...proving that there is something existing independently of conscious beings. But do do so, one must step outside of subjective experience. But obviously, that is not possible. — Hello Human

How convenient.

Proving there is an external world does not require stepping outside of subjective experience. Human experience is not the sort of thing that can be stepped into and/or out of to begin with, so it makes no sense at all to claim that doing so is needed for anything else at all.

Understanding how language creation and/or acquisition happens leaves no room at all for serious well founded doubt regarding whether or not an external world exists.

Simply put, understanding that we use the term "tree" to pick out the thing in my front yard suffices.

The bottom 80% of the country have almost no political power whatsoever. Their interests are simply ignored. — Xtrix

In much governmental practice as well as most accounting practices thereof.

Many government officials have acted and are acting in ways that are quite harmful to very large swathes of American citizens. There are specific pieces of legislation, as well as specific court cases, throughout the last five or six decades that have rendered the overwhelming majority of Americans virtually powerless to be able to elect someone who does what's best for them.

When I was much younger, I used to jokingly say "We have the best justice system money can buy" as a means to point out the benefit of having a good defense attorney. It garnered very little, if any resistance. Usually people would smile while responding, regardless of what they said while smiling.

Mind you, I understood very little about how the justice system and other governmental institutions actually worked, but don't get me wrong, I did have the basic understanding of how it was supposed to work - ideally. I had no idea how monetarily corrupt American government actually was/is until I had been exposed to more than enough adequate evidence to know.

If workers' lives and livelihoods were cared about more than profit margins, there would be no need for collective bargaining measures.

It makes absolutely no sense at all to deny and/or object to the following claim.

"14th century humans had cells."

That's my answer.

To the basic question asked in the title of the thread...

Is there an external material world?

If by "external" we mean not within the physical bounds of our skin, and by "material" we mean detectable stuff, then all we're asking is whether or not any detectable stuff not within the bounds of our skin exists.

Such questions are the bane of philosophy.

They are consequences of placing far too much - perhaps it's better described as placing the wrong kind of - value upon consistent language use.

You've claimed that experience is a matter of definition and nothing more, and that experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— creativesoul

No, I didn't claim that — Janus

Sure looks that way to me...

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more.
— Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more.
— Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

Okay. I've quoted the relevant portions of our exchange above. Where you claimed "No, I think it's just a matter of definition", what - exactly - are you referring to? What - exactly - is just a matter of definition?

I asked that already. You did not answer.

It may be best to revisit the succession of agreements leading up to that objection, because the objection itself contradicted the prior agreements. What you objected to followed from what you'd agreed upon.

You've claimed that experience is a matter of definition and nothing more, and that experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. Those two claims are mutually exclusive. If the one is true, the other is not, and vice versa. That is the epitome of self-contradiction - by definition, ironically enough.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. — Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

We didn't have cell theory back in the 14th century. So did the people back then have cells? — Isaac

Are you serious?

:brow:

It’s been established that some thoughts need words....thoughts with words as their object. — Mww

So, that could be established henceforth as a basic agreement.

Some thought needs words.

While I could agree that "thoughts with words as their object" is a description of one example of thought that needs words, I would not agree that that is the only kind. Nor do I find that that description is capable of taking into account all thought that needs words. As before, all thought that needs words is thought that is existentially dependent upon words. Such thought are the kind that cannot possibly exist without words, and those include more than just thought that has words as it's object.

Let's suppose a very different case...

Consider the curious case of a cat thinking about the contents of its food bowl. I have just such a curious cat named "Cookie". Cookie will come to me, wherever I may be around the property, make eye contact with me, and then immediately take off as fast as she can back towards the kitchen, where her food bowl is. I mean, she tears out of the area with claws extended. It's quite memorable. Sometimes, if I'm lying on the bed, she'll sit around on the floor for quite some time waiting for me to look at her. If too much time passes, she will begin tearing around in circles, claws extended, on the rug at the foot of the bed. If, after doing this, I continue to remain in place without ever having made eye contact, she will then begin tearing a path between the rug and kitchen, through the bedroom doorway, going back and forth between the two areas, tearing around in circles on the rug during each visit to the bedroom. Finally, if all that happens and I still have not acknowledged her presence, she will jump on the bed, na dmake her presence known by meowing at me, while placing herself into my immediate proximity, within mere inches.

After she has my attention, regardless of my whereabouts, she will lead me to the bowl stopping every few feet or so to look back at me, as if to ensure that I'm following her. Clearly the curious cat Cookie cannot think about the word "food bowl". So, words are not the object of her thought. The contents of the food bowl is. Despite not being able to think about words, she can nevertheless think about the fact that her bowl is empty. She can want me to pour food in the bowl.

Her thinking that her bowl is empty is an excellent example of thought that needs words despite not having words as their object. It is a very curious example. In this particular case, her thoughts do not have words as their object. Her thoughts are however, about the bowl. That particular bowl is the sort of thing that is itself existentially dependent upon language. That bowl is the resultant product of many a linguistic endeavor. From the initial conceptual drawings, through all of the different engineering inherent to the manufacturing processes, the emergence of that particular bowl was facilitated by words. That bowl is existentially dependent upon words.

Thinking about A is existentially dependent upon A. If A is existentially dependent upon words, then thinking about A is as well.

Let Cookie's food bowl be A.

I'm guessing that there's a bit Quine influencing your thinking here. In Ontological Relativity he argues<roughly> that what we choose to focus upon and/or later talk about is arbitrary. That is to say that the distinctions we draw and maintain are arbitrarily chosen. In Quine's view, to be is to be the value of a variable. That is to say that to be is to be talked about. This is akin to Witt's notion that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world".

Such frameworks are the linguistic equivalent of someone trying to pour thousands of gallons of water into a five gallon bucket. The world includes much more than one's worldview.

So, just so I understand this...

Are you really objecting to anyone claiming that humans had experience prior to language use?
— creativesoul

No. — Isaac

Good.

Isaac will correct me if I've misunderstood, but I don't think that's what he means. At least that is not what we've been discussing, which is the various ways of defining experience, not whether it exists without language.
— Janus

That's it, yes.

Understood. There are a plurality of accepted usages/definitions of the term "experience". Those definitions have no bearing whatsoever upon that which is being picked out by the term. What experience consists of and/or amounts to is not up to us. It is not a matter of definition, and nothing else. The notion that it is a matter of definition and nothing else) and all that follows from it is precisely what I'm rejecting. It's dead wrong. There are a number of ways to show this.

I'll start here...

Consider a group of humans living in England during the 14th century. There were famous artists, artisans, craftsmen, theatre, nobility, royalty, and everyday life. There were struggles. There were defeats. There were victories. There was class warfare, politics, truth, and lies. There were common beliefs. There were disparate fringe beliefs. There were worldviews. There were social conventions and rules governing behaviour. There was fairness and injustice. There were romantic relationships, infidelities, and loneliness. There was starvation and excess. There were murders and victims thereof. There were hunting expeditions, games, jousting events, etc. There were people who were proud. There were people who were ashamed. It was a society of people.


Here's the salient fact of the matter:The term "experience" had not yet been coined.


So, either no one in that time had experiences, or they did. I can only trust that no one here would deny that those people had experiences. Thus, since they did, and did so long before the term was coined, it only follows that human experience existed in its entirety prior to the term "experience". As a matter of backwards causation alone, that which existed in its entirety prior to being picked out to the exclusion of all else and subsequently further described is not effected, affected, determined, and/or otherwise influenced in any way whatsoever by the accounting practice. Human experience emerged prior to our ability to take it into account. What human experience is amounts to what it consists of, and that is quite clearly not up to us. Rather, it is up to us to get the definition right(to arrive at true statements about human experience and what it consists of), and that requires keeping the right sorts of things in mind during our endeavor to acquire and/or accrue knowledge about human experience.

If you think I've contradicted myself then all you have to do is quote the purportedly contradictory statements I've made and we can look at it. — Janus

I did.

Now, did those three Xs exist prior to my naming them? Yes. — Isaac

Those Xs are not the sort of thing that exist in their entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices.

Look again. You've contradicted that.

I'd say that what we count as the toddler's experience depends on how we define the word "experience". The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. — Janus

...there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external... — Janus

Are you sure about the last statement above?

No. Something existed prior to our naming practices — Isaac

So, just so I understand this...

Are you really objecting to anyone claiming that humans had experience prior to language use?

Wow.

So then, no sex, no eating, no being full of fear at the sound of the bear, etc? Really? As if all of that does not count at any time prior to language?

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts... — Isaac

The toddler's experience is not a defined concept

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. — Janus

I would concur. It only follow then that we can get such things wrong.

Our definitions regarding all such things(all that exists in its entirety prior to our ability to talk about it) can be mistaken.

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts. — Isaac

Being normal doesn't equate to being accurate, correct, and/or true. Our definitions determine what else we can say without self-contradiction. They do not determine whether or not they are true. They do not determine what something consists of when the candidate is the sort of thing that exists in its entirety prior to our attempts at taking it into account. Some human experience is exactly that sort of thing. So...

The toddler was a deliberate choice. The toddler's individual experience is not at all influenced and/or determined by how we define the term "experience". It consists of external things, internal things, as well as things that are neither(associations/correlations drawn between external and internal things).

Toddlers have experience. I think we agree there.

The point here is simple really. Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. All definitions of "experience" are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Thus, it only follows that some human experience can and does exist prior to any definition of the term "experience". If the notion/conception of experience cannot take those kinds of experience into account, then it is found sorely lacking.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".
— creativesoul

You're putting words in my mouth. I haven't said anything about content. — Janus

Fair enough.

According to you, the toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

So, I'm imagining a one-year-old human, playing contently in a crib with some toy. Happy slobber. The family dog is lying close by fast asleep... legs and facial muscles twitching. There's a sudden loud knock on the door. The dog barks incessantly. The toddler is startled.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

That cannot be right.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. — Janus

What - exactly - is a matter of definition, and nothing more?

Whether or not a tree is inside or outside my head?

If experience is defined as the sensing, feeling and thinking processes of an individual, which are obviously not open to public scrutiny, then on that definition experience is internal. So, it is up to us how we choose to think about it. — Janus

emphasis mine

Again, what - exactly - is up to us how we choose to think about it? The elemental constitution of all human experience? As if that changes depending upon how we choose to define the term "experience"?

Do you think that we can be mistaken about what experience consists of?

I think we agree upon much, actually.

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.
— creativesoul

True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? — Mww

Well, no. Some things we think about are themselves existentially dependent upon words. If A is existentially dependent upon words, and thinking about A is existentially dependent upon A, then thinking about A is existentially dependent upon words.

Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms — Janus

Yup.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them. Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both. — creativesoul

So, ...

You've agreed to all of what's in the above quote.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?

:brow:

...there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external... — Janus

Never claimed otherwise. Red herring. Strawman. Non sequitur. Readers' choice.

There are better approaches.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them..

Do you object to either claim..? — creativesoul

Sure I agree, but I see those claims as being more obvious, more trivial,.. — Janus

Perfect. Do you object to what's directly below?

Thus, the experience consists of both internal and external things. It most certainly follows that the experience is neither internal nor external for it consists of elements that are both.

In the complete absence of light and leaves there cannot be any experience of seeing them. In the complete absence of the biological machinery, there cannot be any experience of seeing them... — creativesoul

So, to repeat myself, "these are just different ways of speaking, different ways of conceptually dividing and/ or sorting things". — Janus

I understood the first time. I agree, but that is a trivial point to make. We all know that much. Do you object to either claim in the quote at the top of this post?

The division of us and the world...
— creativesoul

But division is not independence. — Isaac

When dichotomies are used as a means to divide everything up into stuff that fits into one or the other, then the inevitable result is a failure to be able to properly account for that which is both, and thus... neither one nor the other. There are no such things in those accounts.<-----That's the fatal flaw. It's a consequence of consistent language use combined with an inherently inadequate terminological framework.

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not.
— creativesoul

So do you see then, that we can make the general claim "complex thought does not need words"? And in your examples, the words are "needed" not for the complex thought, as you seem to think, but for something else. We could for instance name a special type of complex thought, propositional thought, or something like that, and say that words are needed for this. — Metaphysician Undercover

If some thought needs words, and some does not, then claiming that thought does not need words is false. Claiming that thought needs words is also false. It's a matter of nuance:All, some, none.

That's what I see.

I might agree some complex thought does not presuppose words, but rather, ensue from them... — Mww

There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.



We're considering whether or not any thought needs words. Regardless of which linguistic framework we put to use, any and all meaningful coherent answers to that particular question are based completely upon what counts as thought that needs words, as well as what counts as thought that does not. This, in turn, relies upon what counts as thought, because both do.

It seems to me that the difference between thought that needs words and thought that does not is one of existential dependency. The former is existentially dependent upon words, and the latter is not. Thought that is existentially dependent upon words cannot possibly exist when and where words have never been. Thought that is not existentially dependent upon words can.

Here we face a 'problem' though.

If we claim that simple thought existed prior to the first words, and we aim to set out that kind of thought, then we are taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our taking it into account. Thus, we can get it wrong! While what counts as "thought" is determined by how we use the term, if we're using the term as a means to take account of that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking it into account, then whatever we say about such thought must not only be consistent with the ability to exist in its entirety prior to words, but our account must set out how it can/does.

how can we experience a tree? — Art48

Look at it. Get hit by it. Climb it.

You figure we're looking at, getting hit by, and climbing green bundles of texture???

:wink:

I find that the single problem with direct and indirect perception is shared in that both positions drive a terminological wedge into the practitioners' brains by virtue of divorcing perception from reality.

That's the fatal fundamental flaw of both.

Human perception is not existentially independent of reality. Rather, it is most certainly a part thereof. We are both, objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves. The division of us and the world, of our perception and the world, creates the very problems that those practitioners find important enough to talk about for hundreds if not thousands of years.

Flies and bottles come to mind.

In my view.....
......it is preposterous, bordering on the catastrophically absurd, that the totality of that of which I am aware, re: the entirely of my cognitions, requires that I read, write and speak; — Mww

Agreed. Who would ever say such a thing, whether overtly or by virtue of inevitable logical consequence?

......if language developed as a means of simplex expression by a single thinking human subject, or as a means of multiplex communication between a plurality of thinking human subjects, then it is the case language presupposes that which is expressed or communicated by it; — Mww

Well sure. I've no issue at all with that aside from the inadequate qualification that stems from your having driven a definitional wedge between language and thought in such a way that you're incapable of even admitting that some thought is itself existentially dependent upon language use. On pains of coherency alone, you must deny all such talk! I mean, good on you for the consistency. However, we both know that coherency alone does not guarantee truth. A position can be perfectly valid, consistent, internally coherent, etc...

...and false.

How do we know whether or not such positions are false, despite being perfectly consistent? A plethora of counterexamples succeed in showing us that the framework in question contradicts everyday events. By acknowledging those contradictions we can also experience the added benefit of bringing our attention to the fact that our framework is inherently flawed somewhere along the line. In this case, it could be somewhat corrected by proper qualification(claiming "some" rather than necessarily implying that all thought is existentially independent of language).

With much agreement, I'm quite certain(for empirical as well as logical reasons) that some language presupposes that which is expressed and/or communicated by it. Not all. So, I would be fine with saying that prior to expressing and/or communicating some thought using language, there must first be a thought to express and/or communicate with language. I'm readily accepting the validity and/or internal consistency(coherence) of your position. I've foregone any criticism of that aspect of the position you're putting forth. However, it lacks much needed explanatory power(the aforementioned examples to the contrary).

The contentious matter at hand is whether or not all thought needs words, which I take to mean whether or not any thought needs language in order to be formed to begin with(in the first place; initially formed; emerge into the world for the very first time; etc.). Some thought clearly emerges solely as a result of prior language use. I mentioned a few already here and now as well as earlier and elsewhere. Odd(perhaps indicative of an inherently inadequate linguistic framework???) that you did not directly address those counterexamples. More generally speaking(being Kantian you hopefully appreciate that)...

There are thoughts about words.

Where words have never been, there could not have ever been thoughts about words. All thoughts about words are existentially dependent upon words. We need words to think about in order for us to even be able to think about words. All such thought needs words.

......if language is assemblage of words, and words are the representations of conceptions, and language is the means of report in the form of expression or communication, then language presupposes the conceptions they represent, and on which is reported; — Mww

This is part of the problem as well.

Language is far more than merely "assemblages of words". Meaning comes immediately to mind. Not all assemblages of words are meaningful. All language use is. So, language takes a bit more than just an assemblage of words. Words are not inherently meaningful. Meaning is attributed.

We also use language to do far more than communicate and/or express pre-existing thought(which is the only use you've focused upon as of yet). I'm claiming that there are far more uses of language, some of which produce entirely new thought. Language use has introduced so many different kinds of thought that I find it very very odd that anyone could possibly disagree with claiming that many thoughts need language(are existentially dependent upon language).

......thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. If language presupposes conceptions, and conceptions are the form of cognitions, and cognition is thinking, then words presuppose thinking. — Mww

Our frameworks are quite different, as you well know. I mean, this is not our first exchange. However, generally speaking, although I reject your framework for all the different reasons I'm putting forth, I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking, if by that I mean that thought emerges prior to language. Well, to be more precise and consistent, some does anyway. Whereas certain other kinds of thought cannot for they are a product thereof.

Thoughts about what time it is cannot possibly exist(be formed) prior to the existence of clocks(a means of time telling, if you prefer). Clocks are themselves existentially dependent upon language in that they owe their very existence to language use. Thus, it only follows that wondering what time it is, even if unspoken, is one kind of thought that needs words, for it is about stuff that is itself existentially dependent upon words. Where there has never been a means of time telling, there could not have ever been thoughts about what time it was/is.

Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words.

If language is so all-fired necessary for the formation of complex thoughts, why did we come equipped with the means for the one, but only for the means of developing the other? Why did we not come equally equipped for both simultaneously, if one absolutely requires the other? — Mww

I have no idea why. That's a psychological question.

Seems to me that we come equipped with the capability to form both thought that needs language as well as thought that does not. Interesting that I've recently watched Chomsky stuff as well as other linguistics and neuroscientists, and they've claimed that the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years.

The robotics engineer manufactures a machine with pinpoint circuit board soldering accuracy; the toddler has somewhat less accuracy but still understands the distinction between thing-as-object and thing-as-receptor-of object, and the congruency of shape for both, to put a round object in a round hole. — Mww

Oh yeah...

It's fascinating to watch children at an age where their understanding of language use exceeds their mastery of speech. They invent totally "new" two word combinations like "more outside" while standing at a glass sliding door separating them from what they want; from being outdoors.

Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is.

So I come upon a thing, some thing for which I have absolutely no experience whatsoever. Maybe something fell to Earth, maybe I discovered something previously unknown in the deep blue. The modern argument seems to be......I can form no complex thoughts about that new thing, can have no immediate cognition of it, unless or until I can assign words to it. But, being new, which words do I assign if I don’t cognize what the new thing appears to be? What prevents me from calling the new thing by a name already given to an old thing?

And, of course, everything is new at one time or another. — Mww

You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway. Not all opinions are equal.

Let me explain then. You have provided examples of complex thought which uses words. These examples are insufficient to produce the inductive conclusion "complex thought needs words". You have provided no evidence whatsoever, that complex thought requires words, only evidence that some complex thought uses words. Therefore you do not have the premise required to conclude that this proposition "a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought" is false. You have provided no indication that complex thought needs words. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Using words" and "needing words" are not always the same thing. I am responding to a claim about complex thought not needing words. I provided a few examples of thoughts that need words, and seem to be complex thoughts. Such examples falsify the claim I objected to as it was written. A simple qualification of "some" would fix the issue.

A criterion of simple and complex thought is on order as well. I mean, if we aim to determine which candidates belong in which category, we need to know what the differences are between the two. I've yet to have seen anyone aside from myself attempt to even perform that task. I drew a distinction between thought that does not include words as content(part of correlation) and thought that does to make the point that some complex thought needs words.

All the nuance, of course, is packed up in both the aforementioned criterion for what counts as thought(simple and complex), as well as what it takes for a thought to "need words".

For whatever it's worth, I'm not at all against claiming that some complex thoughts need words whereas some do not. "Need", on my view, means existentially dependent upon. Furthermore, depending upon the content of the thought in question, some languageless creatures can have thoughts that need words although they do not use words. It's nuanced, but no issue if we have an adequate linguistic framework.

I never said that or otherwise...

The issue - to me - is what sorts of complex thoughts can be formed in the complete absence of language(without words). My objection was to the claim that "a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought." That claim is false as it is written. I gave examples of complex thoughts that most certainly do.

I think I shall remain content that a complex thought doesn’t need words any more than does a simple thought. I affirm that complex thoughts are indeed possible, but deny the necessity of language as the ground of their possibility. — Mww

On your view...

Are thoughts about the truth of a sentence considered complex thoughts? Thoughts about what's going to happen next Thursday? Thoughts about which words best describe meaningful experience? Thoughts about language use in general?

All those thoughts are impossible to form, have, and/or hold without words.

I'm curious though, does that elimination have consequences regarding whether the red leaves are directly or indirectly perceived?

P.S. For whatever it's worth, the indirect/direct dichotomy and/or debate is neither a necessary nor helpful tool for acquiring understanding of meaningful experience. It can be brushed aside, and ought on my view due to the inherent deficiencies in how they talk about experience itself.