Seems to me that the activation is better called reactivation...

So, the very first time someone sees red, it does not require anything not in the head?

A red colour occurs when the appropriate areas of the occipital lobe are activated. — Michael

Does it require having seen red before?

I understand that.

Are there trees inside the blind person's head that they can see only after activating the biological machinery? If so, then all that is required for seeing trees is activating the biological machinery.

Just look at perception from a purely biological perspective. Electromagnetic radiation stimulates the rods and cones in the eyes. This sends signals to the occipital lobe which processes visual information, which is then sent to the temporal lobe where the visual information is processed into memory and to the frontal lobe where the visual information is processed into intellectual reasoning and decision-making.

Now what happens if we ignore the eyes entirely and find some other means to activate the occipital lobe, such as with cortical implants or the ordinary case of dreaming? I would say that the subject undergoes a conscious experience. And I would say that their conscious experience is one of visual imagery, such as shapes and colours. Seeing shapes and colours does not require electromagnetic radiation stimulating the rods and cones in the eyes (or an apple to reflect said light). Seeing shapes and colours only requires the activation of the appropriate parts of the cerebral cortex.

Given that seeing shapes and colours only requires the activation of the appropriate parts of the cerebral cortex, regardless of what triggers it, it's understandable why one would argue that the shapes and colours we see are "in the head" and not properties of apples. Seeing shapes and colours is no different in principle to feeling pain or hot or cold. — Michael

I think there's something to be said about the claim that seeing shapes and colours only requires the activation of the appropriate parts of the cerebral cortex. That is false. It's akin to claiming that phantom limb pain does not require having once had a limb.

If we ignore the eyes(or previous limb) we're also ignoring everything that led up to the ability to 'activate' the biological machinery. Much of what's being ignored is not located in the head.

Very nice. The best yet, and he will not have financial motivation to be here as most of the others have had. One need only read through the previous guests' responses to see that they were trying to sell a book. That was quite disappointing to me.

Kudos... MAJOR kudos to whoever set this up!

Great job!

Disappointing ending to the Fox News trial. Yes, Murdoch has to shell out $700 million and eat a certain amount of crow, but the cast of clowns that spew lies and pollute the electorate don’t have to own up to their bullshit on their own stations or in the witness box. Still, it’s something. — Wayfarer

It's something alright..

A tremendous public disservice!

You have no way to assess how the construction of your own CNS compares to the source of the stimulus. — frank

That pretty much says it all.

In order to know that A is not equal to B, one must have access to both. By definition, an indirect realist stipulates that we cannot have direct access to the world. Kant's distinction between Noumenal and phenomenal suffers the same fatal flaw. Arguments outright denying objectivity based upon the idea that everything ever believed, known, and/or stated come through a subject do as well.

Untenability by virtue of being strung up by one's own hamstrings.

The result renders the distinctions/dichotomies themselves meaningless/useless in that they cannot be used as a means to draw and maintain the distinctions of their own namesake.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken.
— creativesoul

Yes, quite so. I think that these cases are one kind of embedded belief, in that we (but not everyone) think that beliefs are also appropriately attributed to animals that don't have language. For the record, my belief (!) is that beliefs are reasons for doing something, and are essential to the language practice of attributing rationale to certain actions. One art of this is that we find that sometimes people act as if p were true when it isn't. So if a rational agent acts as if that piece of cloth were a cow, I believe that agent believes it is a cow. Another part is that sometimes they act without taking into account some p that is clearly relevant, and it can be the best explanation that they do not believe that p. I think that "know" does the same job, with the addition that p is true. This contributes to the language practice of passing on information. It may all sound a bit wacky, but I find it very satisfying. — Ludwig V

I'm very sympathetic to the idea that thought and belief are efficacious. The explanation sketched out above makes sense. Given that all knowledge that p consists of belief that p, what you say here sounds about right in that regard.

Although...

We may be talking past one another in a specific way. I'm often making ontological arguments, and I'm not sure if you've been aware of that. For example, my argument against convention is ontological. The conflation of propositions and belief is the charge I've made, and subsequently supported throughout this thread. So, while I agree with saying that beliefs are reasons for doing something(Witt sets this out nicely in a manner that you've continued here), I do not think that beliefs are equivalent to reasons for doing something, and you've said much the same thing a few replies ago.

The definition of terms is an interesting case. Kant differentiates between a priori concepts and arbitrary ones, which I take him to mean: technical terms (set aside by Jamal; referred to as “stipulated” by @Banno). He says they are ones (conceptions) that we create, which (unlike the other kinds of concepts) we can define; he says: however we choose, as we created them (which Kant excelled at). — Antony Nickles

I'm sympathetic to Kant(given his time), but much as Banno hinted at earlier, he's far too confused/confusing and - I think anyway - overcomplicated things by unnecessarily multiplying entities. I think that Kant's taxonomy could not perform the task of drawing and maintaining the distinction between that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking note of it(prior to our naming and describing), and that which does not.

Hey Ludwig! So, I've been partaking in an international move. Sorry for the delay! I'm curious if you are still interested in continuing this discussion? I'd love to!

Seems to me that the question presupposes sensations and minds are completely distinct things. I think that that is entirely mistaken.

Is “define your terms!” always or often or ever a legitimate imperative? — Jamal

Seems extremely helpful for readers... to me anyway. I mean, when there are terms that have more than one commonly accepted use, it's certainly helpful for mutual understanding.

Consciousness is meaningful experience.
— creativesoul

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc.
— creativesoul

Consciousness is neither physical nor nonphysical? Are you saying ontology doesn't apply to consciousness? — frank

Not at all. To quite the contrary, I'm saying that attempting to parse meaningful experience into either/or dichotomous language is a fatal flaw when that something consists of and is existentially dependent upon both. Thus, if I'm to be taken as saying anything at all about ontology, I'm saying that the historical and conventional ontological frameworks are fatally flawed in that they are inherently inadequate as a result of being incapable of taking meaningful experience into account.

I feel that there's an ontological idea going on that there must be some object that is believed, just as there's a feeling that there must be some object that is true or false. It seems pure assumption to me and I find it annoying. But I don't pretend that I'm clear about it. — Ludwig V

Not too certain how clear I am about it either, but in fairness to convention...

Historically speaking, it became increasingly necessary for humans to be able to discriminate between contradictory assertions. It is my suspicion that epistemology was born thereof, and is where and when belief as p gained a foothold. It's worth mentioning here that I do not find it's entirely wrong. I mean, there are all sorts of situations when someone would assent to some proposition/statement or another. There are all sorts of situations when someone asserts something or another, makes a knowledge claim, etc. In such situations, the belief that approach works perfectly well enough as an accounting practice.

It's the situations when someone holds false belief unbeknownst to themselves that the practice is found lacking, because it is during these times that the person cannot even tell you what they believe. It is impossible to knowingly hold false belief, and/or be mistaken.

I'm not fond of speaking in terms of 'objects'. It's fraught with archaic baggage. That's a big part of the underlying problem... the inherently inadequate linguistic frameworks being used to talk about that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it. Language less but meaningful nonetheless human thought and belief are precisely such things.

I find that the very language we use to talk about stuff effects/affects the way we look at the world as well as the way we feel about it while looking. The degree to which this is the case cannot be overstated, but that is a subject matter in its own right.

I don't have a list of the interesting words. I seldom get much beyond know, believe, think, say, assert, but I would include suppose, imagine, fear, hope, wonder (both that.. and whether... and why... ). I'm sure you could go on. — Ludwig V

I find our exchange a bit odd, because unless I've taken you the wrong way, you've repeatedly dismissed several different aspects of the conversation, citing these yet to have been disclosed verbs as what interests you in lieu of whatever aspect was being discussed at the time. In addition to that, I'm reminded of the blanket theory that you mentioned as a preference to piecemeal answers to Gettier, after saying you weren't interested in a theory.

The oddity, I suppose, is that it looks like a performative contradiction.

I suppose this could very well be a direct result of my own continual critical thinking. If it is, my apologies. I've no way to turn it off. Thus, I attempt to direct it towards more practically beneficial subjects. "An eye for detail" barely scratches the surface of that personality 'trait'. But that's already too much about me. Just wanted to soften the critique above. I could be very wrong. You would be the one to know that, if I were.

Would you argue that it isn't possible to reduce our theories of consciousness to physics? — frank

Well, I'm not familiar enough with our theories of consciousness to say. However, I tend towards the fundamentally basic objection that meaning can be reduced to neither physics nor physical processes. Consciousness is meaningful experience. Therefore, consciousness can be reduced to neither physics nor physical processes.

My position is that all meaning is a biproduct of thought and belief formation(drawing correlations/associations/connections between different things), and that that is a process which is existentially dependent upon and/or consists of physical and non-physical things. Therefore, thought and belief cannot be reduced to merely physics or physical things. Although, I do hold that meaning emerges from physical things, and as such it is existentially dependent upon physical things. I reject many if not most commonly employed conventional dichotomies used to talk about the subject matter.

Meaning is neither physical nor non physical, internal nor external, etc.

We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank

It seems clear enough to me that meaningful thought and belief(experience or consciousness, if you like) are reducible to neither physical events nor physics, similar to Davidson's anomalous monism(without 'mental' events).

How does one reduce meaningful correlations drawn between different things to physics?

The issue with knowledge is that we cannot always check to see for ourselves if something or another is true. Hence, our becoming aware of that and our own fallibility can and ought lead to a bit of skepticism. However, it does not follow from the fact that we cannot know everything that we cannot know anything. It also does not follow from the fact that we are sometimes mistaken that we are always mistaken. Hence, radical skepticism seems to me to be an emotionally based overreaction.


You're absolutely right in pointing out that the nature of human progress requires us to stand on the shoulders of many before us, and it's worth mentioning that there is a significant amount of trusting the truthfulness of the source material inherent to our daily lives. In a society where no one trusts institutions and/or each other, it's only a matter of time before it collapses. Such is and was the danger inherently within American government over the past fifty years such that the legislations passed throughout the last five decades cultivated a society of people that led the up to the likes of Trump.

A real life tragedy of the commons on steroids. Ah, but I digress...

You're right. I'm sorry. — Ludwig V

No worries. No need for apologies, it's not like I'm offended or anything. I figured the fact that you copied my reply to Michael and treated it as if it were addressed to you was something you did unbeknownst to yourself while doing it. I hope you did not take the shortness for terseness. It wasn't. I'm just quite busy, and I will be for the next few months.

All that being said, it is very interesting that that has happened here, in this context though. Serendipitous even. If I may: You believed that my reply to Michael was meant for you. Yet I do not think that you would have believed that "my reply to Michael was meant for you" was true at the time. This all points to a curious failure of current convention to be able to properly account for the fact that it is humanly impossible to knowingly hold false belief and/or knowingly be mistaken.

It is for that reason and that reason alone that there are often situations when and where someone would not agree and/or assent to a rendering of their belief at the time they were forming, having, and/or holding it, if it were put into either belief statement or propositional form. <-------That's very problematic for current conventional notions of belief as well as current belief attribution practices. Belief as propositional attitude(which includes belief that approaches) simply cannot take this into account.

For instance, Russell's clock is a perfect example of the aforementioned situation, as is the cottage case regarding the farmer. The person looking at the clock would not agree with and/or assent to the statement "that broken clock is working" although they most certainly believed that that broken clock was working at that particular time. Likewise, the farmer would not agree with and/or assent to the statement "a piece of cloth is a cow" while believing that a piece of cloth is a cow. Now, circling back to the serendipitous mistake you made earlier: I'm relatively certain that the same holds true for your earlier belief that my reply to Michael was meant for you.

It's curious because current conventional notions of belief as well as the belief attribution practices based upon those notions are fatally flawed in their inherent inability to properly take account of such belief in such situations.

As Moore skirted around, we can coherently say something about another's false beliefs and/or mistakes at the time, yet we cannot say the same things about ourselves.

Why?

Because the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude, the conventional practice of treating propositions as though they are equivalent to belief, and the belief that approach are all inherently incapable of properly taking these situations into account. The inherently inadequate linguistic frameworks, schemes, conceptions still being practiced in current convention are exactly what gave rise to Russell's clock, Moore's paradox, and Gettier. Convention has gotten human thought and/or belief historically wrong. Those paradoxes and more are simply logical consequences of the conventional notion of belief that has been at work for centuries.

First, I don't understand what you mean by "accounting practice" or "malpractice" in this context. You seem to think that philosophy is a kind of accountancy. Perhaps it is, in some ways, but it seems clearly different in other ways. — Ludwig V

Well, each and every time that we are talking about that which existed in its entirety prior to our talking about it, we are indeed taking account of it. The belief that approach works from the notion of belief as an attitude/disposition towards some proposition/statement such that the person who believes the statement believes it to be true. So, it is held that when we say someone believes "X", we are saying that they have an attitude/disposition such that they hold "X" to be true.

That's most certainly an accounting practice at work.

Second, after our exchange, I decided that it was simpler not to talk about propositions in this context, but simply about beliefs. That way, the amount of confusion in the discussion might be reduced. — Ludwig V

I like the attempts to reduce confusion and add clarity whenever possible. For whatever it's worth, the position I argue for/from began with and still has a very strong methodological naturalist bent.

However, it's impossible to address current conventional issues such as Gettier without addressing propositions and how they've been used to represent and/or as equivalent to belief. That said, I've no issue with agreeing, if you do - and I think you do - to no longer focus upon the issues involving propositions and/or propositional attitudes. I think we largely agree there, so we can close that part off and focus our attention elsewhere if you like.

This involved accepting that "propositional attitude" was not a helpful way of describing the group of verbs that I was interested in. — Ludwig V

Okay, we've yet to have broached that aspect in its own right. I'm curious, which group of verbs are you interested in and how exactly are they relevant to Gettier?

Oh, and I just realized that I earlier confused Gettier's Case I, once again, regarding who got the job and who Smith believed would get the job, but I'm hoping you overlooked that due to the earlier clarification I offered after doing the same thing.

Does that help? — Ludwig V

No, because you neglected to respond to my reply to you, and instead replied to my response to Michael.

It’s not unusual to say “we both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons.”

Max believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because he believes that Jane is a horrible person.

Jessica believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because she believes that marriage is a terrible practice.

They both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane. — Michael

What I'm saying is that Max's and Jessica's beliefs are equivalent to neither the proposition "John should not marry Jane", nor their attitude towards that particular proposition.

What I'm saying is that they have different beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane, clearly as you yourself have stipulated. You seem to want to call part of their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane "reasons", as though part of their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane are somehow different than their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane.

In addition, you seem to place far more importance and justificatory weight than I do upon common speech patterns/practices. It does not follow from the fact that it is common to say that they both believe that John should not marry Jane, but for different reasons, that their belief is equivalent to the proposition "John should not marry Jane", or that the distinction you're drawing between their belief and their reasons somehow reflects that there is a difference between reasons and beliefs such that reasons are not beliefs.

What is clear is that they hold completely different beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane, and yet the notion of belief you're using along with the belief attribution methods you've been practicing, inevitably leads you to say otherwise.

Their beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane are far more complex than your accounting practices are capable of admitting. The same fatal flaw underwrites the earlier example you gave of belief about your birthplace.

I'm a bit puzzled. On the one hand, you've expressed the desire to have an all-encompassing solution. On the other hand, you've expressed several times that you're not interested in theory. In addition, you've expressed agreement that what I've proposed dissolves the Gettier problem in both cases. It also dissolves all the cottage cases discussed here as well, then you mentioned qualifications...

Which of the 'qualification cases' are you not satisfied with my answer to?

What stops you from agreeing with the accounting malpractice charges I've levied against the historical and current conventional practices of belief attribution(including believe that approaches), belief as propositional attitude, and treating naked propositions as if they are equivalent to belief?

Not only are these practices inherently responsible for the inability to make sense of language less belief, they are also responsible for the inability to defend Gettier's cases as well as understanding the lessons of Russell(the clock) and Moore's paradox. In other words, understanding the accounting malpractice results in dissolving all three issues.

This problem was devised by Jonathan Vogel.

1. Someone (call him Al) has parked his car on Avenue A (out of sight now) half an hour ago. Everything is normal, the car is still there, Al has a good memory. Does he know where his car is?

2. Every day, a certain percentage of cars gets stolen. Does Al know, right now, that his car has not been stolen and driven away since he parked it?

3. Meanwhile, in a parallel universe with a similar crime rate, Betty has parked her car on Avenue B half an hour ago. Betty is cognitively very similar to Al (just as good a memory, just as much confidence about the location of her car). Her car, unfortunately, was stolen and driven away. Does Betty, who believes that her car is on Avenue B where she parked it, know that her car is on Avenue B?

4. Having answered all three questions, would you like to revise your answer to any of them?

5. Why? — Ludwig V

1. Yes, Al believes his car is where it is.
2. If he believes it has not been stolen, and it has not been stolen, then yes, he knows it has not been stolen.
3. No, because her belief is not true.
4. No
5. There is no issue I see.

I second what and both say as well.

I was specifying a belief that I think Gettier’s practice shows that he holds. Yes, it does hark back to atomic propositions. — Ludwig V

Okay. Seems we're in agreement here as well. Gettier may well have presupposed such beliefs about propositions being clearly distinct. Michael seems to have as well. I'm more prone towards agreeing with Quine's idea of a web of beliefs. Davidson largely adopted it as well. Are you familiar?

I don't like "propositional attitude" much either. For me, it is a useful classification that groups together a number of different verbs that share a grammatical feature, that they are require a clause in what grammarians call “indirect speech”. Many, if not all, of these verbs are cognitive and hence of interest to philosophy. I wouldn’t have any objection to using “cognitive”, so long as other people would understand what I mean. — Ludwig V

So, we agree that belief as propositional attitude is problematic.

I know you mentioned speech acts earlier, and I did not see how it was an issue between our views. Would you consider yourself a speech act theorist along the lines of Austin and Searle? I see some definite similarities, based upon my very limited understanding. I own some of Austin's and Searle's literature, and have read Austin's "How To Do Things With Words", but my memory of it is not at all acute.

Is the clause you're referring to above a "belief that" clause, such that when we claim that someone believes a proposition, we're basically saying that they believe that, or believe that that proposition is true?

Could you elaborate on this mention of using "cognitive"? I'm curious what the benefits of the use would be, and if it were being used to replace or supplant some other common terminological use. I've no issue with your use of it. So, if it doesn't matter, we can leave it be.

I would like to express the point about "language-less" belief by saying that a proposition is (usually) an expression of a belief, but not necessarily the form of expression used by the believer. Actions, in which the belief is attributed as a reason for the action, are another way of expressing belief. Beliefs are reasons for action, if you like; and since that formulation includes speech-acts, it seems general enough to cover everything it needs to.

But that doesn’t really explain the concept. The core of it is a most the useful property. Without belief, there is no coherent way to say that someone acted for a reason but the reason is false. In other words, attributing beliefs enables the speaker to express an assessment of the truth or otherwise of the belief. — Ludwig V

It seems to me that belief has efficacy in that one's beliefs will cause one's actions, and by virtue of this fact we can attribute beliefs based upon actions. Witt made several convincing remarks over the years regarding this. I think we agree on that. The issue with that the approach is that it is underdetermined at best which sorts of beliefs caused which sorts of actions. Any number of actions could be caused by any number of beliefs. At least, that's my current understanding of it. There is always the chance of my being unaware of something or another of importance.

Trying to work out a way of expressing where I think we have got to, I have to start from my understanding of what the standard use of “proposition” amounts to. A proposition, on my account, is a sentence with its use in a context. This implies that each proposition comes entangled in a cloud of other propositions which are essential to understanding it. This includes, but is not limited to, its truth-conditions and its truth-maker (if I may use that term). An attribution of belief includes a proposition but locates it in a specialized context which requires special treatment. — Ludwig V

I've seen propositions defined in a few different ways. Attitudes towards propositions would follow the notion of "proposition" being used. I've seen others use it as you're using it here. If we take a proposition as a sentence with its use in a context, it may serve to eliminate the ambiguity of reference issue underwriting Gettier's Case I by allowing us to know that Smith was referring to himself and only himself despite the fact that the naked proposition is true regardless of who believes it.

This touches upon the issues I raised earlier regarding treating naked propositions as though they are equivalent to belief. Interestingly enough, it seems that treating a proposition as you suggest may very well be another way to dissolve the Gettier problem, at least in the first Case.

There's any number of tangents here, all of which are germane. Most folk approach Gettier's paper as though it is all about justification. You and I have been approaching it here much differently.

...each observation of an object of sense is particular
— Janus

The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.

I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?

I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?

A tree does not consist of sense. — creativesoul

You haven't identified what "other stuff" I said and precisely what parts you disagree with. — Janus

That's not true either. See above.

The irony here is that what you said afterwards is what I complimented. You've said all sorts of things, and then said completely different things after issues with the original things were pointed out, and then claimed that the completely different things were all you meant when you said the first things. Then you claim that what I wrote in the quote at the top of this post was 'murky'???

All good from my vantage point. I know better. The casual reader can decide for themselves. I'm done here. I've got far more important, meaningful, and rewarding things to do than to play pin the tail on the bullshit artist.

That's not true. You can see it. You may or may not understand or agree with it, but you can definitely see that I addressed something you said. I quoted it verbatim.

In fact, I quoted you twice and complimented the clarity of the second quote.

:smile:

What is the root of all philosophy?

Metacognition:Thinking about thought and belief.

Well, that clarifies a great deal, and I agree that this dissolves the Gettier problem. — Ludwig V

Is that alone not enough to warrant assent?

I agree that the Gettier problem has an element of ambiguity.

Each belief, proposition, and sentence is clearly distinct from all other beliefs, propositions and sentences... — Ludwig V

What counts as "clearly distinct"?

I disagree with it at face value. Doesn't this hark back to atomic propositions?

...if you focus on "Michael was not born in Germany" and the fact that all three people would agree on that, you will think that they all have the same belief, and with reason. If you focus on the fact that they each have a different reason for believing that, you will think that they all have different beliefs, and with reason. So, I prefer to stick with what I have just said and refuse to adopt either that they do, or that they do not, have the same belief. — Ludwig V

The reason for agreeing that they all have the same belief has been shown to be fraught.

They cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace if they have contradictory beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It's one or the other, not both. It has been clearly stipulated that they have mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It only follows that they cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace. Saying that they all believe that the same proposition is true is not a problem. Treating the proposition as though it is equivalent to their belief, and holding belief as equivalent to a propositional attitude is.

Acknowledging that they do not have the same belief about Michael's birthplace requires us, on pains of coherency alone, to deny that they do. Hence, "Michael was not born in Germany" serves just fine as a meaningful proposition. One who believes that Michael was born somewhere other than Germany will believe that that proposition is true. However, if we stick with belief as propositional attitude, we're forced to conclude that they all share the same belief about Michael's birthplace. <--------that's an unacceptable logical consequence. It's false.

How do we square that with the fact that they all hold mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace?

Seems to me that belief as propositional attitude has been shown to be lacking in yet another way. Earlier it was found lacking the ability to take proper account of language less belief. I find that rendering all belief as propositional attitude has hindered our understanding.

If I say "This car is made of steel" this assertion can be publicly checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. If I say " This thought I'm having is about a car made of steel" this assertion is not publicly checkable and cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed. — Janus

If that's all you meant, it's much more helpful - to me anyway - to understand you by saying that rather than the other stuff you said leading up to it. The above is easily understood.

That's one reason why I disagree with the position you're arguing for.

if you disagree with what I wrote above, then explain why — Janus

I agreed with a particular critique that Meta offered against your position. Well, to be more precise, I generally agreed with Meta about a problem with your position, as you stated it. That said, the last post you offered had nothing to do with that issue.

It seems to me that both of you are using unnecessarily complex language coupled with inherently inadequate dichotomies to discuss the subject matter. The last post you offered shows the former nicely. For example, let's look closer at this:

...each observation of an object of sense is particular — Janus

The quote directly above serves as prima facie evidence supporting the charge that you're using unnecessarily complex language. Furthermore, such usage serves only to add unnecessary confusion. This could be demonstrated a number of different ways. I'll stick with one, for brevity's sake.

I'm assuming that a tree counts as "an object of sense". So, an observation of a tree would count as an observation of 'an object of sense'. But what sense does that make?

I mean, when we talk about one thing being "of" another, there is some sort of relation between the two. When we talk about an object of steel, there are no meaningful issues regarding the sensibility of our language use. We all know what counts as an object of steel. Steel cars, for example. Steel knives. Steel wheels. The same easily understood sensibility holds good for objects of brass, paper, plastic, etc. An object of steel is a something consisting of steel. An object of brass is something consisting of brass. An object of paper is something consisting of paper. But what sense does it make to talk about "objects of sense"?

A tree does not consist of sense.

So, in summary, I find such linguistic frameworks to be entirely unhelpful. Meta follows along because he grants too much to start with. Therefore, I disagree with both approaches regarding all that and more. I'll leave it at that though, for what I've said is plenty enough.

Exactly, in reality, the public is dependent on the private, and we could exchange public and private for external and internal here as well.. That is what Janus denies and refuses to acknowledge. As much as we like to model the private as emergent from the public, thereby making the public prior to the private, "the public" is nothing more than an idea and is therefore fundamentally dependent on the private. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree with both of your approaches for different reasons. I agree with your critique of Janus' position, as it has been stated in this thread.

The public/private distinction breaks down completely when the 'private' part becomes existentially dependent on the public part.

Shaming. Pride.

The examples are far too plentiful to enumerate.

So, there's that...

Carry on folks. Just running through.

:wink:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers, Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Flowery vague ambiguities all packaged up nicely into a name. It's all in the name. It's all about the name. What's the name picking out to the exclusion of all else?

There is nothing it is like to be me.

"Felt" quality of redness??? The redness of the apple feels...

Gibberish.

It's qualia because the felt quality of the redness is private and unique to each individual...

,,,colors are not the sort of thing that we feel.

What unites each of these is that some folk call them "states of experience" not that there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.

As if all conscious organisms who been burnt were/are conscious to the same degree about the same things in all the same ways? Gibberish. As if all people share one and only one set of characteristics or features of and/or within experience such that it makes sense to say that there is something it is like to be a person or a bat or a cat or whatever?

The hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than self-imposed bewitchment.

Shit Banno, I've mentioned you countless times in past without linking your name so you knew...

I'll do better now that I know it bothers you.

:gasp:

Yup. I was being facetious. He and I agree there.

If you're not pro-US, you must be pro-Putin. It's pathetic. — Isaac

As long as I can be pro-US while disagreeing with their foreign policy many/most times, and still not be pro-Putin.

I believe there is actually a proof of that, of the fact that we cannot visualize very well, even though we convince ourselves that we do visualize really well. I discovered it in primary school. There was this girl I was very found of. She liked my drawings and asked me for one. I decided that instead of drawing Mickey Mouse or Lucky Luke as usual, for her I would draw something nicer, more original: a horse. I thought I knew exactly how it would be, for I had this picture in my mind of a splendid horse. Then I started to draw.

Try as I may, I could not replicate on paper the splendid image I thought I had in my head. I had to take a photo of a horse and draw from it. The result was somewhat ok but I wondered: how come I needed an external picture to copy? Why couldn't I simply copy my mental image?

Introspectingly, I realized that this image was not actually 'there' in my mind. — Olivier5

Dennett has very interesting lines of thought on that... well worth watching. The gulf between the purported complex complete picture of something people believe they have in their mind('visual thinkers' and all that) with what they can describe when asked a few questions about it.

Do you think someone can sincerely try and do something that they at the same time believe - really believe - they will fail to succeed at? — Bartricks

Yes, I do. Some people know that success often comes after many failures. Others have guts and determination. I've had far more failures than successes. Failures are wonderful to learn from, if one has such a mindset.

It's not a matter of "if" one will fail when trying something new or novel. It's a matter of how one handles such times of strife. That is when character is shown, despite the common belief that such times 'build character'.

I don't understand what "how the relationship emerges" means. The relationship between propositions, belief and action isn't hidden. The relationship between the three persists for as long as S's belief persists. The relationship between belief and action is the relationship between reason for action and action and depends on the mental state of the believer - and, yes, that seems to conflict with my remark that it is not a question of the mental state of the believer. That remark over-simplifies the complex relationship between the mental state of the believer and the way that someone else may report it. — Ludwig V

Greetings!

We can revisit the above at a later date.

I don't want to get in amongst the weeds of the Gettier problem, but there's a link between the last paragraph and Gettier and it sits behind that last paragraph. If S is justified in believing that p and p implies q, is S justified in believing that q? Even if if p is false? I want to say no, but I'm not sure I can. — Ludwig V

Oh, we most certainly can deny that. I already do, for different reasons than you, however. Those reasons have nothing to do with whether or not P is true.

We're already up to our neck in Gettier overgrowth! That's exactly what the cottage industry cases are. :wink:

It is my understanding that one of Gettier's targets was that specific formulation. If S is justified in believing P and P entails Q, then S is justified in believing Q. I cannot remember whose formulation it was but that doesn't really matter here.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. — Ludwig V

Indeed. That is a problem.

In addition, even if and when S does understand P and that P entails Q, S's belief that Q is true is not adequately represented by Q and Q alone. Such beliefs are more complex than just Q. They are directly connected to P. Q because P. Not merely Q.

The earlier example that Michael was using demonstrates this all rather nicely. "Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by a plurality of completely different beliefs about Michael's birthplace. Many of these directly conflict with one another. Three people with mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace all have belief that entails Q.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by all of the following...

Michael was born in Botswana.
Michael was born in Israel.
Michael was born in Russia.

We cannot justifiably arrive at believing that Michael was not born in Germany, unless we are already justified in believing that he was born somewhere else. P and Q are entwined by S's belief formation process, and irrevocably so. It is only as a result of severing P from Q and treating Q as if it is an accurate report of S's belief that problems arise.

Hence...

"Michael was not born in Germany" cannot stand alone as S's belief about Michael's birthplace. Current conventional practice leads to our claiming otherwise, and in doing so it also results in saying that all three individuals share the exact same belief about Michael's birthplace.

They - quite clearly - do not.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P, where P is any of the three beliefs written above. Upon doing so, we find Gettier's problem dissolved. Justified false belief is not a problem for JTB.

Heat doesn't radiate. Heat is the transfer of thermal energy between two bodies.

There are three modes of heat transfer, conduction, convection and radiation. — RussellA

Interesting exchange between you and Banno.

Pardon the quibble/pedantry. The above looks suspiciously like an equivocation fallacy. A substitution exercise shows it nicely.

If heat is the transfer of thermal energy, and we're using the term "heat" consistently, then in each and every instance where we use "heat", we ought be able to substitute that term with "the transfer of thermal energy", and retain all sensibility. However, we cannot successfully perform this exercise with the last statement in the above quote, for doing so results in the following...

There are three modes of the transfer of thermal energy transfer...

So, something is off. Could be just the use of "heat transfer". Is it just as sensible to say that there are three modes of heat, conduction, convection, and radiation. Or perhaps, that there are three modes of thermal energy transfer, conduction, convection, and radiation?