...

It's that "broken clock" is an extensional definition, while believes is an intensional operator.

The typical example of intension is

Jack believes Stephen King's first novel is The Shining.

If we stuck an extensional definition in there it would read

Jack believes that Carrie is The Shining.

Same thing. — frank

Could you apply this to (Jack believed that a broken clock was working)? I'm curious to see exactly how it is the same...

Your notion of what counts as being within the scope of our belief includes only what we would assent to if asked.

Jack would assent to once believing that that particular broken clock was working if asked after having become aware of the relevant facts. Not before.

So, the scope of Jack's belief ought be broadened a bit so as to include what he believed rather than what he would admit to believing. The scope of Jack's belief ought include all of Jack's belief. He was totally unaware of his false belief that that particular broken clock was working while he believed it. He believed what the clock said, and would readily admit to this all after having become aware of the relevant facts. After becoming aware of the broken clock, he would have become aware of his own mistake. At this point in time he would readily agree if asked "Did you believe that that broken clock was working?"...

He would have never agreed if ever asked if the proposition/statement "That broken clock is working" were true. He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true.



That's a bit more cleaned up.

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true.

SO you do not understand that...

"the broken clock" is not a description Jack could correctly make?... — Banno

At least not while he believed that the broken clock was working.

SO you do not understand that...

"The broken clock" could not be within the scope of Jack's belief? — Banno

I would agree if what counts as being within the scope of our belief are only what we would assent to if asked. Jack would assent if asked after becoming aware of the relevant facts.

However, if the scope was broadened a bit so as to include what we all actually believe rather than what we know, and/or would admit to, we would surely see that the scope of Jack's belief is beyond his own knowledge.

The move to set it outside the scope of Jack's belief is due to the fact that it would be impossible for Jack to make such a statement based on his belief. — Harry Hindu

Well, yes and no.

While believing that that broken clock was working, it would be impossible.

However, after becoming aware of the fact that he believed that a broken clock was working, by showing him that clock had stopped, after becoming aware of exctly how he had come to believe that it was 3 o'clock, he could no longer believe that that clock was working. At this point in time, Jack could readliy admit to having once believed that that particular clock was working, and that that particular clock was broken at that time, so he had once believed that that particular broken clock was working.

So, no, it is not always impossible to make such a statement based upon his belief.

Here's the interesting part...

Never did he have an attitude towards that particular proposition(that broken clock is working) such that he believed it to be the case, or true. Thus, he cannot be sensibly said to have an attitude towards that proposition such that he takes it to be the case, or takes it to be true. If an accurate rendering of Jack's belief were put into belief statement form, he would not assent. That is not a problem at all for what I'm saying here. He did not know he was wrong. He believed that that broken clock was working nonetheless.

That example stands in direct opposition to underlying false presuppositions pervading some of the objections to the simple account I'm offering here. Namely, 1.that we must be aware of everything we believe, and 2.all belief can be rendered into propositional form such that the individual to whom the belief belongs would assent.

Neither of those are true. I'm offering an everyday example that warrants our tempering our confidence in those two notions. A bit more carefully well-placed skepticism is appropriate.

There are some interesting aspects to some of your objections. However, we seem to be having difficulty focusing upon what I think is of importance. That's on me.

The example is akin to believing that a facade is a barn, or a sheet is a sheep. These could all be broken down into two propositions as Moore did with (it is raining and I do not believe it).

I'm going to postpone any further replies to you for now. You seem to be taking things personally. Mea culpa on a few of those things you said in the last long reply...

We're all stubborn around here. :smile:

I understand that and most of what others are objecting to. The rendering of the belief as (a broken clock is working) is said to be problematic. On my end, it would be better put as (that broken clock is working), but the objections would remain. What I do not understand is the move to set (that broken clock) outside of the scope of Jack's belief and replace it with (that clock) when the example hinges upon the fact that the clock is broken but Jack believes what it says. Jack does not know it is broken, so he cannot believe that it is broken. I grant that much entirely, but there's no reason to say that he cannot believe that that broken clock is working.

We're in agreement there. I've never argued otherwise.

The content of belief is what the debate is about.

Jack believes(or believed) that a broken clock is(was) working. So, what is that belief about, and what is the content of that belief?

The belief under our consideration is problematic for the conventional rendering of belief as a propositional attitude. It is not problematic for rendering it in propositional form — creativesoul

Jack believed that a broken clock was working.

So, Banno, I'm wondering what you think of this? It seems to be not at all problematic for being rendered in propositional form, but Jack never believes the statement is true. Do you not find that both odd and interesting?

Jack believes that a broken clock is working.

You're either forgetful or dishonest. You have been levying charges against the claim. That's not something one does unless the claim is problematic, or they are not arguing in good faith.

As far as the charges I'm levying against convention...

The belief under our consideration is problematic for the conventional rendering of belief as a propositional attitude. It is not problematic for rendering it in propositional form.

As I said, this is the kind of de re belief ascription that we can use when we are not sure about a de dicto belief ascription (i.e. we don’t know what someone else’s beliefs are really about, see the case of the kid in the park). In the case of Jack, I would prefer that form of rendering, if e.g. I’m not sure whether Jack is holding contradictory beliefs or he simply ignores that that clock is not working. Certainly, if I knew that Jack ignores that clock is not working, I would prefer to say “Jack believes that clock is working” or “Jack mistakenly believes that clock is working” instead of “Jack believes of that broken clock that is working”, or worse, “Jack believes that broken clock is working”. — neomac

Jack cannot believe both simultaneously, that the clock is broken, and that a broken clock is working. There is no possibility of misunderstanding what is meant by "Jack believes a broken clock is working" unless one has already bewitched their own thinking skills by virtue of arriving at a gross misunderstanding of what belief is as a result of working from a misconception thereof.

All belief as propositional attitude is one such misconception.

Interesting thing here to me is that on the one hand you're railing against propositional calculus(as you call it), and yet again on the other your unknowingly objecting based upon the fact that Jack would not assent to his own belief if it were put into propositional form and he was asked if he believed the statement. At least, not while he still believed it.

Mary's room is based upon the dubious presupposition that we can learn anything about seeing red without seeing red.
— creativesoul

In other words, qualia is ineffable. Why else can't Mary learn everything about red without seeing red? — Agent Smith

No. Not in other words 'qualia is ineffable'.

What qualia?

:worry:

...the problem I have is with "Jack believed that a broken clock was working" since your are insisting on it. — neomac

Indeed. That is at issue. I'm waiting for a valid objection.

You came up with this rendering based on the propositional calculus suggested here: “Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?”.
So I proposed you the following propositional calculus: if one can render “I did/did not believed that p” as “p and I did/did not believe it” and vice versa. And asked you: why can’t we do the same with p="Jack believed that a broken clock was working"?
So I'm challenging you to explain why your propositional calculus is correct, and mine is wrong based on your own assumptions. This is the problem you should address, hopefully in a non ad-hoc way.

Rather than propose something I've not, would it not just be easier to answer the question following from the simple understanding set out with common language use? I've no issue at all accounting for Jack's belief.

Do you not find it odd that Jack would agree, if and when he figured out that the clock was broken? He would have no issue saying that he had believed that a broken clock was working. So, what's your problem with it?

From Jack's point of view he doesn't believe anything about a broken clock, obviously, since he thinks the clock is not broken. Of course we can say that he believes of a broken clock that it is working. But so what; people entertain mistaken beliefs all the time? — Janus

Which clock does he think is not broken?

The broken one. Clearly, he does believe something about a broken clock. He believes that the broken clock is working.

I'm not sure what possesses you to see this as problematic.

Anyway, how's this thread going? — Banno

:smile:

What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox?
— creativesoul

Not sure about it, also because knowledge is a wider issue. — neomac

We're not discussing knowledge. What's your view wrt belief? Do you agree that in the Russell and Gettier cases that the belief was properly accounted for?

Get it now? — neomac

I got it then. You agreed with what I wrote, changed that, and then denounced the change. If you wish to see how they could be rendered similarly...


It was raining outside and I did not believe it. The clock was broken, and I did not believe it.

I haven't thought about those specifics. Off the top of my head I'd say that Jack's belief is about a clock and it's condition of working, which begs the question as to whether the clock and its condition of working together form the content of the belief. What else could Jack's belief be about? — Janus

A broken clock.

:up:

So, is it safe to say that - on your view - the content of Jack's belief is equivalent to Jack's belief and that Jack's belief is about something other than it's content?

Mea culpa!

:blush:

Jack's belief is that the clock is working.

I just saw the answer a few replies back...

Okay, so then we have...


Jack's belief is that the clock is working.
The content of Jack's belief is "that the clock is working".
Jack's belief is about a clock that he does not realize is not working.

Are you still okay with that?

According to your answers in the last reply...

The content of Jack's belief is "That clock is working".
Jack's belief is about a clock he does not realize is not working.

What is Jack's belief?

So, the charges of ambiguity ring ironic as well...

Jack's belief is...
Jack's belief is about...
The content of Jack's belief is...

Please, to avoid any possible misunderstandings. Fill in the blanks.

Again you introduce the ambiguity — Janus

No. I repeated what neomac said and you seemed to agree with. Evidently I was wrong, and you do not agree with neo's rendering either.

So, I am asking you to clearly state Jack's belief and then proceed to tell me what Jack's belief is about as well as what the content of that belief is...

So then,

Are you saying that Jack believes of a broken clock that it is working, and that the content of Jack's belief is "That clock is working"?

Granted for further evaluations...

And what is Jack's belief about?

I write something that you agree with. You change what I write. You disagree with and denounce the change, not what I wrote. Evidently, you cannot see.

Great job of denouncing shit that I've not written.

The irony of the earlier sophism attribution.

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about?
— creativesoul

It's very simple; the belief is simply that the clock is working. If he was asked whether he thinks 'the clock is working' is true, he might say 'yes' or he might say, as I said before 'give me a minute and I'll tell you'. Or he might say 'I had assumed that, but on reflection I realize that was a baseless assumption'. — Janus

That does not answer the question I asked. The discussion is all about what counts as the content of some belief or another. So, again...

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief, and what is Jack's belief about?

Interesting how different your account of my position is from what I've argued here.

What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox?

Great job denouncing shit that I've not said.

...besides the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong. — neomac

Plato is perhaps best attributed with the original conception of JTB. Nonetheless, JTB presupposes belief as propositional attitude, as you yourself have acknowledged. My claim was that JTB was the basis of the rendering.

It's never a good sign when someone simultaneously does both, confirms and denies, something I've written all while denouncing something I'd not. Hence...

:meh:

Gettier. Russell. Moore.

Both Gettier cases, Russell's clock, and Moore's paradox all directly involve and/or include false belief, but none of the three address that aspect as a subject matter in it's own right.




The stopped clock example shows how Russell left out a key consideration; Russell is correct to question whether or not the belief about what time it is counted as a justified belief. It's certainly true, but are we to claim that a false belief counts as good justificatory ground?




Gettier's first case shows how an accounting malpractice of a false belief can lead us astray when taking account of that false belief by virtue of using the rules of entailment. Smith believed that he would get the job and that he had ten coins in his pocket. Entailment allows us to say that he is justified in believing that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job, and he is. The issue here is that - when it comes to Smith's belief - "the man" has one referent and one referent only. He's talking about himself and no one else... after-all. So, because Smith's belief is about himself, and because "the man" refers to himself, the only way for Smith's belief to become true is if he got the job. He did not. Therefore, his belief about what would happen was false. This case shows us that the belief and the statement thereof have different sets of truth conditions.

It only follows that the two are not always equivalent.

Gettier's second case shows us the same as above, except it's a bit more complex. Smith believes Jones owns a Ford, and because Smith believes that he also believes that either Smith owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, but he only believes that the disjunction is true because he believes Smith owns a Ford. He cannot believe it to be any other way. He does not believe that that disjunction is true as a result of the second disjunct. Rather, to quite the contrary, Smith believes the disjunction is true because he believes the first disjunct is true. So, while either disjunct can be true, and that alone makes the disjunction true as a result of either one's being so, Smith's belief is only true if Brown owns a Ford. His belief is that the disjunct is true as a result of the first disjunct being so. It is not. It is true as a result of the second. Smith's belief is false. Again, this example shows us that the belief and the statement thereof have different sets of truth conditions.

It only follows that the two are not always equivalent.



Moore's paradox shows us that we can say of another that they are in error, that they have some false belief or another, but we cannot say the same about ourselves, at least not while still believing the falsehood. That last part is what I've found to be lacking in the explanations of the problem. There are all sorts of reasons for this, self-contradiction being one. However, after becoming aware of our error, there's nothing at all stopping us from admitting that it was once raining outside and we did not believe it, or that we once believed a broken clock was working, or that we once believed that we would get the job, or that we once believed that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because we believed that Jones owned a Ford.

All of this seems to show some inherent issues with the accounting practices...

Mary's room is based upon the dubious presupposition that we can learn anything about seeing red without seeing red.

Qualia is neither ineffable, nor knowledge.

Earlier you mentioned that one interpretation of believing that a broken clock is working would lead to what seems to be Jack holding self-contradictory belief, and that that was ground for changing the report to something similar to neomac's rendering.

I pose the same questions to you that I just posed to them...

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about?

Meaning is the relationship between cause and effect. — Harry Hindu

An all too common error; the conflation of meaning and causality. The former requires being meaningful to something or someone, whereas the latter does not. The conflation is the basis for many who claim that clouds mean rain even when there is noone around to take notice...

So, I'm curious as to how your account makes sense of the content of the belief as well as what the belief is about...

If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief and what is Jack's belief about?