A Wittgenstein Commentary Here is a good explanation of the historical and philosophical place Wittgenstein holds. I hope it helps with reading the Investigations.
“By the middle 1960’s two separate but related intellectual forces were taking root in American social sciences and humanities. Both were a response to the positivism that had dominated the professions in the period immediately following the Second World War. The appeal of that positivism was wide-spread – in social science, in philosophy, in the New literary Criticism – and was itself in great part a reaction to what appeared to have been an extremely dangerous subjectivism and irrationalism in the 1930’s. Both of these reactions had the effect of breaking the intellectual hold -- or were at least taken to have broken the hold – of the positivist understandings of the social world and of how one should go about trying to understand that world.
Central to positivism had been three claims. The first was that there was a clear-cut conceptual separation between facts and values and that, in consequence, values were subjective, not of the world, and could be kept apart from ones analysis of social reality. This was not a denial that values were “important” but it was a denial that values were objects of knowledge.
The second claim was parent to the first. It was a claim that propositions about the world could and should be made to speak for themselves – thus that propositions about the world should have a validity independent of he or she who advanced them. One could and should clearly separate the speaker from the spoken, for if one did one’s work right not just empirical claims about the world but concepts themselves would stand independently of the speaker. In its simplest form, the claim was that a statement like “mass equals force times acceleration” was true independently of who said it and of when and where it was said.
The third claim derived from the first two. It held that certain forms of discourse (claims to knowledge) were responsible and responsive to the real world in ways that other forms (one might think of them as emotive, or expressive) were not. In the first form honesty towards the world required something of the thinker; in the second anything (apparently) went.
Into this vision of the world came a critique that came to carry the shorthand name of “Kuhn.” Thomas Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued that claims about the world carried with them participation in a broader understanding – to some degree social and historical in nature -- without which those claims would not be possible. Kuhn called these broader understandings “paradigms.” Kuhn, in other words, appeared to question the distinction between the two forms of speech or knowledge, between the expressed and the un-or inexpressible.
Soon, everyone was citing Kuhn. Crudely, what most people took him to have done -- whether or not they approved of it – was to have brought “values” or cultural commitments back in scientific discourse. It is important to realize that in this reading of Kuhn, however, “values” were still understood precisely in the terms that positivism had cast them in. They were, in other words, the unexpressed, the non-cognitive and so forth. That facts, as one learned to say, were “theory [or value] laden,” and “embedded” in “webs of meaning” did not seem to join culture, value or meaning any more tightly to the world, nor make knowledge of these things any more shareable. The emphasis was rather in the other direction – loosening the grip of facts on the world, introducing a scrim of “values” before everywhere we might look for the former.
This terrain was fertile enough to foster a second development. Pretty soon those who read Kuhn in this manner – whether favorably or not – were reading Wittgenstein and allowing themselves free passage between paradigms, pictures, forms of life and language-games. Central here was the claim taken from Wittgenstein that language, or certain linguistic conventions, so shape our understanding of the world that we do not see around their corners. Wittgenstein’s apothegm that “a picture held us captive” came to stand for a peculiar kind of blindness forced on one through language itself. For those who were favorable to this so-called “linguistic turn,” however, Wittgenstein’s proposition about imprisonment became a slogan of liberation. For if what seemed to constrain our thought was merely a picture, then it would certainly seem one could get out of it, or at least change pictures, -- or so it appeared. The irony here is that Wittgenstein’s passage expresses a disappointment with knowledge. Wittgenstein continues: “And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” The irony is compounded in that two disappointments are captured here simultaneously: the initial one, a disappointment with the failure of knowledge to satisfy its own inveterate demands (in the Investigations this appears as the demand for a crystalline pure ideal of language), and the succeeding one, a disappointment with this initial disappointment -- a finding of the latter to be in effect empty, a disappointment with success. It is this second disappointment that drives Wittgenstein to his famous turning around of the axis of his investigation (PI 108). We shall have more to say about such turnings below.
In the social sciences, however, it was not long before some were proclaiming that “what you see depends on where you sit.” Kuhn’s paradigms – already carried from scientific practice into society itself – were now radicalized by being located in the plurality of “language games” that were suddenly found to mark the differences among everything from academic disciplines to political projects. Ironically, since Wittgenstein’s earlier work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, had been a central document in the rise of positivism (whether properly understood or not), his later work, the Philosophical Investigations, acquired its prestige in part as a recantation of an earlier “positivism.”
We shall not be concerned here directly with the status and importance of Kuhn’s work for the social sciences. However, leaving aside the question of whether or not those who read Kuhn got him right – and the answer to that would have to be for the most part “no” – it is important to realize that Kuhn’s work drew heavily on certain developments in philosophy which have were associated with the designation “ordinary language philosophy,” a practice of philosophy variously associated with the work of J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Its most prominent contemporary American practitioner is Stanley Cavell, who has extended Austin and Wittgenstein beyond any point that might have seemed obvious. We shall focus here on the importance and implications of this practice of philosophy for political theory and political science.
II. Sources and Resources
…Wittgenstein has been, for the philosophical community, a difficult person to place. Three broad approaches to domestication seem to have developed. First, to some he appears as a Humean (or “mitigated”) skeptic. In this reading, the central part of Wittgenstein’s achievement is to have shown that philosophically we can always raise questions, but that these questions will, however, have little to do with our ordinary life. This view places great weight on passages such as “Justification comes to an end” (PI 194) and “My life consists in being able to accept many things.” (PI 44). In this reading, the task of philosophy is to keep itself in its own, proper, corner and not to pretend to be part of life as we live it. This view is held in different ways by Richard Rorty and Saul Kripke.
A second reading holds that Wittgenstein is a kind of empiricist justificationist. The Investigations are taken to be a justification of cultural common sense. Hence: “Our mistake is to look for an explanation.. where we ought to have said ‘This language game is played’.” (PI 654). This view derives ultimately from G. E. Moore for whom philosophical problems can and should be eliminated by reinforcing what all people know unproblematically. A contemporary exponent of this understanding of Wittgenstein would be the late Peter Winch.
A third view is a kind of Kantian justificationism. Kant, as is commonly known, tried to determine those categories of the understanding which delineated the realm in which reason was possible. David Pears, for instance, refers to Wittgenstein as a “linguistic Kantian.” In readings such as this, Wittgenstein wants to show the limits of human reason by reestablishing the boundaries between the phenomenal and the noumenal realms. Thus: “Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is.” (PI 373). Grammar, in this reading, becomes the equivalent of the synthetic a priori; however, it is understood as conventionally based.
It is important to realize that all three of these readings see Wittgenstein as concerned centrally with the justification of knowledge. Thus to the degree that any one of these views would be correct, Wittgenstein’s thought will not be of much use in political theory. There is also a danger when addressing these questions – more present in Wittgenstein and Cavell than with Austin -- of falling into one of three interpretive modes. The first is that of the valorization of ineffability – these authors are taken to point at the power of what cannot be said, at a realm of mystery lying beyond language and to which language is inadequate. A second mode is to hold that these authors are not talking about philosophy at all but rather about that which is pre- or non-philosophical, a kind of anthropology. Here the expectation is that these readers desire to keep philosophy in its proper place. The last mode is to think that these men are attempting to turn philosophy into literature – a kind of edifying discourse that since it makes no real claims to the truth need not bother about being “right.” Here they are read into a particular version of continental thought, with its emphasis on reading as opposed to (in Anglo-American analytic thought) argument. Gerald Bruns may be thought to hold this position.” TELLING THE DANCER FROM THE DANCE: ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE ORDINARY FOR POLITICAL THOUGHT (has appeared in Andrew Norris, ed. The Claim to Community) Joseph Lima and Tracy B. Strong
Sorry about quoting the whole thing instead of attaching it but I didn’t want people to get confused by the rest of the article, which is beyond the OP here.