There is an aura of absurdity when crybabies moan and shout about reverse racism or reverse sexism (against white people and men, respectively). — _db

It's only 'reverse' to them because they are white, on the other side of it, and they do not know what racism is to begin with!

:lol:

It is a perfect opportunity to help those out, should they be capable of being helped and there is someone capable of helping them. Sadly, there is no universal method applicable to everyone successfully. Getting through to some people requires much different approaches than others, and also requires certain kinds of people doing the approaching...

The point, lost, is that there seems to be nothing in common in the correspondence in each case.
— Banno

I don't see that; — Janus

Me either. That each corresponds to and/or is consistent with different facts does not mean that correspondence is not the commonality between them.

"Snow is white" is not a fact; it is a sentence. That snow is white is how things are, and so, it is a fact.

Now the bit in the above sentence that I italicised is a string of letters, "snow is white", and it is not dissimilar to the bit I bolded.

I'm emphasising that the very same thing can be marks on a screen, a string of letters, a sentence and a fact.

Do we at least agree on this? — Banno

Only if facts are true sentences/statements. If facts are situations, circumstances, states of affairs, or what's happened and/or happening, then the answer is "no", because none of those things are marks on a screen, strings of letters, or sentences.

If there is a mouse behind the tree, then the fact consists of a mouse, a tree, and the spatial relationship between them from some frame of reference/vantage point. That fact is no more a sentence, string of letters, or marks on a screen than the tree, the mouse, or the spatiotemporal relationship is.

Its truth value can only be known if its meaning is first known. — RussellA

Sounds right to me. My granddaughter knew what "there's nothing in there" meant, thus she knew it was false when someone said it about the fridge. Given she was barely able to string two or three words together at the time, it shows us that we can know what some statements/sentences/claims mean long before we're able to vocalize and/or utter them. It also shows us that knowing what a statement means and/or whether or not it is true or false does not always require metacognition and/or doubt that is informed by thinking about our own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right.

"Snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, and
"Snow is on the ground" is true IFF snow is on the ground, and indeed
"Snow is turquoise with purple polkadots" is true IFF snow is turquoise with purple polkadots

are all true. — Banno

Not true in the same sense that any of the left side utterances are though.

Interesting.

It doesn't seem that either (3) or (5) can fully account for self-referential sentences. — Michael

I think the T schema only works with sentences that begin with a universal quantifier. I cannot make much sense of my saying that, but it seems to me that I'm just repeating something Davidson and Quine said during a discussion between them about Tarski's definition and disquotation model.

Truth value gaps...

The living being's actions are influenced by, and affected by... — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore... they are not free...

Exactly. Sounds like there's quite a bit of overlap in our positions regarding that.

Another interesting bit of etymology concerns the notion of "false" which came about as a means to denote anything contrary to Christian doctrine, after the Church absconded with the notion of truth. Interesting that subsequent generations of speakers retained the notion of "false" as being contrary with/to truth even if and when they were secular.

That came long after the first known uses of "true" and "truth"...

I don't think this is about hinge's, at least not how I interpret hinge's — Sam26

You may be right, I just thought that her belief that stuff was in the fridge was well grounded, true, and required no further subsequent justification method.

justification, sensory justification. — Sam26

If being justified means being well grounded, then sure. If it means providing reasons to support a knowledge claim, then no.

I tend towards justification as being well grounded, which does not necessarily require language use.

I think that that real life example tells us quite a bit about how we autonomously 'employ' correspondence long before ever being able to talk about it. It may tell us something about unreflective thought and belief and the presupposition of correspondence within it.

Correspondence is primary.

With regard to Witt's notion of hinge propositions, does her knowledge require any more subsequent justification?

There's some sort of bedrock there, I would think.

Perhaps just knowing what the words mean is enough.

Did you miss the anecdote about my granddaughter? You may appreciate it greatly.

I could not have imagined or wished for such a great real life example. I laughed so hard as a result of her opening the door to show that stuff was in there... The way she uttered "ders dat, nnn dat, nnn dat, nnn dat.... She was so emphatically serious.

:lol:

"The man with ten coins in his pocket" refers to Smith and Smith alone, because it is Smith who is doing the thinking. Smith's belief is true only if, only when, and only because Smith gets the job. Smith did not believe anyone but himself would get the job. Gettier's accounting malpractice would like us to believe otherwise.

In the second case, Smith believed Jones owned a Ford. He did not believe that Brown was in Barcelona. It is only as a result of believing that Jones owned a Ford that he would believe "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona". He believed "either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford. Gettier leaves out the last bit, which is the most important bit of Smith's belief in the second case.

Again, an accounting malpractice of Smith's beliefs. Smith's belief was justified false belief in both cases. False belief is not a problem for JTB.

To be clear, it's not a charge against Gettier so much as it is a charge against the convention he used. He followed the rules. The rules allowed the accounting malpractice.

This stuff is complex. — Banno

Ought it be?

My twenty-seven-month-old granddaughter understood just fine when she heard someone say something about the fridge that was not true. Her behaviour showed that beyond a reasonable doubt. The interesting aspect of that was that at the time she was barely capable of stringing two or three words together, but she knew right away that "there's nothing in there" was false when an adult said that talking about the fridge.

You also find this in the Gettier examples... — Sam26

Accounting malpractices of human belief. That's what they all amount to.

Ah, playing with the T-schema.

Not even sure what you're trying to do there...

...logic excludes temporality. Not that it should do so -- but that's the idea. — Moliere

That's a flaw in my view for what it is attempting to take into account does not always exclude temporality.

The reason why the Liar is not truth apt is because it has no truth conditions.

Sure. I situate logic differently in that logic is an accounting practice. When taking account of that which already existed in its entirety prior to being taken into account, different sort of considerations arise... Such considerations are only established more along the lines of a priori reasoning.

Banno calls me an anti-realist as a result of the stance I take regarding what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. A prediction is neither true nor false at the time it is made because it is about what has not yet happened. Correspondence to(consistency with) what has happened(fact, in the original sense of "true") plays a major role in my thinking. Seems to me that most academic circles realize that any substantial notion of truth needs to be able to account for or be amenable to correspondence... somehow.

The liar's paradox is not capable of being true or false. Neither are predictions at the time they are made.

The exercise here is to find an appropriate grammar that explicates what is going on. — Banno

That would need to be done with normal everyday language use.

T sentences are shorthand. I've an issue with the very notion of propositions, so clearly with the accounting practices involving p are included in that, but I'm very fond of the simplicity of Tarksi's formulation, despite not placing as much or the same sort of value upon logic as folks like yourself.

The original use of "true" was set out earlier by me, and it meant consistent with what occurred. I personally do not employ the notion of "fact" because of - as you like to say - all of its philosophical baggage. I tend to stick to the long form. But, given that not all true statements are so as a result of being consistent with what happened and/or is happening, it seems reasonable to extend its application to being consistent with the way things were and/or are as well as the case at hand. I say this, if for no other reason than to account for things like claims about personal preferences, as well as social conventions and other parts of reality that emerge via language use.

It's interesting to me, as well, how the original use did not involve being taken account of. I mean, we began using the term "true" long before ever considering that and/or how we were. The same goes for "truth". It was only later that skepticism over the use emerged.

Seems to me to be a refinement of language over time. — Banno

Don't refinements usually imply improvement?

Thoughts? — ThinkOfOne

Karma presupposes supernatural record keeping and judgment.

The reassurance was directed at the etymology. — Banno

The etymology is interesting, because the term "true" was first used in the sense of being consistent with what has/had occurred, long prior to the term "fact" being coined and/or being used in a manner inconsistent with what had occurred. The first use was that sense, what has/had ocurred. I cannot be too certain off the top of my head, but it seems like a couple of centuries went by...

"Fact" in the sense of the case at hand is notably different than "fact" as what has/had occurred. Those are both distinct from "fact" as a true statement.

You're welcome.

:wink:

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact. — creativesoul

Sure. — Banno

And then...

I'd say they are both facts because they are both true statements, and facts are true statements. — Moliere

Yep. — Banno

:brow:

There are only variables that can be substituted for English sentences... — Moliere

Yeah, I think that that is a key consideration here. Logic is an accounting practice of that which already existed in its entirety prior to being taken into account.

True statements are sentences. Facts are not. — creativesoul

Yep. — Banno

1. snow is white - fact
2. "snow is white" - sentence
3. "snow is white" is true - fact
4. '"snow is white" is true' - sentence.

You seem to think that (1) and (2) are the same. They are not. But (1) and (3) are logically equivalent. Or if you prefer, (2) and (4) are equivalent. — Banno

(3) is about the sentence "snow is white". (1) is not. How are they both facts? As a result of logical equivalence?

Truth conditions are on the right

True statements are sentences. Facts are not.

I want to run something by you and any others who may be reading this.

The most common Old English use had it that truth was the quality of being steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest, steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. That is... "truth" originally meant the quality of being true, and when something was true it was steadfast, loyal, faithful, trustworthy, honest and steady in adhering to promises and friends, etc. Such use of "truth" seemed to be more applicable to people. Another Old English use, the sense of "something that is true", was first recorded mid-14c., whereas the sense meaning "accuracy, correctness" is from 1560s.

The term "true" was first used in the sense of being "consistent with fact" around c. 1200. Given that the English language began being written around c. 600, it comes as no surprise to me that English speakers would begin using it "true" to mean consistent with what occurred because they found themselves faced with conflicting stories about the very same events, especially when amidst much denser populations, many of which that had written record. They needed a means for distinguishing dependable and reliable stories from those that were not. Hence, true stories are consistent with what occurred. Stories that are not true, are not.

If being true means being consistent with fact, then a true statement is consistent with fact, where "fact" is what has occurred. True statements are not facts. To quite the contrary, true statements are so, only if, only when, and only because they are consistent with fact.

"snow is white " is true iff s..........All we need to do now is work out what s might be.
— Banno

My attempt:

I believe that I am observing something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer

Rather than keep saying "I believe that I am observing something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer" it is more convenient to say "I believe that I am observing snow"

Where "snow" is defined as "something that is atmospheric water vapour frozen into ice crystals and falling in light white flakes or lying on the ground as a white layer".

In other words, "white" is part of the definition of "snow".

I need no knowledge of the world to know that "snow is white", only knowledge of language.

In Tarski's terms, I can say "snow is white" and a German can say "schnee ist weiss". These are said within the object language

The metalanguage is where words are defined, in that "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow" means "schnee"

Therefore, we can replace "snow is white" is true iff s by "snow is white" is true iff "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow means "schnee"

Therefore s = the linguistic declaration that "white" is part of the definition of "snow", "white" means "weiss" and "snow" means "schnee". — RussellA

Just wondering if you saw this ...

Probably best not to delve too deeply into belief though, given this is a thread about truth.

Well...

Unless that is, truth emerges within some language less creatures' thought and belief formation itself as compared/contrasted to emerging as a property of true statements, assertions, claims, propositions, etc.

:wink:

So be it...

I'll have to read it then. His notion of "proposition" must be notably different to yours in that they cannot be equivalent to statements or assertions. I hope he's not one of those who claim that propositions are somehow existentially independent of language. Either way, I've found him helpful in a few ways. If there are some things I disagree with, then it would be quite normal. As before, I'll give it a look. Thanks for the link...

Well shit!

No link. For some reason, I believed you'd given one. Do you have one? I do not remember that title, so I doubt if I have a copy of it. I'll have to look to be sure...