...the past is the paradigmatic realm of truth, eternal and unchanging, while there is no truth about the future and for that reason no knowledge but only belief. — Srap Tasmaner

Strangely enough, I'm in complete agreement with you here. Belief about the future goes from prediction to knowledge when it becomes true, and from prediction to falsehood when it becomes false.

Anthropomorphism is, like many other human characteristics, on a spectrum from the inescapable to the egregious. — Janus

I agree that - in the overall bigger evolutionary picture - anthropomorphism was inescapable. I disagree that it remains so to this day.

It's in line with Dennett's view.

...If you believed that you had come to some understanding which you believed was completely free from any anthropomorphism whatever, how would you demonstrate that to be so? — Janus

Infallibility is unnecessary.

The belief you've attributed to me directly above is something I do not believe. Red herring. The belief you've attributed to me above does not follow from anything I've said. Non sequitur. The belief you've attributed to me above represents your misinterpretation of what I've written thus far. You'll just have to trust me when I say that somewhere along the line you've misattributed meaning to my parts of this exchange. I'm under no burden to demonstrate something I've not claimed.

It's worth mentioning to say that we need not be mistake free in order to know that anthropomorphism is a mistake. In fact, we had to have already been engaging in the personification of things that are not persons(anthropomorphism) in order to even become aware of the fact that we were.

Would there be a fact of the matter, or does it just come down to definitions or personal opinion?

Well... none of the above are adequate and all of the above are necessary in order for us to acquire knowledge of how thought and belief first emerges into the universe and later evolves into the rich and complex variety that we like to say that humans have. The evolutionary origen of thought and/or belief is not inaccessible to us. We need not know everything in order to know some things about that.

It's not as if knowledge of the differences between human thought and belief, non-human language users' thought and belief, and language-less creatures' thought and belief is something that it is impossible for us to understand. We have the tools, the knowledge base, and the potential to acquire such knowledge. I have seen no valid argument to the contrary.

Sometimes the best thing to do is to take a deep breath and go about figuring out exactly what it would take in order for humans to think in the ways that we do. We have to understand our own thought and belief in terms of its evolutionary progression prior to being able successfully discern between our own and other animals'.

Do you agree with all of the following?



1.)Anthropomorphism is when we attribute uniquely human kinds of thought and belief(those that are exclusively human) to things that are not.
2.)Some human thought and/or belief are exclusive to humans.
3.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures.
4.)Some human thought and/or belief are shared by other language using creatures and language less ones alike.

Three key bits of advice here.

First note you need to differentiate between the neurobiological awareness of animals and the language and culture expanded conciousness of humans. Awareness is biological. Self awareness is socially constructed. Knowing that should deflate a large part of the problem as it is the neurobiology that is the complicated bit.

Second, it will help to realise that awareness is not about a passive neural display - a representation of the world - that then requires some further mysterious witness. This is the dualistic Cartesian mistake. Awareness is a pragmatic and embodied modelling relation with the world. The brain exists to predict how the world could be in the light of actions that might be taken. It is an active engagement rather than a passive contemplation.

A third thing that could be added when it comes to getting started on the neurobiology is that neuroscientists prefer to talk about awareness in terms of its two critical levels of process - habit and attention. As part of the whole prediction-based design of the brain, it is set up to learn to process the world as automatically and “unconsciously” as possible. Attention only kicks in if the world doesn’t fit the predictions and the brain has to pause to generate some new predictive state that better explains the available evidence. — apokrisis

Very well put.

Not interested. Was curious to get your take on that quick down and dirty summary, but evidently you're not interested.

So be it. Be well.

Did you read the rest of that post? I generally do not align with Meta.

All our understandings are, strictly speaking, anthropomorphic, or human-shaped, because we are human; so, leaving aside any imputation of what should be understood to be exclusively human qualities and capacities to animals, I think the question of anthropomorphism is beside the point. Do you have anything substantive to add to that or disagreement to express? — Janus

I do not share your pessimism. It's not fait accompli, regardless of whether or not you poison the well. It does not follow from the fact that we are human that all our understandings are anthropomorphic. I sense a bit of chippiness from you. I added quite a bit of substantive examples to discuss earlier. You quoted the first statement of the post and ignored the rest. We can agree to disagree, but it would be far better for us to at least come to clear understanding of what the disagreement is about, and/or where it lies.

Animals without linguistic capabilities obviously do not think in linguistic terms, so presumably they think in sensorimotor ways; whereas we think in both sensorimotor and linguistic ways... — Janus

Well, that's a fine place to start. I agree. Although, the "think in sensorimotor ways" would be best fleshed out.

Some other animals - beside humans - do have language though, so drawing the line at language is not going to serve the purpose of drawing and maintaining the distinctions between thought and belief that is exclusively human in kind, thought and belief that could be had by other animals with language, and thought and belief that can be had by language less creatures.

Gettier is hard. It seems clear there is no general way to block Gettier cases, because whatever you come up with will generate a revenge case purpose built to block your solution. — Srap Tasmaner

Is it hard? Seems straight forward to me.

Gettier is attempting to take account of another's belief(granted, the other is a fiction borne of Gettier's own imagination, but nevertheless). Gettier invokes the rules of entailment in order for Smith to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket, and I will get the job" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job".

The point is that Gettier is talking about Smith's belief, not a naked proposition. With that in mind, because it is Smith's belief, "the man with ten coins in his pocket" refers to Smith and Smith alone. So, when someone else gets the job regardless of how many coins they have in their pocket, Smith's belief is false, because he did not get the job. Smith does not believe anyone other than himself will get the job.

The second case neglects the fact that Smith's belief is a complex one, and again fails to take that complexity into consideration due to treating the disjunction as a naked one. Smith only believes that either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, because he believes Jones owns a Ford. The disjunction is true because Brown is in Barcelona. Smith believes it's true because Jones owns a Ford. Smith's belief is false.

We need only to take notice that there is an accounting malpractice going on.

We proceed on the assumption that we can analyze "naked" propositions with no speaker; — Srap Tasmaner

As did Gettier when invoking entailment to go from "I have ten coins in my pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket".

Pretty sure that release was prior to the Mar-a-lago search. I just wondered if there was any conncection between Trump's penchant for stealing classified materials and that reporting.

Thanks. That's sounds like what I remember seeing only once mentioned, then forgotten.

No.

I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus

I suppose I could make the broader point now. Perhaps the reason you do not share my optimism regarding avoiding anthropomorphism is because you have difficulty yourself in understanding what sorts of thought and belief are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not. The notions of 'language capable beings' and 'linguistically mediated thought' only discriminate between language users and language less creatures, so, they are unhelpful for avoiding misattributing some of our thought and belief to other language using creatures. We see this often in nature shows.

I have no idea what you are trying to say. — Janus

Earlier I asked how you/we avoided anthropomorphism. You basically questioned whether or not we could. I claimed that we can in both principle and practice. You then said you did not share my optimism. Then...

I expressed that we understand the difference between thought and belief that is exclusive to humans and thought and belief that is not.

You then acted as if you had not disagreed with that, but you had, evidently unbeknownst to yourself, because you disagreed that we could avoid anthropomorphism. The problem(for you) is that if we can understand that much, then we can avoid anthropomorphism, for that is the key for doing so. That's how. If you agree with that then it ought be easy enough for you to realize that we can avoid anthropomorphism in both principle and practice. That's one of the things I am getting at.

Secondly, you invoked the notions of 'language capable beings' and 'linguistically mediated thoughts' in order to make a claim that you later judged as trivial/uninformative. You were arguing with yourself, because I never invoked those notions. In fact, neither can draw and maintain the distinction necessary to avoid anthropomorphism because some animals have language.

I've no idea.

There have been an extremely unusually high number of American agents murdered or missing since Trump left office.

Trump illegally took the kind of highly classified documents that deal with agent information like those agents to Mar-a-lago.

Is that a coincidence?

Not if those stolen documents directly pertain to those missing or murdered agents. Not if the classified information pertaining to those agents is missing.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this
— Janus

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism. — creativesoul

Do you not understand that understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not is how to avoid anthropomorphism?

The question you ask presupposes that I meant something other than what I wrote. I did not. What I wrote is plainly understood exactly as it is written. Do you not understand it as it's written?

Yes, of course we can say that only language capable beings can have linguistically mediated thoughts. It's analytically and trivially (insofar as it doesn't really tell us anything) true. — Janus

Which ought tell you something. That's not something I would or have said, nor does it follow from anything I would or have said.

The sheer number of agents who were working with American government and have come up either missing or murdered since Trump left office hasn't been openly considered in the public domain. I wonder if there are any connected dots between those abnormalities and Mar-a-lago?

You can take a further step and claim that there is nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than people who hold the belief that it is honestly expressing that belief by saying, or being disposed to say, "The book is in Michael's room."

Now what does this mean, that there is "nothing more to it"? That suggests there is a biconditional that looks like this: — Srap Tasmaner

That just seems way too convoluted and theory laden...

Seems to me like there's nothing more to the book being in Michael's room than the book, the room, and the spatial relation between the two.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.
— creativesoul

You seem to think I have disagreed with this — Janus

That's how to avoid anthropomorphism.

The notions of 'linguistically mediated thought' and 'language capable beings' don't - ahem - can't.

Seems to me that we're perfectly capable of understanding what sorts of thoughts are exclusive to humans and what sorts are not.

It would make no sense to say that a parrot danced as a way of showing its appreciation for the aesthetic beauty of a particular song unless it had personal taste regarding music. It would make no sense to say that my cat is jealous of the way my other cat looks unless she had a beauty standard for her to even be bitter about because it is one that she feels she has failed to meet whereas she feels her roommate has succeeded.

The gecko on my outdoor table was not thankful to me for leaving bits of butter mochi and juice for it - and could not possibly be - without having a meaningful sense of gratitude. The pheasants in my yard cannot respect the individuality of each other simply for the sake of doing so unless they have some socially derived moral/ethical sense of respecting the individuality of others simply for the sake of doing so. The male peacock does not have all his hopes and dreams wrapped up in successfully 'courting' females unless he has thought and belief(hopes and dreams) about what has yet to have happened(the future).

In principle, thoughts exclusive to humans would be(consist of) correlations including written language use. In practice, we do not attribute such thought to non human creatures.

Since it is always we who imagine or posit this or that about what we think or imagine animals might experience, can we avoid anthropomorphism? — Janus

I think we can in both principle and practice.

It takes knowledge of what the difference is between language less creatures' belief and language users'. We need a standard for what language less animals can and/or cannot think and/ believe. One thing is certain; language use is the key for establishing what they cannot.

How do we(or you) avoid anthropomorphism?

You seem to be suggesting that you can't create a bowl without a language. I'm sure that pre-linguistic man created bowls of some sort, or maybe you're referring to a particular kind of bowl, say plastic bowls. Even if you're right, it seems like a stretch to the conclude that because a thing (maybe stove is more appropriate), is created by language users, that the cat's belief is dependent upon language. — Sam26

It's all about the content of the belief Sam. I think you would agree that believing a mouse is under the stove depends upon the prior existence of a mouse, a stove, and the spatiotemporal relationship between the two from the vantage point of the believing creature(regardless of whether or not the creature has language). There may be other elements as well, but for simplicity's sake alone, we can just focus upon those main elements of this particular belief. The belief is existentially dependent upon all of those elements. All stoves are existentially dependent upon language. All belief involving stoves must be as well.

When I use the phrase "dependent upon language," I'm referring to the use of concepts as part of a statement of belief. So, the cat is not dependent upon language in this sense.

The cat is not dependent upon language. We certainly agree there. I completely agree that cats do not use linguistic concepts. However, they can and do directly perceive some things that emerged into the world by virtue of our use of linguistic concepts; stoves and sofas are precisely such things. All belief about such things is existentially dependent upon those things. Those things are existentially dependent upon language. All belief about those things is existentially dependent upon language.

You're adding another sense of "dependent upon language" that doesn't involve the direct use of concepts, which seems to be an indirect dependence. Am I understanding your point, or not? Mostly I'm talking about concepts, in particular the concept truth. The difference maybe in our focus.

I do not think that I'm adding another sense of "dependent upon language" - as in a completely different sense - so much as expanding the sense you've put to use here in such a way that it includes spatiotemporal considerations pertaining to the direct dependence upon language use that some things require for their initial emergence. I mentioned earlier to someone here how I thought that logic's lack of spatiotemporal consideration was a fundamental flaw. The approach I use includes keeping spatiotemporal considerations in mind. I see no other way to arrive at a scientifically and philosophically respectable position regarding how belief emerges and subsequently evolves given time and mutation. This ties into truth and meaning both, because it is via thought and belief formation that both truth and meaning first emerge onto the world stage(that's a topic in it's own right).

That being said, you're right to take note of the difference, because to the best of my knowledge, it is unique.

This ought help you to understand my use of "existential dependency".

I'm just saying what we all know; that we know, in the most basic sense, pre-linguistic sensory experience, which our language cannot capture without losing its living quality and distorting it into a world of fixed entities and facts; which, in other words our language cannot adequately capture even though it can express linguistic truths and falsities which pertain to that collective representational schema we call the world.

To say otherwise would be to claim that animals do not experience anything at all. — Janus

That first sentence is very long, but the more I read it over, the more it looks like a partially formed incomplete thought. Be that as it may, I've thought long and hard about what you've been saying and I think, but I'm not at all certain of it, that you seem to be claiming - roughly mind you - that language doesn't do any justice(so to speak) to language less creatures experiences. You seem to also want to say that it cannot, despite our being able to use it to make true claims about our shared world, which you call "that collective representational schema".

The last sentence clearly suggests that we only have two choices when it comes to talking about the thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience of language less creatures. We can either hold the view that you hold or claim that language less creatures do not have any experience at all.

That's not true.

The approach one takes towards setting out the meaningful experience of language less creatures is pivotal to one's understanding, assuming one maintains coherency by avoiding self-contradiction and/or equivocation. Different approaches often lead to different consequences. Our respective approaches are remarkably different. Being a charitable reader, the one you've employed/adopted leads you to believe that language cannot capture the meaningful experience of language less creatures.

Whereas my approach leads me to first question what it takes to 'capture' the meaningful experience of language less creatures. What are we expecting to be able to do with language? Language cannot reproduce meaningful experience. We're just offering reports and/or accounts of meaningful experience. We're not attempting to accurately reproduce each and every aspect of meaningful experience in our report/account of it.

Perhaps you would find it helpful to adjust your expectations regarding what we can do with language.

One consideration worth mentioning...

An overlap happens between language less creatures' belief and belief of language users. The overlap could be rendered as a Venn diagram with the commonalities being directly perceptible things. Trees, sofas, stoves, fridges, mice, and spatiotemporal relationships, for instance, are directly perceptible things within the aforementioned overlap. This overlap could be talked about in terms of the world shared between cats, mice, and humans.

There is, as a kind of ground to all our propositions, truths and facts, a pre-linguistic actuality to which they must submit. Analysis and conceptualization cannot gain purchase on that actuality, because to do so is to bring it into the linguistic domain, and there all we have purchase on is our communal perceptions and conceptions of what is the case, — Janus

The "pre-linguistic actuality" I have in mind is our basic experience of images, smells, sensations and impressions as well as recognition of repetition and pattern. — Janus

In the bottom quote above you are doing what you said we could not do in the top quote. In addition, we've also arrived at incoherency/self-contradiction by virtue of equivocating the notion of "pre-linguistic actuality". The top quote sets it out one way. The bottom another.

It is very hard to talk about the subject matter at hand when we do not avoid such results and/or situations. I think we can nix the notion of "pre-linguistic actuality" altogether and by doing so, increase clarity while losing nothing. While "pre-linguistic" seems potentially useful, "actuality" does not.

I think we agree that a cat's belief that a mouse is under the sofa includes a mouse, the sofa, and a spatiotemporal relationship between the two from the cat's vantage point... right?

Things such as the tree being, say, 11m tall, will be true regardless of their being stated. — Banno

Only after we first stipulated what counted as eleven meters. Not before. The fact that the tree is eleven meters tall is existentially dependent upon language. The fact that the mouse is behind the tree is not.

The tree we are talking about is outside of language? — Banno

We may be talking about different trees. The one in my front yard is most certainly outside of language.

The term "tree" consists of meaningful marks. The term "tree" is not outside of language. What I'm picking out of the world to the exclusion of all else by using that term most certainly is.

Some facts involving trees are existentially dependent upon language. All statements about trees are.

One issue here is what a "linguistic fact" is, so that we can understand what a "nonlinguistic fact" is.

It seems to me that it doesn't make sense to say that (1) is a linguistic fact. If someone thingks it does, then it is up tot hem to provide some account. — Banno

I'm not defending that use of "linguistic fact" or "non-linguistic" fact.

All kettles were, are, and will forever remain to be, existentially dependent upon language. If they were planned originals, then all meaningful marks involving kettles emerged in the planning and fabrication of the first kettles, as well as accounting practices of kettles thereafter. If they were accidental originals having resulted from ingenious on the spot novelty of use, then all meaningful marks involving kettles emerged after the original kettle.

Statements involving kettles. Situations involving kettles. Circumstances involving kettles. Belief involving kettles. Knowledge involving kettles. Everything involving kettles came immediately prior to, during, and/or after the first kettle emerged into the world.

All facts involving kettles are existentially dependent upon language.

1. The kettle is boiling
2. "The kettle is boiling"
3. "The kettle is boiling" is true
4. '"The kettle is boiling" is true'
5. '"The kettle is boiling is true' is true

Previously I've felt obliged to explain that 1, 3 and 5 in this list are facts.

Arguably, since they are directly about sentences and not about kettles, 3 and 5 might be called linguistic facts. But on that criteria, 1 is directly about kettles, not sentences. — Banno

Makes sense to me thus far...

There are, it seems, folk who think that we need an item 0 in this list, a state of affairs or an exterior thing in itself, outside of language or perception or belief or some other; and that it is this item 0 that is the fact, which is represented (or some such...) in item 1.

The tree is outside of language, perception, and belief is it not?

A kettle? Not so much.

Obviously linguistics played a part in the stove's creation, but the fact that stove exists, is just like any other fact of existence for the cat, and the cat's belief. What if we removed all humans from existence, but there still existed stoves, would there still be an overlap between the cat's belief and language? What if someone created a stove, ceased to exist, then cats came into existence later, would you still say that the cat's belief overlapped language? I don't see any reason to think that the cat's belief has a linguistic component simply because some language user created the stove. The stove is just another fact of reality, like a tree or the moon... — Sam26

Hey Sam, sorry about the delay. Doctor visit.

I think we agree much more than the above seems to suggest. Could you re-read that post and tell me at what point exactly you begin to disagree?

Just to be clear, I haven't posited an "actual world"; I've talked about the distinction between experienced actuality, meaning actual experience, which I'm saying is of images, sensations, impressions, and the world, which I'm saying is the idea of the totality of things, facts and relations that we think gives rise to actual experience. — Janus

There is, as a kind of ground to all our propositions, truths and facts, a pre-linguistic actuality to which they must submit. Analysis and conceptualization cannot gain purchase on that actuality, — Janus

That's the bit directly above that seems to be untenable in the same way that Kant's Noumena is.

The object that the concept refers to is not dependent on language... — Sam26

When and where there has never been language there could have never been stoves.

That sums up the difference between our views it seems. The object that "stove" refers to is existentially dependent upon language on my view, but not yours.

Understood. I do strive for agreement with myself though.

:wink:

Indeed. Gives me time to do this though! lol. Cannot move around as usual, otherwise I would not be doing this. There are more real life results based things I would be doing if I could.

It's like an itch that won't go away — Sam26

Like the shingles virus that I'm currently suffering from...

:yikes: