Do you think of support for trans youths as something that was previously overlooked? — frank

I’m not sure anyone imagined trans as anything but a funny preference adult men had (Bossom Buddies?), and that it had something to do with wearing women’s clothes and padding a bra, so I’d say no, the interests and needs of young trans wasn’t in the cultural awareness

How is all of that unaware and asleep, at least how is that any more unaware than thewoke” person who thinks America will always be here for the immigrants of the world seeking to better their lives. — Fire Ologist

But this is different in that we have a known issue, a clear view of the interests, and are just debating what to do. And yes, we do need to also conduct such a discussion ethically as I have suggested, but I don’t take the description to be about your reasoning, as if you are unaware as in uninformed. I think it is just a different kind of moral issue when our culture is overlooking something, like we wouldn’t recognize it (not even have the opportunity to be interested in it) analogous to when we don’t have the words (nobody in California cares whether rain is spitting, misting, pouring, sheeting, dumping, etc.—just: it’s raining! as in, not a drought).

@Number2018 @NOS4A2

So if the wokist is an activist, then their activity is not aimed at rational persuasion. What follows is that to try to agree or disagree with an activist is a category error. — Leontiskos

I knew this was going to get sticky. I am not arguing for activism as a means of persuasion, nor am I even arguing that activists deserve a discussion; only that, despite all that, we can make their interests intelligible (before agreeing/disagreeing to them), even if only by imagining them (as, analogously, we can read people)—as we might with someone blowing up beer cans. To claim we cannot—to judge the other as “irrational” or otherwise dismiss intelligibility—is, categorically, a decision we make, rather than an impossibility (as with lions, which I get into here).

The repudiatory nature of wokeness is inconsistent with the metaphor of waking from slumber. — Leontiskos

Again, without having any actual knowledge of what “woke” is, couldn’t our current culture—our interests in the judgments we share, what matters, even what is rational—be asleep, as in unaware, of the world as it is, the overlooked importance of others’ interests, say, other’s pain, as with Wittgenstein’s recognizing an aspect of something (or not, being blind to it; in one way, because we want them to meet our criteria, to “know” their pain, PI p. 223).

Descartes will ask if we can be aware that we are dreaming in much the same way we recognize others as not automatons (in just seeing hats and coats moving past a window). “We judge that they are [people].” 1st Med. p. 8 (my emphasis). It takes an effort to see someone as a person, as someone different than me, perhaps with competing interests, different measures of importance. In being asleep, perhaps we are not making that effort, perhaps in only looking for, or considering as valid criteria, hats and coats.

Or maybe we are lulled into sleep, staring at Plato’s shadows, trapped in Rousseau’s chains, not seeing Thoreau’s dawn because it is midday. If we are to wake, or judge that we are awake, we would have to become aware of what we had overlooked, say, that black people were being killed by police for reasons claimed to be unexamined, not yet deemed to matter. We may need to reconsider our criteria for judgment, say, of how we value (evaluate) people (though I’m sure someone else could come up with better examples).

Philosophically this first looks like turning back, reflecting on our current criteria that have been unexamined, fallen into presumption; to “remember” them Plato says; draw them out explicitly, their assumptions, implications, etc. I would think it’s not hard to accept that, at times, we have not, and need to, question our culture, our slumbering conformity to it, to give it life and incorporate new situations, overlooked concerns, say, the interests of “strange people” as Wittgenstein says, which I discussed is possible here and here.

@Joshs @Leontiskos @Fire Ologist @Number2018

I would never dismiss anyone’s beliefs and concerns so long as he was talking about them. But activism is not conversation. It is anti-social, ill mannered, and unethical behavior, in my view, no matter the intent, no matter the politics. I would likely dismiss it and ignore it. — NOS4A2

This is going to be tricky so grant me some leeway (if I haven’t asked enough for philosophers not to jump to judgment). I’ll caveat that no one wants discourse to break down into, say, worst case, violence, and this also will not be a justification of what I’ll just call poor manners. However, to take the extreme example, although violence is unintelligible on its face, we can—only in that it is possible to—discover interests that we may not recognize as our culture stands (even if we have to imagine those for others). Just to say that seeing what is important to the other may not be given to us, handed to us on our terms. We may not first understand how to see their interests, but that does not preclude us methodologically, epistemically.

@Joshs @Number2018

But then there is also the disparagement of custom that is so obvious in thinkers like J.S. Mill, which has become almost a heroic virtue in contemporary society. It's a sort of trope of modern hero narratives that the heroic protagonist has no time for custom and "paves their own way." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I want to say that the precursor is the undervaluation of the conservative instinct, or the status quo, or tradition (or whatever else one wants to call it). — Leontiskos

A breath of fresh air to have actual political philosophy come up (even if peripherally). Mill, Emerson, and Rousseau (even Nietzsche, more controversially) all define the political as a relationship between the individual and our culture. Emerson will say we at times need to be “adverse” to it, Rousseau that we withhold our consent to the social contract. What gets overlooked in the push back and distance is that we push from our current practices and judgments; our new claims are intelligible in relation to our present culture. Wittgenstein will discuss this as extending a series. A moral claim is in an area we are at a loss as to how to continue, and I argue that we do not yet understand the criteria and interests for moving forward, but where we go is structurally tied to our history (despite my call to see the other on their terms). Nietzsche criticizes the stasis and implementation of deontology, but he does not abandon norms and morals, only pointing out their death and bringing life to them, that they exist in time, subject to our revision.

I do not (almost ever) see rejections of calls for parity, equity, inclusion etc.. on emotional grounds. I see the reverse constantly, in the face of rational argumentation. — AmadeusD

Another rejection is in limiting what counts as “rational” “argumentation”. Wittgenstein points out that there is not one standard but that each practice has different criteria for what counts, with a discussion of norms different from a point at which there is no given authority for the determination of what is right, different from a political debate, etc.

There is no way to value an opinion over another outside of actual expertise, as you then go on to outline. A "legal opinion" is not a personal opinion. — AmadeusD

I don’t think it is valuing one opinion over another, but valuing one person over another. We are not at this point judging their evidence in the decision but their value at the table. However, to call what someone says an “opinion” is to miss that we do have criteria for judging what is said based on the situation, type of decision. etc.; and calling (just some?) opinions “personal” is to imagine the world of rational discourse (already) exists apart from our efforts in making it so.

It is almost entirely impossible to give a reasonable, helpful account of something one lived through — AmadeusD

It is not the account of their lives that is valuable, it is their having lived in the context, been affected by the current criteria/practices, etc.

@Number2018@Joshs@Leontiskos

which are routinely not taken seriously on expressly moral grounds. Again, i'm not saying anything moral about the two possible outcomes, but I'm trying to show that most 'moral' positions cannot be made to be sensible to others who don't intuitively get the point of the moral claim being made. — AmadeusD

The former concept (i.e policy considerations, or instantiating social norms) doesn't seem to accept this type of assessment without falling into totally irrational nonsense in fairly short-order. — AmadeusD

Thus the importance, which I discussed above here and here, of our making the other’s claim as intelligible as possible by getting at their interest in it on their terms (getting at why different criteria are important). The responsibility to make that effort is each of our duty as moral agents, as citizens of a democracy, even the work of philosophy. Merely having a reason to dismiss the other, even on “moral grounds”, because you don’t believe they are “rational”, don’t meet your requirement for justification, etc. is to shirk that responsibility.

The legitimate concerns underlying the urges of woke political correctness will need to be addressed if any real cultural progress is to become of these urges, but the manner by which the proponents of wokeness have been trying to cause progress has allowed their passions and emotions to over-power rational assessments and discussions. — Fire Ologist

I agree with this need to go deeper; I would only suggest that we have not drawn out and made explicit for consideration these “urges” (I would say taking them as “legitimate” would be to treat them as the concern of a serious, intelligible person; not just a feeling, or fleeting desire). The fact that they are “underlying” is because we have not yet made the effort to look past our own criteria and (perhaps also unexamined) interests to see theirs, treat them with the respect of being able to be different but equally able to be considered once understood. In this way, they are unexamined, still hidden by our current practices, culture, language, and, philosophically, because of our desire for only certain kinds of (criteria for) “rationality” (generality, abstraction, etc.)

To even get to where we can decide what to do, what we have to “address” is that we do not yet understand, or even recognize, these concerns, their interest in them, how they are important to them (make explicit the criteria that would matter), and that claiming they are irrational is judging them before this work, and dismissing them because of the worst case, bad actors, resorting to force over the equal duty to answer for themselves, choosing “coercion” as you say, over a persuasive description, etc. is to despair of a rational society and forego our duty to it. Ergo:

The point is that I am not sure if philosophy matters a great deal in this struggle. It is political more than philosophical, and a matter of mobilization and counter-mobilization of resources of power. — Tobias

[Irrationality is] the inability to legitimize one's moral positions to others. — AmadeusD

This is to put the responsibility on them to meet our (society’s) requirements and criteria, when the whole point is that those are what are up for discussion because of interests and reasons we do not yet understand (and fear, belittle, dismiss, claim are irrational, destructive, etc.) or even made explicit; as you say, without which we can’t even get started “I have no place to judge it that way”.

Now, as I have said, doing a poor job in presenting the claim, refusing as well to explain the interests in changing criteria or practices, engaging in moralizing, power struggles, “coercion”over etc., is of course equally detrimental, thus why we may even have to imagine for them, take them as someone with serious, important interests not currently recognized in our society. If we grasp at something like this with our terms for judgment, we only see what we want.

We do not accept that 'lived experience' is a good metric for an accurate appraisal of anything — AmadeusD

"valuing" opinions is insane, on a policy level, unless we're talking expertise. Life Experience is not expertise, in any sense, to my mind. Maybe there's a disconnect there. — AmadeusD

It is not a matter of being a metric (a criteria for accuracy—which is judged differently), but an expert as a valued source of evidence of what matters, perspective on our current criteria. An attorney is an expert, but only gives us advice, suggested criteria (factors to judge on, like risk). You can still decide to do whatever you want based on whatever you feel is important (like “accuracy”). I believe the claim is that in certain situations (as I discussed), it matters to have input from someone who has lived through something. It is a claim for us to re-evaluate our interests, what we consider important (not definitive) in a decision.

Morality can be rational, but there is absolutely no non-telelogical way to make it 'legitimate' — AmadeusD

What I meant was that an individual can make a moral claim that is legitimate, in the sense of intelligible, able to be defended, worthy of being taken seriously as a claim on us, not in the sense of legitimized, as if justified, simply by them making it.

I think you may be using “irrational” as in something like unpredictable, but also claim reasons are “irrational” when maybe they are just not understood.

If you then say "lived experience is the only true source of information one can rely on" — AmadeusD

I think we might be able to do better in drawing out the interests of relying on someone having lived through something. Perhaps part of it is like carpentry, which you can’t just tell someone how to do (well, sorry DIYers), so it is learned through apprenticeship. And it may have something to do with only certain types of situations (it couldn’t always help), such as constructing policies that would change things that affect how people live, as it were, not deciding abstracted from all the aspects of a life. As I said above “Valuing that someone is representative does mean that not every person’s evidence will carry the same weight as just anyone else. This is a hard pill to swallow for someone that believes one earmark of rationality is that it should be the same for all of us.” Analogously, everyone can have an opinion, but there are actual reasons we prioritize their value.

intersubjective norms of rational discourse yield to the immediacy of subjective experience — Number2018

If we are going to call these both means of discourse, they are not competing, opposing methods, as if, for power, or at the expense of the other. They are categorically different, with their own ways they work, separate, specific criteria, and different contexts. Norms and practices form our lines of judgment, terms of valuation. They set the criteria we are familiar with including what is right and wrong. I understand the philosophical objections to “subjective experience”, but I think this is a straw man misconstruing our necessary part in the moral area where we are all at a loss what to do, how to decide what is right—when our norms and practices no longer apply (say, to a novel situation; maybe something until now unseen). Then we move forward based on what we (each, all) are willing to stand for (be responsible for, inteligible to), we further or change our practices, we modify our criteria to reflect our new interests in an unknown landscape. This is not something we feel (or believe), but the actual extending or pushing back against conformity to our standing society. I can understand objecting to specific claims (and of course tactics), but to deny individual moral authority at all, to argue it is without legitimacy or rationality, is either a philosophical misunderstanding or maybe the rationalization of a fear of how democracy actually works.

@Joshs@Leontiskos@frank@Tom Storm

it is likely that her testimony derived its power from the emotional credibility and perceived sincerity with which it was delivered. Despite the absence of physical evidence or eyewitness corroboration, her visible fear, trembling voice, and hesitant speech were interpreted by many as signs of epistemic and moral authority — Number2018

Obviously the criteria for judging the credibility of a witness can come off at first glance as…. vague, inconclusive; but, if we think about it, there are actual things that are important to us in (correctly, doing a good job of) judging whether someone is believable, and that they are not, say, just making a show of emotion. We can decide someone is faking it (an emotion, a ruse), We can judge whether someone is playing for sympathy. We might realize we were being charmed and that, in the cold light of day, they were trying to pull a fast one, etc. (thus feeling “betrayed” when someone does get away with it; the amazement at having a “poker” face).

I take you to be claiming that someone being upset shouldn’t convince us of anything; sure, granted. But being upset is not always just an expression of emotion, as if detached from someone, their larger situation, the result of a history, evidence of important concerns.

Only attributing “power” to expressions of emotion denies the intelligibility of a person for whom they would be a serious matter (even our duty to imagine it). We judge whether a witness is sincere and believable in order to decide whether to trust their word, not just treat it like another opinion.

To be clear, I do not question the sincerity of Dr. Ford’s account or the possible significance of her experience. — Number2018

I would offer that the powerful thing for people was not that she was upset, but that testimony (from, as you concede, an otherwise credible witness) of an assault was not going to seem to matter in confirming someone to the Supreme Court.

Consequently, efforts to critically assess or scrutinize Ford’s claims were often interpreted as acts of misogyny or trauma denial. — Number2018

Well we have practices for impeaching a witness, attacking their credibility, say, providing evidence contradicting their testimony, but sometimes this is (done poorly) just slander. Some will say that the desire for abstract reason is a form of violence (Heidegger? someone French?). I would merely say it is not everywhere appropriate.

@Joshs @Leontiskos @Tom Storm @frank

I do not attempt to re-inscribe a metaphysical binary between reason and emotion — Number2018

You may be wishing to qualify your argument with the above somehow (it’s not “emotion” but power), but a variation of this is happening on multiple levels. I would offer that it avoids making the actual interests, or does not allow them to be, intelligible on their terms. Case in point:

emotional experience and perceived marginality are not retained within rigorous ontological framing. — Number2018

What we are witnessing today is not the philosophical deconstruction of rationalism, but a normative inversion in the public sphere. — Number2018

I take this as guessing that these claims do not attack rationality on its terms, but rather pull the ground out from under it, which I would again argue is only to understand rationality a certain (impersonal) way, assuming that those claims are not expressions of any serious interests. You have judged certain methods to be illegitimate, but I am suggesting we set that determination aside to first understand the concerns themselves (as reflected in the desired criteria). I take one interest to be the acknowledgement that (among other things) our shared terms of judgment make us unaware of certain (various) concerns, and thus unaware of what the unexamined conditions, criteria, consequences, and recourses are currently in place surrounding and affecting those concerns.

escape the dominant power formations. — Number2018

this doctrine of knowledge that literally pushed [Foucault] towards the discovery of a new domain, which would become that of power. — Number2018

The characterization of a claim only as a desire for power again overlooks any underlying interests. Characterizing the claim as “escaping” to a “new domain” is denying the possibility of making those interests intelligible to us, relegating power (or persuasion) as the only option (giving up on actually getting to the bottom of them). And having an interest in adding to, or changing, the “dominant formations” of our practices, our judgments, does not necessitate that the only means are power (unless violence is the only avenue allowed).

I take the claim that “identity” be elevated to an important consideration, is to want the valuation of the human (but not just an individual, or an accounting of its exclusion, to be a necessary part of this type of claim, not just an abstract argument about what should be the case. I would think the initial interest in “power” would merely be to have what is important in these situations be made explicit and accepted; to be allowed to make claims and provide evidence in a discussion of a situation where and when no one has more authority to know or decide what is right.

legitimacy, moral authority, and social control now flow through different channels. — Number2018

It seems like what these are should under consideration. I have suggested that perhaps these claims and those making them have been historically not considered “legitimate” (that we were asleep to them as to people with important concerns), that we have not given them the opportunity to matter to us, not given these issues the importance, say, to impact our society, our practices, our judgments.

practice is subordinated to representation — Number2018

reconfiguration of power through identity — Number2018

expressions of marginalization have begun to function as sufficient sources of epistemic and moral authority. — Number2018

So it appears you are claiming that representation, identity, and marginalization are the interests that are being asked to be criteria for our judgments about… what exactly? (I would venture maybe what we should reconsider of our current practices, the assumptions, what is being ignored, how we attribute value, the basis for response, etc.) Apart from even having that correct, the question is whether these are the most generous, accurate descriptions of the interests taken as seriously as possible.

I’m not sure what these would look like as criteria, but assuming representation is someone being a representative of a certain group, that implies that the interest is that the response should not be decided outside of all the aspects of a life.

they assert themselves as affective self-reference of truth and moral authority, becoming resistant to questioning, nuance, or deliberate reflection. — Number2018

Valuing that someone is representative does mean that not every person’s evidence will carry the same weight as just anyone else. This is a hard pill to swallow for someone that believes one earmark of rationality is that it should be the same for all of us. Here, “questioning” perhaps becomes doubting the importance of their life as a practice; bringing up “nuance” and “reflection” is maybe to suggest we don’t trust that the foundation of their testimony is, ultimately, them (that at a point we become powerless; that rationality at times must cede to other criteria).

If we are interested in identity as an issue, I would think it would be the desire to have control over who I am (how I am to be defined). Marx, Emerson, Nietzsche, Rousseau, etc. would point out that we are already defined, by outside means or conformity to culture or the terms of society, and suggest ways we could assert ourselves. Now even if we don’t believe that we are someone, inherently, we might still appreciate that some of us are unfairly unable to assert ourselves at all. The desire not to be marginalized seems pretty clear; not to be systematically ignored, sidelined, not allowed a voice, or not shown respect, etc.

establishing a cultural norm where a testimony of harm received moral and epistemic authority… the status of the primary epistemic standard. — Number2018

My expression of pain is the best case for our knowing pain (to the extent pain is related to knowledge). Wittgenstein will point out that you can just as equally know my pain in the same way. But I am the only one able (with the authority) to “express” my pain (in that I own the responsibility for that), but the standard to judge its authenticity is just as much yours, thus the possibility to judge the “credibility” of a witness. The thing is that knowledge is not our only relation to pain; when I say “I know you are in pain”, the way it works is that I am accepting (or rejecting) you as a person in pain, the claim your pain makes on me—to take you seriously. Perhaps the interest here is to point out that some testimony is being dismissed because of the inability to see (or trust) the witness as a person, as in: one who it is important to listen to to begin with. Perhaps because we’d rather deny its authenticity than reconcile that amount of pain to a person, I don’t know.

moral claims based solely on feeling hurt or offended. — Number2018

Well this seems impossible to avoid now; the expression of pain (writhing on the ground), solely, by itself, makes a claim on us, to respond. Now, as part of how it works, we can ignore someone’s pain, ignore them, for any number of reasons. We can refuse it as a claim on me to do anything. Perhaps we are scared to, or resent being forced to, accept the claim someone else’s pain makes on us.

this phenomenon likely calls for a deeper philosophical framework to better understand the contemporary affective landscape. — Number2018

I take this as the fundamental misunderstanding, placing rationality as the sole resource. This is not a matter of understanding through philosophy, but (maybe even philosophically) realizing that the job is understanding people and their interests better.

Scrub

I realized that you actually have done some work in coming up with some theories about what is important in judging these claims (whatever they actually are). Wittgenstein found that the criteria we use to judge a thing, reflect our interests in it. So all we have to do is look at the criteria you are telling us are used, to get at what you think their interests are.

There is an epistemic shift in the grounds of justification, so that the conventional norms of rational discourse yield to the immediacy of subjective experience. — Number2018

irreversible transformation of the autonomous, rational subject of liberalism into a digitized, emotive, and aestheticized form of subjectivity. — Number2018

But this seems to fall into very, very old frameworks of reason vs. emotion, or abstract vs individual, which are as old as philosophy. We demand rationality and view anything else as personal, but our requirement to only allow abstract reason is what blinds us from seeing any other criteria as rational at all, including that some claims require consideration of individuals, their pain. Setting that aside, there are still some attempts to guess at the desire of this claim.

So, emotional authenticity has been elevated to the status of epistemic foundation of identity politics and online discourse. — Number2018

Isn’t this just to acknowledge that how someone feels is important in these kinds of claims, but then dismiss it out of hand before understanding why? You add “authenticity” but I think you mean the demonstrative, performative display (or outrage on behalf of others), but I would point out again that the possibility of playing up our emotions does not get at how they matter here.

struggle between oppressing and oppressed groups — Number2018

Taking a smaller step than this very tidy number of generalizations, I would think we could agree that one concern is suffering. I take you to postulate that the claim is for retribution against those that caused the suffering, and I’m sure there is that. I think, however, the more fundamental claim is the desire to be seen as, treated as, an ordinary person** (otherwise like anyone else) whose pain has so far gone unnoticed (and, yes, perhaps dismissed, undervalued, etc.) With this, it is now easier to see that: just “being seen”, in the sense of popular, is simply the superficial version of that larger claim.

**the marking of the just and unjust is a matter of moralizing, as is any demand powerless to make you accept any part of these claims (after actually getting to the real need here). You would, as it were, have to see this for yourself for it to have any weight.

prioritizing a collective identity over personal freedom. — Number2018

I do think that part of this is about having power, and that there is a corrupted version of that as well, but, again, I take it there is a more serious claim to accept, which may be: there is no power to avoid the pain, or that it should not have to be a matter of power. Thus I think the circumstances are important to this kind of claim, in that we are being asked to look closer, specifically, for something we have been missing, which we would miss in generalizing the grounds, evidence, situations, etc. This makes me think we are perhaps skipping forward to assume ends, goals, enemies, etc., when the claim stops before all that.

In the case of wokeness, the issue is not one of disagreement or misunderstanding. Rather, it lies in the complete blurring of boundaries between the authenticity of identity performance and the sincerity of moral expression — Number2018

If I grant you there are real concerns about mere performance and whether a claim is an expression of a person’s actual interests (on top of social media grandstanding, moralizing, etc.), these objections are still only to the form of the claim (though, yes, something that needs to be addressed). Even judging the grounds we take (or are presented with) for a moral claim does not get at the reasons it is made, nor discharge our obligation to find the need for it. Is the extent of your OP that there are legitimate objections to these methods? That rational discourse has become lost? This is of course a serious issue (deeper and more wide-spread than even these concerns I would think). But do your objections to these methods include (and wish to refute) the underlying interests?

Because these failings do not preclude our ability to attribute (even if imagining) genuine, authentic interests and needs to others if we treat them as serious moral agents. To try to theoretically explain why they are doing this or why we are justified in dismissing them, is to avoid our moral responsibility. To speak frankly, not trying is a cop-out that reflects on us, on our part to bring back rational discourse (though again, I sympathize with the difficulty). I would even argue this is our duty as a citizen in a democracy (as I explain in my discussion of John Dewey - Democracy as a Personal Ethic “Democracy is… respect for the capacity of each other (as if we do not yet know the terms on which to judge).

In an attempt to provide an example of that kind of inquiry/discussion: If we look past the demonstrations we take as (somehow completely) reflecting “woke” “culture”, can we brainstorm what might be the circumstances involved, the necessity of the claim, even the need to make it in a fashion we might misinterpret or not know how to make intelligible? Don’t these claims have a history? Here I am not enough of a social critic to know the answers, but, if we are to be “woke”, what is it we were asleep to?

contemporary moral discourse has undergone a dramatic transformation. — Number2018

But if we agree as to what moral discourse is, we can differentiate it from simply moralizing, which, as you say above to @180 Proof, leads to self-affirmation for being a “good” person without actually doing anything or adding to the conversation, identifying ourselves by our judgment of others as good or bad, etc. But I don’t see the justification to dismiss any actual interests and needs because I’m pretty sure we don’t understand those yet.

The imperative to understand others ‘from the inside’ and to take their experience seriously on their own terms often becomes an impossible undertaking. — Number2018

It is hard not to be inclined to judge others as irrational or unintelligible. I would still argue our responsibility is not to give up and simply moralize in return because others cast the first stone, as any dismissal based on characterization, the existence of worst cases actors, and presumed ends does not take the other person’s interests seriously.

And what I suggest is not to understand the other’s “experience”, which has been philosophically pictured as ever-present and always “mine”, which manifests as the desire to remain misunderstood (or be clear on its face), or be special by nature (always unique). But it is also used as a justification to ignore the human altogether in only recognizing fixed standards for knowledge and rationality. I take these as a general human desire to avoid responsibility to answer for ourselves and to make others intelligible.

How can one distinguish between authentic expressions of suffering and their strategic imitation? We are often caught between the necessity of listening and the danger of being manipulated. — Number2018

The possibility we may not ultimately agree or understand the other’s interests is not a reason to assume irrationality or disingenuousness. Sometimes attributing a serious person to some things that are said and done takes more imagination and generosity than you may receive. We may have to set aside our feelings, our desire to react, our inability to understand instantly, in order to not jump to the first conclusion, to paint the other in the easiest light, to deny their human interests because they don’t come to us on our terms, maybe don’t even live in our world of norms and practices.

In the context of this thread, wokeness often transforms vulnerability into a source of ultimate moral authority. — Number2018

But each of us does have the authority to make a claim on others, even our culture as a whole. Now I understand that you probably mean that just because they say it (are in pain) doesn’t make it right, which of course is true. All there is when someone is making an appeal of this kind for us to change our actions is that it can be done well or poorly, say, appropriately (as I’ve tried to draw out). Plato will call this persuasion and rhetoric because he wanted to only consider pure knowledge. Wittgenstein makes the analogy that we don’t know someone else’s pain (their “experience”) because the way it works is that we react to it (PI p. 223); we accept them as a person in pain, or ignore it. There is an appropriate way to see an aspect of us in the other; to take an attitude towards them (perspective). Wittgenstein will say we are not of the opinion they have a soul, because we treat them as if they do, or not.

Just philosophically speaking, we may be mixing a few things together. Presumably, we want to have a discussion about something on which we might all not agree, nor agree what to do about, nor even be able to value together as an issue. I take these to be moral claims.

But the main thing I see being noticed, objected to, and perpetuated on both sides is superior, righteous judgment, criticism, shaming, and condescension, which I would differentiate as moralizing (e.g., on terms of, say, "good" and "evil"). Unfortunately, any actual discussion of these issues is getting buried under this pile of mutual indignation, claims/denials of authority and rationality.

But in a moral moment there is no authority to claim what is right, thus the importance of understanding the issue from the inside, on another's terms. To make the "strongest" case for them, which is not to say the one we ourselves would make (based on our standards), but respecting that they might have legitimate interests that we don't yet know. Thus a moral discussion is putting ourselves in the place of the other; digging deep to understand (not assume) what they value and want, and not dismissing them out of hand (as we too often do in philosophy, looking first to refute).

an emotional expression and personal experience increasingly substitute for rational deliberation and shared ethical frameworks. — Number2018

It is easy to find ways to close this argument, shut out or moralize the other, but a moral claim puts this responsibility on us, to find its ineligibility, its "rationality" as another's reasons. Of course, these conversations fail all the time, and of course there is not any guarantee of resolution, but I would think the point is to learn what is at stake in a way that is deep, explicit, and wide-ranging.

@J @Moliere @Hanover

if people were given the chance to do things society and general are considered "bad" or "evil" with no one ever finding out, and with zero chance of anyone suspecting them, most would likely take it(correct me if i am wrong) — QuirkyZen

Well, there’s a few maybe unexamined premises here. I take one to be that morality works based on predetermined standards that merely need to be implemented (judged on). Thus, if there is “no one” to do that (judge), because they ‘never find out’, we are free to do whatever we want. This would also include other sources of oversight, like God or a (separate) conscience.

Also, it appears there is the implication that even the (pre)determination of our standards is up in the air, perhaps because, if no one is there to enforce them, it doesn’t even matter if they are there to begin with; thus there appears to be no basis for action, leaving whatever worst-possible scenario you want: anarchy, whim, “indulgence”, evil. I believe we can use the traditional catch-all: “self interest”.

In addition, we are assuming not only that norms are “decided”, but that, either who we are is in place already and determines the choices we make, and/or that the decision about, and judgment of, standards is not just about right and wrong, but implicates our very nature (not just our actions), thus:

Does that make them a bad person? — QuirkyZen

Nietszche suggests we move beyond good and evil not as an argument for some other standard (or just self-interest) but as an observation about the structure of morality. If you decide a thing is right, or “good”, and I don’t follow it, I could either be bad or just wrong. Good and evil assumes an inherent intention (beforehand) behind our acts and/or a constant nature or self that is the cause of them, instead of our just being responsible for our actions after the fact. Thus why there are excuses, extenuating circumstances, bad acts for good reasons, etc. (This also allows for the possibility someone does something horrible because of something inherent in them, and/or for our categorizing who they are for us as part of something they have done—but not in every instance as a function of morality as a whole.)

We do have social norms, but sometimes there is no guide for what we should do (they come to an end or a new situation), and we have to insert ourselves into the moral future as it were, not based on whether we are good or bad, or having decided what is right or wrong, but in so doing we stand up for what is important to us. Wittgenstein saw that our common standards reflect our shared interests in our practices, so (correct) judgment of a novel act is based on the extension of those interests (standards), not a judgment of the individual (their nature or “intention”), say, their selfishness, or selflessness, etc. If we were certain about what was right beforehand (and of all instances), there would be no cases where defying a norm was the right thing to do, or any error or fickleness in our praise and condemnation (mere moralizing).

If we agree to set aside the idea of a legitimate Absolute Conception, how are we going to characterize what an alleged Absolute Conception is saying? Isn't the AC itself now revealed as an error? Is there a way to describe it, more mildly, as merely another "incomplete" view? — J

It’s not the view that we are to overcome, not the form of answer, but letting go of the desire for the outcome.

[Local predispositions] are incomplete, and perhaps dependent on a framework that can't be made part of an absolute conception. But this isn't the sort of "error" that Williams believes an Absolute Conception needs a theory to explain. That error would be the one that claims to be "a rival view" to the Absolute Conception itself. — J

We appear to agree that the “local”/“absolute” framework needs to be set aside, I would say because it is merely a wish, a desire, a manufactured dichotomy. So other observations would not be “rival” views, in competition (not other claims to still conquer skepticism). They would simply not be “complete” or certain, though not thus “errors” or simply “predispositions”. They would still be rational, communal, and correct based on the individual criteria for each thing.

I'm not sure whether an Absolute Conception that unifies and explains all knowledge would also need to demonstrate itself to be certain. And that's part of Williams' question -- does such a conception have to know that it is correct? He calls that "going too far." — J

Again, focusing on specific rather than abstractly “unified”, we can “explain all knowledge” correctly because even knowledge actually has different variations (senses/uses) which have tailored criteria.

@Banno @Wayfarer @Joshs @Fire Ologist @Leontiskos

within any practice that is deeper and more complicated than, for instance, "what constitutes a correct and sufficient apology or excuse," there is likely going to be debate about framework and criteria that is difficult to resolve — J

Sure: knowing, understanding, thinking, seeing, being just, but they all have (specific) ways we judge them and philosophy is the way we talk about what is essential to us about them. There is no fact that ensures those discussions even will be resolved, but that doesn’t annihilate the ability or process to do so, nor make it a matter of individual “opinion” (or a sociological matter). Separately, I would think agreement on the criteria for what constitutes good (even “correct”) scientific method would be easier.

His point is that you don't even get to practices without certain understandings about basic background stuff. — J

We feel we need justification for the “background stuff” beforehand, because we require it to be abstract and absolute. We have no specific topic or situation to dig into. It’s like wanting to agree on the terms of discussion before you can start a conversation. We may not come to an agreement on criteria, but there is at least some substance to talk about.

For Williams' purposes -- and, he suggests, for Descartes' -- an absolute conception would allow us to make sense of, to explain in a unified way, "local" things like secondary qualities, social practices, and disagreements within philosophy. — J

Now I’m not sure what to think, but my concern has only been that dictating that a conception be “absolute” forces what constitutes “local” in comparison. And again, I think we are smooshing together “absolute” as a criteria and “absolute” as all-encompassing (“unified”).

[The absolute conception] should be able to overcome relativism in our view of reality through having a view of the world (or at least the coherent conception of such a view) which contains a theory of error: — Williams, 301

As a reader of Austin, my curiosity is piqued by a discussion of error (he looks into action by examining excuses). Only, I don’t think relativism is to be “overcome”, nor do I imagine a “theory” of error. But yes, error and mistakes and failure and impasse must be accounted for. We have a conflict of interest, however, because our conception wants to avoid the possibility of doubt, or maybe include every outcome. So in saving some of the world (or gaining a complete picture of it), we relegate the rest to “error” or "local predispositions".

What is the difference in kind that you see? — J

Maybe the easiest way to say this is that a moral disagreement is different than an aesthetic one or a scientific dispute. Kant might call the differences categorical, in what makes a thing imperative (to itself). Wittgenstein says the different criteria tell us what kind of object a thing is, what is essential to that kind of thing (for us), what possibilities each thing has.

the assumption is that philosophy's criteria for how to [talk about (say, scientific) criteria] are not on the table. But when the inquiry turns inward, we don't have the luxury of bumping any questions of judgment or method to some off-the-table level. — J

Yes, the last bastion is undefended, without justification or authority, without an arbiter of right. Thus why it is a claim for acceptance, that you accept my observations because you see them for yourself, that you have gathered on your own what evidence is necessary for you to concede. As Wittgenstein puts it, we see the same color to the extent we agree to call it that. This may or may not dovetail into seeing philosophy as a set of descriptions, rather than answers. Doubt creates a gap in our relation to the world, which we turn into a problem of a lack of knowledge, of being unable to envision the world at all (absolutely).

Tank

@Banno @Wayfarer @Leontiskos

The problem is that while "we all" can indeed make intelligible and rational claims in support of a given framework, another group of "us all" can dispute them, with equal rationality. — J

This seems to be generalizing a sense there is relativism in any practice where the requirement for certainty (authority) does not apply. Philosophy is describing the workings of practices in which we already share interests (in the practice; thus their normativity) so it’s just a matter on agreeing on the explication of the criteria. To say you can speak intelligibly and have reasons doesn’t mean you can say anything you want (intelligibly) in claiming, say, how an apology works (or how knowing does). Again, we might not end up agreeing, nor circumscribe every case or condition, but it’s not as if anything goes.

[Specific criteria] hardly transcends the local interpretative predispositions of various cultural communities on earth, [so] there is not much reason to think it could transcend the peculiarities of humanity as a whole — Williams, 302-3

Some practices are human, some are just people who throw cabers. But making how they are judged explicit is not an “interpretation” nor does it rely on “predispositions” (I can only imagine the assumption is that since we don’t usually speak of them they are some natural, individual inclination.) Plus, if we have different but related practices, that does not make either any less accountable, reconcilable, nor necessarily destroys the criteria for identity of the practice itself. In different things this matters more or less. Doing science, more, making tea, less (or not).

How are you understanding "power" here ? — J

Science’s power is, among other things, it is predictable and verifiable as an independent authority (though I may still “disagree”, take its findings as not important).

Wouldn't a genuine View from Nowhere provide, along with many other things, an account of those standards, and why they can serve as a basis for judgment? What would be questioned, from this view, would be the absolute nature of such judgment -- only the Absolute Conception gets to say absolute things. — J

We can’t measure everything with the same spoon. I just did “account for those standards, and why they can serve as a basis for judgment.” We can’t with one hand give that there are a multitude of criteria and with the other require that the judgment of each thing requires the same “basis”. It depends on the thing whether the judgment is “absolute” or not. Judging a good shoe and what is considered a planet are different in kind, not hierarchy, or scope. The more we restrict our criteria, the less meets the standard, so the less we actually notice, can understand, and so get to say anything about.

"Why have so many philosophers, beginning with Descartes, tried to locate genuine philosophy within an Absolute Conception?" — J

This is a good question which requires a lot to explain, but Descartes’ fear of making mistakes created the desire to never make one again. If Plato could use knowledge to be certain of everything, we would have control prior to doing anything (life as physics by math in space). Wittgenstein called this the requirement for crystalline purity of logic, that we want prior to a moral act. If we turn our doubt into a problem, we require a particular answer (knowledge), one that meets preset criteria (certainty).

The philosophical assessment of philosophy is presumably based on philosophy's own criteria. You don't see a problem there? — J

But how philosophy is done, and what even counts as philosophy is always an internal struggle of the discipline; it’s self-guidance and lack of external adjudication makes it harder to reconcile, but not impossible (there is no better/other). This is the benefit of looking at the tradition as a set of texts, and not necessarily a set of problems.

Flub

@Banno @Wayfarer

Well, if what I claim to know is framework-independent, true no matter who asserts it, etc., et al., then surely it must be certain. What more could I require, in the way of certainty?"…. There are those who believe that scientific realism is self-verifying, on pain of contradiction. — J

Additional criteria would be completeness (encompassing all variables and outcomes); infallibility or predictability; being right without being responsible; ensuring agreement, being only either true or false, etc. It seems we are taking abstraction from context or an individual (or human fallibility, limitation) as the criteria for “certainty”. I’m trying to point out how forced this is by differentiating topics and claiming that their individual criteria and their appropriate contexts are necessary and sufficient for being accepted (that we can all assert intelligible and rational claims about their “framework”). That this does not ensure agreement is philosophy’s (and morality’s) lack of power (which @Fire Ologistpoints out correctly) which science claims (though as easily ignored it appears). But this a categorical difference (it works differently) not a relegation to individual persuasion, opinion, belief, rhetoric (“locality”).

What Banno says, would indeed be the problem if speaking from within some absolute conception implied only one type or level of description. But does that follow? Perhaps you could say more about why we'd have to describe abstracta and physical items the same way. — J

If we insist on removing a topic from its context and specific criteria, then we lose the ability to judge a thing based on its own standards.

Is it the same sort of discourse that allows phil to speak about a discipline outside itself, such as science? — J

Yes. Philosophy is the unearthing of the criteria for a practice, such as why we value, and how we judge, science. The philosophical assessment of science is not based on science’s own criteria.

What form does that acknowledgement take? — J

As I said earlier: “Our reflection on our (shared) interests in the things we do is recognized in our ability to articulate.”… in order for you to see it for yourself; to provide your own proof.

To simplify, if I claim (describe sufficiently) how a mistake is different from an accident, or what constitutes a correct and sufficient apology or excuse (or scientific study), you may agree with those criteria. You may claim others more important. You may assert other distinctions are necessary. We may need to discuss examples in order to resolve the issues. This conversation is intelligible and rational because we share these practices (over the course of human history) and the evidence (and our standing to make claims) is available to all of us. This is not “local”, so much as, specific. Not based on the individual, but the particular (criteria and context of a practice). Abstraction makes philosophy impossible; thus, ironically, our desire to want everything to be like science is the death of rational discourse.

(* the claim is: "as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the [absolute] conception is, my talk about it can remain "local.") — J

I think we are pushing a few things together maybe. I took the “view from nowhere” as the requirement of a criteria of certainty (which I take Descartes to be desiring, even in bringing up “God”). But if we are talking about a conception of the “absolute”, then we’ve reached the cliff @Banno was worried about, as that would be theology’s discussion with science. If we are talking about a conception of absolutely everything, then we’d describe justice and rocks the same way.

Let's grant that both "absolute" and "local" are predetermined, created standards. How does this exempt philosophy from nonetheless speaking from one or the other? What would be the third alternative? — J

Above I said “Thus knowledge of something is uncovering the particular criteria for judgment of identity, completion, correctness, etc. to itself (a practice).” As Wittgenstein was trying to point out, different practices have different criteria, different standards (not just certainty)—what matters as that counting as such-and-such (pointing, apologies, a moral stance, a fact); as it were, being true to itself.

But is it the kind of certainty that says, "This very statement [about the grounds and limitations of the absolute conception] is certainly true"? That goes to the heart of my discomfort with Williams' "move." — J

When I said here that “A philosophical claim has its power only in as much as you see it for yourself”, the kind (sense/use) of “knowledge” I am talking about is acceptance, acknowledgment (in contrast to other senses of knowledge: as awareness, or a promise that I have authority). Our reflection on our (shared) interests in the things we do is recognized in our ability to articulate. More may be dreamt of than in our philosophy, but that’s not to say we can’t acknowledge, say, how science is important to us, or paraphrase a poem, or even discuss the unknowable (@Wayfarer).

To throw another couple monkeys in, Cavell (from Wittgenstein) would say that our relation to the world is not only through knowledge, which is not to say it is opinion or faith, but that part of what it is to take action is not knowing what to do, but in doing it, being the one who does it, is held responsible for having done it. There is also our own growth; e.g., changing how we think, rather than just what we think (even more than wisdom).

@Banno

If philosophy asserts [knowledge about what an absolute conception is] is it asserting a piece of absolute knowledge? …what is its claim to being knowledge, and of what sort? Is it "merely local" -- that is, the product of a philosophical culture which cannot lay claim to articulating absolute conceptions of the truth? — J

I think what we're experiencing here is a version of what Richard Bernstein called the Cartesian anxiety: the fear that unless we can affirm an absolute with certainty, we’re condemned to relativism. — Wayfarer

Without a full and exhaustive (-ing), discussion of what “knowledge” is, let’s assume we are all pretty much right that our desire for certainty (an absolute) is a unachievable standard we created; that philosophers (humans) have always wanted knowledge to be math-like—elevating science as the closest (to: complete, predictive, universal, abstract, etc). The presumed fallout without that is chaos, which @"Wayfarer” rightly points out is equally imagined.

Can the mere avoidance of self-reflection or self-appraisal still leave philosophy able to say what it wants? — J

reflecting critically — and necessarily — on the conditions of intelligibility that science presupposes... — Wayfarer

A philosophical claim has its power only in as much as you see it for yourself. We are not “avoiding” reflection; that is exactly the method. But it is not reflection on the “self” as much as “the conditions of intelligibility”, put otherwise, the interests we all have in this or that practice (not our personal interests). Thus knowledge of something is uncovering the particular criteria for judgment of identity, completion, correctness, etc. to itself (a practice). Now, of course, one may dissent, disagree, live against our practices, opt out, but the key is philosophy is able to make what is presumed (say, the need for an absolute)—what is: not “known”—made “intelligible” (as in, aware of/explicit).

“we have to know that we have [an absolute conception of the world]. . . . To ask not just that we should know, but that we should know that we know” -Williams

Thus we have multiple uses or senses of know happening at once without distinction, “we have to know [as in: understand (be aware of) the criteria] that we have [for] an absolute conception of the world… To ask not just that we should know [be aware], but that we should be [absolutely certain] that we know [have the right criteria].

@J

“We have agreed . . . that we would need some reasonable idea of what such a [absolute] conception [of the world] would be like, but we have not agreed that if we have that conception, we have to know that we have it.” Williams

In the spirit of the argument, what I am pointing out is that the “need” (desire) for certainty created the “absolute conception of the world”. It is philosophy that created “what such a conception would be like”, and it was its job to understand that reason for such a framework (“idea”)—to “know that [why] we have it”.

as long as I don't claim knowledge about what the conception is, my talk about it can remain "local." — J

That is philosophy’s claim, but it neither claims it “absolutely”, nor “locally”, as these are predetermined, created standards.

If there is or could be such a thing as the View from Nowhere, a view of reality absolutely uninterpreted by human perspectives and limitations, then scientific practice would produce this view, not philosophy. — J

The idea of “reality” was created by philosophy and is not what scientific practice produces, thus one reason why philosophy is “larger” than science (is prior to it, as it were). The basis of any stability, predictability, universality, and certainty (“facts”) of science is based on its method, not its correlation to a “real” world. Because the practice is repeatable, and not dependent on us (can be done by anyone—is not “local”), is what gives science its power, and also allows it to be (really) wrong sometimes.

I am not arguing that we do not cooperate (even, fundamentally), nor even that this is a “fact” (biologically/socially universal; say, formative of our humanity, or however else this wants to be framed). I am also not arguing for or against it being “good”, because, as you’ve pointed out, it is just something we do (a means), even inevitably, necessarily. But the import being claimed for that fact (implicitly perhaps) presumes a particular framework of morality that I would suggest we have not yet adequately considered. Deontology does have its place; we do have norms and rules and we do act on them or justify our actions based on them, judge others by them. But we have traditionally warped “morality” taking it simply (only) as justified norms of action, because we want to rely on the solidity of their ground (the more factual or logical the better) rather than examine our own part.

A few things to consider: we don’t normally take all action as moral, so what categorizes a moral act? The modern answer (Nietszche, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell) is that it is when our norms and practices actually come to an end; when we are at a loss as to what to do at all and there is no guidance or authority for what is right. Thus there is no single process or level of justification because it happens at a particular case, with a specific context, and facts that are uniquely relevant.

You point to Rawls above; which brings up another facet of morality that people want to nail down (apart from having factual or rule-like norms), which is figuring it out ahead of time. Rawls would have justice be decided in a just process, only: beforehand. Now whether that is best or if science and biology is a better method is not my point. In a truly moral moment, we stake our future not in deciding it (agreeing on it, being agreed in it by biology), not thus turning on relative values or self-interest, but on our future responsibility for our current actions. Emerson will put this as “Character is higher than intellect.” We take a stand which we answer for, which characterizes who we will be.

I said I agreed that cooperation is part of morality, because it is a defining moment, and we can move forward together (in our further judgments and practices), or not (as has been said, sometimes the moral thing is to actually break with society). Our cooperation is our commitment to be intelligible to each other (even in disagreeing), without a pre-determined standard for reason, even without any guarantee of (or fact that “requires”) our success.

Stepping in only having read your OP, I would agree that cooperation of a kind is necessary in a moral situation (not everything is a moral moment). I would only question the desire that it need be “factual”, either innate or based on a (agreed/universal) response to the world. The human condition of being separate requires cooperation, but nothing (no fact) ensures it. Thoreau of course points out that sometimes doing what is “moral” requires us to not cooperate with society.

I previously introduced a discussion about norms (as rules) and facts in this OP.

Perhaps I'm being told that I can't really believe it's warm out, given the temperature?… I can't believe something I also acknowledge isn't true. — J

That would be the sense that “You can’t be serious!” (Not, denying the fact, but questioning my experience). But I could say, “You should have seen the weather where I grew up” or concede partly “I must still be warm from inside.” Maybe it takes more, better example of when belief absolutely flies in the face of facts, because it is contingent on me, thus the desire to either discount it, or create something to fix it internally, like “emotion”.

@J @I like sushi

At the least some beliefs are about facts — Banno

Yeah I worded that poorly, making it sound like belief has no relation to the world, which of course is putting too much mustard on it. And having the impression that it is fine out, when it really is cold, I accept is a belief. But is this a matter of actually being correct? Even if you point to the fact it is below freezing, I may still hold to my belief (impression, perspective, position). Would we then call that wrong? lacking evidence? unreasonable? irrational? I may even concede the temperature, but maintain my position (unrelated to my sensation even). Then you might think me courageous, or silly, or insane, but not wrong about a fact (unless I am guessing the temperature, which is belief as hypothesis).

It is convenient to have the terms gathered, but I think the important part about OLP is that a human can imagine cases (even fantasies), fill out the context to distinguish (even novel extrapolations), or change the circumstances—even as part of a collaboration with others because everyone has the ability to provide input—which is different than aggregating data and regurgitating analysis.

Turnt

@Banno @I like sushi @J

Looking at the diagram of associated concepts made me think more on the assertion of a claim of knowledge compared to a statement of belief. I want to say we don’t “believe” in facts as some tentative or lesser claim to knowledge. When we say “I believe steel has a high tensile strength”, we might be in a situation where we are trying to calm ourselves before driving a heavy truck over a steel bridge, and we are expressing (reiterating) our trust in a fact. When we say “I believe in global warming”, we are in a sense accepting the consequences of facts. Another general sense is that we are ready to stand behind the science, which simply means that we assess the scientific method was followed competently (which is not to doubt the facts so much as their validity at all).

I put this out there because I hold belief is not about facts, not in contrast to knowledge; they are not part of how belief works. Of course, our desire to stand for something can be lessened by learning facts, but that is not the same thing. Accordingly, there is no “fact” about us as well. There is no occurrence, or instance (existence) of something (an emotion) that is “believing”, which is the desire in the paper: to solve for belief, to find the version of it as a switch that could be flipped. We don’t account for belief through a fact about it, we hold the person to account.

Another feature this brings up though is that there is a scale of attachments; I wouldn’t characterize it as “tentative or firm” but what extent we are willing to go to. It could just be an expression, or “view”, to willing to risk life and limb. So, from the diagram, maybe scaling from suspicion to impression to inclination to assumption to confidence to disposition to attitude to idea to tenet to conviction to creed to dogma to faith. These seem to move between those I hold for myself to those I express or claim to others, thus giving the impression of “emotion” vs “rationale”.

@J

It's part attitude, part emotion, part intent, part disposition, but not wholly any or all or some grouping of these. — Banno

I’ve learned in this thread that belief does have more involved than I thought. Even though emotion seems to be an accompaniment (and not essential), I had not realized that they reveal what matters to us; they are an expression of our interests. I do still argue the common feature or important mechanics is that it involves me, individually, tied to my responsibility in claiming (or wanting to claim) to believe, and so reflecting or creating me.

All in all, watching AI do Ordinary Language Philosophy kills a part of my soul, as it’s not about an answer so much as an exploration. And I hate, even more, to agree with a machine, but “She holds a strong belief in democracy” demonstrates that belief involves commitment (here a recognition of it actually); the person has done something to demonstrate that they hold fast against some threat.

I hate even worse arguing with one, but “That’s just your belief” is simply sloppy (who even says that?); I only possibly imagine it as a very disrespectful insult, in the vein of “I don’t care about what is important to you”, though that shows that who we are is tied to our interests. p.s. - We of course say “That’s just your opinion.” (which is also dismissive) but opinions and beliefs are not the same thing (as “I believe it’s going to rain” is neither a judgment nor an opinion, but a personal conjecture, a hypothesis, a gamble). Opinions are assessments, of people, or politics, or plumbing estimates (thus the personal nature of the jab about my opinion, and why we consult experts).

“Do you believe in ghosts/God?” is in one sense obtuse, asking for justification (evidence), ignoring this is about living in a way in relation to something other, say, than ourselves.

I do find the example interesting that “He acted on the belief that she was in danger” but isn’t it just qualifying a mistake? Seems it turned out she wasn’t in danger and he perhaps did something bad and is asking to be excused because he had the wrong impression. But is thinking that something is the case and being mistaken really what is at stake? Consider, “Why did you do that?” “She was in danger.” I take an action and when asked say “I did it because I believe x”, which is, again, to say something about me, who I claim myself to be. In this case, the defender of those in danger. And so is the request to be excused about being wrong? or asking that the bad be erased by the (perceived) good?

Grk

@Banno

the difficulty we have giving a satisfactory explanation of what's actually going on shouldn't blind us to the fact that it is our experience, it is something we do. — J

I’ve been trying to argue that this “what we do” is our individual responsibility, and not anything like “what’s actually going on” that we could “explain”. The “difficulty” is our inability to relinquish control over belief, and yet also our reticence to have it depend on us. The characterization of this as a problem with something “actual” happening is created by this desire for control and inevitability.

Maybe we should say that a simple claim like "There are bacteria on my left shoe" is capable of multiple interpretations, ranging from "I believe so" to "I damn well know it," depending on context. — J

Absolutely the phrasing is loose and the circumstances and responses determine a lot; only to add that those two cases (once differentiated) would be categorically different, with different workings and different criteria, claimed for different types of reasons with different ways of moving forward and resolution (with what mattered about the context being different).

@Banno

Indeed, if you wanted to call the [a-ha!] experience by a different name that doesn't invoke "understanding" at all, that's fine. — J

I of course acknowledge that we have that experience, even would call it a feeling, but, yes, it is not understanding (see PI #323 et seq “Now I have it!”). It is optimism perhaps, a “glad start”, (countered by deflation when we realize we didn’t really understand), but that feeling is not evidence of the occurrence of “understanding” somewhere in us, as belief is not evidenced by emotion (or even interest, because we might not care enough to meet the criteria for believing: to put ourselves out there as answerable for our desires).

"I believe there are bacteria on my left shoe" is simply the assertion, "There are bacteria on my left shoe." An assertion is no more certain than a belief, so degrees of certainty wouldn't be an issue. — J

The assertion would technically be “I know that there are bacteria on my left shoe.” Certainty isn’t part of belief (perhaps resolve) and it may not even be possible for knowledge, but it is a desire philosophy has always had for knowledge, thus minimizing anything else as “belief” or “instinct” or “emotion”.

But it seems equally odd to call such a belief a disposition. A disposition to do what? To confirm certain statements about shoe bacteria? — Banno

I don’t like the word either. But maybe it is that we are disposed to fulfill the requirements (criteria) associated with what we believe (or claim to); for belief (generally), that I can and will answer for it. Though I wouldn’t put this as “confirming” “statements”, as that sounds like having justification to claim a fact (“evidence” as has been suggested), which is the purview of knowledge (acknowledging the long held opinion that knowledge is justified belief, which I would argue against).

Of course we may claim it is raining outside (“I believe it is raining”), even based on x,y,z, but this isn’t a claim to a fact, nor that x,y,z constitute knowledge. Belief (in this case) is a hypothesis; one which is not justified, but tested. I am not putting a “statement” up for confirmation, but putting my word on the line. When we look outside, we know it is raining (or not), but this doesn’t confirm my belief—though the fact is confirmed by our seeing it rain—because I never claimed I “knew”. If it is not raining, you think less of me: in being fooled, or making a ridiculous claim, or lying. I could try to mitigate your low opinion by saying I believed it was raining because the weather report said it would, but in doing so I am not making a claim to knowledge that fell short (was found to be unsubstantiated). I am making an excuse by shifting responsibility (I could be right with ridiculous reasoning too). If I walked into the house through the rain, I might claim I know it is raining. If it had stopped when we went to look, I would be wrong. If it was actually the sprinkler, I would be embarrassed. I didn’t “not know” it was raining, I (personally) was mistaken, but I believed it was.