This sounds like maybe you don’t hold that we cannot know the things-in-themselves that appear to us, is that correct? — Bob Ross
…..what ontological status does the logical part of the representational system have it is not a thing-in-itself nor an appearance. I get it is a logical system, but ontologically what is it? — Bob Ross
Keyword: things. Logic is not a thing. If a label is required for some reason, I’d just call it a condition, or maybe a axiom or fundamental principle of a theory. Heck, maybe just a merely necessary presupposition, in order to ground all that follows from it. All of which lend themselves quite readily to analysis. This is metaphysics after all, immune to proof from experience, so there are some permissible procedural liberties, so maybe logic is just that which prohibits such liberties from running amuck.
Besides, it is possible that the human intellect is itself naturally predisposed to what we eventually derive as logical conditions, so maybe we put so much trust in the power of pure logic for no other reason than we just are logical intelligences. Maybe we just can’t be not logically inclined. — Mww
Perhaps it would be better to start afresh and in a more concrete way. You seem to be saying that by virtue of feeling our basic existences which you would characterize as "being a mind" (?) we can confidently extrapolate to a view of the basic nature of the cosmos. Are there other steps that need to be added in there or is that it?
Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.
Remember: the thing and the thing of the thing-in-itself are identical.
The only difference is the exposure to human systemic knowledge/experience criteria, which reduces to time.
We can’t know the thing-in-itself because it doesn’t appear in us. If that specific box….the only one that appeared to your senses…..had stayed at the post office, you’d never know anything of it, even while inferring the real possibility of boxes in general, iff you already know post offices contain boxes.
If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time
it follows that if logic is not conditioned by space and time but only time, thereby out of compliance with the criteria for existence, then the study of its ontological predicates from which its ontological status can be determined, is a waste of effort.
Keyword: things. With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.
I want to get back to something you said the other day, something like….the universal mind change the world to fit out knowledge, to which I thought it better that our knowledge changed to fit the constant world. If I got that right, I might have a thought up a decent counter-argument or two I’d like you to shoot down, in accordance with your thesis.
Way back when, and in the interest of the most general of terminology, that which contacted the bottom of human feet has never changed, even though through the ages more and more knowledge has been obtained about it.
Long ago, some humans knew the moon as some lighted disk in the sky. They also knew of periodically changing ocean levels, but had no comprehension of tidal effects caused by the moon and even less comprehension of effects a mere disk can have. Nowadays the relation between the tides and the moon are the same as they ever were, but there is resident knowledge of that relation derived from principles
If so, then how do you know they even exist? — Bob Ross
. I submit to you that Analytic Idealism, that reality is fundamentally a mind, meets the aforementioned requirements better than physicalism (and any other possible metaphysical theory). — Bob Ross
We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense. — Janus
Things-in-themselves aren’t what appear, never become a sensation, so, yes, those are what we don’t know.
-Mww
If it never becomes a sensation, then it sounds like you are saying we never come in contact, even indirectly, with the things-in-themselves, is that correct? If so, then how do you know they even exist? — Bob Ross
If the representational system isn’t getting, as input, sensations of the things-in-themselves, it sounds like, to me, the former is completely accounted for without positing the latter. — Bob Ross
I didn’t follow this part: what is a “thing of the thing-in-itself”? — Bob Ross
Is that the substance of (or in) which the thing-in-itself is of? — Bob Ross
If we aren’t exposed to it as sensations (….), then how are we exposed to it? — Bob Ross
how you could know that if you can’t know anything about the things-in-themselves—i.e., the real world. I still don’t understand, as of yet, how you resolve that. — Bob Ross
If ontology is the study of what is, and what is implies what exists, and to exist is to be conditioned by space and time…
-Mww
If what exists is what is conditioned by space and time, then space and time do not exist. — Bob Ross
Are you saying that the logical part of our representational system (for each and every one of us) only is conditioned by time? So it exists within the temporal world but non-spatially? — Bob Ross
With respect to ontology, logic is not a thing.
-Mww
But it has to exist in a thing: what thing are you saying it exists in? — Bob Ross
….reality (which is fundamentally a Universal Mind) — Bob Ross
As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws. — Bob Ross
As far as I can tell, the Universal Mind adheres to strict laws.
— Bob Ross
There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is. — Mww
That criticism may also accurately describe Panpsychism, which is a philosophical generalization, not a detailed scientific account of mind. It simply assumes that "mind stuff" is more fundamental than "matter stuff". In which case, the emergence of Mind from Matter needs no further explanation, other than perhaps adding the holistic notion of "Emergence".Now, sometimes I do hear physicalists rightly point out that an analytical idealist is not actually providing an explanation to consciousness at all but, rather, simply positing it as fundamental without a detailed account of mind (i.e., of how it works) which, to them, is more epistemically costly than obscurely explaining mind in terms of emergence from the brain. — Bob Ross
In my experience, most people act like Materialists in all practical phases of life. Only a few brain-washed nuts actually attempt to walk through walls, which, according to subatomic physics, are 99% empty space (image below).↪Bob Ross
Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live? — Tom Storm
Could it be that Universal Mind "adhering to strict laws" is merely the wrong choice of words? — Tom Storm
Only a few brain-washed nuts actually attempt to walk through walls, which, according to subatomic physics, are 99% empty space (image below). — Gnomon
How does how we live change if idealism is true? — Tom Storm
The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense. — Janus
Of course, and like an idiot I didn't even consider this aspect. — Tom Storm
All universal common denominators are only ideas? — creativesoul
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