I'm wary of claims like [ that we are separate and knowledge is limited ] since there is no a priori reason to listen to philosophers about what is or isn't part of the human condition — Snakes Alive

Well all they have are a clear and thorough descriptions and examples at hand, but if you feel that philosophy has nothing legitimate or worthwhile to say about doubt, fear of uncertainty, and the desire for control, than maybe you haven't been gripped by the necessity philosophy can instill, which differs from the solidity of the method of science.

One of the things I like about OLP is that it is able to treat problems as they arise in their native home. The bad flip side of this is that its refusal to create an abstract theory or set of procedures prevents it from being very effective in a lot of practical environments. — Snakes Alive

I agree with the globalization of skeptical doubt, but Witt and Cavell uncover a informative reason the skeptic needs/wants that jump (I tried to get into this about Witt's Lion Quote in another discussion). I'm not sure OLP doesn't have a set of practical procedures--it is being used in aesthetics and literary theory and education.

Isn’t it just the case that we obey the rule because that’s the practice/convention and that’s what people typically do here? — Luke

We can point to rules, we can give examples, we can threaten consequences; at a certain point sometimes they run out, you don't continue as expected--it is meant to be a situation which summons skepticism.

Or else we don’t follow the rule for whatever reason, yet the rule still exists because that’s how most people do this particular thing, as a rule. — Luke

Kripke's take on the passage is that this leaves us with only the options of following the rule, change the rule, or be excluded--that it is conformity to a rule. Where Cavell takes Witt as showing that people's judgments are attuned, they share the same interests, etc.--not as an agreement, but because our lives are similar. Because this happens mostly implicitly, he is trying to make explicit a case in which it doesn't happen. And we can do lots of things, but we do not just point to a rule. So the exhaustion of justifications for how you should obey a rule, make a wish, apologize, mean what you say, etc. can be that you refuse to follow the rules, but it can also be that we have not yet imagined all the implications, shown you how our interests are aligned, etc.--that there is not only force and defiance, which says something about knowledge and reason and pre-determined deontological morals (rules).

This thread is now an excellent example of why ordinary language philosophy is both important and useful. Especially the bit about focusing on specifics. — Banno

Meanwhile this discussion lies ignored with no response. Either way, not winning.

I think that topics like "what it's like", "mind-body problem" and a few others can be, if not solved, then thought about properly using ordinary language. But these issues continue going. — Manuel

Again, it's not to get to a problem "thought about properly" (with exceptions). And it is not using a certain type of language, words, terms. It is an investigation into the ordinary criteria we have for language that informs us about the criteria we set for philosophy. And the reason these problems continue going is because, for example, one drive of the human is to not need the human--philosophy's problems shed light on the human condition. OLP is just a more productive way of doing that I've found.

And who belongs in OLP is also a bit messy. As you say, Austin, Strawson and other get grouped under this heading. At the same time, it seems to me as if some facets OLP are be closely related to logical positivism. Carnap comes to mind as someone who tried to use ordinary language to solve "big problems". Also A.J. Ayer. — Manuel

Because it is not a theory (not knowledge--an explanation) and does not have a common purpose, the method is used for a lot of things. But logical positivism is the exact nemesis of Wittgenstein's later work, and A.J. Ayer is the example Austin uses of a "descriptive fallacy".

The belief, I do have, (all the time) is that language intends some coding and decoding of information. The success of the sounds to carry information was successful prior to talking about it in a strange way. — Cheshire

What if the "coding" "language" "intends" is something hidden, forgotten? That we need to reflect on when it is not successful?

If we didn't know what we were saying(when you say it), then we couldn't talk about it; could we? — Cheshire

People mostly don't know what they are saying when they say it. Only the "what you are saying" is not the "meaning" of the words, but their criteria for identity, the way they are judged, the responsibilities we are expected to uphold, etc.--what makes a mistake different than an accident.

I'm skeptical of claims that regard insight into meaning delivered in the most difficult to comprehend way. — Cheshire

Some things you can't tell people--or that they are so resistant to, they can only see for themselves. And you better skip Emerson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, etc.

some how this thread defies a desire to be understood. — Cheshire

I think you mean a desire to understand; and that is not a desire to force something, constrain it, require of it a basic explanation.

Or get stuck on a raft with @Banno and mock each other while drifting, slowly, nowhere..

I'm going to tread lightly here, as all I am trying to point out is that modern OLP is relevant and important to the future of philosophy.

on inspection, the philosopher is either confused, or is expressing nascently some desire to refer to what is normally called a fox using a different word, 'wolf' – for some reason. Hence the issue, if there is one, is linguistic. — Snakes Alive

Let's take the example of the skeptic, who wants to say knowledge is essentially groundless. Now most people would put OLP in the camp that says, "No it is not!", only by means of showing that the skeptic is confused about what they are saying (or saying meaning is use). But Wittgenstein (and, after, Cavell) are able to show that there is a truth to skepticism, that knowledge is limited--we are separate (see The Claim of Reason). Now this is not "linguistic"; it is part of the human condition.

Yeah, that could be attempted trying to figure out what are the instances in which people use words to either refer or shout or anything else people do with words. — Manuel

OLP is not trying to come up with "all the conditions" or instances, but just to compare the ordinary criteria we use in saying something like "I believe it might rain" (a hypothesis), or "I really believe in the Dodgers this year" (feel strongly), compared to the goal of some philosophy to differentiate belief from truth, and comparing the difference in the criteria. And this isn't to say OLP is trying to find or impose the "correct" way, though Austin may feel stronger about that.

OLP informs what it means to say "I know"? — Cheshire

OLP makes claims** about the implications of when, for example, we say, "I know your phone number". How it matters, what counts as an instance of it, in what ways it is meaningful to us. Here I am either confirming that you have given it to me, or I am making an assertion for which I can produce evidence to justify; i.e., that I can tell you what it is. But we also say, "I know" when someone makes a claim upon us, like, "I am in pain", which tells us about the problem of other minds, because we cannot confirm with knowledge that the other is in pain; so in this sense we acknowledge it, which also tells us something about our moral lives. **this is a type of claim I explain in an earlier discussion on OLP.

People have been arguing about what it is "I know" means. — Cheshire

If you are looking at the criteria for when/why we say it, the implications of saying it, the responsibilities we are expected to answer for; you are arguing about what knowledge is.

The philosophical problem best addressed by OLP is the phrase "I know". — Cheshire

I believe, I mean, I think, I understand, I see, I intended, I doubt...

...the examined life is of importance to Socrates in that it may lead to various terms that lead to a better life. Such terms can be called, "enlightened", "rational", "virtuous".

Yet, without context these terms are ambiguous in terms of living an examined life. If we to take what Socrates said as important to ourselves, then what does it mean to live an examined life, as surely it is to our benefit to do so?

Do you think it boils down to ethics again? How so?

Or more technically, what kind of analysis or even methodology should a person incorporate when doing this examination? Isn't it really psychoanalysis?

Contemplation seems to be the natural arising thought in regards to the issue. So, what kind of contemplation? — Shawn

Well I hate to bring up a methodology by name being hammered out (upon) elsewhere, but the examination (contemplation) of ordinary thresholds and procedures (criteria) in contexts, for, as an example: an excuse, teaches us about ourselves (our actions) and how we take responsibility and avoid it, etc. The further argument, by Wittgenstein among others, is this makes one a better person, or able to see (be enlightened as to) where our part comes in (what virtue is). Socrates, unfortunately, was only looking for one (kind of) answer, rather than necessary for each practice (concept) in its own way.

"What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

I guess I got sidetracked by the poor depiction of OLP that I didn't even answer the question (@chad @Manuel @god must be atheist @Amalac @Cheshire @Banno)

Stanley Cavell examines the Problem of the Other Minds in "Knowing and Acknowledging" and covers a lot of ground on skepticism in his work; Austin examines the standard of true/false statements in How to Do Things With Words; Wittgenstein examines why we want a referential picture of meaning and what that means about the limitations of knowledge, and then the ethical position we are in; Nietszche uses examples of the things we say and do to show that our moral realm is affected by our desires, and how history plays a part, as well as our part; Emerson and Thoreau are drawing out our ordinary criteria from so far inside that it almost doesn't seem like they are doing philosophy, or that it applies, say, to Descartes, when Emerson says "we dare not say, 'I think,' 'I am,' ". I would even argue that Socrates is doing OLP, but that he ignores all the criteria except the ones he has in his back pocket.

OLP makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. — Tony Nickles

Look me in the eye and claim this isn't bullshitting. I don't mean can you rationalize it either. Rather, is there really information content that could be further examined? In a meaningful way; as it applies to any philosophical problem called X. X=? — Cheshire

I edited that comment to say I provided Malcolm's example (about "I know") above, and Austin's as well. Cavell (in Must We Mean What We Say) draws out Austin's examination of "intention": his finding (claim) that one condition is that something has to be "phishy" compared to our ordinary criteria for an action in order for there to be (the possibility of) an intention (see the cows and donkeys above). Now if we have criteria for pulling off an action correctly (felicitously Austin will say), apart from true/false, then we have a rational way to discuss a moral situation (understanding excuses, judgment, etc.), and also a explanation of the "normative" nature of language/our actions--you may say anything you want; at a certain point you are no longer, say, apologizing, or, playing chess (Witt's example). That conversation is the one Socrates started, Kant tried to finish, Nietzsche pried open again; one which we want finished, and ahead of our actions, with certainty, etc. Philosophy itself is under investigation (again).

Meta-semantics? — Cheshire

Semantics smacks of only about words, or limited in importance to language. When OLP examines the criteria of what we say when, we learn about our lives.

First, words are our tools...

Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things:...

...these surely are likely to be more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters... — Austin

The second [ quote ] both negates it and muddies the water. — Cheshire

He is alluding to the historical argument that corresponds words to "meanings" or "thoughts", as if these are facts or things--that they refer to/from them.

The third explains... it's authoritarian dismissal as the emperor's new wardrobe and served to maintain the religious madness we are still trying to cure. Did that make sense? Not asking for agreement; just is it a coherent claim about a thing? — Cheshire

Austin is defensively dismissive of philosophy's profundity over our ordinary criteria. Wittgenstein does a better job of investigating what philosophy wants in supplanting our ordinary criteria, and what it says about the human condition.

The point I should be making is that if you can't say something coherent about simply 'words', then stop. — Cheshire

The desire for "coherency" and the attitude that words are simple, are some of the reasons philosophy has theories of language (all of it), and meaning (in every case, for every thing). Your unwillingness to look further may hide the need for a certain answer.

"I'm only saying that people refer, it's is an act that people do. They can refer with words, as is often the case, or with gestures. — Manuel

I agree; OLP would be looking into what (ordinary criteria) makes it "referring" in different cases, maybe how it is differentiated from implying, in order to see how "referring" is held to different (metaphysical) criteria at times, such as:

Either words refer or they don't. — Manuel

Austin and Wittgenstein's starting point is that, yes, words can refer, but they do not only refer. They marry us, make promises, lie. That not only are things not meaningful in one way, but everything has its own ways; each of: agreeing, condescending, threatening, pointing, playing chess. (Some of these are/can be done with words, some not, of course.) And that maybe there are reasons for this, for us wanting referring to work a particular way.

@bongo fury
That Frodo depends on words isn't that "Frodo" refers to words. "Frodo" refers to a hobbit, and hobbits exist only in a fictional piece of writing. — Michael

And how OLP might help here is with the criteria for referring as naming; and with how we use "existing" as, say: alive; or: among the records we have but not all that we might find; or: "real" as opposed to literary, but then what if we want to say hobbits have an actual impact on me, as much as people (who can come off as unreal)? or that some people are alive, but lack existence (their self does). I realize these are mostly questions, but part of the point is that you must answer these for yourself for them to be philosophically relevant (they are not statements), that you could continue to answer these types of questions to shed light on why we want a referent to be a certain type of thing.

I see, you did not take my advice on how NOT to explain things with negatives — god must be atheist

I'm not sure we agree on what the grammar is for advice. When someone doesn't ask questions but just makes blind assertions, one answer is: well, no, not quite, more like....

You used two negatives with one blurred, muddled, ineffectual, vague positive claim. — god must be atheist

Well unless you have a counterclaim or a question, this is just rude; and just because you don't understand it, doesn't make it any on those things.

So... I don't know your point, until you state it in ordinary language. Simple, ordinary, common language. — god must be atheist

This is the most common misconception--granted, thus, it is a dumb name--but the last thing OLP can do is "state" things "with" "simple" "common" language. It makes claims about the ordinary (non-metaphysical, let's say) criteria we have for different language in different situations, for the purpose of shedding light on philosophical problems. I do provide examples elsewhere in this thread.

Critiques are solutions too. Inasmuch as solutions can be found. In the sense that 5 <> 6 is a solution much like 5=5 is a solution.
***
After all, solutions point to a set that satisfy the criteria in question — god must be atheist

OLP does not point to a set that satisfies (and, again, notice the skeptical fear of inconclusiveness); it uncovers the criteria of how we even are satisfied (here), or not. And it is not a "solution", say, on the terms/grounds of mathematics. See The Mathematical and the Ordinary.

Carnap devoted an essay on the impossibility of metaphysics, it had a strong flavor of "ordinary language philosophy". But it's an open question as to if Carnap succeeded in showing that metaphysics is nonsense. — Manuel

I don't know Carnap, but Wittgenstein literally embodies (with the interlocutor) our tendency for something certain (like a Platonic form, or positivist logic), and Cavell explores what that means for us, our struggle to overcome the fear of our responsibility.

referring is an act people do, it's not something that a word does. — Manuel

Let's try this OLP style: "Referring"--as is promising, indicating, distinguishing--is a concept ("knowing" "intending", say, practices). I would offer that one ordinary criteria of referring is that it is something words can do, that you actually can do it (get the referring done) using only words, that the words are the doing of it--"I refer you to Exhibit A". With those words, the act of referring is accomplished. Well, yes, you said it, but you can (or not) acknowledge that saying: "I convince you" does not make one convinced (but we can talk about what/how words convinced us). And I even do something to you; I have referred you to something, as in: given notice. There is no now avoiding being referred, even if you don't, thereafter, actual refer to whatever someone has referred you to.

That can be an ordinary language philosophy solution to a problem. But there's bound to be disagreements. — Manuel

My claim is that these are the workings, the criteria for identity, the terms of correctness, of referring; if you disagree (on the features), there may be examples or counter-examples, after which I might: see and grant that something is an important distinction, admit I was thinking of something else, point towards the concept in different contexts, etc.--but we have a process for coming to agreement, call it rational--even if only to learn how we/to disagree. Now can we learn anything from this, or from looking more into this, about the philosophical idea of reference?

Also, the desire to never have a disagreement, fueled by skepticism, creates the opposite of the kind of "ordinariness" that language has.

It's a mode of critique more than a set of solutions. It's basic tenet might be "cut the bullshit". — Banno

Austin for sure. Then Wittgenstein started to look at how we bullshit ourselves, and what it is about us that we want to bullshit ourselves, drawn out by Cavell into an investigation of our shitty human condition.

Thanks for writing the above, but I actually don't see how it relates to our argument. My position is that a summary may be a good starting point while not being (or else being) a good summary at all, of philosophical (other other types) of enquiry for the otherwise uninitiated. Your counter point was to decry three-sentence or shorter garment label descriptions (so to speak) of any philosophical trend, particularly the trend of ordinary language philosophy. — god must be atheist

If it wasn't just advice, I would argue that philosophy is not about acquiring knowledge, that your thoughts in reading it are more important than what it is telling you. Thus starting with a summary reduces philosophy to a set of answers people judge and regurgitate or dismiss; it trivializes the point of going through the process of being changed by reading. Not just changing your mind, as in now you hold a different opinion, but changing the actual way in which you think, broadening your sense of the world, realizing a greater version of your self. Wittgenstein does not have a "theory of meaning" anyone (he) can tell you. Even the method of OLP can not be explained by its outcomes (as is being assumed here); there are no conclusions; no "maxim" or answer, e.g., when questions are framed without any sense of the picture itself. Most importantly, the postulations of what is implied when we say ___, are for you to see (come to) for yourself, or they have no force; they are not arguments, not true/false "theories" or statements--what is there to summarize?

If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game, then all that matters is that everybody understands what the phrase means in the context of ordinary life activities, and have no need of analyzing the logical structure of the phrase to do so. — Amalac

The whole point of OLP is to "analyze the logical structure" of our concepts. Not as a normative authority, or to "make everyone understand", or to come to (uncover) some agreement. It is to shed light on the problems of traditional philosophy, as our language (the criteria for it) reflects our interests, and judgments, and the ways things fall apart, etc. This can be a study, as Austin does, or when we do not know how to continue with a concept, as Wittgenstein examines.

If we follow the late Wittgenstein's maxim that the meaning of a word (or of a sentence) is its use in a particular language game — Amalac

And, again, Wittgenstein examined lots of words (and the different but ordinary criteria there are for judging in which of their sense they have been used, in this context) in finding out there is no one way in which words are meaningful to us--that there is no maxim.

Thanks for providing an example of your point: — god must be atheist

Yeah, right--the irony was not lost on me. Another specific example from Malcolm is coming up with circumstances when we would say: "I know" and then see and describe what those instances imply about our various criteria for that concept (realizing that a concept can have multiple options--"senses" Witt says--ways they make sense, ways they can be used in different contexts.

One sense of "I Know" is that I am certain: "I know when the sun will rise today"; the criteria for this might be that I can give evidence of that certainty, etc. This appears to be philosophy's one and only use and preoccupation. Second, we can say "I know New York", as in: I know my way around; I can show you; Third, I know (knew) that, as in to confirm or agree with what you said; and Fourth, I know, as in to sympathize with you. Cavell uses this last sense to shed light on our knowledge of another's pain--we don't "know it" in the first sense, we acknowledge it, recognize and accept (or ignore or reject) the claim their expression of pain makes on me.

I didn't mean to be condescending, but you are better off diving into the text yourself and making your own mistakes. Especially about a method that is not about arriving at theories or making arguments or explaining. A knee-jerk, superficial, three-sentence takeaway can't be anything but misleading.

OLP is not about knowledge or being told anything; it's about texts, and going through a process; answering the questions, seeing for yourself.

Wittgenstein's basic idea was that there is no general solution to issues other than the custom of the community. — Hanover

This takes Wittgenstein as solving (or trying to solve) skepticism (or something else) with communal agreement--that "forms of life" are somehow foundational. This is a cliff-note misunderstanding; like that OLP champions "ordinary language"; which will solve philosophy, or make it irrelevant. I'm sorry, but this is just a jealous dismissal without any real understanding, which unfortunately happens more often than not really though.

From Wikipedia: — Chaz

Oh please for all that is good in the world save me from philosophical summaries (even mine).

What are the "Ordinary Language Philosophy" solutions to common philosophical problems? — Chaz

OLP is not a theory (argument) but a method, though it is working within the analytical tradition (calling it "linguistic" is to dismiss it as not also about our world). Some people say it is a diagnosis, but I resist the conclusive implication of calling it "therapeutic"--that it makes philosophy, or its problems, go away, or treats them as errors or a confusion. It does not pit "ordinary" language ("what words actually mean in everyday use") against philosophical language (though G.E. Moore appears to be a example of that). Moore did want to resolve our skepticism; Austin in a sense ignored it, focusing on the fallout: positivism's rejection of anything but true/false statements. Wittgenstein's later work started with a similar issue (his earlier self) as Austin, in trying to show that there is not one way of how things have meaning, but his "conclusion" is not that language creates skepticism (though its criteria is the means). What he found out, uncovered, learned about us--which is a better way of framing OLP's goal (not a "solution")--is our desire, our weaknesses, our blindness to ourselves (philosophy's and humanity's). That our desire for certainty is a reaction to the threat of skepticism, but that it is situational, possible to investigate, but not always (or forever) resolvable by our knowledge.

The method is not to attend to the "details" of language, but to see or imagine what matters to us when we say "...", for example, "I know..." (in every day situations and in philosophical ones). That this is philosophical data, much as Socrates' questions, that helps deepen and broaden our picture/understanding of our world, our philosophical problems, and our selves.

I did attempt an OP on it Ordinary Language Philosophy but I'm not sure I did a very good job of clearing up the mischaracterizations. Stanley Cavell is a good current example--try any essay in "Must We Mean What We Say".

An example from that OP:

The method is to ask or imagine (as Austin says): what do we ordinarily imply ("mean") when we say…, e.g., “I know”, "I think", "I forget", "I apologize", which also might involve fleshing out the context (situation) that would go along with that case. As an example, when we ordinarily say an action was done accidentally rather than mistakenly, we can imagine a case (a context): that “the gun went off in my hands and killed the donkey” (accidentally), as opposed to: “I did want to kill the cow, but hit the donkey instead” (mistakenly) (this is Austin's example). The example allows us to see what is usually skipped over unexamined: to describe what “actions” are and how they work, e.g., that “intention” does not come up in every circumstance (just when asked about a mistake) and how moral culpability works (Austin will talk of excuses—“The donkey just walked in the way!”).

Why does Nietzsche almost unique among many of the famous thinkers have to write in such a highly ambiguous way. — Ross Campbell

This makes me think of Wittgenstein saying "We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough." By the time everyone's way of thinking is framed by Kant in reaction to Descartes still looking for Plato's knowledge, it takes a different form of argument not to just fall into the same trap of relativism vs absolutism. Thoreau is not talking about living in a house in the woods, it's about getting your mental (philosophical) house in order. What you think you understand about Nietszche is not wrong, it just lacks depth and an openness that there is more than meets the eye. Attempt to take him as a serious philosopher--not a social critic with personal opinions--writing within the history of the philosophical tradition. If you take something as the first thing it appears to you to be, you will never see anything new in the world. It is really easy to glance at Nietszche (Wittgenstein, Hegel, Heidegger, Emerson, Marx, Austin) think you got the gist and dismiss him. Try thinking analogously, mythologically; imagine he is tricking you into becoming an example of the moralistic person he is critiquing. He can't tell you in the way you want because you have to see it for/in yourself, which is a matter of turning against your first thoughts and looking at it from a new place. I'd try Human, All Too Human for the most straight forward text, though he plays out a lot of examples in the second half.

Real philosophy is not about knowledge of theories, so summaries and introductions spoil the point, which is to listen to how you react when you read the original texts. The result is to change who you are and how you think so there is no shortcut. Don't start with Nietszche, or Descartes, or anyone modern because they usually have an axe to grind. Plato or Aristotle are good because they form the reference for most everyone after. Mill and Hume and Hobbs and Rouseau are all fairly easy to read, which might be the best place to start (do not attempt Kant or Hegel or Heidegger).

I'm afraid I couldn't understand everything you were saying. — Ross Campbell

Well, if you are interested, I stand ready to clarify, draw something out further, or answer any questions.

I think there is a grain of truth in Nietzsche's attack on Christianity as being a slave morality. — Ross Campbell

Or we can simply continue to see these as his opinions (see Witt. P.I. p. 152). I am arguing this is not a discussion of pity and compassion (better to read Arendt, Foucalt, etc.). In this vein, Nietszche is challenging our habit to think we see and can judge immediately. He is asking for a different reader as much as a different moral culture. I found that if I felt I "got him", especially at first glance, I would be wrong, missing something; maybe this is not an argument, but a call for something, a claim on us? Maybe these are not statements (true/false) about our society, but challenges for a change of our entire picture of morality.

And the idea of our being slaves is, again, an analogy, say, slaves to our desire to give our self (our responsibility) away to our morals. Emerson calls for us to "master" ourselves or someone else will; i.e., our unexamined culture makes us a slave. We are quietly desperate, in chains, etc.--this is not new.

The fundamental problem with Nietzsche , as with some other existentialists is that they are too individualistic in their thinking. — Ross Campbell

As I said at the bottom of my original post, this is the other side of misunderstanding Nietszche. If I do not give myself away to morals, that does not mean I abandon them--we take them on, examine the context (or lack of it), history, use (misuse)--perhaps each case on its own terms (we become adverse to them, as Emerson phrases it). He is not anti-morality, but simply asking us to inhabit our moral life. All his talk of self does not mean we then become the sole arbitrator of what is right; that we have some right to a private moralism (equal to the moralism we inflict on each other with our public morals). The call for my will to guide me (my whim Emerson says) may be to help others, be a good citizen, go along with everyone else; my duty need not be our downfall, nor different than yours or anyone's. The aspiration to the self is not an abdication of moral responsibility (but a call for it); ironically, irresponsibility comes from the reliance only on unexamined morals.

Aristotle said, "Man is a social animal". — Ross Campbell

Nietszche is different from Aristotle, and most traditional philosophers, in that he is not advocating for a particular type of human. He is not explaining or telling us what human nature is. Another way to think of this is that he is not talking about what we ought to be or do (setting our future goal or ideal). His is an open-ended call to aspire to your next self, a revitalized culture. Can we trust each other? or are we bound to pre-judge us all? Can we have our humanity without it appearing we desire an anarchy of no culture, no rules, no language?

Nietzsche's attack on the virtues of kindness and compassion seems to me an unfortunate flaw in his thinking. ...Nietzsche's psychology is flawed in many aspects ...his contempt for the virtues of pity and compassion regarding them as weaknesses which inhibit the "strong" individual. — Ross Campbell

There is another discussion of Nietszche's book The Antichrist that touches on this. In that discussion with @frank I try to make the case that Nietszche's work is philosophy, and is not meant as social commentary. His characterization of Christianity is drawn as an example of morality pre-determined with certainty and rules, such as Kant's imperatives and Plato's forms.

Pity and compassion are used analogously. For him they are attitudes we take to ourselves and our perspective on morality. Morality decided in advance and fixed is to remove ourselves (the human) from the equation. Our pity is our sense of lack for what we wish we were (our ideal or ought); our desire for a universal, rational, "normative" moralism is our weakness. Emerson frames it as a quarter he wishes he had the strength to withhold giving to the poor, for they are not his (oh my!) What he is critiquing is Kant's sense of duty, which says: if you just do this, you will be a good person. For Emerson duty is to stand for what I say and do ("I am!"); to be read by it, answerable for it. Our strength is not to take the easy answer that abstract morality provides, contemptuous of our moral self.

So why does Nietszche (and Emerson) court misunderstanding? I'm not sure. Why does Wittgenstein talk out of two sides of his mouth? Why does Heidegger never get around to saying anything? Maybe there are some things that cannot be told, but that we must find for ourselves. You need "new eyes", "new ears"--maybe he wanted to start a fight to set himself as an outrageous example. You're shocked, provoked, antagonized? Is what you think right desecrated? Your sensibilities, your righteousness? Perhaps now you are ready.

(In anticipation of knee-jerk reactions, I'll also say that some take Nietszche to advocate that we are selfish--"pitiless", "dominating", "powerful"--beyond morals (not just beyond good and evil); that he thinks our instinct will make us superior in a zero-sum game (not that my duty could be the same as yours, or better). They take him to propose a new type of human, apart from (above) culture--a morally-naturalistic nightmare. I believe the interpretation comes from a desire not to be subject to society ("free") and the need to feel special, important--an excuse to hold individual (internal) experience paramount.)

Can anyone think of other cases where being a kind of thing at all is conflated with being a good example of that kind of thing? — Pfhorrest

Well J.L. Austin talks about how to decide if a bird is a goldfinch or not, and he uses the example to draw out the criteria we use in making that decision, in determining its identity; this is in distinction from other birds, what distinguishes it.

In another case, we would identify two dogs as bloodhounds but hold one over the other, say, in its "bloodhound-ness". We might say we use criteria of judgement. The importance of saying one is a better example or more representative (rather than just a set of criteria, or ideal) is that there is an embodied comparison and thus no way to explicate all the ways one example differs from another, or, more importantly, how we might value one over another.

And we wouldn't normally say criteria of identity are set by us (that we created the distinction between a crow and a bluebird) but usually that criteria of judgement are in a sense manufactured: utility, beauty, right, etc. Stanley Cavell said "modern" art brought its identity (its medium, its form) into discussion with us as part of our judgement. We might also say when we identify something as fair it is also a matter of judgement.

Maybe you could elaborate what doing or being better means in the context of the contingency of values. What is an aim to do better outside of goals, utility, ought? What is an interest or desire if not normative , goal-oriented , anticipatory? — Joshs

Well this is a necessary demand for clarification, so thank you; these are the questions. If we do not give in to the weakness of abdicating our desire to the desire for certainty--a predetermined, timeless, universal; if we don't sublimate our attraction to the essence of a thing to a fixed, external explanation, then what are our interests, our desires?

It should be noted it is no small thing that Nietszche gets us to this point; and our anxiety to jump to an answer is what requires courage and joy to overcome. If we are now turned and see our reflection in our world, we can then consider our real need, what interests us (draws us, Heidegger will say). So our goal could be put as knowledge of ourselves, in the life we are a part of (Wittgenstein will call it Grammar). We could say: the difference between a value, and what we value; between what is the meaning, and what is meaningful. This is not a goal as an end or answer, it is a reoccurring question (for each type of thing) for which we are answerable--there is what is normal, and what we are prepared to stand apart for (even if seen as mad). Nietszche makes us see our part in our bankrupt morals and rallies us to revitalize them, fill them with us, rather than with our lack (pity) of what we wish we were.

Are you talking about perfection as the thing in itself , as an asymptotic ideal? — Joshs

My point was, similar to when you say that "nothing can reside outside time and history", that we can not reside outside institutions, rules, words (our culture). But, with Nietszche, our culture as it stands needs to be transfigured (not abandoned). That is not teleological (you seem to see an inevitable tipping point here, "Perfecting, approximating, developing, evolving all imply a telos or center that defines the movement.") I frame it as perfectionism only as change and progress. The imagery (of the sun, of moving upward) and the enthusiasm he advises is not to a certain goal (Emerson would say we should live fuzzy in front). We join or re-write the social contract; we aspire to our (next) better self. I only wanted to try to show that he is not doing social commentary of our culture (except as an example); that he is writing in analytical contrast to Kant and Plato. He is humanizing that morality by introducing the context of the history of our interests and desires. The example is our desire for rationality to remove our responsibility, but he is showing us that we do (together/each) have interests and desires. In seeing that now (reflected in our moralism), I/we aim to do/be better. This is beyond the argument of grounded or not grounded; absolute or relative; goals, utility, ought.

Post-structuralism , deconstruction and Will to Power don’t eliminate structures — Joshs

Well there are a lot of people who take Nietszche to propose an individual (seen as selfish--"pitiless"--"dominating", "powerful") who is beyond morals (not just beyond good and evil); to imply that my instinct matters even if that means a zero-sum game. That a "new human" stands apart from (above) culture. I believe the interpretation comes from a desire to not be subject to society and the need to feel special, important (an excuse to hold their (internal) experience paramount).

When our desire is for the ideal , even when we set aside aside the thing-in-itself we are still presupposing it. — Joshs

I agree, that was my initial point. I would only say that this shows the importance of Wittgenstein's realization that in looking at everything individually on its own terms, in each case--not AN essence (universally)--we can recapture what we want from the thing-in-itself: what is important to us about something, how it matters, which we see in looking at its regular ordinary criteria (not abstracted or imposed). He could been seen as continuing this from Nietszche unearthing our unexamined purpose/desire in the creation and use of our morals.

Even as you seem to be closing your hand around an argument only to have it slip out. I don't see in your post anything specific enough to disagree with. — Banno

I enjoy the irony of a comment about vagueness being unspecific. I wanted to point towards how and why the preoccupation here is philosophically important.

this vagueness that irritates philosophers.
— Shawn

That's a psychological problem for philosophers, not a philosophical problem. — Banno

"than what is it that goes wrong with [human life such that idealism emerges]?"
— Antony Nickles

He's saying it becomes a sort of cultural suicidal state. — frank

We die by our own hand. Our desire for the ideal, kills us. We set aside the thing-in-itself because we can not have it on our terms. In our weakness we destroy our world because we can't know it with certainty, and give ourselves the pity of our own reason. It is the humanization of epistimology.

The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not fact but fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is "in flux," as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for--there is no "truth" (Nietzsche 1901/1967 Will to Power) — Joshs

We could simply take away, 'there is no truth', but then why are 'we concerned'? maybe this is not a dismissal, but an observation and critique. If our guidance is changing, in flux, and becoming, then we are getting near and approximating; bettering, perfecting. Maybe this time with a greater attention to observation, and with this knowledge that we will never be perfect and timeless.

“…the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning' and ‘purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. — Joshs

And if we must 'interpret' again, there is no place outside of standing for a conclusion or description, though 'adjusted' and 'transformed'. So it can be a +/- determination about grounding moral values, but I only urge that is the first, not the last, of him. Yes, he is hammering away at the fixed, certain nature of Kant and Plato, but is that the conclusion?

people down the ages have believed that the obvious purpose of a thing, its utility, form and shape, are its reason for existence, the eye is made to see, the hand to grasp. So people think punishment has evolved for the purpose of punishing. But every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea [Sinn] of a use function; and the whole history of a ‘thing', an organ, a tradition can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretation and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random.” (Genealogy of Morality) — Joshs

And I know, 'at random' jumps out here, but before that is a restructuring of classical epistimology. A thing's rationality ('utility, form and shape') tells us it's 'purpose' (essence). And we take this as 'obvious' because we want everything to be certain and timeless and predetermined. So we skip over, as Wittgenstein notes as well, looking closely to investigate what the actual logic of a thing is, what sense does it make apart from our desires (which Heidegger picks up on). So, again, is pulling out the carpet really the point?

So are we left without 'forms' or 'things'? without morals, rules, words? No. But Nietszche shows us their history, their perspective, that they are used as much as essential. He does what another philosopher suggested, turn and see yourself reflected in the thing. But the clarion call is not kill God, but, do better! less seriously (seeking reason) and more joyously.

The Antichrist comes across as psychology. Proto-Jungian. He wants to analyze the Savior type. He's not psychoanalyzing Jesus, but a type of idealism. He's explaining how idealism emerges out of human life. — frank

But this is philosophy, just maybe not a form (of argument?) we are used to seeing. Why must it take the form it does? If we can agree that he is analyzing idealism (whose? what form?), than what is it that goes wrong with this "emergence"?

In Antichrist, hes not focusing on building morality back. He's just saying that when self condemnation becomes the prevailing vibe (as in Christianity), it's a deathly force. — frank

I'll grant you that Neitszche gets a little one note as he progresses, but It is easy to take from him simply a critique of morality and a description/judgment of attitudes (weak, pity, power, are about our thinking, say, they are in context to our self). I offer that there is more, if you look deeper--what is he trying to get us to see about how it is, in philosophy, that we condemn ourselves ("the human") with our thinking, the creation of our morality?

I suppose this makes me want to compare Christian cultures to non-Christian ones. His critique doesn't seem to bear much on the reality. — frank

It may seem like a sociological critique, but it is analytical. He is not doing history, he's fashioning an example to show a dynamic. You could call it mythical, or fantastical. Wittgenstein will do the same (even creating surreal worlds) to contrast with the logic of our ordinary mechanisms. Plato has his parables of chariots and caves. Nietszche's contribution is in and to this history of moral philosophy, and it is not a stick of dynamite nor simply a social commentary.

This sounds consistent with the moral perspectives of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Levinas (and Caputo, Critchley and Sheehan) , because it still makes the idea of god coherent. I read Nietzsche as deconstructing this thinking. — Joshs

I'm not sure this is such a black-n-white fight. I don't think my descriptions of Nietzsche's critiques of deontology "still makes the idea of god coherent"? Is this to say that Nietzche's aim was to make deontology incoherent? when his work is a description of how it functions? I think it's too simplistic to say Nietszche is doing away with it or replacing it; he finds there is no "human" history or recognition of our part in the creation or our misuse of morals to judge people. If he is taking it apart, it is to see our part in it.

And without Nietszche you don't have Wittgenstein; the idea of looking at a fictitious history as a case to learn the ins-and-outs of something; the idea of the ordinariness of our concepts, that they come from a place in our lives; that our concepts are not precise and fixed...

he doesn't think of morality in terms of fixed rules. — frank

But what I was saying is that he uncovered the desire for them, our weakness for an answer that doesn't involve us, our failings. But also, if you read early work like Human, all too Human, he is simply breaking down our moral framework to build it back with an eye on history and context, and acknowledging our part in our moral judgments, though later he will seemingly be simply railing on an
about the individual.

So you're saying that living out someone else's morality is easy, it provides an easy Good buzz. How would you explain the alternative? That embracing authenticity comes at a price? — frank

Nietszche talks of needing strength, courage, indifference, and, at least elsewhere, joy. If there is a desire in us for certainty and universality and the surety of a fixed morality knowledge, then we must resist a part of ourselves, turn away from our culture, towards our attraction. Our will is not us forcing something, but allowing our instinct and interests to guide us.

From the preface, he describes his reader:

"He must have an inclination, born of strength, for questions that no one has the courage for; the courage for the forbidden; predestination for the labyrinth. The experience of seven solitudes. New ears for new music. New eyes for what is most distant. A new conscience for truths that have hitherto remained unheard. And the will to economize in the grand manner-to hold together his strength, his enthusiasm. . . . Reverence for self; love of self; absolute freedom of self..." — frank

This sounds like Emerson and Thoreau. Whitman talked of having the right person to tell his secrets to. Could Nietszche be asking us to become something else? to change us, rather than simply tell us something? To have us stop giving our self away for nothing?

"...the rottenness I speak of is most apparent to me precisely in those quarters where there has been most aspiration, hitherto, toward "virtue" and "godliness." — frank

-quoting Nietszche

Some prefer to see Nietszche as a continental philosopher, commenting about the state of his world (and Christianity). I read him as an analytical philosopher, reacting to Kant and Plato. His example is religion but his target is deontological morality. If you 'aspire' to a specific idea of what it is to be virtuous, you are abdicating the opportunity and responsibility to be a better you. Also a moral moment may be lost on you if you feel you are a good person because you have done what has been decided beforehand by others long ago.

A history of the "higher feelings," the "ideals of humanity"-and it is possible that I'll have to write it-would almost explain why man is so degenerate. — frank

- again, quoting Nietszche.

But he has written the history of our desire for ideals. His work is an examination by strawman of the forces at work in us to replace our human failing with righteous reasoned imperatives and forms. He is trying to get us to see the historicity of moral philosophy.

However, some misconstrue the impassioned fever of his entreaties, even hatred, as that he is against rules at all and that it is every person for themselves. Emerson is thought of this way as well--withholding charity to others (giving ourselves over). But to follow my whim (will) may be to help others, be a good citizen, go along with everyone else; my duty need not be our downfall, nor different than yours or anyone's. But Nietszche doesn't see any desperation in the quietness of our voice, so he is desperate for us, controversial, shameless, hated--a god-killer--a hyperbolic example, for us. We are the weak and ill-constituted. We pity ourselves (being "moral") rather than being our self.

I think of it as a mythical analogy (prejudiced hopefully more by the trope than in belief) written in code, where "God" is Plato's form and our weakness is our desire to relinquish our responsibility over our self to a moral theory.

I'm not trying to look at this through a lens of preciseness only. I think, it also seems to me to be an issue about inherent vagueness in language — Shawn

This is the killer though. @Banno waves this off as a problem with a philosopher's psychology, but it is so tied to how we think I take the resolution as an analytical problem. The desire you are trying to see with is creating your picture of the concept. Emerson and Heidegger both have the image of closing our (human) hand and everything spilling out. We grasp with the criteria of certainty, specificity, universality, and we end up without the essence of what a heap is, its gist--this is not ontological or correlative or definitional--it is what matters to us about heaps and the judgments we make about them, etc., our lives with heaps. This need is crystallized with Logical Positivism, which excluded everything vague and uncertain. So Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is the obvious guide out of these woods. His term Concept, like, say, "game", is pulled and pushed to show how our lives are measured in more ways than a simple theory would like. He discusses "vague" at #71, starting "One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges." and to ask "Isn't the indistinct [picture] often exactly what we need?" and also "is it senseless to say: 'Stand roughly there?'" Or at #98 "Where there is sense there must be perfect order--so there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence." Now this isn't to say there aren't mistakes, misuses, laziness, etc. but the point is laid out in #101 "We want to say there can't be any vagueness in logic. The idea absorbs us, that the ideal must be found in reality." The cart is before the horse; the game is rigged before the thought problem, say, of criterion, is even set up. But this is a classic philosophical hand-wringer. There is confusion, miscommunication, and lack of agreement, and philosophy blames common language and sets out to correct it or clarify or qualify, but our ordinary criteria (for heaps, games, vagueness) is the most connected to our actual lives.