@Ludwig V @Banno (if anyone else is actually reading this book, please let me know.)

Without having read the whole of Lecture I, I want to point out that Ryle is actually using Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s methods. As I have not gotten to the part where Ryle points out how two arguments which we take to clash are merely answering different questions, as alluded to in the introduction, I don’t think it is important (or it is at least premature) to consider the arguments themselves.

He is, however, making claims about the ordinary ways we—in the quote below—help (or hurt) ourselves, contrary to fatalism’s conclusion.

this argument… that nothing can be helped…goes directly counter to the piece of common knowledge that:
some things are our own fault,
some threatening disasters can be foreseen and averted, and
there is plenty of room for precautions, planning and weighing alternatives. — Ryle, p.16, broken apart by me

He is asking that the description of the mechanics of these acts be accepted on their face. Not that they are unassailable (foundational, undoubtable), say: because they are “common sense” or the opinion of “ordinary people”, but that the rationale to be made for these claims can only be done by yourself, to see for yourself; or to reject them, which is to say: point out how “fault”, “forseeing”, and actions to mitigate the foreseen, do not work this way, or that help in the face of destiny does not refute determinism.

He is pointing to what Wittgenstein will call the “grammar” of our activities (“practices” Witt says). And the method involves drawing out what we do by looking at what we would say, when…

Very often, though certainly not always, when we say 'it was true that ... ' or 'it is false that ... ' we are commenting on some actual pronouncement made or opinion held by some identifiable person…. — Ryle, p.17 emphasis added

Thus he is claiming that how our relation to the future works is dependent on an individual (and not a force) making a guess. (Wittgenstein points out that “belief”, in one sense, works as a guess (a hypothesis, PI p.190) and not as an unjustified lesser claim to knowledge.)

If you make a guess at the winner of the race, it will turn out right or wrong, correct or incorrect, but hardly true or false. These epithets are inappropriate…. — Ryle, p.18

You will note that the claim is that true and false are “inappropriate”, which is to say their implications do not apply, their criteria have nowhere to measure against, because our relation to the future is not a matter of knowledge (outside of science, which is based on repeatability, predictability; as maybe determinism would like itself to be).

Ryle is not as generous and skilled at drawing out the details of the argument for determinism as Austin was with perception (nor are these examples as various and in-depth), so I think there will be more to do in working out on what terms Ryle takes these views to stand, and thus how they miss each other from different perspectives, if that is the case.

@Banno I am reading Lecture 1 still but your welcome to move forward.

@Banno

Just catching up with the preface. I find it ironic that the book is entitled Dilemmas when Ryle says his examples are only when two thinkers have “divergent goals” “from the beginning” (p. 1, emphasis added). Ryle wants to say philosophers only take themselves as conflicting when (unbeknownst to them it would seem) they are actually addressing two different problems (answering two different questions). Ryle does say it is not our logic, but our relationship to others that is the problem. (p.1)

We learned in reading Austin that we paint a picture as black-and-white in only taking into consideration one example rather than first looking at a variety of cases. Wittgenstein felt the same as Austin about variety but starts one step back to say that it is “having a goal” at all before you start (say, a requirement for crystalline purity. PI #107) that forces your mind into one picture (and maybe in this case, against another). Perhaps Ryle will say that we see others as rivals because of our pushing an agenda (“goal”) from the start, much as we fixate only on the example that makes our best case (pain, illusion, etc.) Hegel would say we are programmed to see things as dichotomies, and that the trick is to let things be what they are on their own (as will Heidegger) and from a larger perspective (as will Wittgenstein).

First Ryle describes the (imagined) fight of, let’s call it, the skeptic, who takes there to be an “unbridgeable crevasse” (p. 2) between us and the world, and the naturalist, who picks up their utensils without doubt. But Ryle is not concerned about the minutiae of the supposed disagreement, only to find out why the two feel they are at odds (or perhaps why we take them to be at odds). Ryle does hint at how they can’t actually connect enough to conflict because the skeptic’s case is based on reason (“theoretical”, p. 3), and there are no arguments for accepting the world.

Second is the argument without victor between free will vs. causation. He says “no one wants further evidence” (p.5) of either position but it is philosophy’s job to understand the “rights and obligations” (id) of the positions. He appears to be doing this in saying that a question about whether we can be moral is different than a question about whether an act was (morally) mine or determined by circumstances. (Id) In the same way a question of how we sensed something in a certain case is not answered by asking the question of how we sense at all. (p.5-6) I would venture that Ryle is highlighting confusion between a generalization and particular cases, but, too early to tell.

Lastly, he separates theology and science from tangling over “truth” by putting them in different “categories” because not only are their subject matters different, but also “the kinds of thinking they require” (p.8), meaning that their questions are different in their “terms and concepts”. (p.9) Ryle though is only saying that one question is not judged the same as another, because a ”category” is only generally created “by showing in detail how the metiers in ratiocination [means of reasoning] of the concepts under pressure are more dissimilar from one another or less dissimilar from one another”. (p.11)

The most important thing here seems to be “what is at stake” (different than what each litigant feels is) and what “considerations” should matter in each case. (p.12), which appears will be a matter of the concepts of the “highway”, the “underlying non-technical concepts employed as well in [technical theories] as in everyone else's thinking.” (Id) So, @Ludwig V, I do take the focus on particulars, dichotomies, goals, means of reasoning, criteria of what matters, similarities and differences, case-specific categories, and considerations in each case, to be right up the same alley as Austin and Wittgenstein. But we shall see.

Responsible to whom? Answer to whom? To make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read to/by whom? Judged by whom? — baker

Anyone? Myself included. Like if I make a claim and you question it; I clarify, or provide evidence, stand by my words, or rescind them, try to weasel out of the implications, etc. And we judge based on the criteria for a thing (or make it personal). I’m not sure what to say as I don’t know what the confusion or contention is.

I just don’t agree that it is objective. I would say it is inter-subjective. Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

If you consider what actually makes up the criteria of "objective" (and not just the picture), then what I am describing can be reasoned and intelligible (not "arbitrary"--"real" in that it matters, has impact), and not emotional or self-interested or intuitive (what you term, "subjective"). Moral choices are not like an "Inter-subjective" contract, and, by their nature, unlike science or math, they do not always lead to agreement, but are nonetheless subject to judgment just as other rational acts.

Something can be independent of me and still be subjective, and it can be independent of any randomly selected person and still be subjective. — Bob Ross

Again, it is the fact that it is dependent on me (that I am defined and held to my acts) that makes moral choices not subjective (as I take you to mean "arbitrary" or, not based on a fact).

I don’t think morality is completely arbitrary. I think that morality is either objective (exists mind[stance]-independently) or it does not (e.g., subjective, inter-subjective, etc.). — Bob Ross

If you force a dichotomy it makes it impossible to take into consideration how things actually are (as does requiring a specific standard), as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Austin discuss. Again, the meat of what “objective” is would be the actual mechanics of how we judge based on what criteria.

But would you say that this ‘fact of our position in the world’ exists mind(stance)-independently and has ‘moral’ signification? I wouldn’t. Having importance or power doesn’t make something a fact. — Bob Ross

The fact of it is not because of its import. The “reality” of it is the structure of our relation to ourselves and society following the limitation of knowledge (to answer independent of us). The fact is that what creates our moral responsibility is that our words and acts speak to who we are; that our responsiveness to others is a duty beyond trying to decide and be sure (know, be certain) what is to be done. So, although I don’t understand the terms you are couching this in, I would say that, yes, our human condition exists apart from me and has significance because it is the possibility of the moral realm at all (and not just rules or impulse).

I take it you imagine the choice is that morality is either tied to something certain (the world, etc), or at least not me, because we are arbitrary. What I am saying is that moral choices are not arbitrary (necessarily) because they are tied to me (at a certain point, beyond society’s ordinary norms and expectations).

Anyway, I wanted to thank you both for making this thread far more interesting, informative and certainly longer than I expected. — Banno

:up:

Facts about psychology do not entail the existence of moral facts. — Bob Ross

But what I was describing is not a fact about our “psychology”. That we are responsible for what we say and do is a fact of our position in the world and in relation to each other (even though we may not be held to it), which is real in the sense it has importance and power; it creates who we are going to be. A moral moment is when we do not know what to do and no one is in a better position to know what is right. The reality of that position does not make the fact of what I do next “relative” or “subjective”, though it might need to be individual and revolutionary (adverse to conformity).

@Banno

On the other hand, Austin does not claim that ordinary language may not need reform (p. 63), though admittedly his description of the process, especially the phrase "tidy up", could be described as an understatement and does largely ignore the practicalities of making the changes he is contemplating. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein refers to this as well, but what I take it to mean is that sometimes OLP’s method does not work because the things we say in a particular situation distort the mechanics of that practice, rather than reflect the criteria we ordinarily judge it by (which is OLP’s means of insight). So, when they talk of “tidying up” or “rearranging” (PI #92), they are not talking about word politics, but simply using the means of OLP, say in “substituting one form of expression for another” (#90). Sometimes this just means simply drawing out multiple examples to see a wider view of how it is that a practice works despite first impressions given only one way of speaking about it. Other times we’ve taken one way of speaking and created metaphysics.

How seriously should we take the possible conservatism of OLP? — Ludwig V

On the face of it, OLP seems to be pitting what we usually say against what philosophy says. The interpretation that OLP is conservative (usually taken from Moore) is that it is just common sense refuting skepticism. Austin will appear conservative because of his snobbishness about how language is just being used clumsily, lazily, haphazardly, etc. In both cases there is the underlying condescension that skepticism is folly or abnormal. Wittgenstein shows us how our fear is warranted (that we cannot know the other, know for certain what is right). In all, I take the suggestion that we look around at the variety of the world to be license to explore our own interests, and that it is democratic to think anyone can reflect and learn.

It might be more relevant to ponder why their work has been so widely disregarded. — Ludwig V

I don’t take OLP as wanting to end philosophy (nor refute skepticism). I think Austin thought he had finally found a way to get started (though in his mind this was just going to be a kind of cataloguing). Wittgenstein took on the same nemesis, however, seeing that the skeptic was part of himself, he realized the desire for certainty is a reoccurring part of all of us, thus, the battle was not to kill the hydra, but only cut of (charm?) each snake as it comes up. And in the face of our fundamental fear and desire, to merely offer as alternative the vast complex flawed variety of the world, is rather like saying eat your veg and exercise to someone who just wants a pill.

There is a practical issue. Simply, that the style of argument that Ryle, Austin and Wittgenstein deploy is much, much harder than it looks. — Ludwig V

Austin and Wittgenstein both make what they are doing look obvious, so people take the point as simple, or trivial.

I get really annoyed about the examples one sees that are tiny thumbnails, which are treated as the whole story, when it is clear that a wider context would reveal complexities that are ignored. — Ludwig V

The fact that taking into consideration further or wider circumstances (and even responses) can change what is meaningful about an expression shows that the expression itself is just kind of “ya know what I mean?” and whether you do is based on so much more that came before it and is happening around it and what happens after, if necessary. There are times when the actual words matter, but much of the time they are as if a cue in a particular direction of what can already be expected in that situation. Thus why our words seem to move right past each other when we don’t take into consideration we might be standing in different worlds (of interest, implication, anticipation).

It seems to me that a form of words always suggests a context, no matter how tiny the thumbnail sketch… Context isn't everything, but it isn't an optional extra. — Ludwig V

And I agree but would double the bet. Words not only “suggest a context”, they require it. If I am going to say “I’m sorry” and there is no harm done, the expression itself here can only move along the attendant earmarks of an apology; so that we all know what the next thing is that will be said in this instance, as if it were required—as if it must be said. It’s not the words here that have the power, which seems even to overwhelm our free will in only being able to respond “Sorry for what?”. So maybe we could say the context isn’t always everything, but we definitely do not have certainty in what we “perceive” nor control over what is said in what we express.

What do you mean here by "responsibility"? — baker

Responsibility for what you say and do; to answer for it, to make it intelligible, clarify, qualify, be read by it, judged by it, held to it, make excuses for it, etc. That words not only do not stand outside of the circumstances in which they are spoken, but that an expression is an event that has an afterwards, to which you are tied.

Ditch Sophie’s World. It makes the error of requiring a certain answer which twists the “inquiry” into the issues. I would also skip summaries and histories as you’ll think you know something when you shouldn’t. You are much better off going to the library and pulling original philosophy texts and reading a bit to see if you can make sense of it and are interested in the subject. You want something readable and relatable. And focus on your thoughts and questions while reading it—don’t automatically assume they are right. You don’t have to start at the beginning but some writing is responding to earlier texts (avoid Kant, Wittgenstein, Descartes, Nietszche, early Heidegger, and Hegel for now). I find Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Dewey, J.L. Austin easier. You could also avoid the technical stuff and stick with more social reflection like Hannah Arendt, Foucallt, etc. Good luck.

Just to throw a curveball out there, Stanley Cavell makes the claim that it is our shared lives that are normative, in that we have (implicit) criteria to judge each other, which come from what we are interested in (as a culture), what matters to us as a society. So, our actions are not constrained by facts, but conformity. That is not to say that others’ judgment is our moral condition. A moral situation is just when we run out of rules and norms (the “ought”), in which case our responses dictate our character; we are morally obligated, responsible as a (real) fact of the limitation of knowledge.

Can we know what is best ahead of time? No. Does anything anyone decides or argues for have power over what we do? No. Nevertheless, we act and learn, excuse, refine, better ourselves, and these things are not individual, necessarily based on whim, emotion, irrationality, unintelligibility—it is “real” in that it matters and is subject to judgment. Those are facts of our human condition, but outside the realism/anti-realism distinction, which is just the desire to avoid our responsibility for our acts by making it about just doing what is right, what we “ought” to—made certain (apart from me) by “facts”.

Switching to newer discussion.

@Banno

Possible wrong assumptions are not a matter of propositions/sentences (i.e forms of words) but of forms of words in the circumstances of their use, i.e.statements. — Ludwig V

I feel this might be misunderstood if we don’t make clear that the circumstances are of greater importance than any “form of words”. Yes, there are expressions that take a particular form, like a statement (or “empirical proposition”), but it is the attendant circumstances which make stating a fact important; whether that it is true, or hurtful, or both. More than that, there are also expressions that do not take a “form of words” at all, because they are simply a threatening gesture, but also because we don’t judge by the words (or the word’s “use”; or my “use” of them) but by the place the expression (or practice) holds in the circumstances, i.e., its sense or “use” (which is here what Wittgenstein is referring to) e.g., a plea, an overture, an apology, pointing, seeing, mocking, etc. To some expressions, the form (or practice) is crucial, like a knock-knock joke, to others, it is the deviance from any form that makes the expression what it is, like modern art, or its singularity, say, the cry of pain from me.

But we don’t hedge unless there’s some reason for doing so. The best policy is not to ask the question. — Ludwig V

This harkens back to Lecture X (p.112), when Austin pointed out that Ayer was pulling back behind “precise” sense-data to allow us to be uncommitted to our expressions. Here “hedging” our claims about the world qualifies our relation in order to mitigate our liability as well. Austin is claiming that our ordinary expressions do not inherently need to be hedged, unless there “is something strange or a bit off-colour about the particular situation.” (P.142) But Austin is not championing the status quo, as if it was more entitled or that it naturally has more solidity. We can unreasonably question another, but in doing so we put ourselves out (too familiar perhaps), or put them out (opening ourselves to calls of libel). In any case, we subject ourselves to judgment, and it is that responsibility Austin wants to be certain we understand.

OLP couldn't exist without definitions — RussellA

I’ll grant you that, but it does not rest on definitions; Austin is drawing out how we judge their use, distinctions, application, possibilities, the circumstances they come up in, etc., so that we understand the variety and logic of more than one case or dichotomy.

Does it mean either 1) the OLP uses ordinary language when analysing ordinary language or 2) the OLP analyses ordinary language but doesn't use ordinary language? — RussellA

Num 2, except it’s technically “what we say when”, like the different kind of things we say on instances of, in this case: “seeing” something, but, also, he’s not just imagining instances of what we say in ordinary use, but also trying to flesh out the criteria and circumstances for philosophical use as well.

@Banno @javi2541997

My point is only that if one remembers the roots of philosophy in ordinary language, it might seem less of an extraordinary aberration to those who don't see the point. — Ludwig V

Yes, and I think it’s also good to point out that the goal is not to negate everything that Plato, Descartes, Kant, Hume, metaphysical philosophers, did (or are doing) because the search for truth, the tendency to doubt and the desire for certainty are clearly part of the human condition, and the work they did obviously has merit. And I mean not in as a theory or summary (knowledge, to tell), but the example they set and the reward in reading those texts.

So long as that voice is hopeful rather than dogmatic… The accusation of arrogance, in both cases, is the response of those who don't recognize the voice or don't find the expected lesson in the book. — Ludwig V

I like to think of it as provisional, speculative. Unfortunately, people always just want something to take away, so any hint that they are generalizing something and we take that as all the value they have, rather than to show us a practice which we continue with our own interests and examples. Austin used performatives utterances as just one example of how not everything is true or false, and now he is forever just the “performative” guy as if that was meant as an entire theory of language.

I assume you mean the whole of the book. — Ludwig V

I meant the whole discussion, but there are a few essays in Must We Mean What We Say by. Cavell that set it out better than I can.

I had taken a rather different direction, thinking about the "ordinary" in philosophy. Descartes starts his meditation from ordinary life. — Ludwig V

Descartes, Socrates, Hume, etc., they all start from ordinary examples

If I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I have just done, I say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax; yet do I see any more than hats and coats that could conceal robots? I judge that they are men — Descartes, 2nd Meditation

But when they see the possibility of error they just jump to the conclusion that we must not be able to “know” the way they want and then they project the skeptical/metaphysical picture from there. Here, Descartes takes it that we do not have ordinary criteria for identification, and, out of his desire for unassailable knowledge to solve everything, does not see that we also “judge” a person as a person (“see” them as a person, or not), which is a different matter then just information and conclusion. So Descartes falls back on the picture that “judgment” must be a process of the “mind” that is mysterious and thus without the foundation he presets which drives the whole picture. As Wittgenstein and Austin say, the first step is the killer.

Berkeley makes great play of his respect for "vulgar opinion" and "what is agreed on all hands", yet rejects "universal assent". — Ludwig V

Cavell, in Problems in Modern Aesthetics, points out that Kant (in his critique of judgment) says that we make aesthetic claims, like OLP’s descriptions of its examples, in a universal voice, which is to say “Do you see what I see?” for yourself, coming to it on your own. Thus why Austin sounds so arrogant, and Wittgenstein is always leaving things unfinished, asking questions you have to change your perspective in order to answer. We, of course, may not agree, and agreement is only to the case, to the circumstances imagined.

I would like to add, however, that it is at its best when it actually analyses the uses. — Ludwig V

Most people take it that the examples are the point, as if they are to argue within the same old classic philosophical framework for the same end. But drawing out the examples are evidence or data from which they do make claims about philosophical issues (truth, “reality”, the other, knowledge, ethics, essence, etc.) and, of course, critique the practice of philosophy.

In contrast, his dissection of "vague" and "precise" is effective enough, but doesn't take that step — Ludwig V

Clearing up how those work is not only to take one more chink out of Ayer, but to show, as his diversity of other examples are meant to elsewhere, that our ordinary ways of judging things, etc., can be precise and clear and thorough and explicit and sufficient and of import to philosophy just not foundational, universal, ensured of agreement, etc., which is not to say they are just claiming it is “good enough” (simply practical).

The Merriam Webster dictionary definition of the word "see" includes i) to perceive by the eye and ii) to imagine the possibility. — RussellA

OLP is not about definitions. In trying to understand seeing (“perceiving”) the method is to find examples of the kinds of things we would say in a particular situation.

But we must look, of course, for the minuter differences; and here we must look again at some more examples, asking ourselves in just what circumstances we would say which, and why.
Consider, then: (1) He looks guilty. (2) He appears guilty. (3) He seems guilty. — Austin, p. 36

The point is to draw out from there the implications, expectations, and how we judge, how mistakes are made, distinctions drawn, corrections, i.e., how seeing works. This isn’t an argument that we should use language a certain way, or for one type of language (“ordinary”) against another.

As OLP is the position that philosophy should be carried out using words as ordinarily used by competent speakers of the language, — RussellA

So it’s not that philosophy should “use” ordinary usage. It looks at ordinary usages in individual cases to inform philosophical claims because what we are interested in about a subject, it’s essence, is reflected in how we judge it, which is captured in the kinds of things we say about it in particular cases.

But Austin in Sense and Sensibilia is saying that Ayer is wrong, in that we don't see sense-data but do see the material object. — RussellA

Austin is specifically not claiming we see directly or indirectly (bottom of p. 3), but that the whole thing is made up, including the picture of “material objects”, metaphysics’ “reality”, etc.

I'm beginning to think that "ordinary language philosophy" is a misnomer. It's a lot closer to philosophy than it seems to be if one reads the programmatic description. Perhaps the project would be better understood if one talked about "natural language". Logicians seem to have a generally accepted concept, which seems at least close to ordinary language. — Ludwig V

It absolutely is not named by them. It isn’t about language (although Wittgenstein looks at “meaning” as an example to investigate); it’s getting at the criteria and mechanics of, here, seeing (“perceiving”), by looking at examples of what we say (judge, identify, imply, expect, etc.) in particular situations. Some of these are fantasies (with Wittgenstein). Again, it isn’t an argument to say we should use ordinary language, nor is it trying to be “normative” about how we practice seeing; even dry old Austin is inevitably making claims about truth, metaphysics, etc. I did try to explain it here though it’s almost like you have to read the whole huge conversations, as I get something’s wrong and misstated at least initially.

OLP is a movement that believes philosophy must lose its grand metaphysical aspirations in asking such questions "what is truth" and "what is essence" — RussellA

Well OLP is not a movement, nor a belief-system, it’s a method, but Austin is not abandoning either truth, as I discuss here nor is OLP giving up on the essence of things, as I argued in the last paragraph here.

The absence of explicit Ethics in Austin is regrettable — Banno

I agree, though I don’t think it is absent entirely. Part of what I take Austin to be doing is to defend the practice of philosophy, thus, not what we should conclude, but the way we should conduct ourselves. Thus his bristling at the paucity of examples, the manufactured dichotomies, the inattention to detail, the exclusion of our ongoing responsibility, etc. And, although he does not directly alude to this, the import is that, without fixed standards or preset goals, everyone could benefit from such diligence.

@Ludwig V @javi2541997

to defend versions of emotivism elsewhere — Banno

This is how I take Austin’s “How to Do Things With Words”. Of course, with him, he is not so much “defending emotivism” as showing how judging only by the criteria of “true or false” of only “statements” excludes all the other various criteria we have that matter to us with similar importance and consequence, depending on each different practices (and their attendant circumstances), including ethics and aesthetics which positivism explicitly ruled out from being able to be rationally addressed at all (thus emotions, or moral intuition, or some other mysterious process).

@Banno @javi2541997

But-and this is his difficulty-there is no definite and finite set of statements about sense-data entailed by any statement about a 'material thing'.

Austin on Ayer, p, 119

I agree the above doesn’t track, but what I thought was interesting was that Austin does again hint at the fact there are “expectations” (p.119) in a situation (involving anything), and so rather than what Ayer’s classifies as “statements” that I would (or must) make, or that must be the necessary fallout (not sure on this exactly), we are subject to the implications of what type of thing is said or done, qualified non-systematically by the particular circumstances. So, we need not meet a predetermined standard of evidence, nor is there a level and nature to what is “entailed”, but “entailment” and “implication” appear to be in the same ballpark (which may satisfy @Ludwig V’s interest in continuing what “entailment” stands for or does).

it was Apple who invented this keyboard command. — Banno

Window-brain on a Mac at home: thus my shame.

As no method is unbiased, using OLP as a method to investigate the philosophical nature of reality will inevitably come up with a biased answer, an answer biased by the very method being used. — RussellA

OLP proposes to try to reach an unbiased take on each example (not, somehow, generally, entirely), subject to acceptance by you, so also subject to correction, refinement, further cases, additional attention to the circumstances. This focus is to strip away any “bias” as in a hidden agenda or prerequisite, like having a standard or goal ahead of time (like incorrigibility) which is thought only needs to be explained, proven. Instead it examines the lay of the land of what we would agree we would say in a particular circumstance to understand the criteria we use, the implications, the distinctions, etc., in that case, and only then using that data to make any philosophical claims.

On the one hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data is independent of language, yet on the other hand, the metaphysical problem of sense-data can be discussed within language. — RussellA

I am not talking about the “metaphysical problem” (whether it exists in or out of language, or can or can not be discussed), but the metaphysician’s use of words (knowledge, intent, real, direct, etc.) in comparison to our ordinary use of those words, which reveals how and why metaphysics wants to remove context and generalize only one type of case.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997

I find Austin a refreshing example of how to productively do philosophy, no matter what the conclusions he comes to; the method is satisfying—the possibility of it (for common ground) is heartening. But when Austin says Ayer & Co “provide the best available expositions of the approved reasons for holding [this position: of the world as, say, hidden]… more full, coherent, and terminologically exact”, I feel like this is a little cagey. He proceeds to tear to pieces what seem clearly strange arguments pieced together like toothpick scaffolding. The only thing I can think is that Austin realized that Ayer throws himself into every part of the position unreservedly, and is detailed and deliberate at every step, however confused. So Austin uses him as a great example of every misstep that metaphysics makes. It’s not that Ayer is a worthy opponent, but that he explicitly hits every touchstone of errors that manifest from the desire for something incorrigible.

But there is the suspicion of technical or specialized concepts. Here's the rub. It is impossible for someone who does not accept the term "quale" or "qualia" as being capable of coherent use to join in the discussion. The only possible strategy is to demonstrate the incoherence of the proposed usage. — Ludwig V

I wouldn’t draw that conclusion about terms from OLP necessarily. Austin’s “terms” of criticism look like ordinary comments, but “circumstance”, “mistake”, “say anything they want”, etc. are in need of unpacking just as he has done with “real” and “perception”, etc. I always feel like the penetration of his insight overwhelms seeing the fact that every philosopher is less aware of themselves than their adversary. Wittgenstein unfortunately used specialty terms to the doom of his being understood, but even pushed words like grammar, criteria, aspect, etc. into terms of art.

I do agree that Austin will seem to be just picking apart others’ terms—and both he and Wittgenstein do talk a lot about nonsense or not making sense—but one of their skills is actually giving others’ terms and arguments as much sense (and circumstance) as they can (both have their limits). I think Austin is asking “What distinction is being made here?”; not to say it is “incoherent”, but to reveal how it is being used, what purpose it is playing, what is important about it to them. What is hard to wrap my head around is that this can be different than what they say, what they want it to do, or the import they wish it had—that they can only mean X. I’ll look back for some examples, but it is not… outright dismissal.

…but there's the issue whether psychosomatic pains and illnesses are "real" or not. I'm in the camp that says they are not deceptions or illusions, even though the usual causal pathways are not involved. — Ludwig V

But if we’ve learned anything from Austin shouldn’t we ask: not whether it is “real” (meets some standard we impose), but what matters to us about pain? What is the distinction we want to impose, and what is the actual criteria and mechanics we judge by. We can try to determine (know) causes. But we, as you said, respond to someone in pain (or ignore them). Could we be fooled? Sure. And there’s our excuse to skip over the other and look inside them instead; to treat the disease rather than the patient (as a human) as is commonly warned against.

But his phenomenological turn, though plausible, is not, I think, particularly illuminating. — Ludwig V

Well no one in this forum has accurately summarized Cavell before, but are you referring to Wittgenstein above? This is obviously for another time, in bulk, but I don’t understand what would be a “phenomenological turn” for either of them.

@Ludwig V

However, I don't agree that he then continues to argue, still as an Ordinary Language Philosopher, that sense-data is not a valid metaphysical position.

The metaphysics of sense-data, which is outside of language, cannot be critiqued by an Ordinary Language Philosopher from a position that reality is established by language. — RussellA

Just to follow through here from my response above, OLP is not arguing that reality is established by “language”. “Language” is not its term. It’s a method that only draws out the things anyone would say in a given situation in order to shed light on the way we look at philosophical issues. It is not about linguistics; it’s about what we do, how we ordinarily judge our practices, compared to how philosophy has traditionally created a standard for knowledge.

So Austin is not trying to replace metaphysics. And he is not arguing just that sense-data is not valid; he’s showing that metaphysics itself is not a valid position at all. He reveals that it is argued for the purpose of its own predetermined manufactured fantasy: certain, foundational, universal, abstract, complete, independent knowledge.

I would have thought that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) is associated with GE Moore's common sense and the later Wittgenstein's ordinary language of the ordinary person-in-the-street. — RussellA

You’re not wrong about Moore. He was simply trying to satisfy the desire of metaphysics for certainty with basically, as you say, common sense (Austin responds to him in “Other Minds”). However, Wittgenstein is using the method of investigating what is said in particular situations, but the lessons from these examples are not a substitute for the foundation that metaphysics wants (I say this to clarify Austin in contrast, but I have no desire to debate this claim here.)

OLP looks at the ordinary use of words, what words mean within the context they are being used in. — RussellA

OLP is examining what anyone would say in a particular situation, in order to find unbiased philosophical data, not as proof of a position. And it makes use only of what anyone would agree is true (though this can be hard for people reading Wittgenstein to see, or agree to; Austin is more understandably insightful, but then without the depth of Wittgenstein). Thus the importance of trying to make the most sense possible of another’s position. Accordingly, here, Austin is also looking at the metaphysical use of words (attempting to give them as much sense as he can—Wittgenstein will actually make up situations that might make sense for them, as he has more sympathy, having been in their position, literally).

And I wouldn’t phrase it that the object is what words “mean”, but the implications that go along with them in different situations, the criteria we use to judge, the distinctions that are made, etc. We could say these are the ways they are meaningful to us. Austin is more concerned with showing that we have the means at hand to address the skeptic’s concerns with errors, illusion, mistakes, etc., where Wittgenstein takes the skeptic’s claims as illuminating the limitations of knowledge of others, expression, understanding, i.e., examples of our relation to ourselves, others, ad the world in general. Austin here only addresses seeing (“perceiving”) but he does elsewhere look at knowing.

OLP tends to be anti-essentialist, meaning that their philosophy is more about relationships between truth and reality rather than based on an absolute truth or reality. — RussellA

I’ll grant that OLP makes it clear that absolute anything is an empty pursuit. But Austin also shows how “reality”, as conceived as a standard for truth or knowledge, is a manufactured idea. Nevertheless, OLP does not abandon the “essence” of the world. I would argue that Austin is reclaiming the myriad ways in which we are interested in things. (I see this as another of Austin’s hidden lessons @Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997.) Wittgenstein points out that “Essence is expressed by grammar.“ PI, #371 This is not to say that the mechanics of our practices serve the same purpose as metaphysical essence. Grammar is not equal to essence; the standards or criteria we judge by reflect what matters to us about a practice, what is essential to us about the world.

Ctrl-C on a Mac does not do what a Windows’ zombie wants.

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997

In the end, I don’t think people take Austin seriously enough, to be as impactful as he should be, so thanks for taking him up. What I appreciate most is that he makes me realize that what you say matters, and that the truth can matter more than we realize, more than our cynicism, laziness, narcism, self-absorption, delusion, aggrandizement, and on and on. In honor of that, his best from the last Lecture:

“It all runs quite smoothly, there's positively no deception: and yet in the end that baby has somehow been spirited down the waste-pipe.”

“He gets off to rather a bad start, however, which reveals him as already at least half-way to perdition.”

“You've got to get something on your plate before you can start messing it around.”

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

So are we prepared to accept that:

many kinds of sentences may be uttered in making statements which are in fact incorrigible-in the sense that, when they are made, the circumstances are such that they are quite certainly, definitely, and un-retractably true. — Austin, p.115

Now it seems to me that the first thing philosophy will want to do is qualify this, as: not “incorrigible” in the same way, or not “truth”, or not “a fact”. And we must grant that we are not talking about “true” in all occasions and for all time, and thus not always the case (a fact set in stone), even given similar circumstances. But all of this perfection has been shown to be a fantasy based on fear and desire; the satisfaction of conclusive verification is not a foundation, but only what is demanded in this situation (our “real need” Wittgenstein will say). So, yes, the “truth” Austin is proposing is qualified in that the circumstances must allow for it, and may not sustain it, but, nevertheless, we have something true, and not, as may also be claimed, that it is only good enough for “everyday or practical or ordinary purposes.” P.119

That being said, and without yet having read the final chapter, I will only convey what I know of what Cavell claims are limitations of his old teacher (this @Banno is perhaps the only shoe I have to drop, having been pleasantly surprised that Austin addresses more than I had before considered, if only peripherally). I think we can agree that Austin says that we only know how to (or need to) address a concern if there is reason for asking, and that we have everyday ways of distinguishing and identifying, etc., though they may not always answer the question. Cavell (through Wittgenstein) takes the skeptic’s generic claims more seriously (where Austin is more… condescending?), though not on their terms either (towards certainty). Austin’s examples of objects and identification, etc., work to his advantage, where Wittgenstein is pulling back another layer in discussing pointing, rule-following, continuing a series, understanding, doubting, etc. The difference in these examples is that our not finding an answer reveals not our ordinary means of resolving cases, but that the mechanics of our lives reveal more than just about knowing how to answer questions. This, of course, is for another day—perhaps “Other Minds”?

[Austin does not claim] that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me.
— Antony Nickles

I don't quite understand this. What else would they be based on? — Ludwig V

Well, “based on” is a distracting word here—of course the only one capable of expressing myself may be me (though others can read me). But, obviously (ordinarily), we can be lying, and even lying to ourselves (“I’m angry” as an expression of sadness). More to the point here, what about not being wrong about statements about me is necessary? “I’ve been shot! Wait, no.” Perhaps we are afraid we won’t or don’t know ourselves, but this is a legitimate possibility. Or maybe I don’t have authority in the eyes of others to report on myself (a child, or a captive). This is to say, first-person statements might not be incorrigible at all, and, even if they are, the fact I am making them is not of the only importance.

But how do we distinguish philosophical theories which can be debunked by appeal to ordinary language from other theories, physical, psychological - without begging the question? — Ludwig V

The term “ordinary language philosophy” is confusing and made up. First, “ordinary” is only in contrast to “metaphysical”, here, sense-data. And it isn’t about “language”, it is about the everyday criteria and cases shown in contrast to the singular criteria of certainty (incorrigibility) and an abstract generalized case. And it is not an “appeal”, as if ordinary criteria are in competition with or replacing metaphysics (nor is the use of “ordinary language” the goal). It is a method of doing philosophy by examining specific cases and “what we say when…” in order to draw conclusions about the way things work (and don’t).

Austin mentions that we learn criteria when he says “certainly we learn what sort of thing it is to which the word 'pig' can and can't be properly applied” (p. 121 my bold). What I think he is pointing out is that we do not “define” a pig, nor do we need to check off a list of entailments (as in prerequisites), but that criteria are just the bounds of distinctions (categories), for example, between a donkey and a horse, which only come up when necessary. And so not that it can’t be a pig unless it checks all the (entailed) boxes, because we don’t know which, if any, criteria to apply until there is a situation, which may be novel, and thus require stretching or changing or ignoring our ordinary criteria.

So, has metaphysics seeped into scientific theories? I’m not going to answer that because I don’t want to go down the road of saying most neuroscience is operating under a number of misconceptions (whoops, now I’ve done it). But, of course, science is not searching for philosophical certainty; it has its own: if I apply its method, I come up with the same answer (so does everyone).

"I am in pain" is not simply passing on information, but is an expression that elicits a response — Ludwig V

Which is what I was trying to say, only said better. Of course we need not only be doing one thing either, and so this is to “give information” as well (and why we shouldn’t be said to “use” language), though, yes, the circumstances would need fleshing out. You would need to be unaware I was in pain, and also be someone who would be expected to do something about it, say, the host at a party, or a doctor. If you just walk up to me and say it, I am likely to respond, for lack of a better way to read it, “Yeah, we’re all getting old.”

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

The shift from worrying about true or false to commitment and retraction is definitely helpful. — Ludwig V

Just to tweak this a bit, Austin is not “shifting” from true and false to commitment (abandoning truth), but only adding that a claim (even to truth) is made in a circumstance, and I am only underlining his recognition that one of the pieces of the circumstance is that it is made by a person subject to the future (responsible to it, to further intelligibility—his “amending” or “retracting” as only examples) rather than philosophy’s desire to try to solve for the future, avoid the possibility of error entirely (be incorrigible, abstractly, universally—thus, also removing our part).

One would have to show this works in the context of incorrigible first person statements of experience. The assumption that the language is being used in standard, or at least shared, ways would be one point. The possibility of self-correction is another. (Austin mentions both of these.) — Ludwig V

Again, Austin’s claim is not that statements are ordinarily (not metaphysically) incorrigible because they are made by me (first-person), but because of the circumstances that make, say, “I am in pain” intelligible, for example, that I am informing you so that you might help me, even if I am not in pain, which is not a matter of it being “wrong”, but of me lying (p. 113, 118), which is always a possibility in that case (without recourse). My understanding is that neither Austin nor Wittgenstein claim that first-person statements are incorrigible (even mine to myself) based on their being made by me. However, in the sense above, it is important that it is me that is making this claim (with respect to my responsibility to it).

Also, saying that Austin is relying on “standard, or at least shared, ways” overlooks the fact that we might not find a right answer (p.66), that he leaves the whole matter of judgment open to new circumstances (though I can’t find that part again, maybe p. 74), and, in any event, any discussion is only brought up when it is under “suspicion” or is questioned, as “if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question [of doubt, thus criteria] simply doesn't come up” (p.76). This is not a general foundation, but, again, pointing out that a question only comes up in a specific situation. Wittgenstein is read as claiming a foundation based on much the same thing, but he also ultimately finds an end to all that (rules, “my” “mental processes”, “language games”, etc.) and looks at much the same circumstances when investigating “continuing a series”, among other things.

The fundamental point is that what matters is the fact that claims are made in a situation. The conclusion is the same for first-person statements as with identification of a pig, or a color. And not only do they have different criteria (which is more Wittgenstein’s focus), but the application of those criteria still depends on the circumstance (what the “use” or “sense” is of something in that instance Wittgenstein would say).

Isn't there a doctrine - it is present in my memory, but I've lost any sense of where it can be found - that logical truths are true in all circumstances and consequently empty and trivial. — Ludwig V

The whole point here for Austin is that the more stringent our presumed standard (incorrigibility), the less cases that actually meet that requirement. Again, this is why philosophy reduces itself to the best-case of objects (or first-person claims). In fact, no case actually meets that requirement for certainty (not as a lack, but categorically/mechanically—thus philosophy makes up something, e.g., sense-data). As I stated above, Austin addresses this, among other places, in discussing the desire for, and outcome of, generalization (p.112), but also that it is less likely to cover “novel situations” (p. 130). Emerson refers (in “Experience”) to this as everything slipping through our fingers the harder we try to grasp (which Heidegger alludes to in “What is Called Thinking?”).

!@@#$@$$!!!

@Ludwig V

The problem with Austin is that he is taking his Ordinary Language philosophy too far, even further than the Ordinary Man would take it.

For example, in the expression "I see an apple", Austin's approach is to ignore any possible metaphorical meaning for its so-called "ordinary" usage, thereby turning a blind eye to the range of possible meanings as laid out in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. — RussellA

Ordinary Language Philosophy has nothing to do with common sense or with the ordinary man, as I tried to explain here (and elsewhere as referenced in that post), it is a philosophical method, not a position.

Also, “nothing could be produced that would show that I made a mistake” (p.114) about “That’s a pig”, because the “circumstances are such” (p.115), not because of some belief in isolated sentences.

I lied

@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: I was amused to see Austin describe philosophy’s desire for certainty in a few lines (it takes Wittgenstein half his book). Descartes starts his Meditations with “Some years ago I was struck by how many false things I had believed….” Austin characterizes this as the regret that in claiming some truths, we “stick our necks out further.” (P.112) The point being that philosophy hasn’t wanted to know the truth, or knowledge, but just to never get egg on its face (especially in the shadow of science). Austin uses the example of generalizing the case we make (retreating from claiming to know the name of the star, to only knowing that it is a star) to show that Philosophy wants to find a place from which it can “take no chance at all, my commitment is absolutely minimal; so that in principal nothing could show that I had made a mistake, and my remark would be “incorrigible”. (Id. Bold added)

The generalization of Austin’s example is one way that philosophy has tried to not be wrong. It struggles with moral loggerheads, but it only takes up the best case for knowledge (the easiest to prove) in: “seeing an object” (it uses “pain” as an example of the other because it is unavoidable, constant, etc. as well), and then it wants to universalize its findings back to ethics (and wonders why it has nothing to say).

Also, you will notice that I emphasized that Austin is aware that when we make a claim, we are making a “commitment”; we are committing ourselves to what we have said, to be responsible for “amending” the meaning, to be subject to the implications of how it is judged (or “retract” it)(p.112). In wanting to be “incorrigible” (as Banno has pointed out) philosophy not only wants something foundational for knowledge, but to rule out even the possibility of being corrected, which means forsaking the part we play in making a claim (or making it poorly, as to magenta on p. 113), which it does by assuming that “the words alone can be discussed…” not only by “neglecting the circumstances in which things are said” (p.118) but apart from a person having said it (“expressed” it Wittgenstein will record this as).