us--which is a better way of framing OLP's goal (not a "solution")--is our desire, our weaknesses, our blindness to ourselves (philosophy's and humanity's). That our desire for certainty is a reaction to the threat of skepticism, but that it is situational, possible to investigate, but not always (or forever) resolvable by our knowledge.

    The method is not to attend to the "details" of language, but to see or imagine what matters to us when we say "...", for example, "I know..." (in every day situations and in philosophical ones). That this is philosophical data, much as Socrates' questions, that helps deepen and broaden our picture/understanding of our world, our philosophical problems, and our selves.

    I did attempt an OP on it Ordinary Language Philosophy but I'm not sure I did a very good job of clearing up the mischaracterizations. Stanley Cavell is a good current example--try any essay in "Must We Mean What We Say".

    An example from that OP:

    The method is to ask or imagine (as Austin says): what do we ordinarily imply ("mean") when we say…, e.g., “I know”, "I think", "I forget", "I apologize", which also might involve fleshing out the context (situation) that would go along with that case. As an example, when we ordinarily say an action was done accidentally rather than mistakenly, we can imagine a case (a context): that “the gun went off in my hands and killed the donkey” (accidentally), as opposed to: “I did want to kill the cow, but hit the donkey instead” (mistakenly) (this is Austin's example). The example allows us to see what is usually skipped over unexamined: to describe what “actions” are and how they work, e.g., that “intention” does not come up in every circumstance (just when asked about a mistake) and how moral culpability works (Austin will talk of excuses—“The donkey just walked in the way!”).
  • Nietzsche's condemnation of the virtues of kindness, Pity and compassion
    ↪Ross Campbell
    Why does Nietzsche almost unique among many of the famous thinkers have to write in such a highly ambiguous way. — Ross Campbell
    This makes me think of Wittgenstein saying "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." By the time everyone's way of thinking is framed by Kant in reaction to Descartes still looking for Plato's knowledge, it takes a different form of argument not to just fall into the same trap of relativism vs absolutism. Thoreau is not talking about living in a house in the woods, it's about getting your mental (philosophical) house in order. What you think you understand about Nietszche is not wrong, it just lacks depth and an openness that there is more than meets the eye. Attempt to take him as a serious philosopher--not a social critic with personal opinions--writing within the history of the philosophical tradition. If you take something as the first thing it appears to you to be, you will never see anything new in the world. It is really easy to glance at Nietszche (Wittgenstein, Hegel, Heidegger, Emerson, Marx, Austin) think you got the gist and dismiss him. Try thinking analogously, mythologically; imagine he is tricking you into becoming an example of the moralistic person he is critiquing. He can't tell you in the way you want because you have to see it for/in yourself, which is a matter of turning against your first thoughts and looking at it from a new place. I'd try Human, All Too Human for the most straight forward text, though he plays out a lot of examples in the second half.
  • Best introductory philosophy book?
    ↪John McMannis
    Real philosophy is not about knowledge of theories, so summaries and introductions spoil the point, which is to listen to how you react when you read the original texts. The result is to change who you are and how you think so there is no shortcut. Don't start with Nietszche, or Descartes, or anyone modern because they usually have an axe to grind. Plato or Aristotle are good because they form the reference for most everyone after. Mill and Hume and Hobbs and Rouseau are all fairly easy to read, which might be the best place to start (do not attempt Kant or Hegel or Heidegger).
  • Nietzsche's condemnation of the virtues of kindness, Pity and compassion
    ↪Ross Campbell
    I'm afraid I couldn't understand everything you were saying. — Ross Campbell

    Well, if you are interested, I stand ready to clarify, draw something out further, or answer any questions.

    I think there is a grain of truth in Nietzsche's attack on Christianity as being a slave morality. — Ross Campbell

    Or we can simply continue to see these as his opinions (see Witt. P.I. p. 152). I am arguing this is not a discussion of pity and compassion (better to read Arendt, Foucalt, etc.). In this vein, Nietszche is challenging our habit to think we see and can judge immediately. He is asking for a different reader as much as a different moral culture. I found that if I felt I "got him", especially at first glance, I would be wrong, missing something; maybe this is not an argument, but a call for something, a claim on us? Maybe these are not statements (true/false) about our society, but challenges for a change of our entire picture of morality.

    And the idea of our being slaves is, again, an analogy, say, slaves to our desire to give our self (our responsibility) away to our morals. Emerson calls for us to "master" ourselves or someone else will; i.e., our unexamined culture makes us a slave. We are quietly desperate, in chains, etc.--this is not new.

    The fundamental problem with Nietzsche , as with some other existentialists is that they are too individualistic in their thinking. — Ross Campbell

    As I said at the bottom of my original post, this is the other side of misunderstanding Nietszche. If I do not give myself away to morals, that does not mean I abandon them--we take them on, examine the context (or lack of it), history, use (misuse)--perhaps each case on its own terms (we become adverse to them, as Emerson phrases it). He is not anti-morality, but simply asking us to inhabit our moral life. All his talk of self does not mean we then become the sole arbitrator of what is right; that we have some right to a private moralism (equal to the moralism we inflict on each other with our public morals). The call for my will to guide me (my whim Emerson says) may be to help others, be a good citizen, go along with everyone else; my duty need not be our downfall, nor different than yours or anyone's. The aspiration to the self is not an abdication of moral responsibility (but a call for it); ironically, irresponsibility comes from the reliance only on unexamined morals.

    Aristotle said, "Man is a social animal". — Ross Campbell

    Nietszche is different from Aristotle, and most traditional philosophers, in that he is not advocating for a particular type of human. He is not explaining or telling us what human nature is. Another way to think of this is that he is not talking about what we ought to be or do (setting our future goal or ideal). His is an open-ended call to aspire to your next self, a revitalized culture. Can we trust each other? or are we bound to pre-judge us all? Can we have our humanity without it appearing we desire an anarchy of no culture, no rules, no language?
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Antony Nickles

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