l

The idea that all we have access to is our perception of the tree, and not the tree("Stove's Gem", it is often called) pervades academia to this day.
— creativesoul

It's strange.

For one thing, we could just grant that we don't know things as they are in themselves, adding also that we don't know what the hell it's supposed to mean to know something as it is itself. We understand (well enough) the idea of a warranted statement or a true statement. But knowledge of something as it is independent of knowledge is like the taste of ketchup without the flavor, or music that is 'better than it sounds.' What's the turn on ? The mirage of surprisingly easy eternal 'knowledge'?


Another thing, whether something is 'real' or an 'illusion' or 'true' is a fundamentally social issue. So there's something weird in reasoning about whether or not others exist in the first place. — Pie

:up:

The consideration I've been trying to coax some kind of agreement upon is that humans had experiences long before the term "experience" was coined.
— creativesoul

Indeed. — Isaac

Human experience existed in its entirety prior to the term "experience". That is a true claim with considerable consequential power. It only follows that what we say about human experience could be mistaken. This becomes even more obvious when we acknowledge that many of the different senses of the term are mutually exclusive and/or in some clear conflict with one another. They cannot all be accurate depictions and/or characterizations of what existed in its entirety prior to them. They are all attemting to take account of something that emerged, evolved, and existed in its entirety long before our awareness of it, and hence long before not only the term, but common language as we know it.

So, when competing notions of human experience are under consideration, at least one is mistaken. Since the notions can be mistaken, it cannot be the case that what constitutes human experience is up to us. It also cannot be the case that whether or not human experience consists of both internal and external things depends upon the definition of "experience" being used. Nor is it the case that the constitution of human experience just a matter of definition alone and nothing else.

It's a matter of what existed in its entirety prior to, and thus regardless of, all accounting practices thereof thereafter.

Any notion of human experience worthy of assent will consist of the simplest terms possible so as to be able to adequately explain emergence at the earliest stages possible, prior to language use, during initial acquisition, as well as throughout the rest of the individual's life. It needs to be universal in the sense of consisting of basic statements that are true of all individuals regardless of subjective particulars because they pick out the basic elemental constituents at the core of all individual meaningful experience.

But you additionally claimed that those experiences constituted both internal and external features.

I did and have offered argument and reasoning for those claims that has been given neither just due nor adequate attention. As just argued above, whether or not human experience consists of both internal and external things is not a matter of definition and nothing more.

The counter was that what experiences constitute depends on the definition being used.

It would follow that the basic elemental constitution of all human experience prior to the term somehow depended upon that which did not even exist at the time.

Not very convincing from my vantage point.

If I see a tree, I am not passively observing hat appears to me, I am deconstructing it. And what I am deconstructing is not an object , — Joshs

What appears to you is not a tree, or trees are not objects, or you're not seeing what appeared to you?

Colorful regardless of exactly what you mean. If I forego intense criticism and grant poetic license...

That makes total sense if we're talking about someone so steeped in such language use that they've come to think like that. It makes no sense whatsoever however if we're talking about a young child whose crib is in the shade under the tree. Whatever that child is doing, whatever is going on in that young mind, if that child is thinking about the tree, then we must be able to take proper account of that child's thought.

It's not doing what you're doing.

...it is a way of relating to something,- me that way of relating never repeats itself identically from context to context.

Okay.

When I use a word in front of someone else, their response establishes a fresh sense of meaning of that word. ‘Tree’ has an infinity of senses that depend exquisitely on the context of a shared situation. In a situation of usage of the word ‘tree’ I am not creating a new physical object , I am enacting a new pattern of relationship with it.

Colorful.

No object simply exists for us as what it is outside of changing contextual relationships of sense.

Key words being "for us"... Does that include the toddler in the crib under the tree?

Someone once told me long ago, a decade maybe, that what I wrote was "too tricky".

:razz:

Words mean whatever a community takes them to mean, that's the gist. — Pie

I agree.

When a community uses words in certain ways, it can be detrimental to the community knowledge base. It can lead to big problems.

Word use can be both sensible(in the way we're talking about here) and dead wrong.

This is particularly the case when discussing that which exists in its entirety prior to our awareness of it.

Are you familiar with the later Wittgenstein? He argues that words do not refer to already existing objects. Strictly speaking , they do not refer at all. They enact relationships by altering prior relationships. If I see a tree, I am not passively observing hat appears to me, I am deconstructing it. And what I am deconstructing is not an object , it is a way of relating to something,- me that way of relating never repeats itself identically from
context to context. When I use a word in front of someone else, their response establishes a fresh sense of meaning of that word. ‘Tree’ has an infinity of senses that depend exquisitely on the context of a shared situation. In a situation of usage of the word ‘tree’ I am not creating a new physical object , I am enacting a new pattern of relationship with it. No object simply exists for us as what it is outside of changing contextual relationships of sense. — Joshs

While I do appreciate some of the changes Witt helped to get going, as well as some of his simple approaches, overall I'm not all that impressed. After having skimmed through "Cambridge Letters", which I took to be correctly translated copies of the original correspondence between him and others, one of whom was Bertrand Russell, my opinion of Witt changed remarkably. It was the conversations with Bertrand Russell that interested me most. All that being said...

What you say above reminds me of Heiddegger, Derrida, Saussure, or something along those lines, much moreso than anything I've taken away from my limited readings of Witt. My personal library includes probably four or five posthumous books, still unread. I've read four to five different publications including Tractacus, Remarks on Color, Brown Book, Blue Book, On Certainty, Philosophical Investigations(about half anyway) and others that were more about Witt rather than writings of Witt.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Regarding the claims made above by you...

A bit of that stuff - as written - is false on it's face. However...

Some of it looks to speak towards how worldviews evolve as a result of how meaning does.<-----That part is interesting... to me.

...the name refers to a concept... — Metaphysician Undercover

Could be an interesting endeavor. Earlier you wrote the following...

A "cell" as commonly defined can be either a complete living organism, or a part of a living organism. How is it, that in some cases an entire living organism is "picked out" as a cell, and in other cases, a part of a living organism is picked out, and called by the same name.

The same way two different people may share the same name.

One is an entire living organism, the other is not, yet they are both said to be the same independent thing, a cell.

They are both called by the same name. They are not said to be the same thing. You've already said as much directly above. One is an entire living organism, and the other is but a part thereof. Sometimes "cell" is used to pick out an entire organism, sometimes it is used to pick out parts of an organism.

Obviously, the term "cell"... ...is used to pick out two completely different types of things, one being a whole living organism, the other being a part of a living organism.

Exactly.

What we pick out with "cell" is up to us.
— creativesoul

Right. That's the point Janus and I have been trying to communicate.

What 'experience' picks out depends on how one uses the word. Could be internal, external, or both.

Just like the word 'cell' could pick out all the phagocytised proteins in the cell vacuole, some or them, of none of them. It all depends how we use the word. — Isaac

There's never been disagreement regarding that much. It comes as a surprise to know that you thought I did not agree with that much.

What made no sense was to deny the existence of what was being picked out before being picked out. 14th Century humans had glial cells, because glial cells existed before the 1800's, despite their not having yet been picked out by name. To deny that they did, because the term had not been coined, is to confuse our language use with what is being picked out. Glial cells are biological structures picked out by the term "glial cells". Glial cells do not consist of words. "Glial cells" does.

The consideration I've been trying to coax some kind of agreement upon is that humans had experiences long before the term "experience" was coined.

Is there an external material world?

If by "external" we mean not within the physical bounds of our skin, and by "material" we mean detectable stuff, then all we're asking is whether or not any detectable stuff not within the bounds of our skin exists.

Such questions are the bane of philosophy.
— creativesoul

Here's my version. At some point in the philosophical tradition (Locke or Kant or implicitly in Democritus even), it made sense to think of human experience as f(X)f(X) where XX is reality in the nude or raw or completely apart from us and ff is the universal structure or mediation of human cognition. The important bits of this insane but charming theory are that XX is impossible to access directly and that f(X)f(X) is private experience (plausible initially because we each have our own sense organs and brain, according to our sense organs anyway, which are in that sense their own product ? And the brain is the dream of the brain is the dream of the brain ? But we must carry on...). — Pie

The quote function did not transfer the symbols correctly...

I am in agreement. The framework treats human thought and belief(human experience) as though they(it) are(is) completely independent and/or separate from the world. They(It) are(is) not. You've also noted how the framework treats human experience as private. It is not, and cannot be given what we now know about how language effects/affects human thought and belief. The idea that all we have access to is our perception of the tree, and not the tree("Stove's Gem", it is often called) pervades academia to this day.

About three years ago, I received a phone call from my better half's youngest child who as an undergrad took Introduction To Philosophy as a means to meet his curriculum humanity course standards. Stove's Gem was the beginning of course! So, because he knew how much philosophy I've studied and done in my spare time, he calls me up and says something like "Hey, uncle <snip my name>, can you help me to understand what in the hell this is supposed to mean?" Then, he goes on to read the typical lines that lead to saying the same stuff we're talking about in this exchange. A few phone calls and he maintained his perfect grade history. Very bright, practical, driven, and considerate young man. Great kid! I digress...

Dennett's paper "Quining Qualia" is the most convincing piece of writing I've been fortunate enough to have read with regard to the purportedly private parts of human experience. His approach is admirable as well as his attitude, even towards people whose approaches and attitudes are anything but.

What we pick out with "cell" is up to us. Whether or not what we're picking out existed in its entirety prior to being picked out is not. If those things mentioned are now considered parts of cells, and they are parts of all cells, then I see no reason to deny that 14th Century humans cells included those things.

"14th century humans had cells."

That's my answer.
— creativesoul

Good. Now what about the phagocytised or excreted proteins in the cell vacuole. Were they part of what makes up these 14th C cells or not? — Isaac

I've no clear idea whether or not those terms pick out things that existed in their entirety prior to being picked out. If so, then those things were part of what made up 14th Century human cells. If not, then they were not.

If what is being picked out by the name exists in its entirety prior to being picked out then it does not matter one bit if those different uses conflict with one another. My point remains.

Oh, for fuck's sake...

The tree in my yard is not a name. The term "tree" is. The term "tree" is used to pick out trees. The same holds for cells and "cells"...

I think the point is that at that time, the word "cells" was not in use, nor was the concept which the word refers to. So at that time it is impossible that human beings had "cells" because there was no such thing as cells. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's what I took him to be saying.

"Cell" is a term used to pick out specific biological machinery. That machinery does not need to be picked out in order to exist. The names pick out the machinery. Humans in the 14th century had all the machinery that we later picked out to the exclusion of all else by virtue of using the term "cell" as a means for doing so. The machinery is the cell. The name is not the cell. Humans had the machinery without having the words. Thus, 14th century humans had cells despite not having "cells".

Simply put, understanding that we use the term "tree" to pick out the thing in my front yard suffices
— creativesoul

Naming things with words is more than just sticking a symbol in front of a sign. Words are not just tools that we use to refer to an independently existing universe... — Joshs

As if this somehow applies to what I've been putting forth?

...they are ways that the world we interact with modifies our engagement with it.

Sure. We're not interacting with things contained within the physical boundaries of our skin. The tree in my yard is one such thing. Which is the point. The tree is detectable and not within my skin(material and external).

Using a word changes us at the same time that it changes something in our environment.

We are in our environment. Word use changes us. How exactly does using the word "tree" as a means to pick out the thing in my front yard change the thing in my front yard?

Perhaps you have an example of a situation when language use changes something in our environment. I mean, I agree with that. At least when I take it at face value. Word use helps to create many different parts of our environment.

Words only exist in their use , and their use reveals new aspects of things.

I'm struggling to see the relevance.

...proving that there is something existing independently of conscious beings. But do do so, one must step outside of subjective experience. But obviously, that is not possible. — Hello Human

How convenient.

Proving there is an external world does not require stepping outside of subjective experience. Human experience is not the sort of thing that can be stepped into and/or out of to begin with, so it makes no sense at all to claim that doing so is needed for anything else at all.

Understanding how language creation and/or acquisition happens leaves no room at all for serious well founded doubt regarding whether or not an external world exists.

Simply put, understanding that we use the term "tree" to pick out the thing in my front yard suffices.

The bottom 80% of the country have almost no political power whatsoever. Their interests are simply ignored. — Xtrix

In much governmental practice as well as most accounting practices thereof.

Many government officials have acted and are acting in ways that are quite harmful to very large swathes of American citizens. There are specific pieces of legislation, as well as specific court cases, throughout the last five or six decades that have rendered the overwhelming majority of Americans virtually powerless to be able to elect someone who does what's best for them.

When I was much younger, I used to jokingly say "We have the best justice system money can buy" as a means to point out the benefit of having a good defense attorney. It garnered very little, if any resistance. Usually people would smile while responding, regardless of what they said while smiling.

Mind you, I understood very little about how the justice system and other governmental institutions actually worked, but don't get me wrong, I did have the basic understanding of how it was supposed to work - ideally. I had no idea how monetarily corrupt American government actually was/is until I had been exposed to more than enough adequate evidence to know.

If workers' lives and livelihoods were cared about more than profit margins, there would be no need for collective bargaining measures.

It makes absolutely no sense at all to deny and/or object to the following claim.

"14th century humans had cells."

That's my answer.

To the basic question asked in the title of the thread...

Is there an external material world?

If by "external" we mean not within the physical bounds of our skin, and by "material" we mean detectable stuff, then all we're asking is whether or not any detectable stuff not within the bounds of our skin exists.

Such questions are the bane of philosophy.

They are consequences of placing far too much - perhaps it's better described as placing the wrong kind of - value upon consistent language use.

You've claimed that experience is a matter of definition and nothing more, and that experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— creativesoul

No, I didn't claim that — Janus

Sure looks that way to me...

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more.
— Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more.
— Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

Okay. I've quoted the relevant portions of our exchange above. Where you claimed "No, I think it's just a matter of definition", what - exactly - are you referring to? What - exactly - is just a matter of definition?

I asked that already. You did not answer.

It may be best to revisit the succession of agreements leading up to that objection, because the objection itself contradicted the prior agreements. What you objected to followed from what you'd agreed upon.

You've claimed that experience is a matter of definition and nothing more, and that experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. Those two claims are mutually exclusive. If the one is true, the other is not, and vice versa. That is the epitome of self-contradiction - by definition, ironically enough.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. — Janus

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it.
— Janus — creativesoul

We didn't have cell theory back in the 14th century. So did the people back then have cells? — Isaac

Are you serious?

:brow:

It’s been established that some thoughts need words....thoughts with words as their object. — Mww

So, that could be established henceforth as a basic agreement.

Some thought needs words.

While I could agree that "thoughts with words as their object" is a description of one example of thought that needs words, I would not agree that that is the only kind. Nor do I find that that description is capable of taking into account all thought that needs words. As before, all thought that needs words is thought that is existentially dependent upon words. Such thought are the kind that cannot possibly exist without words, and those include more than just thought that has words as it's object.

Let's suppose a very different case...

Consider the curious case of a cat thinking about the contents of its food bowl. I have just such a curious cat named "Cookie". Cookie will come to me, wherever I may be around the property, make eye contact with me, and then immediately take off as fast as she can back towards the kitchen, where her food bowl is. I mean, she tears out of the area with claws extended. It's quite memorable. Sometimes, if I'm lying on the bed, she'll sit around on the floor for quite some time waiting for me to look at her. If too much time passes, she will begin tearing around in circles, claws extended, on the rug at the foot of the bed. If, after doing this, I continue to remain in place without ever having made eye contact, she will then begin tearing a path between the rug and kitchen, through the bedroom doorway, going back and forth between the two areas, tearing around in circles on the rug during each visit to the bedroom. Finally, if all that happens and I still have not acknowledged her presence, she will jump on the bed, na dmake her presence known by meowing at me, while placing herself into my immediate proximity, within mere inches.

After she has my attention, regardless of my whereabouts, she will lead me to the bowl stopping every few feet or so to look back at me, as if to ensure that I'm following her. Clearly the curious cat Cookie cannot think about the word "food bowl". So, words are not the object of her thought. The contents of the food bowl is. Despite not being able to think about words, she can nevertheless think about the fact that her bowl is empty. She can want me to pour food in the bowl.

Her thinking that her bowl is empty is an excellent example of thought that needs words despite not having words as their object. It is a very curious example. In this particular case, her thoughts do not have words as their object. Her thoughts are however, about the bowl. That particular bowl is the sort of thing that is itself existentially dependent upon language. That bowl is the resultant product of many a linguistic endeavor. From the initial conceptual drawings, through all of the different engineering inherent to the manufacturing processes, the emergence of that particular bowl was facilitated by words. That bowl is existentially dependent upon words.

Thinking about A is existentially dependent upon A. If A is existentially dependent upon words, then thinking about A is as well.

Let Cookie's food bowl be A.

I'm guessing that there's a bit Quine influencing your thinking here. In Ontological Relativity he argues<roughly> that what we choose to focus upon and/or later talk about is arbitrary. That is to say that the distinctions we draw and maintain are arbitrarily chosen. In Quine's view, to be is to be the value of a variable. That is to say that to be is to be talked about. This is akin to Witt's notion that "the limits of my language are the limits of my world".

Such frameworks are the linguistic equivalent of someone trying to pour thousands of gallons of water into a five gallon bucket. The world includes much more than one's worldview.

So, just so I understand this...

Are you really objecting to anyone claiming that humans had experience prior to language use?
— creativesoul

No. — Isaac

Good.

Isaac will correct me if I've misunderstood, but I don't think that's what he means. At least that is not what we've been discussing, which is the various ways of defining experience, not whether it exists without language.
— Janus

That's it, yes.

Understood. There are a plurality of accepted usages/definitions of the term "experience". Those definitions have no bearing whatsoever upon that which is being picked out by the term. What experience consists of and/or amounts to is not up to us. It is not a matter of definition, and nothing else. The notion that it is a matter of definition and nothing else) and all that follows from it is precisely what I'm rejecting. It's dead wrong. There are a number of ways to show this.

I'll start here...

Consider a group of humans living in England during the 14th century. There were famous artists, artisans, craftsmen, theatre, nobility, royalty, and everyday life. There were struggles. There were defeats. There were victories. There was class warfare, politics, truth, and lies. There were common beliefs. There were disparate fringe beliefs. There were worldviews. There were social conventions and rules governing behaviour. There was fairness and injustice. There were romantic relationships, infidelities, and loneliness. There was starvation and excess. There were murders and victims thereof. There were hunting expeditions, games, jousting events, etc. There were people who were proud. There were people who were ashamed. It was a society of people.


Here's the salient fact of the matter:The term "experience" had not yet been coined.


So, either no one in that time had experiences, or they did. I can only trust that no one here would deny that those people had experiences. Thus, since they did, and did so long before the term was coined, it only follows that human experience existed in its entirety prior to the term "experience". As a matter of backwards causation alone, that which existed in its entirety prior to being picked out to the exclusion of all else and subsequently further described is not effected, affected, determined, and/or otherwise influenced in any way whatsoever by the accounting practice. Human experience emerged prior to our ability to take it into account. What human experience is amounts to what it consists of, and that is quite clearly not up to us. Rather, it is up to us to get the definition right(to arrive at true statements about human experience and what it consists of), and that requires keeping the right sorts of things in mind during our endeavor to acquire and/or accrue knowledge about human experience.

If you think I've contradicted myself then all you have to do is quote the purportedly contradictory statements I've made and we can look at it. — Janus

I did.

Now, did those three Xs exist prior to my naming them? Yes. — Isaac

Those Xs are not the sort of thing that exist in their entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices.

Look again. You've contradicted that.

I'd say that what we count as the toddler's experience depends on how we define the word "experience". The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. — Janus

...there is no fact of the matter concerning whether experience is internal, a combination of internal and external or neither internal nor external... — Janus

Are you sure about the last statement above?

No. Something existed prior to our naming practices — Isaac

So, just so I understand this...

Are you really objecting to anyone claiming that humans had experience prior to language use?

Wow.

So then, no sex, no eating, no being full of fear at the sound of the bear, etc? Really? As if all of that does not count at any time prior to language?

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts... — Isaac

The toddler's experience is not a defined concept

The toddler's experience is what it is regardless of how we define it. — Janus

I would concur. It only follow then that we can get such things wrong.

Our definitions regarding all such things(all that exists in its entirety prior to our ability to talk about it) can be mistaken.

...It seems quite normal to say that our definitions determine the content of those defined concepts. — Isaac

Being normal doesn't equate to being accurate, correct, and/or true. Our definitions determine what else we can say without self-contradiction. They do not determine whether or not they are true. They do not determine what something consists of when the candidate is the sort of thing that exists in its entirety prior to our attempts at taking it into account. Some human experience is exactly that sort of thing. So...

The toddler was a deliberate choice. The toddler's individual experience is not at all influenced and/or determined by how we define the term "experience". It consists of external things, internal things, as well as things that are neither(associations/correlations drawn between external and internal things).

Toddlers have experience. I think we agree there.

The point here is simple really. Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. All definitions of "experience" are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. Thus, it only follows that some human experience can and does exist prior to any definition of the term "experience". If the notion/conception of experience cannot take those kinds of experience into account, then it is found sorely lacking.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".
— creativesoul

You're putting words in my mouth. I haven't said anything about content. — Janus

Fair enough.

According to you, the toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

So, I'm imagining a one-year-old human, playing contently in a crib with some toy. Happy slobber. The family dog is lying close by fast asleep... legs and facial muscles twitching. There's a sudden loud knock on the door. The dog barks incessantly. The toddler is startled.

According to you, the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience".

That cannot be right.

I put it to you that whether or not experience is external, internal, and/or both is something that is not up to us any more than whether or not our biological machinery, the tree, leaves, and light are. Would you agree with that as well?
— creativesoul

No, I think it's just a matter of definition, nothing more. — Janus

What - exactly - is a matter of definition, and nothing more?

Whether or not a tree is inside or outside my head?

If experience is defined as the sensing, feeling and thinking processes of an individual, which are obviously not open to public scrutiny, then on that definition experience is internal. So, it is up to us how we choose to think about it. — Janus

emphasis mine

Again, what - exactly - is up to us how we choose to think about it? The elemental constitution of all human experience? As if that changes depending upon how we choose to define the term "experience"?

Do you think that we can be mistaken about what experience consists of?

I think we agree upon much, actually.