Much of OLP was, and I think should still be seen, as destructive to philosophy, and is a matter of 'seeing through' it. — Snakes Alive

There is much made of some OLP philosophers, Moore, Austin, etc., taking OLP as solving skepticism. And some who take Witt as either solving it or making analytic philosophy a confusion that can and should be undone (permanantly), as I believe is Rorty's stance. But I think Cavell is on to something when he talks about "the truth of skepticism", which builds on Witt's seeing the limits of knowledge (and thus our responsibility), which also is a thread which bridges the gap between analytical and continental philosophy (as everything is not explained through manipulating a general theory of language/knowledge). I do believe the methods and revelations of OLP are capatible with traditional philosophy (taking the good from the bad).

For me it clicked with Cavell's Knowing and Acknowledging, which I've just realized, references Malcolm.

Suppose we're going through the forest and we hear rustling, so we go to investigate. We look beyond and in a clearing there's an animal. We are close enough to see it perfectly clearly. You say it's a wolf, and I say it's a fox. When you protest, I ask, how can that possibly be a wolf? It looks and acts like a fox – it has all the features typically associated with a fox. But you protest, and say 'I grant you that – it has all the characteristics of what we would normally call a fox. Nevertheless, it is a wolf.' — Snakes Alive

This records the fact that traditional philosophy strips away our ordinary criteria and any context in the attempt to generalize for universality and ensure certainty by fixing the picture of language, even with identity for particulars (Austin works very hard picking out Goldfinches). The step we really run into trouble with is the need for justification that it is a "real" fox.

Mentality is whatever you think it is, and from which whether images are part and parcel of it, is then determinable. We are not saying imagination, because we already said mentality. If it was the ability to bring up images, then they are presupposed and the question remains as to their part and parcel. — Antony Nickles

I have the feeling if this is not just a trap, it is a guessing game or riddle; which, of course, I can't help but play/try to solve. If calling up an image has to be accepted as essential to "mentality", and it is not related to imagination, then... mentality is the group of stuff you can do by yourself, like talking, remembering? I feel like this is too trivial to be right.

I discovered where you got your writing style. — Mww

Ohhhh, found out! Yes, I have read too much Cavell. The reason I picked that up is that I find it respectful and an acknowledgement that this is a claim on you, not an explanation/statement, and there is the possibility I have not got it right and there might be additional evidence to be considered (but specifically not that I can take it however I want for any purpose).

after dropping out all those stupefying cogito interruptus parentheticals — Mww

Tangential to the extreme. I've found the point is that part of philosophy is listening to what interests you, and another point is that this is not a theory so much as an investigation, one that opens avenues for further inquiry, so there are a lot of questions left unanswered, which is separately an essential part of OLP: that you answer the questions Witt etc. asks, for yourself, to see what they are seeing for yourself (what Grammar is shown be the examples).

“...And what we mean (...) to say, like what we mean (...) to do, is something we are responsible for....”, pg 197

.... is merely a reiteration of that which has always been the case, long before this article was written, because the rules for what is meant by what is said, are never simultaneously established in the saying, but already completely established beforehand in the relation between the words said and the conceptions thought, from which they arise. — Mww

I'll let the formulation of Grammar as "rules" go for now, and say I agree that Grammar has been established beforehand (as part of learning and joining society), though "completely" is also a bit far, as seeing that "we are responsible for" "the saying" does play an extra part because, once said/done, we are bound to our expressing, acting, "responsible for" having said it, for answering why, how, among all the possibilities and among what part of the context is important, we said this now, here--we are called out by it, seen in it. And also to point out that Witt and Austin's goal is that our lives ([all] our judgements, distinctions, interests, in this language-game) are attuned to these words (concepts**), not that words "arise" from "concepts" (as in "ideas" I would guess) which are thought (casually, or otherwise). Witt's idea of "concepts"** (completely different) is a grouping of regular and complex parts of our lives (language games) like justice, meaning, understanding, but also, forgiving, threatening, sitting in a chair, pointing, learning a series, seeing, seeing an aspect, and that each of these have their own Grammar (roughly, ways they work, as they are part of our lives); the point being that an investigation of those shows us something about our philosophical issues (not to justify those claims, again, as it were, like Cavell says).

And to which the question regarding images becomes its most relevant. — Mww

And here I think I can say that if the idea that I am guessing as the answer to the riddle--of "concepts" being thought (then?) turned into words--is what you mean by "mentality', then I would say Witt is trying to diagnose the reason people are drawn to that picture by showing how public "meaning" and language are, and how "understanding" is relational (see comments above) at a point where knowledge reaches its limits.

"That language is dead is to say that writing comes before the speaking (as if opposite of Derrida I believe Joshs)."
--Antony Nickles

Writing’ for Derrida means that what is spoken is not immediately understood but is deferred, delayed in its reception. — Joshs

I put your name in there as I thought you might have a better idea of Derrida's take on this idea of the life and death of language, or of the priority or primacy or metaphorical temporality of voice and writing (the garmene?) I know there is a "trace" and the idea of "presence" but I'm not sure they come into play here.

I've spent a lot of time reading the 'canonical' OLP philosophers,
* * *
OLP spawned some of the most exquisite methodological discussions about how inquiry itself works that I've ever read.
* * *
To read Ryle on what constitutes 'ordinary' language, what it is for words to have a 'use,' and so on, is truly a pleasure, and the back-and-forth between Ayer and Austin, and Mates and Cavell, are wonderful. I don't think analytic philosophy has ever reached such self-awareness and methodological heights again. It was a rare burst of sophistication. — Snakes Alive

Well, you are officially in charge of this thread. I'm finding "explaining" it is either beyond me or does little to shift people's framework to consider it, and I'm afraid I don't seem to have the skills to provide compelling examples and don't even do a good job of stealing Austin's or Cavell's. I have posted a few other oblique attempts, and I will, of course, carry this on.

The less-celebrated OLPers, such as Malcolm, Wisdom, Urmson, Ambrose, and Lazerowitz, are all worth reading in their own right. — Snakes Alive

I'm impressed. I have read everything Cavell has written (the essay in "Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome" looking at Ryle on rules is even better than the Mates' one--great political philosophy book) and Witt and not enough Austin, and I have a book of Wisdom's, but I will check those out. I have considered reading Stephen Mulhall, Alice Crary, Tracy strong, or Cora Diamond--people "influenced by" OLP, but I find myself reading back with fresh eyes on late Heidegger, Nietszche, Hegel, Kant, Marx, and Emerson. Any modern/old interests?

I'm in dire need of getting over the the name of the method, and looking more towards understanding the benefits thereof a bit better than I currently do/can. — creativesoul

Well that's refreshing. The name leads to a lot of confusion. If I didn't already suggest it, this essay by Cavell is a good explanation and example (way better than I appear to be doing); though a little dense, it's only 40 pages.

https://sites.ualberta.ca/~francisp/Phil488/CavellMustWeMean58.pdf

(I provide the whole link as I understand you are working on a 1994 PowerBook)

It's strange but the idea is that we formulate an expression, say, "I know..." (maybe a regular one or a traditional philosophical one) and then imagine a context where this would be said, or what about it makes it impossible to imagine a context, (even a fantastical one), and other variations of this, and in doing so we see something traditional philosophy usually skips over, that has the same legitimacy and addresses the same issues.

If you skip through the comments and find ones with quotes, like in the OP, those are examples (though pretty horrible really). I made a list of Witt quotes too and tried to list out some misconceptions again somewhere in the middle. I really need to re-write the OP in having learned where a lot of people are coming from, and the assumptions they carry about OLP.

hope you see that this makes your rebuttal to my point appear to be that you know what reality is, and I do not.
— Antony Nickles

Yes, you suggested that a human being could remove oneself from the context of intention, and I think that's simply unreal. It's no different from asking me to accept a proposition which I strongly believe to be false. I'd tell you that if you believe that proposition you simply do not know the reality of the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand you want to let me know that you disagree, but you simply rejected this with no justification than I'm not living in reality. It is arrogant and not even an argument. I find it rude and I will not tolerate it. This is a philosophical discussion. If you speak to me like that again I will not respond.

To say that we ought to discuss these activities as if there is no intention involved would be foolish. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is unacceptable behavior. I feel I have been quite patient and met with nothing but refusal of consideration. It is not a foolish argument. I appreciate the opportunity to attempt to refine how I present this material but a blanket denial in the end leaves nothing to say. I hope you have learned something from all the effort I put in but I fear you are not ready to hear from others other than to defend your beliefs.

..our shared lives...
— Antony Nickles

Again, this is incoherent to me. My life is my life, and yours is yours. We are separated by space, we are born and die at different times. There is no such thing as a shared life, except perhaps the Siamese twins'. — Metaphysician Undercover

It must seem like a lonely world. Good day sir.

Regarding the rules of language games...

One need not know or interpret the rules to learn them. The knowing is shown in the using. We do not call trees "cats". Etc. We learn that trees are called "trees" by drawing correlations between "tree" and trees. Learning the rules is embedded in language acquisition. We learn that "Shut the door" can have several different meanings, depending upon the speakers' tone, facial expressions, volume, etc. The different contextual elements are part of the different meanings(uses) 'tied to' the same words. The same words are part of several different uses. We learn about the differences in meaning by virtue of drawing correlations between the same words and the different contextual elements(tone, volume, facial expressions, etc.) — creativesoul

I agree; and this is an important fact for OLP; that we learn our language (concepts) and the world at the same time. That our language is molded by the interests, judgments, distinctions, etc. that we have shared over the course of our (everyone's) living in the world.

Regarding ordinary language...

I'm all for striving to use as much common language as possible to explain something or other. The simpler the better assuming no loss in meaningful explanation. I'm also inclined to believe that Ockham's razor is worthy of guiding principle status, so... — creativesoul

If it matters, not at all what OLP is about. But I agree Kant and especially Hegel could have dialed the terminology back some.

Not "what do you mean by___" It's: "what do we mean when we say___?"
— Antony Nickles

Your phrases "we say", and "we mean", are incoherent, as if a phrase could be properly interpreted outside its context. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think maybe you are taking this as a statement, when I am trying to explain the method of OLP, which necessarily involves fleshing out the context in which the example would be said.

But this is to just divide acts/expressions into intended ones and unintended ones, so the intended ones still fall under the picture of a ever-present cause (for those "intended"). And this is different than my proposing the question of intention only comes up sometimes, not that it applies to all acts that are (pre?) "intended".
— Antony Nickles

You are simply denying the reality of the situation. Human beings are intentional beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hope you see that this makes your rebuttal to my point appear to be that you know what reality is, and I do not.

They always have goals and therefore they cannot separate themselves from their goals, as if they could pass some time without having any goals. So an habitual, "unintended" human act, exists within the wider context of intention. When I walk to the store, my legs are moving in an unintended habitual way, but this is within the context of me intending to get to the store. When I talk to my brother, my lips are moving and I'm making sounds in an unintended habitual way, but this is within the wider context of intending to speak to him about some subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not denying that people have goals or "intend" to do things, just that I think the picture is framing them a particular way (I could say they seem to be in the present, when we can see from examples--below--that they are about the future), as if there was the intention, and then the action. Or that there is some thing "the intention" which divides these two types of action (habitual and intended), maybe rather than dividing them between movement and action? Anyway, you say "my legs are moving in an unintended habitual way, but this is within the context of me intending to get to the store. When I talk to my brother, my lips are moving and I'm making sounds in an unintended habitual way, but this is within the wider context of intending to speak to him about some subject." (Which, by the way, is close to doing OLP, but these are explanations.) Can we not just say: "I'm going to the store." or: "I'm speaking to my brother about something." We do not need your picture of intention here-- what is the determination of where the line is between intended an unintended? I could say: "I'm intending to go to the store." and there is a context you can imagine for this. And also "I'm intending to speak to my brother about something." and a context or this as well. And these show us something about intention--that it is a hope for the future, which, however, may go wrong (like shooting a cow instead of a donkey).

If it's difficult to justify the idea that "you and I" exist as one united entity called "we", how much more difficult is it to justify your claim that "all English speakers" exist as such a united entity? — Metaphysician Undercover

"Our" is not an "entity" but merely a way of saying our language, its Grammar, our shared lives, are owned by each one of us and together--a form of social contract. And with each expression, we consent to the contract (agree to be bound by our expression), or break it.

"What about the circumstances led to the mistake?" The fact that the person (oneself a part of the circumstances) did not properly account for the particulars. "Why did you shoot the cow instead of the donkey?" "Someone put the cow into the donkey's stall and I didn't confirm that it was the donkey I was shooting." This is the answer to "why" in every instance of a mistake, "I did not take into account all the particulars of the circumstances". A mistake is an intentional act which was made without adequate knowledge of the particulars of the situation, therefore it does not result as intended. It is because each situation consists of particulars which are unique to that situation, as "the circumstances", and the person fails to account for the particulars, that mistakes are made. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see what you see here as part of the Grammar of a mistake: failing to account for the particulars of a situation, and I agree. And I think this is a very good job of using OLP to get there.

"We are separate people, but not separated by anything...
— Antony Nickles

The biggest problem of idealism is to account for the fact that we, as individual minds, are separated. There is a very real medium of separation between your mind and my mind, which we call the material world, and this very real separation forces the idealist toward principles to account for this reality, to avoid solipsism. If you deny the reality of this separation between us, you force us into a reality in which there is no material world, and we are all just one solipsistic mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to the point I made previously, which Witt gets to and Cavell elaborates (in Knowing and Acknowledging); we are separate bodies, and that gap can not be intellectually solved by knowledge--we have a further relation to each other. We make claims of the other, and they accept those claims, or deny them (see my post on Witt's lion quote). Character is higher than intellect Emerson says. And Nietzsche is pointing to this as well.

Understanding as:

looking at use...
seeing certain words articulated in a novel or curious way
thinking anew...
intentionally suspend[ing] our judgement...
carefully considering another's viewpoint...
grasping where another is coming from...
wanting to hear from another...
entertaining - sometimes said to be "for argument's sake"...
begin[ing]... with an attitude that everyone deserves a certain modicum of respect...
hear[ing] them out as thoroughly as is needed... — creativesoul

Hear, hear. An ethics of understanding, being understanding to reach the point I try to make of Witt's in my further response to @Metaphysician Undercover--where we can go on from/for the other, and the similar necessity in OLP that the criteria for Grammar being true is that you can see it for yourself, come (from where I am, what I have said) to it on your own.

Our original worldview is almost entirely adopted, and all the stuff you learn to talk about is already meaningful to those with whom you learn to talk about it with. In this way, the world is always already meaningful, if and only if, the world is equal to word (to what one can talk about, what has been talked about, or what can be talked about). It's not. — creativesoul

You bring up a good point which I have overlooked; that interest, attraction, and what is meaningful are very important. Now what is meaningful for us (everyone) is what shapes our lives and our Grammar of our concepts (our shared interests in judgments, distinctions, what counts, how we decide, or reconcile, etc.--for each concept). But there is also our personal interest and what attracts us about something--meaningful as impassioned. Witt will say "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the use its life?" #432 That is to say something happens in the expressing (not within the language, or me), the fact of me saying this now, here and the options of the concept that come into play. That language is dead is to say that writing comes before the speaking (as if opposite of Derrida I believe @Joshs). We make our concepts come alive by being sloppy or ignorant of the way they work, or calling for a higher justice (aptness) as it were for our expressions--being answerable for them, called out by them, and openly prepared for further intelligibility.

Surely everything said is meaningful at least to the creature saying it, even if it sounds like gibberish to everyone else. — creativesoul

Well, not really (everything?)--sometimes we say things flippantly, mechanically, under duress, etc. To a certain degree we could say the person may care about receiving a basic respect for having said something, but some people don't care about that even. Sometimes we are passionate, sometimes we just say things we don't care about.

Stubborn bunch, aye. They’ve done the heavy lifting, so perhaps have earned the right.

I’m familiar with the essay. What I found quite telling about it, is located in fn2, wherein it is admitted that the explication of the stated purpose of the essay, follows conditions "as I understand them to be”. — Mww

Well, footnote 1 talks about philosophical problems common between OLP philosophers and that similar questions enter into their attempts to deal with those problems. He says it is with these questions he is concerned, and qualifies that to say, with what he understand them to be. I take that to refer to the fact that among the common problems there are similar, but not the same, questions, and that Cavell counts (understands) certain of those questions to be his to answer among all the similar (though non-identical) ones that enter into dealing with those problems. I will also note that Cavell interestingly earlier says philosophy for him is a set of texts rather than a set of problems, so it may be that he counts (understands) the questions to be categorically about something else (the "what") than problems.

That's all you took from that essay?

“understanding” is precisely the quanta of the heavy lifting to which the especially post-Renaissance continentals directed themselves, and the anti-metatheoretical analyticals have back-burnered. — Mww

I enjoy Cavell because he talks about bridging that trans-continental divide, which I take as meaning that analytical philosophy can be meaningful to how we live our lives (being a better person, to use the parlance of the scurge that is self-help). I did talk about Witt's take on "understanding" with Meta in the last few comments.

Question: are images part and parcel of human mentality? — Mww

Well this sounds like a loaded question--what is "mentality"? Are we saying imagination? Or just the ability to bring up an image? I would say "part and parcel" sounds like a lot even with either in terms as general as "human" anything, but I'd need more I think.

Witt did not have a good grasp upon human thought and belief. Otherwise, he would not be looking for "hinge propositions" as the 'bedrock'. — creativesoul

That is actually a misapprehension based on a misquote. The teacher is only "inclined" to draw the line and say "this is what we do". His desire is not to "ground" anything as needed by one attempting to solve skepticism. The teacher is always open to try again to reach over the gap between us (except Ms. Kemik, horrible woman).

I'm afraid I will never understand you then, if you're not willing to compromise with your terms, and explain yourself in a way which appears to be intelligible to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh the irony. The sense I was saying it was: being understanding. Of the sense as in "knowing", Witt will speak of "mastery of a technique" ("is able to") #150 or "now I can go on" #323 or that it is "in the application" #146 based on the "particular circumstances" #154. As if not a middle ground or agreement that people reach between my meaning and your interpretation, and not an inner process, but, as it were, being able to continue from the point of the other; the circumstance dictating what it is to show one can continue--here, being to apply a method.

If, simply asking the question, "what do you mean by...?" is the method, then ...I'm practicing it very well. I've been asking you, what do you mean by "ordinary criteria", by "grammar", etc. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not just asking questions. And not asking them on behalf of you, to me. Not "what do you mean by___" It's: "what do we mean when we say___?" This may appear trivial to you, but it is crucial to come up with something we would say about the concept, and prepare to elaborate on the context. And, as I said, then we can see and make claims about the grammar from the example. And "we" is, as I said, ever English speaker, as it is a claim to universality (subject of course to clarification, etc.)

I spoke of familiar, habitual activities, which most of language use is. These language acts are mostly just responses, reactions, to the particular circumstances which we find ourselves in, we might even call them reflexive. So these language acts cannot be directly tied to any meaning or intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this is to just divide acts/expressions into intended ones and unintended ones, so the intended ones still fall under the picture of a ever-present cause (for those "intended"). And this is different than my proposing the question of intention only comes up sometimes, not that it applies to all acts that are (pre?) "intended". And there will need to be very many more examples than of accidently and mistakenly to show all of intention's Grammar, which I will leave to Austin and Witt. After many examples, Witt will say we are inclined to say intention is internal to an action, it is "interpreted as the accompaniment to action." p. 219. That I can know what you intend, not as guessing thoughts but, that I might know what you will do (p. 223), as if it is imbedded in the situation. #337.

"My description is completely different from yours" is different than "how our lives have come together" (I would say "when"). Our shared language (concepts) is "how our lives have come together". Now our description of the Grammar of those concepts is subject to disagreement, but thus also open to agreement. Seeing the Grammar is to look at what we say when as instances of "how [when] our lives have come together"
— Antony Nickles

The claim that we have "come together" is not justified. To say that "our lives have come to together" is a false description. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not "we" as in "you and I". It is "we" as in all Engilsh speakers (Cavell will say "native" speakers, not to be racist or exclusionary (intentionally) but to record the fact that learning a language is to learn (be trained in, is more accurate given Witt's student) all the things that we do and say. And here I am not saying people don't then disagree or have hidden motives or speak past each other or mistake a claim for a statement, etc.

how would we ask your question? "I made a mistake." "What was the cause?" Now there are a number of answers here, perhaps they show the grammar of explaining a mistake (as in confessing to it, asking for help in correcting it, or learning how it went wrong, etc.)
— Antony Nickles

I find that there's a problem with your example of "mistake". A mistake, no matter when or where it occurs, is a product of the particular circumstances. I think that is the only generalization we can make about mistakes, other than that something has gone wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

I guess I don't see where I implied that mistakes happen without circumstances--"product of" seems to need accounting for, as if a mistake was a result of, at least an outcome of, the circumstances. "I made a mistake." "What about the circumstances led to the mistake [as an outcome]?" And this seems like it is more of a desperate act than a mistake (in what context I can imagine). And "What circumstances was the mistake a result of?" And this could almost be an excuse; you see what looks like me trying to do one thing and messing it up (making a mistake), but to offer the circumstances up to qualify the mistake... I'm not sure this example works for a mistake or if it's hard to imagine the context this would be in--and this is what makes OLP hard sometimes. But it may turn out that "I" have to "own up to" the act of shooting the cow, as if my intention is the only thing it being a mistake hangs on. And we can here say "my intention" would not have come into the picture if I had hit the donkey (unless perhaps it was your donkey).

do you see that we have control over our own descriptions, the descriptions which we make, of whatever we describe? We can choose whatever words we want, even make up new ones. Furthermore, there is no need that we be truthful, or accurate, we can leave things out, and do all manners of deception, depending on what one's intention is. The intention of the individual is not completely irrelevant. So, how can there be such a thing as "our Grammar"?

It is (all of) our Grammar as it is all of our shared lives. And you don't need intention here (describing, choosing or inventing words, deceiving, are enough). Now if you have an example of what we say, and you describe it, the truth and accuracy of it is my seeing it as you do (not being persuaded or deceived into what you say). Witt refers to this not as agreeing in opinions, but in judgments. #241-2. Witt talks of perspecuity, and seeing the whole view, but his examples show there is a kind of epistemological ethics; he says we conjure up a picture designed for a god which flxes sense unambigously but with which we can do nothing, lacking meaning or purpose; instead, we go by side roads and detours to the seeming muddiness of actual use (#426).

— Metaphysician Undercover

I can break the Grammar of an apology; that doesn't mean an apology is not an apology, but that I am a jerk.
— Antony Nickles

If you break the Grammar of an apology, then you are not making an apology. If the thing is not consistent with the description, then it is not the named thing. Otherwise you could call anything an apology. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did I say this or you? What? Felicity in action!

We're pretty far apart... — creativesoul

"We are separate people, but not separated by anything, so we are answerable for everything that comes between us." - Cavell (roughly)

Overlooking the idea of "ordinary language use"...
— Antony Nickles

Seems quite an irrational move, remarkably so even, given that ordinary language is one of many irrevocably crucial elemental constituents of ordinary language philosophy. — creativesoul

Well I won't take this as deliberately obtuse (I assume you have not read the 20 comments at the start trying to iron this out nor the list of additional misconceptions I made halfway through)--I'll say cheeky, which is fine. I will simply say that "ordinary language use" makes it sound like it's contrasted to philosophical language use (as if I am merely advocating: "No terms!" "Speak like regular people!" "My opinion matters!" "Common sense!!"), and, more importantly, as if we are talking about "language use" as in a theory about how we use language, and not a (poorly-named) philosophical method (like, say, Hegel's) and as if "language use" is one thing (explained generally), instead of as varied as there are things to do and say, as Witt and Austin are attempting to show (the Grammar of each, how each works differently, basically--very basically.) And you failed to consider my response? or it just made so much sense you've moved on, yet somehow irrevocably changed?

Don't you see, what I've been saying, that this is what "understanding" is, to subject another's terms to one's own standards? * * * Interpretation is an act of subjecting your terms to my standards of judgement. If I have not interpreted what you have said, simply read the words and agreed to them, it is impossible that I have understood what you have said. — Metaphysician Undercover

Uhhhh... this is the opposite of understanding. You are never going to get Hegel unless you find a way to meet him on his ground through his terms as he uses them. I try to just imagine that terms are a word in a foreign language and that you have to understand them by inference and context. The sense of understanding that I am talking about is through "being understanding", instead of, I don't know how to put it--assuming they should write to you rather than you come to them; learn something new rather than assume you have the tools to figure it out ahead of time; or that the whole thing crashes down because you can poke one hole into it based on a general standard or logical necessity.

And I am not saying read the words and simply agree to them. It takes work to see what they see, it takes stretching your imagination, putting things in the context of the philosopher they are reacting to and the history of texts in the tradition. I think reading the words is only a start, and more people need to treat philosophers as if they are not easy to understand (Nietzsche knew this problem, and I think Witt suffered under it--taking the author of the Tractates and of the PI as the same person); as if everything is a statement that you either agree with or not.

Try to understand that it is a method not a theory; I have repeatedly given examples and samples of Witt's text.
— Antony Nickles

But I don't see that you are showing me a method. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suggest going back through all these comments and find the places were I am imagining something someone might say (in quotes). Those are the instances of method (I think there are some on the Witt page too. Sometimes it is "Imagine what one would say..." as well. The (sure, speculative) claims to the Grammar of the concept from the implication of what we say is meant not to be taken as independently justified; it is justified if the example allows you to see and agree with it. If not, you can (must) object to it with a different example, a more detailed context, etc. I do think you will balk at what you see as the indirect nature of this, but I think that is part of not seeing how the ways we live are reflected in what we say in a situation.

I think we need to know the intention to know what was meant. So we have the vicious circle whereby we cannot say what was meant by the word without knowing the intention, but we are wanting to say something about the intention by knowing what was meant. So we are actually completely excluded from describing intention, and all we can do is speculate. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sometimes (in regular life) you'll want to know the intention, as I have said, because something is fishy. But the picture that everything said is tied to a "meaning" or "intention" is the misconception that Austin and Witt spend their entire books overcoming, so maybe I'm not going to get you to see that here.

I have also tried to say that grammar is just a description of the ways in which our lives have come together to create these distinctions and terms of judgment and identity and possibility for each concept.
— Antony Nickles

So you are talking about a "shared grammar" here. And "grammar" means a description of how our lives have come together. But my description is completely different from yours.
* * *
If "grammar" is a description of the ways we have come together, as you have defined it, then it makes no sense to speak of a "shared grammar" because we've each come from different directions with different descriptions, therefore different grammars. — Metaphysician Undercover

Seeing the Grammar is to look at what we say when as instances of "how [when] our lives have come together" (I would say "when"). Our description of the Grammar of those concepts is subject to disagreement, but thus also open to agreement.

Under your definition of "grammar", I don't see how a concept could have a grammar. Grammar is a description of the possibility for a concept. How do we make the jump from describing the possibility for a concept (grammar), to the the claim that an actual concept has a grammar? Or, are all concepts just "possible concepts", because that is how they are described by "grammar", such that a "concept's grammar" implies the possibility for a concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

Possibilities of a concept (plural)--the senses of a concept, the ways it is moved forward, its conditions of employment, etc. Not possibility of a concept, as in its potential to be (at all). Sorta like the conditions of possibility in the Kantian sense.

Don't you recognize a separation between the thing described, and the description? — Metaphysician Undercover

The description is of what you see implied in the example of what we say when. You want to call the implications "things"? Sure.

It is a theory about the way intention works, it is not a description of the way that intention works. Actions, which are what is described, as " the ways in which our lives have come together to create these distinctions and terms of judgment and identity and possibility for each concept", are the results of intention, the effects. When you proceed to speculate about the cause of those actions, intention, it is theorizing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, the description is a claim about the ways in which intention works (sort of, basically, the Grammar of intention); you may disagree. But the description does not need a theory because it is based on the evidence of what we say when. I would not describe intention as a "cause" as it is not only not a part of an action, the actor may not even have an answer to a question about intention, and, as I said previously, the difference between motion and an action is not a matter of "intending" it; our motions are seen as "actions" based on our concepts (responding, anticipating, defying, etc.). This is going to require you to shift your whole picture of language and meaning.

To show the way a mistake works is to show the cause of a mistake. That is what I described in my last post, "the way mistakes work". But your study of grammar has no approach to this, because you have no way to apprehend the actual conception, which is where the mistake inheres. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you can theorize about the "cause" of mistakes, or we can ask when we might say it: "What was the cause of your mistakenly shooting the cow, and not the donkey?" Of course, this is probably a different sense of "mistake" (not as used re actions) than I believe you are using. But how would we ask your question? "I made a mistake." "What was the cause?" Now there are a number of answers here, perhaps they show the grammar of explaining a mistake (as in confessing to it, asking for help in correcting it, or learning how it went wrong, etc.) Now do we want a theory to avoid the mistake? or is the theory the "cause" of the mistake (having created a standard for what is "right")?

Grammar is a description of this shared life. We may not have control over the sharing of our lives, which we've already had, but we do have control over our descriptions of it, and consequently we get some control over the way we share our lives in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wouldn't say the control we have over our shared lives is through description (maybe politics, decent, violence, etc.--Emerson will call this "aversion", Thoureau of course, civil disobedience). I do agree that we can disagree over our descriptions of our Grammar (though we are not doing sociology), but there is a logic and rationality to this (through OLP's method), though no certainty of agreement, or the kind of justification you might want.

If grammar is just a description, then it is not "the ways our lives come together" but a description of that. We need not follow any such description, we might even reject a description on a judgement of inaccurate after reference to criteria. A description is really nothing more than a theory about the thing being described. — Metaphysician Undercover

This all works for me except we have not set our criteria ahead of time in making an assessment of a description of the implications of what is said when (Austin calls this "the descriptive fallacy"). It is a competition of details and breadth and imagination--like I said, if you have a better example and more details or a different context, we can sort that out rationally, though just not always, as with talk of art, or morals. Oh, and I understand "theory" here as like a guess, which is fine, but it is based on evidence.

Furthermore, if you ascribe to human beings the capacity to act freely, randomly etc., in a way which does not follow the description (grammar), then you are actually admitting that the description has inaccuracies. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't follow, I can break the Grammar of an apology; that doesn't mean an apology is not an apology, but that I am a jerk. Part of the Grammar is seeing the consequences (or means of reconciliation)--what comes after. This is one of the important lessons of OLP (historicity of acts/communication--which Nietzsche learned about morals; Hegel/Emerson about our growth).

Is [OLP] not seeking a method toward truth and understanding (as other philosophies are), but rather a practical method for activities in the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would suggest that in learning (reflecting on) how "activities" (concepts) work, we are learning about ourselves, and the possibility to better ourselves in seeing our part in them and where we might go from there. One lesson of OLP is the responsibility we have to what we say; a responsibility traditional philosophy wanted to get out from under by having a picture that did not include that responsibility (and possibility of failure). As Cavell says, knowledge is not our only relation to the world.

moral philosophy seeks to understand intention directly. — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the great philosophical words, "directly". Others include "actually" "logically" "exactly" etc. Ironically, in a sense, traditional philosophy has been staring at itself (the picture it created) instead of turning and looking (Plato and others will say remembering) our ordinary Grammar.

The degree to which "our human lives are together" is extremely minimal. * * *Therefore, there is a fundamental separation between people which makes it impossible to speak about "the Grammar of language" in general, or, "the language-game" in general. * * * Instead of recognizing the individual differences between the individual perspectives of individual people, differences which need to be worked out through establishing consistency in interpretative, explanatory, and justificatory practices, through the application of rules and criteria, you simply take all this for granted, as a starting point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well I would simply call this cynicism (we're talking pretty fundamental human concepts here), but it is philosophy's interpretation of our human condition of being separate (bodies) to make the individual special (and unreachable), or that the failure of knowledge is our separateness turned into an intellectual problem--that this separateness is our differences which need to be constantly reconciled (as if with every word). I'm not going to try to talk you out of this, but this is the slope that leads to a picture of every expression being intended or meant or thought and understood or interpreted, and those are all up to you and me. As if we were responsible not to what we have expressed (held to it), but that we are responsible for everything--the whole process--thus the need to perfect language (rather than ourselves).

I obviously can not get this across well (it is complicated), but I think it would be best, if you are still interested, to read a better explanation with much better examples than mine. I would try Cavell's essay Must We Mean What We Say (found the link) from the book of that name or, better yet, Knowing and Acknowledging from the same book (though that does not appear to be online).

It is an OLP claim that structurally, categorically, the process and identity of believing is not the same as that of thinking.
— Antony Nickles

We can think about something without believing it. — creativesoul

Well the full quote is: #574 "A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the 'expression' of belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. (A grammatical remark.) The concepts of believing, expecting, hoping are less distantly related to one another than they are to the concept of thinking."

So I might have been a little hasty, but what you've said sounds like the grammar of thought is that every thought is either "believed" (not justified) or known (backed by something that ensures it as such).

A proposition as an expression of hoping "I have a great feeling about our project," or of expecting "I'm gonna kill it once I get that new technology," or of believing, "He looked into gene therapy as it might be a cure" (Witt calls this believing, like a hypothesis--see below). (I'm not sure in what sense of a proposition it is a thought, but here maybe just not the outward expression--my guess is he is saying this because the topic above it is thought compared to "belief".)

However, the process of believing is fundamentally the same as thinking. — creativesoul

Witt's claim is that believing is expressed in a proposition (which here he is saying can be thought (as it were, to yourself as well as externally). This is differentiated from picturing "belief" u]as[/u] a proposition, setting it up to be judged as a proposition (compared critically to true/false knowledge)--Witt's claim is that believing is a hypothesis (see the example above). See PI p. 162. "So it looks as if the assertion "I believe" were not the assertion of what is supposed in the hypothesis "I believe"! (emphasis in the original)

That's not to say "thought" doesn't come into it, just not in the way you may picture it. This is the next paragraph:

"575. When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed [had the hyposthesis] it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing. But: 'In spite of everything that he did, I held fast to the belief. . . .' Here there is thought, and perhaps a constant struggle to renew an attitude."

It is only when one becomes aware of their own fallibility that the two are no longer the same. It is only when we begin to consider whether or not some thought or belief are true, that there can be a difference between thought and belief.... — creativesoul

And this is the skeptical fear which creates the desire for a standard of certainty for justified knowledge (as opposed to something deemed lesser) which is then used as the only standard instead of the ordinary criteria (Grammar) which varies with each concept as much as our interest in our lives--as Austin and Witt are in the business of showing.

[In OLP] are we the final arbiter; do we have the final say, regarding what counts as an "insert name here"? — creativesoul

As I explained above, the claim is to the Grammar implied in what we say when. It is an observation. It is made in Kant's "Universal Voice" (see my contribution to the Aesthetics as Objective post), which is to say for everyone to see for themselves--subject to if there is a more detailed example with a more appropriate context, etc., i.e., a closer description--but thus it is a rational discussion without statements relying on theories of justification (simply true/false, etc.).

It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is more than one use for the same term that all uses have equal footing, are equally justified, are equally warranted, have equal explanatory power, do the same thing, afford us the same capabilities, etc. — creativesoul

This idea that what we need is "equal footing" or "have equal explanatory power" would be the exact issue being addressed: of wanting the same standard of knowledge applied to every concept (and every use of that)--when all this may be as varied as the Grammar of each and our lives are. Also, the claims are not explanations, but observations, descriptions.

What is the benefit of our taking such a careful account of, and/or placing such high regard upon ordinary language use? — creativesoul

As I've tried to explain elsewhere, we are not talking about "ordinary language use". It is the ordinary criteria (grammar) of language (for all our varied concepts)--this is seen indirectly through what we imply, etc. when we say "I believe ____".

Our account of everyday ordinary language use must meet certain standards in order for it to be true. Those standards are nothing less than the way that different people across the globe use the same terms. — creativesoul

The Grammar of each concept are not "certain standards" (as in all the same), and "true" (or false) is not the only criteria that has the value of truth (distinct, rational, rigorous, re identity, etc.). And OLP limits its claims to all English speakers as the Grammar/language is contingent on our the way we live (which is not to say this is a ground). That is not to say there are not ways to bring our lives/Grammar in line with, say, the "strangers" Witt discusses (on the page with the lion quote--as I discuss in another post), in as much as we can align our judgments, interests, what counts for what, and all the other ways we live (to have similar Grammar and thus a similar concept---hoping, misunderstanding, learning, etc.)

Has the conventional academic use "belief" become something quite different than the ordinary everyday use(s) of those same marks? Does academic convention pick out the same things as everyday ordinary people? If academia has altered the use of ordinary terms, and the different senses of the term are incompatible with one another, if the one negates the other, then which sense warrants our assent? — creativesoul

Overlooking the idea of "ordinary language use", yes, the ordinary Grammar of belief was wiped clean (as well as any context) by the kind of philosophy OLP is defining itself against for it to make a picture of philosophy created by its desire to rise above all the things that are uncertain to have a certain, universal, pre-determined criteria for knowledge. That is not to say that OLP philosophers are not rigorous, accountable, etc. or that in saying each person has a right to this type of claim, that this is just anyone's opinion (again, as gone over in the OP and other times above).

The problem I see here is a backward analysis. The processes of formal logic came into existence following the coming into existence of language. the application of rules, grammar, criteria, etc., was developed in an attempt to make language use logical, so that language could provide better understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well... that might be to jump a few steps. If I were going to tell a story, it would start that we learned language and our human lives together. At some point we started asking questions, like what is it to be a better person. But we wished for knowledge to provide the answer for us, but found it lacked the ability to fix the space opening between our world and our interest in it. And so we built a new language for knowledge, one that would be certain and cover all occurances no matter the situation. And it was so wide and comprehensive that it bridged the gap but it was as if we sacrificed the world to save our connection to it because we were never allowed to touch the world again. But then we realized that, when we had learned our language and our lives together, the things we said had a memory of the things we did. We didn't need to fix our langauge nor have knowledge secure the world, because in finding that memory we found the world again.

It's a stubborn bunch. I will say, the understanding of of OLP came over me all at once in a way. I don't believe I have the ability to present a description that interests people enough and allows for seeing the breadth of the change requested. I would suggest this Essay by Cavell, which is in response to someone so addresses the sticky points of seeing things a different way. Stick to your guns.

So here's the dilemma for you Antony. Can the word "grammar" be successfully used in the way that Wittgenstein demonstrates, which is to go outside of the concept's grammar? If so, then it's not true that a concept's grammar is what determines its possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

A concept has possibilities, as life does. These are described by grammar--the difference options ("senses" as Witt says), but, also, some concepts provide for where they are fluid, how they can be stretched, extended into new contexts, etc.(as much as some will not be defied without being deemed incorrect). Grammar is not everywhere prescribed by rules, not is our lives, and OLP is enforcing statements explaining Grammar, it is making open claims, refutable by anyone.

And I hate to say it, but "Grammar", "Sense", "Criteria", are all technical terms here. As I said, it is philosophy--but in traditional philosophy it is as if every word were a term.

What's the logic of "Pass me the salt"? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, for one thing, it appears to be a request. I would say that it is a claim upon me that is open to refusal, despite anything said in support (even pretty, pretty please)--and maybe there is something specific about the type of support here? But the fact of the unqualified denial of a request differentiates it from a demand, which appears to be based on leverage, consequences ("If you don't ___, then I will ____."; or a command, which would be contingent on authority ("Pass me the salt!" (said to a waiter--however rudely). The other thing about a request seems to be that it can be made of a stranger, or a friend--but it is perhaps a kind of claim not just for help, an expression of need, but a claim to a community possibly? And then what could we imagine we would say to elicit the criteria for the kind of support offered to create community?

Do requests or commands even have truth values? — Srap Tasmaner

Well I use them interchangeably with my 9-yr-old but not my wife, if that helps. That is to say, there are criteria which differentiate one from the other. That they have a categorical identity is also tied to doing them correctly, aptly--not boffing it and inadvertently commanding your wife instead of requesting something of her (this is the value of being apt, or felicitous as Austin says).

"Walking in my shoes" is exactly the type of thing which requires criteria, rules and definitions. Agreeing with each other does not require criteria, rules, etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Walking in my shoes" as an idiom here would mean trying understand me on my terms rather than subject my terms to your standards of judgment. Try to understand that it is a method not a theory; I have repeatedly given examples and samples of Witt's text. And the point here is that agreeing is: agreeing on the description of the grammar of a concept. Agree that to do something mistakenly requires intention, or provide an example of what we say with a context to show there is another point which makes "mistakenly" what it is.

So I requested, that you define "ordinary criteria", in a way which I could understand, and you couldn't, or didn't. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure this is always possible, and in this case I'm guessing not. To understand "ordinary criteria" requires you to let go of a standard of judgment or justification that I take you to consider essential, which I would consider a choice. Again, I tried to show how it was different than what you are familiar with and with what you appear to want. I think you would have to not focus on your understanding of those words (grammar) and look at the examples and the method by which they are reached--a definition (or explaination) is not always sufficient for understanding.

At this point I would say that we do not have a clear understanding between us, as to what "grammar" refers to. I will adhere to a familiar understanding, that grammar refers to some sort of rules which we follow, and I will attempt to demonstrate how it makes sense to interpret "grammar" in this way. If you can show me another way to interpret "grammar" which makes sense to you, then I will attempt to follow you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have said that grammar are not rules in the exact sense that we do not "follow" them. Also, we agree to rules, or set them, and we have authority over them, etc. None of these things are true for grammar. Of course you can interpret the word "grammar" as you are familiar with, but how does that help us? I have also tried to say that grammar is just a description of the ways in which our lives have come together to create these distinctions and terms of judgment and identity and possibility for each concept. If we assume we do not already have an understanding of meaning, we learn about it by examining what we mean when we say "I meant..."

If you want to show me a method of philosophy, then show me a method of philosophy — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it fair to say that none of the examples I have given, nor the quotes from Witt, have been sufficient to show this method? Have we tried it? Or to counter the implications of what we say when?

Your words are referring to some type of thing or things which you assume exists somewhere, "ordinary criteria", "grammar of a mistake", But you are not describing this thing or things, and when you point toward where the thing ought to be I do not see it, nor do I see any logical possibility that the thing referred to through my normal, familiar, use of those words, could even be there. Therefore you need to provide me with a better description of what you are referring to, so that I might understand your use of those words. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are not using a picture of language that has "words" "referring" to "things" which you assume "exist" "somewhere". Nevertheless, I have repeatedly tried to explain how grammar is just a description of the ways our lives have embodied the things that grammar sees. @Banno brought in a quote from Austin. I tried to show @Janus how a definition is contingent on a world of concepts.

criteria is very explicitly principles for judgement. In language use we have two very distinct types of judgement, choosing one's words, and interpreting the words of others. So if grammar shows some boundaries as to what is correct in language use, and it doesn't refer to rules of correct usage, then can I conclude that it refers to rules of correct interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

Skipping over that this is a particular picture of choosing and interpreting words, and a particular idea of "correctness", which I have addressed previously, why can't we describe the possible, categorical ways a concept (not just individual words) can be meant? and what is possible (open) to question (in different contexts)? As I paraphrased Witt earlier, it is not part of the grammar of knowledge to speak of it when there is no possibility of doubt, such as "I'm in pain" compared to "I know I'm in pain".

If the boundaries for choosing words were different from the boundaries for interpreting words, wouldn't this lead to misunderstanding? Where else could you possibly be pointing with "grammar", and "criteria", other than to rules of usage? I just don't see it. That's how the words are normally used, now you want to say that you are pointing to something different than this, but what could that different thing possibly be? — Metaphysician Undercover

The whole point of Witt's PI in describing our shared grammar is to show that words don't always "point" to a "thing". With that in mind, our grammar describe the ways we live our lives. As I have said again and again, this is not about language "usage" as in conscious reasons we say one thing or another. We don't decide how to apologize, we apologize. There are criteria (measures) of the boundaries for this, practices, conditions, ways to judge, etc.--these are just our lives.

First, as you say to 'practice a mistake' has very confusing implications. No one practices a mistake. Couldn't you have found a better way to say what you wanted here? I assume you are asking 'what does it mean to make a mistake?'. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I meant was that a concept is like a practice in the sense of a way of doing something.

Why must we "find differences"... "animal" is a descriptive term used for describing "human being". In describing a thing we do not assume to have to distinguish that thing from other things, we do the exact opposite, compare it to others, looking for similarities, to establish its type. The differences are what is obvious to us, we don't have to find them, as they normally jump out at us, to describe the thing we look for points of similarity, and make comparisons. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously we can compare a concept's grammar to others--grammar is like context in that what we focus on is dictated by what we would like/need to investigate it for. So it is helpful to categorize groups of concepts together, as Austin does. But he also gets into the differences in types of excuses in order to show the ways our actions are considered moral or can be qualified to avoid our responsibility.

But you really lose me with "Grammar of intention". What is the point of "Grammar" here? It appears to serve no purpose but to distract, as if you are talking about Grammar when you are really talking about intention. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think describing the ways in which intention works--its conditions, its place, when it comes up, how it is possible to discuss, how we question it--are the same as "talking" about "intention". These are not justified "true" statements explaining intention, it is a claim about what is implied in examining and describing what we say when we talk about intending.

Clearly you are talking about intention rather than grammar, as you proceed with "you do not intend anything when you have an accident". However, this statement is itself mistaken. "Doing something" always involves intention, so even when there's a mistake or an accident there is still something intended. So a mistake, or an accident, is an unintended feature of an intentional act. Therefore the fact that there was an accident is insufficient for the claim that intention was not present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Must We Mean What We Say is to a essay by Cavell that does a great job of explaining Austin''s claim from the description of the examples he gives of what we say which show that intention, as I have said above a few times, (usually) only comes up when something about an act is "fishy" he says. ("Did you intend to...?") The traditional picture is that every act or expression is "intended", as the same picture that every expression is "meant". Of course "doing something" (which is unclear), which I take as consciously deciding to act, can be done deliberately, after consideration, in the hope of a certain outcome, etc. And we can ask, what was your intention?, and I can answer along these lines. But most times, actions are not intended, and one part of the grammar of doing something accidentally is that we are not culpable because we did not intend for it to happen--"I" do not come into it, so I can not intend to "do something" accidentally (though I might intentionally make it look like I did it accidentally, or intentionally say it was done accidentally--more of the grammar of accidentally).

We might however, use this fact, the occurrence of a mistake, as evidence that Grammar wasn't present. Let's do that instead shall we? Now we have evidence of intention without grammar. And we appear to have no principle whereby grammar could be brought into intention. So "the Grammar of intention" is a misnomer, a mistaken use of words which we need to reject. As you ought to be able to see, grammar is not inherent to intention, but extrinsic to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this might be an assumption of some causality or necessity. I thought I have made clear that Grammar may not be present (conscious), but what it describes is inherent in the concept (the life in it). It is not just made up rules or some theory about words; it is a description of ways in which intention works, what matters to us, what counts for it, the reasoning it has, and the ways it falls apart. This is not an explaination nor a justification nor the reasons we use nor the ways we discuss it. Intention is part of the world, which is inherent in it. Grammar is merely the explication by description of these ways of the world that make up, are embodied in, as Austin says above, intention.

Grammar is not any part of a mistake. Grammar is brought into existence intentionally, to serve a purpose, and that purpose is to avoid mistakes, to exclude the possibility of mistakes. The "conditions of/for a mistake" are the absence of appropriate grammar. If the appropriate grammar was there, there would not have been a mistake. So we can see that since "mistakes are part of our lives", so is the absence of grammar. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not say Grammar is "part" of a concept. It isn't part of its makeup--it describes what counts for a concept (among of things). Looking at the grammar of a concept has different reasons, and it might be said that someone might reflect on it in order not to run afoul, or, as discussed, someone might look at what makes an expression what it is (literary/art criticism (see my discussion in the Aesthetics as Objective post), political speech, come to mind), but OLP is also using the investigation of grammar to shed light on our traditional philosophical issues. The point is not to "avoid mistakes" or "exclude their possibility". I would say that is the desire of the philosophy OLP is trying to revolutionize. Studying grammar shows us the way mistakes work--how they are identified, how corrected, the responsibility I have to what I say.

It is not the phrase itself which has a grammar, it is the people using the phrase which have grammar. It really doesn't make any sense to say that there is grammar within the spoken words. How would we locate this grammar in our attempts to interpret the words? As I explained above, we apply grammar. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now here we are way off into a picture of communication that Witt spends half of PI trying to unravel. Yes, grammar is public. It is both within the expression and in our lives because those are woven together. We do not "have" or control grammar or meaning (use it any way we like) anymore than we "have" or control the ways we share our lives. An apology is an apology despite what you want it to be. A concept has different senses (options, possibilities) in which it can be used, but "sense" is not some quality an expression has which is applied by intention or "meaning" (or "thought"). We do not "apply" grammar. Our expressions use concepts which are embed in the shared lives we already have.

It makes no sense to say that the grammar is within the words, "meaning", "knowing", "understanding". Where could it possibly be hiding? Instead, we follow a grammar when using the words (speaking), and interpreting the words. Otherwise we have no way to understand the nature of misunderstanding. If the grammar was in the spoken words, then either we'd perceive it (and understand), or not. To allow for the possibility of misunderstand, we allow that the words are apprehended, but improperly interpreted. Then what does "improperly interpreted" mean other than not applying the correct grammar? So we must allow that "grammar" is the rules we follow in choosing words and interpreting words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Grammar is forgotten (not hiding, or "in" an expression, readily viewable) because we just handle things in our lives--thus philosophy's images of turning (in caves), and reflecting, and looking back, remembering, etc. Thus we have to see it indirectly in the kinds of things we say when we talk of a concept. Again, we do not use grammar (directly) to clear up misunderstandings ("interpret words" plays into the picture I describe above). "Misunderstanding" has grammar as well, and so ordinary ways in which it is handled. Concepts have different senses so which one is being used might need to be cleared up ("improperly interpreted?"); also, you may break the concept expected in a particular context, but that can be fixed in ways everyone understands (drawing out the context, making excuses); etc. Our lives have much more depth than we give it credit for. To have one theory of how language works is a picture that, for example, we always "choose" words and that words always need to be "interpreted": e.g., I mean something (applying my rules and "my context") and then you interpret that (with your rules and from "your context"), or some such explanation.

If you follow me so far, I can tell you about a third condition, and this one is the most difficult to understand. The third condition is the willingness to follow, or adhere to the grammar. as we are free willing beings, their is some tendency for us to drift off into some sort of random actions, or trial and error situations. Here again we would have no grammar in our intentions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, again, the picture of "intention" (as casually or ever-present) is getting in the way, as well as the idea that grammar is somehow a justification, reason, or conscious necessity. That being said, this is a good thing to bring up. We do not "have" to follow the ways our lives come together. We can act randomly, or even act rationally (or emotionally) but revolutionarily (against our concepts or taking them into new contexts). We can act flippantly, playfully, experimentally, etc. All of those things are specifically possible because of the grammar for each concept being specific to it and flexible in those ways (even those concepts).

I will just point out, as I did above with @Joshs, that Witt and Austin and Cavell (and Emerson) see our relationship with our expressions as giving ourselves over to them, choosing (if that is the case) to express, and then that expression speaks for us, but also reveals us (in its having been expressed). We say it, then we are responsible for it (which we can shirk), so answerable to the other to make it intelligible, even why it was meaningful to say it, here, now; describe, in what matters for this concept, what matters to me, to make clear to you.

This would mean that a person's grammar is developed individually from another person's, through one's social interactions for example. But this implies that a person goes into the social interactions, in the original condition (as a child), without grammar. And, the person must still be capable of communicating, in that original condition, in order to learn the grammar, without having any grammar. Therefore grammar is not a fundamental aspect of communication — Metaphysician Undercover

We learn how to communicate in learning our concepts which is to say what matters about our lives, the distinctions we need to make, the way an apology works, etc. Witt has many instances of a student or child and how we take them through something (like training) and see if they can follow on or continue a series, etc. Learning our lives and learning our concepts happens at the same time. That is not to say we are not sometimes without words, but as I discussed that above with Joshs, this is not to say we don't have the means of expression, even without words (is violence a concept?), but that we are nonetheless responsible to make ourselves intelligible.

In #90 the statements we say about concepts show us their possibilities; these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. When does a game just become play? The concept of knowledge has different possibilities (senses, options) and each is distinguished by its Grammar.
— Antony Nickles

So here's the dilemma for you Antony. Can the word "grammar" be successfully used in the way that Wittgenstein demonstrates, which is to go outside of the concept's grammar? If so, then it's not true that a concept's grammar is what determines its possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

A concept's grammar" does not "determine" anything. Its possibilities are a part of our lives and the way language can move into new contexts or our lives change or the possibility of justice is lost or dies to degenerate times, but we can find it by turning to look and bring it back to life in our expression.

The issue was how to distinguish a mistake from an accident in order to ensure that the correct word is used to describe the situation.. And, as I demonstrated, sometimes a mistake is also an accident, and in those instances the accident would also be a mistake. What makes one of those a better choice of words in these instances? — Metaphysician Undercover

The fact that we can switch one synonymous word for another shows that our words don't hold the meaning so much as the context/our lives in a way allow for it, and shows the fact that the difference between mistakenly and accidentally does not matter in that instance, nothing hinges on it then. But just because in most circumstances you can be sloppy with language does not make that demonstrable of anything.

We can say that an accident in some cases is the result of a mistake, the consequences of. But a mistake might also be the consequences of another mistake, or some other unforeseen thing, making the mistake itself an accident. So in many instances the same thing could be correctly called an accident or a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, speaking of sloppy language, I'm gonna have to get both my foot and some crow out of my mouth @Janus. I just realized I (inadvertently? unintentionally?) lost track over the posts that the point of Austin's examples was to understand intention so they were examples of excuses for action (Austin has a whole essay). So I have meant to be strictly describing the grammar of how an action can be done accidentally or mistakenly (not all senses of mistake and accident). Ugh; "I'll not trust his word after!"

But if you aren't ready to kill me yet, this is a good exercise.

Now we can say "I accidentally went through the intersection." and here we can imagine my foot slipped off the brake (which I did not intend). And "I mistakenly went through the intersection." (is a crappy examples again). Here I could say "I intended to go into the turn lane", or "I only meant to creep up to the edge of the intersection." And thus part of OLP is imagining cases (contexts) to fill out what we say in order to see what it means for the grammar of the two concepts and what they show about intention.

Again sorry for the confusion. Saying things over and over tend to take the punch out of em.

To say Witt is corrective is not to say he is convincing people to "now believe" in language games. He is doing more than changing the subject; he is hoping you see what you desired of the picture, and then to turn around and see a better way (method) to see our actual desires.
— Antony Nickles

What does it mean to see a better way? If you’ve read Kuhn, you know that embracing a ‘better’ scientific theory always implies a change of subject. — Joshs

I guess in this analogy I would not say a different subject (nor a different theory either), but a better method, as in different than the scientific one.

I think you, Austin and Cavell are holding onto a version of realism along with Putnam, who has nothing but praise for Cavell, and this puts you at odds with Rorty and a thoroughgoing postmodernism. — Joshs

I don't know what "realism" is but I've always been wary of labels. I find there is always something worth learning even if not everything is agreeable or correct. And I don't know Rorty at all, but from what I've been told, the idea of "postmodern" is something like we are past the traditional concerns of analytical philosophy. So Plato created the Forms, Descartes ended up in outer space, Marx thought humans were good under it all--you're not going to learn something in reading them? Like theory is more important then "the dark path" as Hegel put it?

Dictionaries are based on ordinary, everyday usage and are constantly being revised, so why should they not be fair guides to the meanings of terms? — Janus

I'm not going to say it's a terrible place to start but it is only one way, and which gives the impression the word carries its meanings around as a definition. Understanding words "independently" as I said would be independent of how and when they are expressed (in what contexts, to whom, what counts as a reason, a misuse, how are those corrected...). You say we don't have "precise" meanings, but what if "meaning" wasn't just in a web of "associated ideas" but a whole life. Cavell has us imagine looking up a word that turns out to be an Eskimo kayak, and he asks did the dictionary bring us the world, or did we bring the whole world to the dictionary?--we already knew what a boat was, an Eskimo, vehicles of travel, etc. to learn the "meaning" of the word.

it would also be a mistake to think that exploration is not required for making good maps, or to think that having drawn the map you've actually been everywhere you want to go. — Srap Tasmaner

I wonder what Witt's image of bumping into things to find our way adds to this. I'll have find that.

Are there other ways that frameworks get forced on people? If there is a desire for certainty, is this universal, or it it possible some people don’t have this desire for certainty? — Joshs

Well Cavell would say the human condition is universal (to humans), in the sense that we are separate bodies. I am responsible for what I say, and answerable for that to you (and, as the other), to make myself intelligible. But nothing is more human than to want to escape being seen by what I say, to want our words to work perfectly without us, yet not have meaning unless I give it. The human desire not to be human. In philosophers it is the desire for certainty (or the seeming acceptance of skepticism while trying to escape/work around it as well), to close the gap, in a way, with the mind. Descartes, Plato, Kant, early Wittgenstein... And I wouldn't put this as a framework or aspect to be seen or not, but some people don't care about these things of course, even some philosophers.

Witt talks a lot about how language forces a picture on us. One point is the idea that if: the word "tree"=tree than all of language works that way. And if each word has a "meaning" we can look at a group of words, each one independently, without any overall concept in a context, and talk ourselves into a picture that makes them understandable. "I only see the appearance of a chair." and... well, that's the only example I have on the tip of my tongue, but the Interlocutor in the PI says a lot of things that seem to be understoodable; and Witt and Austin just started asking: but when would we say this?

What is meant by "the grammar of a mistake"? If "grammar" concerns rules of correct usage, and a "mistake" is to do something incorrectly, then how could a mistake have grammar? Doesn't "grammar of a mistake" seem oxymoronic to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

With a lot of this I feel like a few things are happening (which happen between people a lot):

1) you insist on your terms and your framework (and your criteria for judging what I say) instead of working to see my terms and how what I am saying requires you to see everything in a new way (walking in my shoes is exactly the method of OLP--trying to see what I see).
2) we are getting side-tracked on every little statement I make if it doesn't fit what you believe even if it isn't part of my trying to explain a different method of philosophy, instead of having to justify every little thing.
3) OLP is not taken seriously enough; by which I mean it is entirely outside the normal framework of traditional analytic philosophy, and thus requirements seeing it differently.
4) the points I have made above or to other participants are getting forgotten or lost and so I am having to repeat myself.

Of course, this is just how philosophy goes sometimes.

I do think you may be taking "grammar" too literally (as regularly defined), but I'm not sure this is all wrong. (Though Witt does differentiate Grammar from "rules" in many different ways (we don't "follow" Grammar), but that is a rabbit hole.) Grammar does show the boundaries of what would be considered a "correct" or apt apology (but this type of criteria does not work for, say, intending--though we may find the Grammar of what is or is not part of intending). And there can be different "uses" (senses) of a concept (like: I know, above), and Grammar does differentiate between these. But the phrase "rules of correct usage" makes it seem like we are looking for something to ensure "usage"; maybe, of meaning, or communication, etc. that would be "correct" as in justified or certain.

In any event, moving on, the focus is the "concept" of a mistake--we could call it the "practice" of a mistake (though that has confusing implications). And looking at what we imply when we say "I made a mistake" is to find differences that make it distinct (in our lives) from, say, an accident (this differentiation is "part of the Grammer" as Witt says). If I can say "what did you intend to do there?" we learn that part of the Grammar of intention is that it is not always present--you do not intend anything when you have an accident, or (usually) if you do something in the ordinary course. These are, in a sense, categorical claims, procedural claims, claims of distinctions, etc. So it is a different level of investigation than just how language is justified--these aren't rules about language or communication, they are what matters and counts in our lives--we are simply turning to look at them.

With OLP we are not "judging" (or justifying) the action, we are making a claim to our observation of the grammar (my claim, your concession to it), and the evidence is the example of what we say when we talk of accidents, or mistakes. So we are not doing the judging; people just make mistakes and accidents happen, and these are part of our lives, as is the deciding between them--which is what OLP looks at.
— Antony Nickles

Can't you see though, that this is a judgement in itself? To say that something is a "mistake", or it is an "accident", implies that you have made that judgement. It's hypocritical to say to a person, "I'm not judging you", but then proceed to talk about what the person has done as a :"mistake". So in reality, you really are judging, by referring to things as mistakes or accidents. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this got all twisted up. OLP is not "saying" something is a "mistake". It is making a claim to the conditions of/for a mistake--you can call that "judging" the example, but the point is to see the grammatical claim. Now, yes, another philosopher might hear the grammatical claim and say, "no, you haven't got that right." At which point they might say "The context would be different", or "the implication does not have that force." (This happens between Cavell and Ryle). But the point is you have the means and grist with which to have a discussion. I was trying to say this is not the normal conversation that people would have to figure out if it was a mistake or an accident--people in a sense "assume" (though this is misleading) the things that philosophers would call Grammar because mistakes are part of our lives. We are not trying to justify whether it was one or the other, we are discerning what makes it so by investigating what we mean (imply) when we talk about it.

Choice of words implies judgement, and that's why we can categorize language use as an action. And we assume that this activity is carried out through some form of intention, like other human acts. The difficult aspect about language use is that it is activity which is often carried on rapidly, in an habitual way, therefore with very little thought. So we're faced with the question of how does intention play a role in an activity carried out with very little thought, and no immediate indications of intention even being present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well I don't want to get side-tracked here--Austin has a whole essay about "intention" and Cavell's essay "Must We Mean What We Say" (a link is above to Banno). First, not every motion is an action (even, "try really hard to move your finger"--is there a point to calling this an "action"?), and this is not to say all actions are intended. As I discussed above, we find that something has to be wrong or off about something for someone to ask "Did you intend to do that [shoot the cow]?" So choice of words "may" be important ("Choose your words carefully, she's grieving"), though most of the time we do not "choose" our words, nor say them with "intention" (nor "meaning"). Witt will even say there is no space between our expression and our pain.

#244 "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.
#245. For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?"

And these statements are claims to the Grammar of intention and expression.

we relate to what has been said through "meaning" implying what was meant, or intended. Therefore there is a serious gap here, a hole in our knowledge. We assume to know what was meant or intended, by an act in which intention is barely evident. So we turn to something completely other than the speaker's intention to justify our interpretations. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Meaning" can be the same thing as "intending", as: "Did you mean to offend them? or did you not know their history when you made that joke?" But we also want to clarify "Did you mean to tell me to fold the dough, or kneed it?" or definitional "What does anthropomorphic mean?" These are all different senses of when we say "I mean" or you ask "Did you mean?" Each will have its own grammar. We do not get someone's meaning by, as Witt will say, "guessing thoughts". And you speak of a "gap" in our "knowledge". And this is a picture caused by (Cavell will say) the fact of our being separate turned into an intellectual lack (problem). We do have things we say in situations, so we do not always (have to) "interpret" what another say. To say that there is a "gap" for Witt is the fact we can be opaque to one another, and so to fill that gap is to ask about meaning (or, yes, assume, and see where that gets you). It is "we" that are responsible to each other for meaning--after (usually), not before; though we can imagine a case in which you can be irresponsible (lazy) in what you say. This is also to bring up the fact discussed before that our expressions and our lives are out there, public, so when we say something, even though we don't (necessarily) "choose" it, we are bound to it, fated to its implications and the consequences of having said it--this is the realm of meaning: what is meaningful to us, what counts for something, what differences have been made, etc.--all the things Grammar uncovers of what matters in our lives.

The hole, or gap is only closed by skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Witt would say that the fear of radical skepticism creates a certain picture of the "gap" (and thus the way that it must be bridged (with knowledge, certainty, justification, etc.).

You say for instance, "grammar of a mistake", I recognize that I might very easily misunderstand what you mean by this, so I question you in a skeptical way. Now, we'll see what comes out of this, but the way I see it, is that very often on this forum, people cannot explain what they mean when questioned about a phrase they have used. This fact provides another piece of evidence. Not only do people appear to be talking away habitually, without thought or intention entering into what they are saying, but even when questioned about what they mean by what they have said, sometimes they cannot even determine what they themselves intended. The evidence therefore, is that there are speech acts with very little if any intention, thus very little meaning, yet they appear to be correct grammatically. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just two things: calling a speech act grammatically correct (not of course correct in regular grammar) does nothing to ensure understanding. Second, one might choose their words very carefully (as is necessary in philosophy as opposed to regular life), and it might be the other is not doing their part in understanding, but rather just insisting on justification or explanation on their terms.

What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty...
— Antony Nickles

This I believe is a misrepresentation of philosophy. It is not preoccupied by this 'one picture', or 'one explanation'. * * * A philosopher might appear preoccupied in skepticism, with the question of what validates that particular explanation (definition), the one employed by the mathematician as the ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I tried to explain above, instead of dragging it out, when I say "philosophy" I mean analytical philosophy like metaphysics, positivism (the Vienna Circle), representationalism, Descartes, Kant (partly), early Witt, A.J. Ayer, etc. And, yes, it is the "preoccupation in skepticism" that is the slippery slope to wanting the ideal (or approximating it), and ignoring the rest.

Take Plato's dialectical method for example. Each dialogue takes a term, like love, courage, friendship, knowledge, or just, and investigates the various different ways that the word is used. The implication is, that if there was an ideal, the ideal would validate the correct definition, therefore correct use of the term. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would offer that Socrates method is analogous to OLP's. The only issue is that (and I think this is the way Plato pictures it) he doesn't stop at the end of each discussion and see that we have learned something of the way justice works when we look at the implications of saying "justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger." (The guy's not "wrong".) Now I would say it is the fixation on the standard that will satisfy us which creates the necessity of the Forms (and the loss of the rest of the discussion).

Clearly this is folly, to claim that we can have "rationality and logic and truth value" without justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this is Austin's point in Sense and Sensibilia. That picturing language as just being statements that are either true or false (because they are justified), is to ignore all the different ways which language has (the value of) truth, rationality, and logic (these of course being different than you'd like I imagine). The one example I have given is felicity (aptness). To pull off an apology aptly is to do it correctly--the right way. And the grammar of a concept just is what counts as rationale and what fits. To say you MUST do an apology a certain way, is not to claim authority to ensure norms--you can do whatever you like. But if you don't do certain things, it's not really an apology is it? This is the categorical nature of concepts (sort of like Kant's except every word in a sense).

Therefore we ought to conclude that interpretation, and explanation, the aspects of language use which philosophers are interested in, cannot be deferred to grammar or criteria. — Metaphysician Undercover

OLP's tools are imagining examples of what we say and describing what we see. Thus its powerlessness to ensure your interest.

But this doesn't make sense to say that there is a particular grammar for each unique action. * * * if we say that each particular action has a description unique to it, how could we call unique, distinct, and different incidents, as following "a grammar"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I would put it that there is Grammar for each "class" or "type" of action (I'm not sure I would say "unique" because they overlap, etc. (as if family resemblances); and one might get the idea we are talking about each individual act.) So each concept, e.g., --"meaning", "knowing", "understanding"--all have associated "grammar" (multiple, and extendable, as much as our lives). Now we are tripping up on "incident" again as well--some incidents are not (grammatically) distinct from each other; we will only come up against grammar when necessary, and, even then, the discussion may not be "about" grammar (just along its lines as it were). Maybe it helps to point out that we are not "following" grammar, that we are just meaning, knowing, understanding, having accidents, making mistakes.

But every circumstance is unique, time and space are that way, despite what you say about the way that we align our lives. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is true, but only meaningful to the extent it is necessary; say, to flesh out the context to clear up something or frame what we were referring to, etc.

Why do you feel the urge to think that there is always 'concepts' involved when people are speaking? Why not just start with the evidence, and basic facts, that people are doing something with words? If, when we proceed to analyze what they are doing with words, the need to assume concepts comes up, then we can deal with that. But until that point I see this assumption of "concepts" as misleading. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well a lot of expressions involve multiple concepts (asking while being threatening), but can we imagine an expression where none was involved? Maybe, but what would that sound like? And that's not to say all or any of the concepts that could be pointed out need to be, or can be easily (passive-aggression). But I would think that "doing something with words" comes close to the idea of concepts, but are we "always" doing something? or, more importantly, are we always doing one thing--e.g., what I mean, what you understand, or something theory/explanation about how all that (all) happens.

I see your assumption of "concepts" as directly opposed to what you say that OLP is telling you: 'What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty'. You have just replaced the 'picture which can give certainty' with 'concept'. — Metaphysician Undercover

OLP is not looking for certainty, nor is it a theory; it's a method, it's a description.

This is what I'll ask of you, as a proposition, to enable our capacity to proceed in a manner of discussion which is acceptable to both of us. Can we start simply with the idea that in language and communication people are 'doing something with words'. We cannot assume "concepts", nor can we assume "grammar", or "criteria", or any such type of principles or rules as prerequisite for 'doing something with words'. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prerequisite for all of it is our shared lives (not agreed; nor as a fallback for justification); our attunements, the way we judge, feel pain, spot folly, apologize, intend... We are looking (at what we say when) not explaining.

let's start with the assumption that a human being is free to act as one pleases, and if the need to assume some sort of grammar appears to arise, we can discuss that need. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, not assuming, looking. And, yes, you can act however you'd like, but, in doing so, you're not going to be apologizing, or threatening, etc.

So, I further propose that this type of action, customary, habitual, familiar, and ordinary acts, are carried out with little, if any, reference to grammar in the performing of those acts. * * * thought is not directed toward, or by, grammar, it is directed by the intent to bring about the desired consequences in the particular context or circumstances. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes people do not usually "refer" to grammar (not sure what this would sound like), this is why philosophy needs to turn and look at examples of: what is said when, in order to see it.

And your mention of "thought" appears to be in the sense of: consideration, or deliberation, or strategizing, etc. but even with all that I would agree that people do not "refer" to grammar, but they might consider the implications, possible misunderstandings, etc. before they speak, and these would be part of the grammar of a concept. They might not consider the way we "mean" what we say (the concept of meaning); or contemplate the criteria for an apology before apologizing; but maybe they would consider our history of determining what is just before they discuss justice. All that is to say some concepts are more transparent than others.

Because of this progression of knowledge, this philosophical need for evolution or advancement of knowledge, there is a need for a progression and evolution of language as required to capacitate the evolution of knowledge. Therefore there is a need for philosophy to "redesign language", and use language in a way initially perceived as "abnormal", or else we could not venture into the unknown with the intent to make it known. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll grant you that philosophy does create a lot of "terms" (even Wittgenstein). It is the entire framework that is re-designed in this traditional form of philosophy; a (unbeknownst) manufactured picture. The story you are telling is what: knowledge as fact? knowledge as a better theory (of, say, meaning)? I'm not saying language does not progress or evolve; our concepts have the ability to stretch into new contexts as our lives do, as poetry does; but traditional philosophy cleared all our ordinary criteria out of the way to make its own space, where it floats and never touches anything.

So be it. To strike out is to show one should stick to his own game. — Mww

I appreciate the attempt.

I have to be honest here: call me obtuse, but I have to say I don't have any idea what Wittgenstein is getting at in those passages from PI. Can it be explained in plain language? — Janus

Don't worry about the points. The reason I picked them is it shows the method of OLP - it looks at what we imply, etc. when we say___. And I was trying to give a flavor of what "Grammar" is for Witt.

What we learned about (the Grammar of) Memory in #56 is: we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal. (That it is certain and a perfect copy). This is (grammatically) a constraint on this concept.

In #90 the statements we say about concepts show us their possibilities; these possibilities are part of its Grammar--this concept can do that and this, but if it tries to do this other, than it is no longer that concept. When does a game just become play? The concept of knowledge has different possibilities (senses, options) and each is distinguished by its Grammar.

In #572 "Expectation is a state" is a claim to its Grammar--to be expecting is to be in a state; that's how expecting works. And we see this when we say: "What counts as a criterion for expecting [being in that state]?" And criteria here being special as well, tied to "what counts as".

#573 has a lot of: when do we say, what do we regard, etc. And the "answers to these questions" shows us what it is that gets treated as a state, grammatically--which is to say, what (criteria) forms its category, what differentiates it from feelings, its relation to time, etc.

In #574 to call the statement "believing is not thinking" a grammatical remark is to say that it is not a statement that Witt is claiming is true (relying on some logic or justification). It is an OLP claim that structurally, categorically, the process and identity of believing is not the same as that of thinking. I have discussed above how an accident is grammatically different than a mistake--not to claim that they are different, but how.

All: @Mww@Joshs@Banno@Metaphysician Undercover@Srap Tasmaner@Luke@Janus

I think it might help to see examples of Wittgenstein showing how we see Grammar and what it consists of. I have underlined and put in bold some phrases [and added some comments] that might allow you to see the method of OLP (that what we say reveals something):

#56 "But what if no such sample is part of the language, and we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word stands for?——"And if we bear it in mind then it comes before our mind's eye when we utter the word. So, if it is always supposed to be possible for us to remember it, it must be in itself indestructible."——But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?—When we work with a sample instead of our memory there are circumstances in which we say that the sample has changed colour and we judge of this by memory. But can we not sometimes speak of a darkening (for example) of our memory-image? Aren't we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample? (For someone might feel like saying: "If we had no memory we should be at the mercy of a sample".)—Or perhaps of some chemical reaction. Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour "C", which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined.—Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would you not sometimes say: "I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as yesterday"? This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal." [ A Grammatical claim ]

#90 "We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena [ the concept of phenomena ]. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena. * * Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.""

P. 59 or 90 "(a) "Understanding a word": a state. But a mental state?—Depression, excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a grammatical investigation as follows: we say
"He was depressed the whole day".
"He was in great excitement the whole day".
"He has been in continuous pain since yesterday".—
We also say "Since yesterday I have understood this word". "Continuously", though?—To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: "When did your pains get less?" and "When did you stop understanding that word?""

#199 "Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life?— This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule"." [ The concept of obeying a rule ]

#353 "Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How d'you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition."

#572 "Expectation is, grammatically, a state; like: being of an opinion, hoping for something, knowing something, being able to do something. But in order to understand the grammar of these states it is necessary to ask: "What counts as a criterion for anyone's being in such a state?" (States of hardness, of weight, of fitting.)"

#573 "To have an opinion is a state.—A state of what? Of the soul? Of the mind? Well, of what object does one say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer.
One should not expect to be enlightened by the answer to that question. Others go deeper: What, in particular cases, do we regard as criteria for someone's being of such-and-such an opinion? When do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has altered his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shews what gets treated grammatically as a state here."

#574 "A proposition, and hence in another sense a thought, can be the 'expression' of belief, hope, expectation, etc. But believing is not thinking. (A grammatical remark.)"

#692 "Is it correct for someone to say: "When I gave you this rule, I meant you to ..... in this case"? Even if he did not think of this case at all as he gave the rule? Of course it is correct. For "to mean it" did not mean: to think of it. But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone else the expansion of a series in the usual way, is such a criterion. [ Part of the Grammar of meaning, criteria of judging ]

Ordinary language can be taken as the content of any linguistic engagement, thus OLP can then be taken as each rational being’s internal ground for his philosophizing by means of that content, and such philosophizing suffices as that by which such internal ground is represented.

From here, it makes sense that he intends differing meanings for articles of his linguistic engagement depending on the differing contexts of its expression, all in accordance with an overarching personal philosophy with respect to all of them. As such, each engagement is itself a measure, or an example, of a philosophy.

How’m I doing? Close? Ballpark? — Mww

I hate to say it, because I appreciate the effort, but this is, metaphorically, not even playing baseball in terms of describing OLP.

OLP is not a theory nor the "content of linguistic engagement"; it is a philosophical method, to learn about our lives. The process was first used by Witt and Austin to show a picture--as it turns out, exactly the one you are trying to understand it within. Now, the Grammar of a "concept"--Witt's term, not, like, an "idea", rather, e.g., apologizing, walking, knowing, sitting in a chair)--is a description (the Grammar is) of what is meaningful about these "concepts"--what counts for it being that (or not), what matters in its judgments, the distinctions that are made, the interests involved, etc. As Austin is quoted above as saying, all the things embedded from living our lives for thousands of years.

Grammar is not discussed (usually), so much as lived (we know, apologize, etc.). Though we reflect (doing philosophy) on them through examining what we say, e.g., "I didn't intend to shoot the cow" (It was a mistake, I meant to shoot the donkey).

And Grammar does not serve as "grounds", as in justification or to ensure meaning ("forms of life" or agreement). As an example, "intention" (above) is found not always to be present, and thus not casual for "meaning", which is also seen as not in any form an object. Try to imagine why and when we would say: "What did you mean when you... ?" and then look for the grammar of it--say, for one, something has to be wrong in order to ask what you mean (that is a categorical necessity), or, we don't always ask, and then, we don't always "mean" something, or maybe something particular, or what you might misunderstand the meaning of.

The grammar is public; that is it is "external" and shared--in the way our lives are shared (not that people explicitly know it, or use it to argue--some things we just do or say without "knowing" the grammar, though we can make/judge a claim about it. Think of Socrates asking about the Good, Justice, and getting answers/judgements from strangers). It is "claimed" to be universal by the philosopher, subject to your seeing it as well, showing it to yourself. Also, Witt and Austin are fighting the picture of an idea being "represented", along with a word "having" a meaning, something internal corresponding with anything else.

OLP makes a claim to those ways and means and identity (a concept's Grammar) in order to learn about our philosophical questions--first, to show that there are as many ways of rationality and justification, etc. as there are concepts (though of course things overlap); and second, about the problems we have of other minds, skepticism, morality, reason, etc.

It is not that each occurrence is an example; we are describing examples of what is said about the concept in order to investigate the Grammar--more public and general than looking at each occurrence and our opinion or "personal philosophy" with respect to "all of them" (articles?).

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake..
— Metaphysician Undercover

Just look up dictionary definitions of the two words and see if there is any consistent conceptual difference. — Janus

I have been going back and forth with @Metaphysician Undercover about the role "concept" plays in the Philosophicl Investigations because it is not a concept as in "idea". He uses it as a technical term, only to say as his own way of categorizing the type of expressions and actions for which we don't set the standards and thus need to investigate their criteria (grammar), another specific term, before we know what they actually are (meaning, intending, thinking--though also to show everyday concepts like sitting in a chair, or a game, or apologies, are subject to the same investigation/mystery--we don't usually think about).

All this to say, with these two words, we are not going to find our answers in a dictionary. I will also throw out there that a definition is one type of description of, say, intention, but the idea that we understand every word independently is one way we get into problems with the picture of how language works.

As Witt says, "back to the rough ground!" — Luke

Thank you, I understand your being wary of talking about something "higher". A reticence that I have is that philosophy does want something higher, a more complete understanding, to better ourselves, to rise above what can be lazy, nasty, partisan, ineffective, unintelligible, etc. I think OLP provides the possibiity of that in taking us from: grasping for a goal of certainty to have it slip away, to waiting to see the grammar that provide the humble dirt from which to begin that work.

Rorty and I are both claiming that Cavell is assuming a logical connection between such situations as believing in the picture theory of meaning and Wittgenstein’s corrective of that thinking. Instead, we argue that moving from a belief in the picture theory to language games amounts to a change of subject. — Joshs

Well I read the Rorty, and I don't agree that we do not have to go through the history of analytical philosophy to get to a point where we feel the need (desire) for radical skepticism. I'm not sure if he just hasn't read enough Cavell (maybe the early stuff), but Cavell does account for the connection (I wouldn't call it logical more then inevitable, or sliding down a slippery slope) between the desire for certainty and removing the human. Rorty even refers to the discussion Cavell has that our relation to the world is not one of knowing, as we understand it (perhaps most directly evidenced in Knowing and Acknowledging).

And there is the "picture theory of meaning" but Witt separately refers to a picture (like a framework) but it is not one people "believe" in. It is forced on them by their desire for certainty. To say Witt is corrective is not to say he is convincing people to "now believe" in language games. He is doing more than changing the subject; he is hoping you see what you desired of the picture, and then to turn around and see a better way (method) to see our actual desires.

Skepticism belongs to the type of thinking that is incommensurable with Wittgenstein. In order for a skeptic to “take meaning out of any context” they would fist have to understand ‘context’ and ‘ meaning’ in the way that Witt means it , and that is precisely what they cannot do. — Joshs

What I mean by "taking away any context" is an implication of what they do; or, in this case, the abstraction of meaning to have an explaination for all communication, or to require that morality be determined before an event (or deontologically--without us). Not everything is done with my intention or reasons--the effect of what I say is not causally related; I may choose my words, but then they are in the world, subject to the criteria or our concepts, even though I remain answerable for them. (@Metaphysician Undercover)

Our lives have agreed in all the little ways (all the pieces are in place Wii says) that allow for us to recognize the terms of a misunderstanding, the concept of miscommunication.
— Antony Nickles

Our lives will have had to agree in more than just the little ways in order for our criteria to align closely enough to attain agreement on the content of the ideas. — Joshs

But we are not talking about "attaining" "agreement" on "ideas" or "meanings". Our lives align (in apologizing) in ways (what is apt or not, how excused, or fixed...) that we can see in looking at saying: I apologize. The alignment is, as Austin said, over thousands of years in myriad ways. And Witt will add from top to bottom, big and small: that we are human, that we act in uncertainty, that things go wrong, that there is pain, that there are remedies, etc. All these things need to be in place beforehand. We do not agree what an apology is, we agree in judgements, Witt will say. #242

One thing I'd emphasize is how one of the quintessential moves of OLP works: if X were true then it would make sense to say Y. — Srap Tasmaner

This is a good point (and I'm glad someone out there is taking up the banner). I have been focusing so much on just getting over some kind of threshold misunderstanding we are having that I have not provided any of the other (negative) ways OLP works. Witt does this a lot, as I mentioned parenthetically above, when he says (grammatically, of knowledge) that we can not speak (categorically) of knowledge, when there is no possibility of doubt. They will also take a statement of traditional philosophy and ask: in what context would this be said? "I only see the appearance of a Goldifinch."

Thank you for the contribution.

well I think you are still stuck on something about these words; maybe thinking there is "no such thing as the ordinary way", as if the ordinary way were opposed to the philosophical way (which can make those distinctions). I can't sort it though.
— Antony Nickles

"Ordinary" in this instance implies normal, does it not? As if there is a customary, familiar, or habitual, normal, or "ordinary" way of making this decision as to whether it was an accident or a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's just use the term grammar for what OLP is doing and criteria for what traditional philosophy uses, as that is along the lines of a set standard to apply or judge by (the most familiar use of criteria and the one I think you are focusing on). Now let's just clear up that the grammar of a mistake would not be used in making a decision as in beforehand (in most cases--except a deliberate appeal to them, like in a speech), but, as I believe you are saying, in a decision as to what happened, though usually indirectly. For example, "Did your finger slip? (Was it an accident?); or, "Why did you shoot the cow?" (Was this a mistake?)

"Each particular incident, in each set of circumstances, must be judged according to the available evidence, and there is no such thing as the "ordinary criteria", to be applied in a particular situation." - Tony Nickles

I don't see where the reference to "worst case" comes from, or "sense of doom with every 'circumstance'". We are talking about judging an action which has already occurred, as to whether it was an accident or mistake. The action has already occurred so there is no sense of impending doom if the wrong decision is made. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was overreacting here I think to the supposition I saw that every instance calls for the need to be "judged" ("must" be justified), which I took as tied to the assumption that everything is intended or decided, or needs to be, or even can be, judged (Witt here talks of the grammar of knowledge: that there can be none without the possibility of doubt). And especially, that, if we were to (could) always judge, it would be based on one picture of how we judge.

And I think we also need to clear up that "criteria" (grammar) is not being investigated to (necessarily) figure out how we judge, as that implies justifying the action; as if every act needs justification (or is judged the same way); i.e., that philosophy is only (primarily) about grounded action or speech. What OLP is doing is looking at Grammar to: 1) show that philosophy's preoccupation with a picture where there is one explanation (for speech, say) is confused by our desire for certainty; and 2) to learn something about, e.g., intention by looking at the grammar of actions which delineate them from each other (here, see Austin, ad infinitum) @Banno. Here, above, we learned that part of the grammar of an accident does not allow it to be considered beforehand (again, revealing something about intention), but that a mistake's grammar allows for mitigation, say, by concentration "Don't make a mistake".

With OLP we are not "judging" (or justifying) the action, we are making a claim to our observation of the grammar (my claim, your concession to it), and the evidence is the example of what we say when we talk of accidents, or mistakes. So we are not doing the judging; people just make mistakes and accidents happen, and these are part of our lives, as is the deciding between them--which is what OLP looks at.

So, I think we are onto something to say OLP is not in the business of justification--we would be seeing what counts (what matters to us)--the grammar--to show us about intention, evidence, judging, decisions, etc., starting with the basic goal of OLP initially, which was to say judging and evidence--justification--works in different ways depending on the concept and even the context; that not everything is about certainty, universality, etc., but we can still have rationality and logic and truth value in other ways, and in cases philosophy thought we could not, e.g., what it is to judge and what counts as evidence, in: the problem of the other, aesthetics, moral moments, types of knowledge, and other philosophical concerns.

What I said, is that in each particular instance of such an action occurring, if such a decision is to be made, the action must be judged in a way which is specific to that particular instance. That is because each particular instance is unique, and there is a very fine line of difference between the two possible judgements. There is no customary, familiar, or habitual way of deciding this, therefore no "ordinary way" of making such a judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now we can see that we are saying each "instance" is "unique" (and here is where @Joshs is, I believe, hanging onto "context" as unique/different) instead of saying there is a "particular" grammar for each "action" (concept). One implication when we say this may be that, if the "circumstances" are (context is) different each time, then the way of judging (justifying?) is the same---say by the one acting, or the one judging, or both in some way in each unique circumstance. This is only to say, look and see!: what are we hinging on the fact that every event is its own. I offer the grammar that, in any expression/act, what is "particular" about the context usually only comes up in light of the "grammar' of how we judge that thing (e.g., its felicity, or identity). In other words, if every circumstance was "unique", we would not have our lives aligned in the ways they are. Different parts of the context will come up with different questions about the act, endlessly, but rationally.

This is why there is a very clear need to distinguish, in principle, between what a person is saying, and what a person is doing with the words. If I judge what a person is 'saying' to me, according to my customary, familiar, habitual, ordinary way, but the person is actually 'doing' something different from what appears through my ordinary interpretation, then I will be deceived. Therefore, I need to apply criteria in my interpretation, to go beyond the ordinary interpretation which the deceiver intends for me to use to support the deception, in my effort to determine what the person is really doing with the words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, there are ordinary means we use to judge deception, but there is always its possibility (the fear of the other mind). And Austin does show that some expressions "do" things--like, I promise, is: to promise. (He also shows that intention=meaning is the opening for deception). But not everything we say "does" something. Maybe we could say, there is what a person says, and then the possibility this is a different concept based on the anticipated grammar and the context, so that there is what is actually "done" with the words in terms of the aptness of the expression and the anticipated implications, and the consequences which should follow. That is to say, if you say: that, here you MUST (grammatically) be, e.g, making a threat, when the words you used took the form of an overture. The difference between these two is a major philosophical issue; Austin touches on it, Cavell is obsessed by it.

If you allow that OLP cannot dispel skepticism concerning "the solution", then you have no principle whereby you can argue that OLP is better than any other philosophy... — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I didn't mean to say that OLP was solving skepticism, just in a different way. The reintroduction of ordinary grammar is to show the many ways we have for rationally handling situations where doubt creates skepticism for the philosopher. Now that is not to say these "solve" skepticism as they come to an end somewhere, but they are ours and we are responsible for them, in our lives, in a way traditional philosophy would like to ignore in just setting its own standards (Cavell will say Witt sees the truth of skepticism)--knowledge has a limit; we are separate but answerable to each other, and the possibility for continued intelligibility exists.

The standard for OLP of a claim to our ordinary criteria is if you see it and agree; if you see what I see--that you can show yourself.
— Antony Nickles

But this has no logical rigour. Agreement does not require criteria. You propose something to me, I can agree or disagree, but neither requires criteria... And your claim that "ordinary criteria" is justified by me agreeing, is unsupported. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is supported by the evidence of my examples and their detail and "perspicuity" (Witt calls it); the distinctions I describe between grammar; the description being thorough (rigorous; not lazy, haphazard, sloppy). I don't think you can read Austin and not call that "rigour". Now maybe you mean logical certainty; rigour as in: held to a certain standard for justification or something.

This does reveal OLP's inability to force itself on us, or necessarily require your agreement if you agree on premises, etc. It is based on you seeing for yourself what I am claiming (about the grammar of a thing). In Wittgenstein there are a lot of places left with questions, for us to answer for ourselves; or (oblique) statements which only point at a conclusion we have to draw, He, and Nietzsche, will make a grammatical claim, and everyone assumes it is a statement justified to be true; that they both are taken to have theories about philosophical issues when they are (mostly) describing what they see, for you to try to see as well. (You can read Cavell and feel like he only told you half the story, and Austin is so obtuse that people only take him to be making the case for different types of acts, with no point to it at all.)

"You say let's get rid of the notion "word=idea", it's a faulty "picture". Then you say "let's put it that: we are seeing how a concept is used." But what we are seeing is words being used.[/quote]

This could have been worded better. I did not mean to say "Words/concepts are used (by people)". Just that OLP is looking at the uses (as in "senses") of a concept, describing the grammar of that use (as a concept may have different uses/senses--see "I know" above). Not that I control the meaning (how it is "used") of the expression, but only that expressions (concepts) have different ways in which they work (uses/senses)--a concept will have different grammar for each use, but we don't "use" that grammar, manipulate, control, intend, etc., or "use" a concept.

The customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts proceed from an attitude of certainty, while we only apply criteria when we are uncertain. So if we wish to obtain a true understanding of these types of acts, we need to maintain that separation between acts carried out with an attitude of certainty, and acts carried out with uncertainty, we ought not use "criteria" when referring to the motivating factor in customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary acts, which are carried out with an attitude of certainty. We only apply criteria when we are uncertain. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is well taken. Part of what OLP is saying is that all acts are subject to uncertainty (though I'm not sure we carry out our acts with "certainty" so much as confidence). But by uncertainty I mean, every act is subject to failure. Now if something "fishy" (Austin will say), happens, the Other will be uncertain in a sense, yes. However, what OLP makes clear is that this is not the open hole that leads to the type of skepticism where we abstract from any context and install "certainty" in some other way. This would be to overlook or wipe out the grammar of the act, which includes the way it might fail, and how we rectify that, with qualifications, excuses, detail, etc. "Was that a threat...?" "No, I was trying to make an overture, and left off what I intended next." Now the Other is reassured, but are they now "certain"?

Now if we are qualifying acts as "customary, habitual, familiar, ordinary", then we are assuming a sense of "certainty" in those types of acts, where with "other" acts we need certainty, in the sense of justification perhaps. Now we may just be thinking of aesthetics, morality, politics, etc., where some might say there are no justifications, or none that satisfy reason, or logic, or certainty. And even here, OLP will point to the grammar of the concepts in these areas as a sense of rationale, intelligibility, if not certainty, nor agreement. But there may be times when, even given the existence of our grammar, we are at a loss as to how to proceed. And then perhaps reflection on our grammar (philosophy) might help, or at least allow us to see the ground we are on in this case (the rationality of our options), so that we may go beyond our grammar, or against it, or extend it into a new world.

The problem though, is that the term "everyone" is extremely inclusive, in an absolute sense, therefore too inclusive. All it takes, is one person who is abnormal, and doesn't share that ordinary way, to be skeptical, uncertain. This person might start applying criteria, and develop the belief that the judgement which everyone else is certain of, as they proceed in the ordinary way, with certainty and without criteria, is actually wrong... This is why we cannot ever exclude skepticism. — Metaphysician Undercover

And I agree, skepticism shows that the ability of knowledge to take our place has a limit. After that, we are responsible for the decision that our ("shared") judgments are wrong (that it is "I" that must go beyond our morality Nietzsche will say). There are ways to address this: education, political action, we ourselves stand for the new judgment by our example, etc.

But the universality I was referring to, as it were, was between philosophers, those investigating the grammar of our concepts. Here, if you disagree, you are obligated to make yourself intelligible, with counterexamples, further, more-detailed contexts, etc.; though philosophy breaks down too.

Either we must just accept as a fact that language was not designed to talk about meaning, and we simply cannot go there with language, it is a realm of what cannot be spoken about, or, we need to redesign language such that it can be used to properly speak about meaning. I think that the latter is the appropriate way forward, and the way which philosopher generally proceed, giving the impression that philosophy uses language in an abnormal way. Well yes, but that's because we cannot do philosophy using language in the ordinary way, because ordinary language was not purposed for doing philosophy. OLP ought to simply acknowledge this difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

In the paragraph before this, you do an excellent job of describing the picture of meaning which Witt is trying to reveal we (philosophy) had been struggling under (and still does in some circles). And your first option here is the direction Witt went with the Tractatus. But then you say '"or, we need to redesign language such that it can be used to properly speak about meaning." And here is where we are caught by the same net. I admit (@Banno) that our language is the rope, as it were, but OLP's idea is not to "redesign language", use it in an "abnormal" way (I would say this is, backwards, putting certainty first and the words second), yet neither, as I have been saying, use it in a contrasting "normal" way, within the net as it were. OLP is turning and looking at what we imply when we say "I mean" in order to see the grammar of meaning--I would say, that our grammar allows for expressions to be meaningful (not justified) because grammar tracks what is meaningful in our lives.

You’ve been adamant in maintaining OLP is best understood by its examples, which suggests there isn’t a method, — Mww

I've given examples of its method, of looking at examples. With knowledge, an apology, intention (accident/mistake), etc throughout this thread.