FYI I prefer arguments to emoticons. — neomac

Then I suggest you peruse the last couple of weeks worth of posts by yours truly here in this thread, because you seem to have either ignored or missed the arguments that have been given.

:meh:

I too prefer arguments to rhetoric, handwaving, and gratuitous assertions. So far, you've offered the latter three. Got any of the former?

When we say that S holds a belief, has a belief, or forms a belief, what exactly is it that we are claiming that S holds, has, or has formed? When we ascribe belief to another, what exactly are we ascribing? If we do not have an understanding of what belief is, what it consists of, etc., then on what grounds are we to determine which sorts of beliefs can be formed and/or held by which sort of creatures?

There is a common practice of personifying animals. If we follow your advice here, anthropomorphism is acceptable.

You are arguing that because our use of the term predates our thinking about that use that our understanding of what belief is ought somehow fit that use. I'm not disagreeing with that on it's face. What I'm saying is that some belief existed in it's entirety prior to our talking about it, and as such, our common practices could very well be wrong, particularly regarding language less ones as well as ones that are formed and/or held prior to thinking about them as a subject matter in their own right.

Be all this as it may...

My aim currently is to shine a bit of much needed light upon the current failings of our accounting practices. Russell's clock, both Gettier cases, and Moore's paradox all stem from belief as propositional attitude.

My attitude towards your position is clear befuddlement. It is about as preposterous as it can be for us to deny that it is possible to believe that a broken clock is working, or object to the reporting of that simply because your accounting practice cannot make sense of it, because not only is it possible to believe that a broken clock is working, it happens on a regular basis to someone... somewhere. It's happened to me.

The notion of "mental" is problematic for it rests upon dichotomous frameworks, none of which are capable of taking proper account of that which consists of both mental and non-mental things.

Belief is one such thing. As are dispositions.

The white snow is one part of belief and/or dispositions about it.

...you as any body else learned the word “belief” and its proper usage in the context of specific linguistic practices about belief ascriptions... — neomac

That is false on it's face.

We learned to use the word "belief" in the context of specific linguistic practices, but those practices were not about belief ascriptions.

A theory of belief should fit into a theory of belief ascription not the other way around, the reason being that you as any body else learned the word “belief” and its proper usage in the context of specific linguistic practices about belief ascriptions, prior to any philosophical debate. — neomac

We've been using the term belief for thousands of years. We've been attributing beliefs to ourselves and others for at least that long. Some attribute beliefs to the simplest of animals, such as slugs.

According to what you've said here, we ought make our theory of belief fit such usage.

...the JTB analysis of "knowledge" challenged by Gettier presupposes (or so it seems) the notion of "belief" as propositional attitude not the other way around. So, unless you have something more convincing to support your claim ("JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude"), b/c that is what I asked, then it is fair to say that you are completely wrong

:meh:

AS I said this is prone to equivocation. The incoherent interpretation would be equivalent to they believe that "a spherical object is flat" is true. — Janus

There is usually more than one interpretation for any report. That is not a problem, especially when the author painstakingly details what is meant with subsequent explanation as to avoid any confusion.

Equivocation is a charge that the author is using two different senses of the same term in the same argument.

You did not answer the question I asked about the charge you're levying.

Believing is far more complex a process than this thread shows, that's for sure.

The content of belief can be very different than what the belief is about. The content is - strictly speaking - underdetermined by any and all of our accounting practices, but I do think that there are common forms and/or different versions that we can glean a bit of knowledge regarding their basic 'outline' as it were.

An attitude towards some proposition, such that it is true, is but one.

you didn’t clarify why JTB is the basis for belief as propositional attitude. — neomac

That's where the idea that knowledge claims consist of propositions believed to be true by those justified in doing so came from. It's the whole S knows that P... parsing. Apparently Frege played a major role as well regarding the attitude part. It also makes sense as to how it became the case that false belief, such as the broken clock and both Gettier cases became such a problem for the notion. I could be wrong, but not completely.

I think we might say it is a kind of believing, but not that is it is in the form of 'believing that'. So, as I have argued before, in other similar conversations with you, I think it makes sense to say that animals believe, but not that they hold beliefs. — Janus

Yes, indeed we have had similar conversations about this in past. I remember that. You may find it interesting to know that there is a distinction to be drawn between holding a belief(according to the position I'm arguing for/from) and believing that something or other is true.

...'that they believe of a spherical object that it is flat'... — Janus

So, are you saying here that it seems to you that the above is not self-contradictory, but "they believe a spherical object is flat", somehow is? And that your objection is based upon this purported self-contradiction?

Well, you are trying to make your belief ascription analysis fit your understanding of belief. For me, it should be the other way around. — neomac

:worry:

So you think we ought fit our understanding of belief into our understanding of belief ascription...

I'm going to think about that for a minute here...

What are you ascribing to another prior to having an understanding of belief?

The common denominator between the problematic beliefs in question seems to be that they are all false, unbeknownst to the believer.

The oddest part of all this is that despite the objections to my renderings here, the believers themselves would readily admit that they did indeed hold such belief, but could do so only after becoming aware of their errors, at which point in time, they would no longer believe.

Are the objectors here going to object to that as well?

The interesting part is that they never believed the propositional rendering was true.

It was once believed the Earth was flat. It was not believed that the spherical Earth is flat, because for those people the Earth was not spherical. The belief in propositional terms was " The Earth is flat " is true, not "The spherical Earth is flat" is true. This is analogous to your "broken clock" example. You are conflating actuality with belief and producing a fatally incoherent admixture. — Janus

This is the best yet. Well done. Then again...

So, we cannot say of those people that they believe that a spherical object is flat(there are still flat-earthers, you know).

And yet they most certainly do!

A sentence is semantically de re just in case it permits substitution of co-designating terms salva veritate. Otherwise, it is semantically de dicto.

Jack believes that a broken clock is working.
Jack believes that that particular clock is working.
Jack mistakenly believes that a broken clock is working.
Jack mistakenly believes that that particular clock is working.

I just do not see how this distinction helps anything at all here, particularly with those who object to saying Jack believes that a broken clock is working. I employ Leibniz and salva veritate in my own substitution rules.

Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is?
— creativesoul

Yep that would be my presupposition — neomac

Do you not see the absurdity in this? Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?

The point of this exercise, on my end anyway, is to show how the consequences of conventional accounting practices are absurd, like saying that we cannot look at a broken clock and believe what it says.

More relevant to our present discussion is that these are puzzles of belief attribution, and not of belief as such. That is, they do not show a problem with treating beliefs as propositional attitudes, but rather with reporting those beliefs. Those who are working on these problems accept that beliefs can be parsed as attitudes towards statements, sentences or propositions.

There are interesting issues here. — Banno

They show interesting issues with our reports, that's true. However, I find that those problematic reports are based - sometimes at least - upon a misconception of belief, as a propositional attitude notwithstanding. Jack believed a broken clock was working, but never did he believe that "the broken clock is working" was true. That's a big problem for the practice of rendering belief as a propositional attitude. Anamoly? Perhaps. Nonetheless, it shows something is wrong with the practice.

Not to mention the issues with language less belief as propositional attitude.

Thank you for the detailed response which is more than I can say about many veteran members on this site.
— Harry Hindu

He'll learn. — Banno

Indeed, he will.

In other words, other folks have come across this tricky conundrum and have set a rule in place to remedy the specific confusion you're wrestling with. — ZzzoneiroCosm

To the best of my knowledge, the broken clock belief has yet to have been properly accounted for in Russell's example. In the defense of convention, the point being made was not about the way that Russell took the man's belief into account. Rather, it was about whether or not we're justified in believing clocks. The fact that it was broken wasn't considered, as a result of the man's ignorance of the fact that it was, and thus his ignorance of the fact that he believed a broken clock.

A toddler runs toward a woman walking with her partner in a park, the toddler’s father runs after him, and, knowing that couple from the neighbourhood, explains to the surprised partner: “my sun believes that your wife is his mum”. Of course the toddler knows nothing about the marital relationship between the partner and the woman, he doesn’t even have the concept of “marriage”, nor “motherhood” for that matter, as shared by adults, therefore the father’s belief ascription is not de dicto (what would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler’s belief?), yet this de re belief ascription is epistemologically plausible to the father and the couple based on their background and shared understanding of the situation. — neomac

You're the one invoking the dichotomy. I'm guessing it's an utterly inadequate one, like most other historically philosophical ones.

You tell me...

What would be a de dicto rendering of that toddler's belief? I mean, ought we not all do our own work?

:wink:

Your claim is misleading for 2 reasons: 1. De re belief ascriptions make absolutely sense in some cases (e.g. when we try to solve belief ascriptions ambiguities wrt other subjects’ contextual and shared background understanding of the situation [1]), yet it’s not correctness the ground for de-re belief ascriptions! 2. Your de re belief ascription about Jack is based on a de-contextualised assumption that the description “that brocken clock” is correct by hypothesis (an assumption that nobody would take for granted in controversial real cases b/c even your belief ascriptions are beliefs after all!). — neomac

Is that supposed to be clearer and more accurate somehow than just admitting that we can mistakenly believe that a broken clock is working?

I don’t see what JTB about knowledge has to do with our understanding of belief ascriptions. — neomac

It has everything to do with it, for it is the basis of belief as propositional attitude.

Your understanding of belief ascriptions is biased by your philosophical understanding of propositional attitudes. While de dicto/de re belief ascriptions have an appropriate usage and make sanse to competent speakers independently from your ideas about propositional attitudes.
And there is a strong reason to prefer de dicto belief ascriptions over de re ascriptions b/c the former ones generally explain better believers’ intentional behavior, than the latter (assumed they are both correct). — neomac

My understanding of belief ascriptions is based upon my understanding of belief; how it is formed. how it becomes meaningful to the creature, what it consists of, what it is existentially dependent upon, and so forth...

Are you of the position that Jack cannot believe that a broken clock is working when he looks at it to find out what time it is?

Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.

He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true. — creativesoul

Jack believed a broken clock was working.
— creativesoul

Sure. But jack did no believe that: a broken clock was working. All you have done is to stuff up the parsing of Jack's belief. — Banno

First you agree with my saying that Jack believed a broken clock was working, then you add a colon and claim he did not believe a broken clock was working...

Is that a magic colon? I mean, does it somehow change Jack's belief?

Help me out here. I think we agree, based upon your "Sure..." answer.

It seems that we both agree that although he believed a broken clock was working, during the time he did, that he would not assent to that belief if rendered in propositional form. In other words, while believing that a broken clock was working, he would not have an attitude towards "a broken clock is working" such that he believed it to be true. Furthermore, that after becoming aware of his error, he would no longer hold the belief, but would readily acknowledge that he had indeed believed that a broken clock was working.

Are we in agreement here?

Jack's mistaken belief that the clock is working when it actually isn't doesn't imply that beliefs are nonpropositional. Am I missing something here? — Agent Smith

No. Jack's mistaken belief has propositional content. A cat's cannot. Both can be rendered using propositions.

We know that substituting within the scope of a propositional attitude need not preserve truth value... — Banno

That is one of the places where convention goes wrong. That's Gettier's foothold as well. Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Smith believed that he would get the job. The substitutions made changed the truth conditions and thus the meaning of the beliefs. In both cases, as explained earlier, when we make such substitutions, we are no longer talking about Jack's or Smith's belief.

Take a couple of English sentences with their relative translations in French:
A1) Alice loves Jim
A2) Jim is loved by Alice
B1) Alice aime Jim
B2) Jim est aimé par Alice
I would take all 4 statements to be about the same state-of-affairs (and you?). Yet B1 is a correct translation of A1 only, and B2 of A2 only. If it was true that the translation is based on reference to the same state-of-affairs then both B1 and B2 would be equally good translations of A1 or A2 indifferently. — neomac

The all share the same set of truth conditions. So, in that sense they're about the same things...

Jack believed a broken clock was working. While holding such a belief, Jack cannot have an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock was working" such that he believed it to be true. It could be rightfully rendered as such - but only in hindsight after becoming aware of his error. At that point in time, he would no longer believe that a broken clock was working.

He never believed "a broken clock is working" was true.

...so far as I can see you have presented no argument. — Banno

I've given the simplest of them. They've not been given subsequent due attention. Not once.

What sort of argument would you say counts as a negation if not one that shows a belief that cannot be put into the form of a propositional attitude?

Why are you looking where the problem is not showing itself?

He does not - cannot - believe that "the broken clock is working" is true while believing that the broken clock is working, because he does not know it is broken.

If we were in Jack's room...

We could show Jack the error. Jack would readily agree that he had indeed believed that that particular broken clock was working. How else does one get lucky about what time it is after looking at a broken clock, if not by virtue believing that the broken clock was working?

This goes to prove my point. We can have belief that we are unaware of. Believing that a broken clock is working is one such belief.

It makes no sense to render that belief as a propositional attitude.

That's a problem for that practice.

It was a broken clock that he believed to be working.

The first rings hollow... the second is nonsense. The sentence "that is a tree" is not about language.

How can a belief, necessarily concerning reality, be nonpropositional? — Agent Smith

In the context of this discussion...

By virtue of not having propositional content.

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it! — creativesoul

Are you objecting to the above quote?

But you want to say more than just this, don't you? Somehow this is supposed to show the be;eifs are not propositional.

Fill in the gap. — Banno

What I said was enough. I admire your brevity, when it's appropriate. I'll mimic.

I'm genuinely confused by your hesitance to agree.

Russell, Gettier, and Moore all took JTB to task. It's not survived very well. No one seems to have figured out what the problem was because those who've been convinced by those critics still hold on to the same conventional notions that gave all three their foothold. Rendering human belief as propositional attitude has remained as a structural ledger. That's quite unfortunate, because that rendering was, and it remains to be a structural problem. It's not entirely wrong. It's just that not all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes, and thus those exceptions cannot be sensibly rendered in those terms. That's what my broken clock example shows us, and quite clearly it seems to me.

We can and do know that at that particular time, and in that particular situation, they most certainly had to have believed that that particular clock was working, for there is no other way to come away believing what it said.

Jack - mistakenly - believed that a broken clock was dependable; read true; was running; was trustworthy; was where he ought look to find out what time it was; etc. Hid did not know that it was broken, but he most certainly believed it!

"I believe that clock is working"?

or

"I believe that stopped clock is working"?

Which version most accurately says, implies or suggests what Jack actually believes? — ZzzoneiroCosm

He does not believe the propositional form of the belief that he actually holds about a broken clock. That's the whole point of showing how that practice fails. Hence, the earlier allusion to Moore's paradox...

Okay folks, it's been a fun couple weeks, but I've got more productive things in life to do. Will be spending much much less time around here.

Be well to all...

:flower:

Which account is true?

Is it just any clock, or it is one that stopped?

The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true. — Agent Smith

If that is the case, then it is also the case that either language less creatures cannot have belief or propositions do not need language. Seems to me that a proposition is what is being proposed. We always propose things using language. So, holding that the content of belief is propositional leads one to the conclusion that language less creatures cannot have belief.

That conclusion is false. Language less animals can have belief. So...

Either propositions do not require language, which they do, or it is not the case that belief content is propositional. It is not the case that all belief content is propositional.

The scope of possible rightful application would be any and all claims and/or positions that are about human thought and belief, and any and all claims based upon those.

Scope could not be much broader.

The implications become known only as a result of critically assessing the aforementioned positions in light of what I've been arguing. I've done much of the work already here, in this thread. Moore. Gettier. Russell. All three simplified while adding some much needed clarity. Occam's razor applies.

If your side of this debate became orthodoxy, what would the implications be for this branch of philosophy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The position I've been putting forth spans several branches.