Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former…..
— creativesoul

To would seem impossible — Mww

A problem.

also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency.
— creativesoul

……and I’m good with calling those correlations. — Mww

A nice clear point of disagreement.

...our brain gained an ability that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. We couldn't ever know the series of mutations, and what each one gave us. — Patterner

The detail of mutations remains unclear. What makes a mutation... a mutation?

The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.

Other animals cannot do that.
— creativesoul
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then.
— Patterner

"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means, but evolution demands survival advantages. Different species have different perceptual machinery. Direct perception in the sense of completely void of abstraction. — creativesoul

I take issue with taking certain kinds of leaps. "Increase" works well. Very very slow increments.

"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means
— creativesoul
Some animals eat what they can find.
Some animals can use a tool, if they find a good one, to help them get food.
Some animals can make a tool to help them get food.
Some animals can use tools and plan a couple steps ahead to get food.

Seems like increasing abilities to me. — Patterner

Yup.

The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.

Other animals cannot do that.
— creativesoul
Right. But millions of years ago, our brains took a leap that no other species has yet taken. We were one of many species that had some limited degree of language, or representation, abilities. Presumably, various other species have evolved greater abilities since then. — Patterner

"Greater" abilities??? I'm not sure what that means, but evolution demands survival advantages. Different species have different perceptual machinery. Direct perception in the sense of completely void of abstraction.

(Maybe whatever species today has these abilities to the least degree is the baseline that all started at. Although even it may have evolved from the barest minimum degree of such abilities.) But our brain gained an ability that was either enough for us to get where we are now by learning and adding to our learning, or that subsequent mutations were able to build upon. It allowed us greater language, and our greater language helped develop our brain. Now we think about things, and kind of things, nothing else thinks about.

I wouldn't disagree with that or what I think it means. It could use a healthy unpacking.

A question that comes to mind...

Do all thought and belief share a set of common elements, such that they are the exact same 'thing' at their core?

I think so.

Correlations drawn between different things by a creature so capable. All thought, belief, and statements thereof consist of correlations. Some correlations include language use(are drawn between language use and other things. Other correlations are drawn between things that do not include language use.

All thought and belief are meaningful to the creature capable of forming, having, and/or holding them. Some correlations are drawn by language less creatures. Some of those correlations attribute/recognize causality(causal relationships). Some of those thought and belief can be true/false.

Either truth and meaning exist in their entirety prior to language or true and false belief exists without meaning and/or truth.

Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof. — Mww

:smile:

If the statue is clay, then there is another relationship between them... also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency.

:wink:

All experience presupposes space and time. On that we are in full agreement. I'm good with calling that intuition...

Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences.
— creativesoul

All logic is consequential: if this then that. For a logical system, if this then that and from that something else follows. — Mww

Okay. It's the quality of the consequences that are in contention.

The implication from your comment is that my logic has consequences it shouldn’t.

Well, that's one possible implication/meaning of that comment. I'm less concerned about whether or not it shouldn't disagree with everyday observable fact, and much more concerned that it does.

Be that as it may, I’m ok with my pickle being the consequences of my logic, as long as nothing demonstrates its contradiction with itself or empirical conditions, which is all that could be asked of it.

We can watch some creatures learn how to use tools for specific purposes even though they have no ability to think about their own thought and belief. Either using tools is something that can be done by a mindless creature(a creature completely absent of thought and belief), or not only humans are rational creatures. Your position forces you to explain the former. Mine dovetails with the latter.

I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.
— creativesoul
I'm waiting on the platform for the 5 pm train; it is 4.58; I expect (believe) that the train will arrive shortly. It doesn't. I am disappointed. Is it correct to say that I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false? — Ludwig V

If and only if the train does not arrive shortly, and you isolate your own belief to the exclusion of all else, and you practice thinking and talking about them as a subject matters in their own right would it then be "correct" for you to say that-------> "I now recognize that my belief that the train will arrive shortly is false?"

It is correct to say that that constitutes a belief about a belief?

Sure. Yours.

Why would it be incorrect to substitute "the dog" for "I" in that story?

The dog is incapable of isolating its own thought/belief to the exclusion of all else. Dog's do not have a means to isolate their own thought and belief and further consider them as subject matters in their own right as a means to compare them to fact. That comparison facilitates the recognition of true and false belief.

I think you would reply that it is incorrect because the dog is unable to speak English.

A dog's inability to become aware of its own fallibility is due to not possessing the capacity/capability to isolate their own thoughts and beliefs. Realizing/recognizing that one's belief is false, in this case, happens when reality does not meet/match expectations and we're aware of that.

English is our means but given that it is not the only naming and descriptive practice, it is not the specific language that matters here. It's more about the ability to think about one's own prior thoughts and/or beliefs as subject matters in their own right.

When someone tries to find some respect in which humans differ from animals, what I hear is a desire to pretend that they are not an animal. But they eat and sleep and do all those animal things. How are they not animals - admittedly an animal with over-developed capacities? But that doesn't change the foundation.
— Ludwig V
Absolutely true in all respects. But I see the opposite. I see people denying there is anything different about us. As though any animal is capable of being educated and made able to build a skyscraper, build the NYC skyline, develop calculus, write string quartets, build the internet, and have these same conversations. Despite being very similar in almost all ways, we can think in ways no animal can. The proof is, literally, everywhere we look. — Patterner

The difficulty is setting out the ways we're similar, and the ways we're unique. Our own thinking is bolstered by our own complex language use and all that that facilitates. Naming and descriptive practices are key. They pervade our thinking. They allow us to reflect upon our own experiences in a manner that is much more than just remembering.

Other animals cannot do that.

:lol:

Yup. A bit before my time, but sounds like an effective ad.

Nicholas? Who's that?

:razz:

I eat them a variety of ways. Some pickleless, but just pickles and mustard suits me at times.

How are the clay and the statue related? — frank

By minds.

I do not believe in facts nor do I believe in good or bad. I do not believe that we truly know anything. — Plex

So... then are you saying that it's not bad to smack an old lady in the head with a shovel, or to kick puppies, or to knowingly and deliberately cause unnecessary harm?

Do you know that you do not believe in good and bad?

Nothing is certain, — Plex

Including this?

Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right.
— creativesoul
I only read their actions. You read their minds... — Vera Mont

Not quite. Rather, I take account of how meaningful thought, belief, and experience emerges, what it consists of, what that requires, and I apply that along with current scientific knowledge to any particular candidate under consideration.

We need not read another's mind in order to know how minds work.

Much of what you've been offering is quite agreeable. It seems that you may think some of that contradicts what I'm saying when it actually supports it.

I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in.
— creativesoul

I’m guessing anyone thinking deeply enough about stuff he doesn’t know, gets himself into a pickle of some sort or another, sooner or later. — Mww

Well, I would concur that no one has been picklefree. :wink:

Seems your pickle is one of logical consequences. I have no issue with the 'problem' of other minds. I have no issue with knowledge about mindless conditions. I have no problem admitting and explaining the minds of language less creatures/non human creatures. I have no problem drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.

Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.
— creativesoul
I did include a citation about biological clocks. I don't see how that presupposes or requires 'thinking about own previous thought and belief'. Yet another caveat added in order to exclude other species. — Vera Mont

Biological clocks? I'll have to look closer. I suspect there's some equivocation going on here. Clocks do not keep time in the sense we're discussing. Clocks have no thought/belief. Time keeping requires that. We use clocks to keep time. Clocks do not use themselves to keep time.

As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices.
— creativesoul
From what can you tell that? Stonehenge? Obelisks? Athens' Tower of the Winds? They don't say much, except that humans have been keeping public time since the beginning of civilization. those practices may have been named and described. — Vera Mont

So... we agree here then.

Before that, humans had to depend on our own sense of when to wake, when to eat, when to move to the summer camp, when to hunt, when to preserve food for the winter. Whether anyone named that or not, we don't know.

There may be a conflation between our reports of animal thought/behavior, and the animal's thought.

Dogs are always in the moment and unreflective.
— creativesoul
Now, there is a bald, naked, unsupported statement.
you can have it. I'm done here. — Vera Mont

I've given several arguments replete with definitions/criteria in support of what I've claimed. I'm often too verbose, but it could be boiled down to a few simple arguments.

The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events.
— creativesoul
Surely this proves too much. It proves that the dog cannot act purposively. — Ludwig V

I don't see how. There is no need to think about one's own beliefs about future events in order to have beliefs about future events.

Opening a gate is possible by observation...
— Mww

No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be?
— creativesoul

Exactly, insofar as it is implicitly self-contradictory, hence altogether impossible, for a minded creature to comprehend a mindless condition. — Mww

According to your linguistic framework, perhaps. Not mine.

Comprehension by a higher intellect of a lesser animal’s behavior, which to an investigator of it is mere experience, was never the problem. — Mww

Who said it was?

To attribute to them a mind of some sort, sufficient for inciting that behavior, but without any means to prove THAT is the sort of mind they actually possess, from which arises causal necessity, or, without any means to prove they have any mind of any sort at all, when his only provision for it is his own experience, is certainly a problem. — Mww

Not mine.

To which the common rejoinder is….well, crap on a cracker, dude….how else could a dog, e.g., ever open a gate, if they didn’t do this or that first, which, in truth, is tacit admission that he could not possibly comprehend how that creature does anything at all, unless he supposes it to be enough like him that he could comprehend it, which immediately negates the possibility such lesser creature could manifest its behaviors by some means completely foreign to him. And that carries the implication he could comprehend the lesser creature’s behavioral causality iff he knew what it was.

But, where such investigator is human, he doesn’t. He can’t; he does not even know his own. He guesses his own, it works for him, the dog performs the same act therefore must be accredited with the same guesswork insofar as it apparently works for him too.

While this scenario may be good enough for sociologists, psychologists and lawyers, it is far and away “…beneath the dignity of proper philosophy….”
—————

I do not see how that gets you out of the pickle you're in.

Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate.
— creativesoul
It's not all that hairless: — Vera Mont

I cannot help but to laugh. This smacks of irony. Assertions have no hair. "Bald assertions" are what we call exclamations that assume precisely what's in question regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by cogent argument. They're bald because they're unaccompanied.

They are bald, not necessarily due to being unjustifiable, but rather for not having been argued for, yet. It's possible, I suppose, that your position rests upon some solid ground.

Do you have a cogent argument for how it becomes the case that any creature could begin thinking about their own previous thought and belief? All timekeeping presupposes that.

As best we can tell, time keeping practices were existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. There is a difference between knowing what time I expect someone to arrive and knowing someone has. The latter is 'fully' in the moment. The former is existentially dependent upon having already been so. Dogs are always in the moment and unreflective. I've known some superbly expressive ones replete with wonderful temperament. Some have been absolutely amazing. Astounding even. Yet they remain creatures that cannot think about their own thoughts and beliefs, because they have no way of picking them out of this world to the exclusion of all else.

Knowing about one's own expectation requires having them. Having expectation does not require knowing that one does. The dog has expectations. Knowing what time one is expected to arrive is knowing about one's own thought and belief. Dogs do not.

When we think about what time we expect an arrival, we pick out the time.

Knowing someone has arrived is not knowing what time an arrival is expected. The latter is a metacognitive endeavor. The former is not. The former is about the one arriving. The latter is about the time. The dog doesn't think about its own thought and belief. The dog doesn't think about the time. The dog thinks about the one(s) arriving. Expectation is belief about future events.

The dog can acquire an anticipatory demeanor by virtue of correlations they draw between different things. These things could be called common elements of past ritual. Sounds. Sights. Tastes. Smells. Regularly occurring events. Becoming part of a routine requires the passage of time. It does not require knowing about the fact that one is part of a routine. The dog can think/believe that their human is about to arrive because the arrival has been well practiced.

The dog doesn't think about its own expectation. Expectation is belief about future events.

To think about one's own expectations, one must first have thought and/or belief, for there must be first something to think about, and a way of thinking about it. Then, and only then, can a capable creature begin to think about their own expectations. Dogs don't do that.

All expectation consists of belief about future events.

How far off into the future one contemplates is determined strictly speaking solely by virtue of one's time keeping practices. The dog doesn't look forward to Thursday, for it has no clue about which days are. No clue whatsoever. Thursdays can be very special days for the dog, but not to... the dog.

Avoiding anthropomorphism requires knowing what sorts of things are meaningful and how they become so... to ourselves and any other creatures capable of forming, having, and/or holding meaningful thought and/or belief. Knowing how things become meaningful is knowledge of paramount importance.

It allows us to know that the dog has no clue, no thought, no belief - whatsoever - about what time they expect someone to arrive. Their expectations are not arranged by them in timely fashion or manner.

The dog practices timekeeping in exactly the same way humans did before the invention of clocks — Vera Mont

Oh gosh. That is in dire need of argumentative support. I have no reason to believe that that's true, as written. Bald assertion is inadequate. Bald assertion conflicting with known relevant facts is completely unacceptable.

I want you to think about that for a few minutes. Humans charted stars, planned voyages, recorded seasons and all sorts of other things long before inventing clocks. We were drawing correlations between weather patterns and their own lives long before anyone figured out how to make mechanical gears with the 'perfect' number of teeth for our purposes.

Planning routines, instead of just being a part of them, is a time keeping practice. Dogs don't do that.

Dogs can be taught to wake up humans at a certain time. When this or that happens. That's not timekeeping. That's behaving as one is taught to behave. It's rational. It involves an unconscious autonomous sense of time. Waking up someone at the right time is rational.

Dogs do not think about their own expectations as a subject matter in their own right. When we think about what time we're expecting a loved one, stranger, friend, foe, and/or family member to arrive we're thinking about our own thought and belief. We're isolating our own expectations by virtue of naming and descriptive practices. That is to think about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires first having them, then becoming capable of isolating them as a subject matter in their own right.

Dogs cannot do that.

Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?
— creativesoul

Opening a gate is possible by observation... — Mww

No thought? No belief? No expectation? What, on earth, could mindless observation be? What is it to observe something that one does not believe is there?

Knowing others open gates is something that plenty of other creatures are capable of acquiring. This allows the creature to carefully watch. This shows innate interest. Curiosity. We can most certainlly watch that happen, in the right sorts of circumstances given the right sorts of creatures.

The subject is involved in a series of events. The subjects under consideration do not know that they are part of a routine. They do not know that they are participating in ritual. In order to see oneself as a subject matter in and of itself, one must be capable of drawing a distinction between themself and their own life. Doing that, at a bare minimum, requires naming and descriptive practices.

...but It is impossible to say apodeitically whether a creature incapable of thinking learns anything, whether by observation or otherwise. — Mww

Is it?

Thoughtless learning? Belief less learning? Learning without meaningful connections? Learning how to open a gate... without believing they can... without thinking about it... without drawing correlations between opening the gate and getting out?

Learning how to open a gate always includes a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. Dogs can want to reach the other side of a gate. They can know it's possible by watching it happen. They can want to get out, watch others doing so, and learn how to do it themselves, and then... they do so.

Performing a task grounded in observation alone could be mere mimicry, which does not necessarily support what it is to learn.

Not sure if that ever a bad thing, in this context. We're talking about what counts as thinking... and then, what counts as rational thinking

Some mimicry is learning how to behave(in the sense of learning what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behavior). Other mimicry isn't.

Learning how to open a gate by watching others do it results in a practically pure form of mimicry. Doing exactly what needs to be done in order to open the gate. The necessity of thought and belief seems apparent enough now, right? The dog wants to open the gate.

The striking singular difference between human minds and most(arguably all) other minds is that humans draw and maintain the meaningful distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. Our own thought and belief(along with meaning, truth, and falsehood) are only discovered via language use. Other animals cannot think about their own thought and belief as a subject matter in its own right. Hence, they have no idea how to tell the difference between their own true and false beliefs. They cannot take account of them unless they pick them out of the world to the exclusion of all else. That cannot be done without naming and descriptive practices.

Learning how to open a gate is rational behavior practiced by a thoughtful creature. Not all gate openers know that they just learned how to open a gate. Zeke didn't think about the fact that he was opening a gate. He just opened it. Zeke was an old dog of mine, and dogs that are opening gates are an elementary constituent part/element of the gate opening facts/events, as they happen. Dogs do not take account of themselves and everything happening around them as it happens. They know what's happening sometimes, but they do not think about their knowledge of that. They think about what they're doing, what they're in the middle of. They think about distal objects and themselves. They think by virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things.

The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
— creativesoul
Because he doesn't know the names humans have artificially given the hours and minutes of the day. Okay. — Vera Mont

Are you having a conversation by yourself, for yourself, and to yourself?

"Okay." ???

No, the dog knows when their human is about to arrive but has no clue what time the arrival happens because the dog doesn't practice timekeeping. You neglect some very important distinctions. That much has become clear.

Dogs do not have that.
— creativesoul
I wonder how you know this... — Vera Mont

I know other things, and "this" follows from those things.

I wanted to mention something prior to retiring for the night.

When I said "language less" I meant without naming and descriptive practices. There is no clear lines to be drawn between language less creatures and our pets, for they are not language less. Not at all, actually. There's good reason domestication changes animals drastically, aside from the shrinking of the gene pool which is the function of the aim of breeding for specific traits.

There's overlap between language less animals and us. Our pets.

This overlap matters here, in these sorts of discussions, for not all dogs and cats and birds have drawn correlations between our language use and other things. Some have. Pets are socialized by us with us. It matters. Language has helped, as best I can tell, in helping to provide better means for pets to become rational to a greater extent than their cousins.

an argument against naturalism. — wonderer1

God made no such thing...

:razz:

Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.

The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief. — creativesoul

Knowing what time the human is expected is knowledge about one's own expectations. Dogs do not have that.

What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday. — creativesoul

The same applies to the five o'clock train.

I don't know how to disengage without seeming rude. — Vera Mont

I wouldn't take it as rude. Asking for clarity may help you to understand, should you want to.

Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.
— creativesoul
I just don't follow the distinction here — Vera Mont

Read the next bits.

You know I'm not going to be goaded into that mess.

:wink:

Is learning how to open a gate or door by observation alone possible by a creature completely incapable of thinking?

But, I emphasize, the description of an action provided by the agent in language may be an important criterion for us, but it is not decisive in all circumstances. — Ludwig V

I would concur.

The agent may be lying or misrepresenting the action for various purposes. — Ludwig V

Sure.

Or the agent may not be recognizing how we might see it - what is just banter to the agent, may be a serious slur to us. — Ludwig V

Yes. Interpretation is a very interesting process. It is entwined with understanding. When someone draws the same correlations between the language use that we do, they interpret correctly, and... understand us.

Which reminds me that I ought check with the readers more often than I do. Always appreciate your 'tone', by the way. Model. Thank you.

It is even possible that the agent may be wrong - deceiving themselves. — Ludwig V

Sure. I'm not fond of 'self-deception' but that's an aside having to do with the inability to tell oneself that they believe something that they do not, or vice versa.

Trauma is another matter altogether. Coping mechanisms and all that.

Hmmm, this isn't the place for it, but there seems to be a remarkable difference between how we treat "meaning". I'm nihilistic, as mentioned heretofore. Where there is no creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, there can be no meaning. When something is meaningful, it is always meaningful to a creature capable of attributing such.

I say that not to argue, compare, or nitpick, but rather to offer you a bit of argumentative ground for the position I'm arguing from/for. Perhaps it will help you to understand where I'm coming from, so to speak.

:smile:

Jeez! You guys get a room, will ya?

Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way.
— creativesoul
Of that specific cluster of behaviours at that same time every weekday, but not on weekends or holidays? Show me three of that multitude of accurate explanations. — Vera Mont

The dog believes that the human will be arriving soon. The dog does not recognize the sound of it's human's car. The dog, after being reminded of past events - by virtue of being amidst much the same spatiotemporal events - begins to form, have, and/or hold expectation that the human will be there. In doing so the dog begins getting anticipatory excitement in a happy sort of way due to the lifelong loving connection the dog and human have.

I'm not saying that the dog's behavior is not rational. I would say that it most certainly is.

I'm questioning which things it makes the most sense to say that the dog is experiencing: Which sorts of thoughts and beliefs dogs can form, have, and/or hold.

Being hopeful does not belong in that grouping.

Holding some kinds of expectation does. Anticipation does. All hopefulness is anticipatory. All hopefulness involves expectation, but not all anticipation is hopefulness, and not all expectation is hopefulness. There is a difference, and that difference is key here.

What is hoping that something will happen without knowing that it may not? You see what I'm getting at? Dogs are not aware of their own fallibility. We are. It is only after becoming aware of the fact that we can be wrong about stuff, that we can become hopeful - in the face of that uncertainty. Compared/contrast that with autonomous anticipation and/or expectation without such metacognitive reservation.

Anthropomorphism looms large.
— creativesoul
And terrifying! Why? — Vera Mont

This mistakenly presupposes that you are somehow privy to my fear(s)?

:yikes:


Attributing things that are exclusively human to that which is not is something many do. I myself have been guilty of it. However, it is not at all 'terrifying' in-so-much-as just being completely unacceptable. It is akin to holding false belief. It is a mistake. I try to avoid those.

Similarity and commonality are not diseases; they're a natural result of sharing a planet and a history. — Vera Mont

Of course similarity and commonality are not diseases. The irony. Those are a large part of the foundation of my own worldview/position. Your replies apply to someone who does not agree on that.

It's becoming apparent that there is some misunderstanding at hand.

A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes.
— creativesoul
You're overcomplicating something simple. A biological clock: so much time has elapsed; at this interval, something is supposed to happen. — Vera Mont

Yeah. :brow: No.

What you're claiming is simple is not. The above can be true, and the claim in question... false. I'm not denying the above. What I am denying is not nearly so simple as that.

Changing goalposts is generally frowned upon too.

No. Knowing what time a particular person is expected to arrive is to pick that time out from the rest. The dog does not do that. The dog knows when the human is about to arrive, and it is perfectly rational in doing so... but it does not know what time the human is expected to arrive.

The expectation belongs to the dog. Dogs are not capable of thinking about their own thought and belief.

The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train.
— creativesou
And that's not rational, because....? — Vera Mont

It is rational. The irony, once again. You're quoting my argument for how and/or why it is rational.

Jeez!

:worry:

Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday.
— creativesoul
No. Because it's the first day of a new work-week. Early rising (possibly with hangover) (possibly lover departing), rigid morning routine, uncomfortable clothing, commute, staff meeting, unpleasant colleague regaling you with their spectacular weekend adventures, bossy department head dumping unwanted task on your desk.... Some people who enjoy their work actually look forward to Mondays; most people don't enjoy their work. Pity!

No?

So now you're going to deny what my coworkers have said when I asked? Sure, some may dread Monday for the reasons listed above. Others just dread Monday because it's a day to be dreaded. That's not all that uncommon. They wake up with negativity teeming, because it's Monday and they're convinced that Monday is the worst day. When asked, some replies have been...

"No reason, really. It's just a Monday, ya know?"

"It's Monday", accompanied by a perplexed look - like I should already know that. :brow: Some people have very strange belief systems.

Arrrgh, feels like a Monday, doesn't it?"

Etc.

There's another relevant issue here. The tactic you're using can be used against the anthropomorphic claims you've made. We can continue to say stuff like, "No. Not because it's the first day of the workweek, but because they do not like work at all."

Whatever.

Many say they dread Mondays because they believe Mondays are the worst days. What you've added and/or said here does not deny that, despite your insistence that you're answering in the negative. Rather, your extrapolation adds further support for why they dread Mondays.

What's in question is whether or not dogs can look forward to Thursdays despite having no knowledge whatsoever that any given day of their life is a Thursday.

To the dog, the train means the human.
— creativesoul
No other train, just the five o'clock local.
But never mind, I have lots of other examples you can explain away.

We could change what we call the train. It would no longer be the five o'clock train is we did so. Would the dog notice? Perhaps it's best put like this: "The five o'clock train" is the way we pick that train out from all others. It is not the way the dog does. The time the train comes makes no difference at all to that dog. What mattered was that train was connected to the human, not what chronological order it was in. Other humans arrive at other times. Their dogs know nothing at all about what time counts as five o'clock or four or two or whatever. The chronological time makes no difference to the dog. What matters is the human connected to the train... regardless of what time it arrives on our clocks.

Yes, dogs have a sense of time. Yes, dogs can develop timely routines. Yes, that consistency can become ritualistic. Ritual shared between species. Bonding. Yes, these can involve the train we call "the five o'clock train".

Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.

In my book, as you know, it's correlations.

Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
— creativesoul

I think I mostly agree with you. — Ludwig V

Sweet. Much obliged.

Perhaps another issue worth considering in this thread is, do animals think critically? — wonderer1

I do not see how that could be possible. Critical thinking is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognitive endeavors require naming and descriptive practices.

Here, you've veered into what we are doing with the word "rational". I'm more inclined to critically examining whether or not any single notion of "rational" is capable of admitting that language less animals are capable of learning how to open gates, open doors, make and use tools for specific purposes, etc.
— creativesoul
From another perspective, the question is what notion of "rational" enables us to explain the fact that some animals are capable of learning how to open gates, etc. I mean that the starting-point is that they can, and that stands in need of explanation. — Ludwig V

Nice. So, we're in complete agreement on that much. I thought we were very close. Nice confirmation.

Here's how I look at it - for what it's worth.
We know how to explain how humans learn to do these things. But humans are our paradigm (reference point) of what a rational being is. So that's what we turn to. It involves a complex conceptual structure (think of it as a game - a rule-governed activity). The obvious recourse, then, is our existing practice in explaining how people do these things. We apply those concepts to the animals that learn to do these things. Our difficulty is that animals are in many ways different from human beings, most relevantly in the respect that many of the things that human beings can routinely do, they (apparently) cannot. So some modification of our paradigm is necessary. — Ludwig V

Nice.

That's not a desperately difficult problem, but it is where the disagreements arise, though in the nature of the case, determinate answers will not be easy to arrive at. But we are already familiar with such situations, where we apply the concept of interpretation. The readiest way of explaining this is by reference to puzzle pictures, which can be seen (interpreted) in more than one way. There is no truth of the matter, just different ways of looking at the facts. So, competing (non-rational) interpretations cannot be conclusively ruled out. However, in this case, the same interpretations can be applied to human beings as well. They are found lacking because they do not recognize the kinds of relationship that we have with each other. The same lack is found with, for example, the application of mechanical (reductionist) accounts of animals. — Ludwig V

I'm not seeing how that approach could help. What does it mean when you say "we apply the concept of interpretation"? What's the difference between say, a concept of interpretation and a notion of "interpretation". Is applying a concept of interpretation any different than sensibly using "interpretation"?

I disagree that there is no truth to the matter of interpretation. Interpretation presupposes meaning. When one interprets another, one is attempting to acquire knowledge of what they mean. Correctly attributing meaning is correct interpretation. When one misinterprets, one is misattributing meaning.

On my view, puzzle pictures are meaningless in and of themselves. All interpretation is of meaning. So, to me, we're not interpreting them so much as attributing meaning to them. Hence, there is no truth in that matter. There is no wrong way to 'interpret' the duck-rabbit or horse-frog, for there is no meaning to be interpreted. Rather, in such cases, we attribute meaning to that which has none, as compared to interpreting meaning already 'there' so to speak.

It has nothing to do with our word use. Language less animals have none.
— creativesoul
Well, it has and it hasn't. It hasn't because we are considering actions without language. But we are used to applying our concepts of action without language, since we happily explain what human beings to even when we do not have access to anything that they might say. (Foreign languages, for example) Indeed, sometimes we reject what the agent says about their own action in favour of the explanation we formulate for it. That is, agents can be deceptive or mistaken about their own actions.

The catch is that we have no recourse but to explain their actions in our language. But this is not a special difficulty. It applies whenever we explain someone else's action. — Ludwig V

We are considering the clearly rational behavior of a language less animal. Sure, we have no choice but to explain their actions in our language. That's not a problem.

There are all sorts of problems. Using our language isn't one of them.

I thinking pulling oneself from flames is not rational or deliberated or reasoned or thought about at all. It's just done.
— creativesoul
That doesn't mean it is not a rational response, does it? — Ludwig V

As far as I can tell, it's not at all rational. It's autonomous. Automatic. Involuntary.

Are involuntary reactions rational? That scope would include all living biological creatures capable of avoiding danger and/or gathering resources, regardless of the biological machinery involved. Hence, the ground for denying that such responses are rational, in kind.

Believing that touching the fire caused pain is. Applied, that belief becomes operative in the sense that it stops one from doing it again.
— creativesoul
That is the animal's response - something that it does. Since it is rational and something the animal does and there for an example of animal rationality. — Ludwig V

The important aspect concerns what makes it rational as opposed to not. It is rational behavior because it was caused by rational thought(thought based upon prior thought and belief). In this case the avoidance was based on the belief that touching the fire caused the pain.

Leaving all that out, misses the entirety of the point, or glosses over it. Neither is acceptable here, considering the matter under consideration/contention is what counts as rational thought as compared/contrasted to thought that is not rational in kind.

I think you're assessing behavior using conventional belief attribution practices, so I think I understand why.

What he's actually looking forward to is the particular event that usually takes place. Do we also know that no other animal can guage the interval at which a routine pleasant event usually occurs? To a small child, one would say: two more sleeps until Grandpa comes to dinner. For a dog who never gets to ride in the car when his human is going to work, and doesn't even ask, looks forward to weekends.
— Vera Mont
There's a complication here, that how the animal thinks about it may not be how we think about it. But, if we are to understand the animal, it needs to be expressed in terms that we can understand. To a small child, one would say "Two more sleeps...", but we would report to Grandpa that the child is really looking forward to him coming for dinner on Thursday.

In the case of the dog, we would have trouble saying to anyone on Wednesday that they are looking forward to the week-end. (How would that manifest itself? I'm not saying that there couldn't be any signs, only that I can't think of any). We might say they are looking forward to the week-end by extrapolation from the enthusiasm that we see on Saturday, but that would be risky in a philosophical context.
Still, when the signs appear, there is no doubt and we well might say the dog is excited because it's the week-end, while acknowledging that that does not reflect how the dog thinks about it. It could be "the day breakfast is late" - but even then, we don't suppose that's what the dog is saying to itself. Perhaps it is more like the response to the fire. I don't think there is a clear answer to this. — Ludwig V

It's difficult, for sure. I'll not address this here in this post. I addressed it in my reply to Vera.

Mww
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In my book, as you know, it's correlations. Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.
— creativesoul

I agree, at last in principle. From Day One your correlations and my relations have busied themselves trying to meet in the middle. A priori has always been my centerpiece, so for me a priori relations are a cinch.

What, in your view, constitutes an a priori correlation?

Forgive me if I’m supposed to know this, if I’ve been informed already and let it slip away. — Mww

Ah, no worries Mww. I do not believe that I've ever tried to fill that prescription.

I was just highlighting the approach set out in my reply to you. The notions of a priori and a posteriori are not used in my position. Both depend upon experience, even if that means just thinking about one's own thought and belief.

:wink:

So, they have some intuitive sense of time passing, as I mentioned earlier... perhaps accompanied by pattern recognition? I'm still not sure that that counts as knowing what time their humans are expected to arrive home.
— creativesoul
Dogs sure look expectant! You get clues off the standing up, prancing and sitting down every two minutes, tail wagging every time a car goes by and slobber all over the glass. — Vera Mont

Those behaviors have a multitude of very different and equally accurate explanations for why the dog is behaving that way. Behavior alone underdetermines thought and belief of the behavioral subject under consideration. That much is very well known. Dog behavior is not fine grained or nuanced enough for us to know with any certainty exactly why dogs slobber, wag tails, or are acting 'antsy'. It happens for a variety of different reasons. That issue causes trouble for every attribution of thought and belief to another creature, when based upon behavior alone, humans notwithstanding.

All that being said, I readily agree that dogs clearly form, have, and/or hold expectations. I've no issue claiming dogs form, have, and/or hold rational thought. What I'm particularly hesitant about, currently, is making any claims based upon ungrounded presuppositions regarding the breadth and width of that scope. Anthropomorphism looms large. I make every attempt to avoid making that mistake. Hence, my hair splitting is just as much about the development of my own position as it is about any particular claim you've made.

To be clear, there is no doubt that "the dog looks expectant" is a perfectly sensible thing to say in that situation. That's not what's in question here, with this particular example. What I'm questioning is how to make sense of saying that an animal knows what time the humans are expected to arrive home.

A candidate not only has to have an intuitive sense of the passage of time, but it also must possess some means of differentiating between timeframes such that they also know that other periods are not that arrival time. They have to think along the lines of different timeframes. I see no way for this candidate to know what time an expected arrival happens. For such knowledge is about a specific timeframe and it's relation to others. Without that there is just the arrival and the dog knowing that that is happening. It does not know so much what time the human is expected to arrive, so much as knowing when the human is about to arrive or has arrived, based upon any multitude of things(all of which must be perceptible to the dog) that always accompany the arrival.

The dog clearly connects the five o'clock train with the master's arrival... but hope?
— creativesoul

Why else would he keep going there every day for three years? The train had nothing for him. He never accepted treats from the staff or made friends with anyone on the platform. He just waited. — Vera Mont

He kept going, perhaps, for several reasons. Dogs have very limited conception/understanding of time, none of death, and the train still most certainly had something for him. The train is part of the arrival, as was the human. The arrival of the train meant the arrival of the human, to the dog that is... due to the correlations the dog had drawn, time and time again between all the regularities surrounding the five o'clock train. None of which were the fact that it was the five o'clock train.

What does "looking forward to going for a car ride on days the human doesn't drive away on" miss?
— creativesoul
I don't know. I suppose the fact that he didn't leave after breakfast. But why would they start getting excited at breakfast - which would take place later than on weekdays? Time sense, probably. — Vera Mont

Perhaps, in addition to recognizing all the individual particular regularities included in weekend car rides, except the fact that they happened on the weekends. The dog has no clue about that much. Weekends are human constructs, made possible by naming and descriptive practices, in addition to the regularity of cosmological events.

I claimed, not Wayfarer, that looking forward to Thursday requires knowing how to use the word.
— creativesoul

Sure, the name of the day is needed to convey your anticipation to another human. But what you're actually anticipating is not the day, or its name, but the event. — Vera Mont

Sometimes. Lots of folk dread Monday, simply because it's Monday. Makes no sense whatsoever to me, but I'm not most folk, and I hear it expressed nearly every Monday.

You could as easily say, "I look forward to seeing my father every week." They don't really need to know that he comes to dinner on Thursdays, it's just quicker and less self-revealing to say the day and not the event. — Vera Mont

For us, and our thoughts. For dogs, it makes more sense to talk about the events. The day of the week means nothing to the dog. Nor does the time the train arrives. To the dog, the train means the human. For three years, if what you say is true.

On my view, all thought based upon prior belief is rational thought. All action based upon one's own thought and belief is caused - in part at least - by rational thought.
— creativesoul

At least with respect to my experience, cutting through the clutter, has always been your philosophical modus operandi.

Gotta appreciate that bottom-up approach you instigated... — Mww

Thanks. I appreciatcha for appreciating me. :wink:

We know there are competing contradictory notions of "rational" at work here in this thread. They do not all rest upon the same ground. Unless we critically examine these notions and show their lacking(explanatory power in this case), then there's always those who will say stuff like, "Well it all boils down to how you define the term "rational". Well, yes and no. Yes, because whether or not any particular notion of "rational" can admit of language less rational animals' thought, belief, and/or actions and remain coherent is all a matter of how one defines the word. So, if we realize that the only reason some notion or other denies language less rational thought is on pains of maintaining coherency alone, and we realize that coherency is necessary but insufficient for truth, and we know beyond all reasonable doubt that learning how to open a door by observation alone IS rational thinking, then we can conclude that the notion under consideration is wrong. It leads to conclusions that stand in direct contradiction with everyday happenings.

Because some language less animals form, have, and/or hold rational thought, as learning how to open doors, gates, and tool invention/use clearly proves, if we accept/acknowledge and include evolutionary progression, it only follows that some rational thought existed in its entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Whatever language less rational thought consists of, it is most certainly content/elements/something that is amenable to brute evolutionary progression such that it is capable of resulting in our own very complex thought and belief.

In my book, as you know, it's correlations.

Hence, the a priori bottom up approach seems to be irrevocable to this subject matter.