What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?
— creativesoul

I answered that already. Belief contents express the point of view... — neomac

Cats sometimes believe that a mouse ran behind a tree...

It makes no sense at all to me to say that the cat's belief has content that expresses the cat's point of view.

...we need your theory of meaning and truth... — neomac

Much, arguably most, of the groundwork has already been offered, here in this very discussion...

I misunderstood your argument because this is how you presented it: — neomac

Has nothing to do with failing to read the next few lines...

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...
— creativesoul

Well if we accept all your premises (and I haven't accepted any so far) maybe you are right... — neomac

Maybe I am right if you do not.

:brow:

A true belief cannot be false. A false belief cannot be true. It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Do you agree with all four of the above tenets?

:brow:

Why are you changing the example again?
You should write: It is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working
And not: It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. — neomac

Either works for me. I'm not picky about it. The only difference is that one is more general while the other(the one you prefer) is about a particular broken clock.

...if only 1 is the accurate report of Jack’s mistaken belief, then your requirement is at best necessary... — neomac

Which is all it takes to show how convention has been in error...

What grounds the truth of the claim — neomac

That question makes no sense on my view.

Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

This is a perfect example of begging the question argument — neomac

:worry:

We cannot knowingly believe that a broken clock is working.

...you should explain why it is impossible to knowingly believe it... — neomac

:yikes:

See above. There is no need for further explanation. I've more than adequately explained several times over in a variety of ways.

Jack can not knowingly believe that broken clock is working because “that broken clock is working” is a linguistic form of a contradiction. — neomac

Well yes and no. Jack cannot knowingly believe "that broken clock is working" is true, because it is a contradiction in terms, necessarily false, etc. That's all about language use. Jack's belief is not.

It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working, because if we know it is broken, we also know it is not working, and thus we cannot believe that it is. That has nothing to do with the sentence being a contradiction and everything to do with knowing that broken clocks do not work.

Jack believes that broken clock is working.

The above report is in proper linguistic form. It is accurate. It is true. It is impossible to knowingly believe that a broken clock is working. That's all that was meant by "proper linguistic form". Jack was mistaken. It is impossible to knowingly be. Thus, a proper rendering of Jack's belief will come in a linguistic form that is impossible to knowingly believe.

The sentence "That broken clock is working" is a contradiction in terms.

It's always the same question... — neomac

That's not true. You're mistaken.

I'll answer whatever questions you like, so long as they follow from what I'm arguing or are just plain ole simple questions about basic facts that seem to cause an issue for my position if and when my position is held in light of those facts. I've no problem at all bearing the burden of my claims. Questions based upon non sequiturs are another matter altogether.

I'm asking you (7th time): in the belief report that you claim more accurate, namely "At time t1, Jack believes that broken clock was working.", I see 3 items: broken, clock, was working. Explain what each of them stands for. Start from was working. — neomac

Here's what you've done...

You've broken down the basic belief report that I am arguing for(At time t1, Jack believed that that broken clock was working) into disparate bits of language use, which is to say that you're not focusing upon the meaningful set of marks I've presented, as I've presented them. Then... you're really asking me what the words "is working" stand for, as if - when isolated from the rest of the report - they stand for something that I bear the burden of elaborating upon?

What is it that you believe can be gleaned here by virtue of this procedure of yours? What does that question have to do anything we've discussed? Explain to me the relevance of the question. If it is relevant, I'll be glad to answer it. Teach me something new. I'm always game for that.




You've been asking, in more than one way, how I've tied this novel understanding of "belief" that I have into my report/account of Jack's belief. You held two claims(well... parts of them anyway) beside one another, basically asking me to explain their congruence. You asked about Jack's belief in terms of correlations drawn. It seemed that you wanted to know how I made sense of belief as correlations when it came to Jack's belief at time t1. I've obliged. I've set that out a number of times. The response was basically rhetorical huffing and puffing followed by some insults and handwaving. Simply put, you've ignored and deflected.

All belief consists entirely of correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so.

At time t1, Jack believed that a broken clock was working. Jack's belief consisted of all the meaningful correlations he drew while wondering what time it was and then looking at a broken clock to find an answer to his question. The content of the correlations Jack drew at that time are the content of Jack's belief at that time. So, I simplified the answer for ease of understanding. The non propositional content included Jack's wondering what time it was, and a broken clock. That satisfies the criterion perfectly.

It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood; to knowingly be mistaken; to knowingly form, have, or hold false belief. Jack's belief is false. Thus, when Jack's false belief is put into proper linguistic form, it will be impossible to knowingly believe.

Propositions are not.

the belief content is the fitness condition expressed by the completive clause — neomac

Could you elaborate?

you are using these three items to determine the non propositional content of Jack's belief — neomac

No, I'm not.

the non-propositional content you attribute to Jack is... ..."Jack believes that broken clock is working" — neomac

No, it is not.

You are conflating the content of my report with the content of Jack's belief.

The content of Jack's belief are correlations drawn by Jack between directly and indirectly perceptible things. That would include the broken clock and his wondering what time it was, amongst other things less relevant. That's at least the fourth time I've said that and answered your question. It's fishy that you act as if I've avoided it.

my primary task is not to develop a theory of belief, but to understand as much as I can the logic of our common belief attribution practices. — neomac

Logical notation? The form of belief attribution? "The logic"???

How can anyone establish what counts as acceptable and/or unacceptable attribution of belief to another if there is no standard regarding what counts as belief? We're faced with the dire need for an adequate minimal criterion for belief which, when satisfied by some candidate or another, warrants concluding that that candidate counts as a belief.

What exactly would we be attributing to another when ascribing some belief to them, if we did not already have an idea of what beliefs are?

This especially comes to the forefront when ascribing belief to language less creatures.

the primary explanatory task for you is to exactly and completely explain the difference between propositional and non-propositional belief content as you understand it — neomac

The former includes propositions. The latter does not.

That is why I asked you to give me the full non-propositional content which Jack is not aware of believing (and can not knowingly believe true) when you claim of him "Jack believes that broken clock is working". There are 3 items in this non-propositional "brocken" "clock" and "is working" — neomac

While words are not propositions, on my view, the content of Jack's belief is not words either. The correlations he draws at the time as a means for believing what the clock says do not include language use. Those words are not being thought by Jack at time t1. Jack is wondering what time it is, so he looks towards a clock to know. That's the way it happens. This is well established habit, to the point of it's being nearly autonomous. That is to say that it is something done without much thought at all about the clock aside from believing what it says. We do not look to a clock and think silently or aloud "I believe that that clock is working". We just don't. That's just not how it works. That is a metacognitive endeavor. Believing a broken clock is not.

To give the full non-propositional content is impossible. There's no way to know that much and to set such a standard is unacceptable as a result of this sound consideration. Omniscience is neither possible nor necessary here. I mean, I'm not defending the God of Abraham. By the way, it doesn't matter which notion/sense of "proposition" you're using, they are all fatally flawed. It's just that some are flawed differently than others.

The basic arguments are simple.

Either propositions exist completely independently of all language use in some way such that a language less creature is capable of having an attitude and/or disposition towards them, or language less creatures do not have belief. I've yet to have seen a notion/sense of "proposition" that succeeds here. Hence, many who hold such a view(belief as propositional attitude) reject the idea of language less belief.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Language less creature's have belief. Therefore, belief are not equivalent to propositional attitudes.

Much the same holds good for claiming all belief has propositional content.

In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" is better than "that broken clock is working" because that clock is working can be either true or false, while "that broken clock is working" is contradictory so always false i.e. it can not adequately express a case of ignorance. — neomac

Sure it can adequately express a case of ignorance. I mean, it is impossible to knowingly believe that broken clock is working(treat this as if we are pointing at the clock). So, when one believes that broken clock is working, it is most certainly a case of ignorance. Jack's is precisely such a case.

While it is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood, it is not impossible to believe one. Jack's belief is false. We know this. It cannot be either true or false. Jack's belief can only be false. Therefore, if we say that he believes a falsehood(as compared/contrasted to just being mistaken), then our report of Jack's belief ought produce a candidate that is impossible to knowingly believe. Falsehoods are language constructs on par with false assertions. So...

The candidate "that clock is working" is not impossible to knowingly believe. Jack's belief is false, and all false belief is impossible to knowingly believe. Therefore, "that clock is working" cannot be what Jack believes.

If we say that Jack holds false or mistaken belief, then our report ought produce a candidate that is impossible to knowingly believe.



If, at time t1, we're pointing at the clock and saying Jack believes that clock is working, we could be saying that the content of his belief is not equivalent to a proposition because clocks are not, and his belief is about that particular clock. All of this would be true for he does indeed believe that particular clock to be working. So, our report would seem fine. However, if we're aiming at the most accurate or precise description of the content of Jack's belief, we cannot leave out the fact that that particular clock, which has become meaningful to Jack as a result of his belief formation, is a broken one.

It is as a result of Jack's belief not being propositional in content, that our saying that he believes that that broken clock is working does not attribute a contradictory belief to Jack, because it is only the words that are contradictory. Jack's belief does not consist of those words. Jack's belief that that broken clock is working consists of correlations drawn between the broken clock and his wondering what time it was. Jack's belief that that broken clock is working does not have propositional content. It's not belief about the words I just used to report upon it. It's not belief about assertions, sentences, utterances, or any other language use. It's belief about a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. Thus, Jack's belief that that particular broken clock is working does not have propositional content.

Jack's belief has that broken clock as it's content, in very large part at least. The broken clock is not all there is to Jack's belief(for it is a complex one indeed with other necessary prerequisites), but without that particular broken clock to look at, Jack's belief would not have been formed at all.

Jack's belief would pose no problem at all if it were not broken. Perhaps that's why there is such a fervor to leave that much out.

Belief contents express the point of view (the intrinsic fitness conditions) of Jack's believing attitudes which best explain his behavior in the given circumstances at t1. In the case of false beliefs due to ignorance and not irrationality "that clock is working" — neomac

So you're saying that those words in quotes are the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

Why is it not a proposition — Michael Sol

What does the word "it" refer to?

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.

At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?
— creativesoul
Yes I do. — neomac

Okay, good.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

If it were the case that, at time t1, Jack's belief was "a clock is working", then Jack's belief would be true, because somewhere at that time, a clock was working. Jack's belief about the clock was false.

What is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

...what is more critical, is that this rendering allows you to keep unclear what constitutes non-propositional belief contents. Which is what you should still explain to support your claims. — neomac

Belief that does not consist of propositions consists of other things... trees and mice and spatiotemporal relationships between them... for example. Broken clocks and wondering what time it is, for yet another.

Not all belief amounts to believing that p.

Notice that this claim is a de re belief ascription analogous to "Jack believes of that broken clock that is working" (which I was talking about a while ago) where the expression "the broken clock" is outside the completive clause of the predicate "to believe", and within the semantic scope of the one who makes the belief ascription. — neomac

If any of that or all of that and possibly more leads you to believe that the content of Jack's belief cannot be a broken clock, in large part at least, and that broken clocks are not propositions, then I don't know what to tell you honestly without sounding like a grumpy old guy...

Bewitched.

"The clock is both working and not working"is a proposition that is necessarily false. — Banno

What does that have to do with the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

To each and every detractor:What, in the fewest exact terms as possible, is the content of Jack's belief at time t1?

You're not interested in discussing how belief that a broken clock is working does not have propositional content.

Stick around and learn something.

Can you give me an example of a belief that is not a Proposition? — Michael Sol

The answer has been given over and over for the last ten or so pages.

Believing that a broken clock is working is not a proposition.

We have the ability to use propositions to talk about Jack's belief, as well as language less creatures'. It does not follow that the belief is propositional in content. It follows that our reports are.

No, he isn't. Jack is "drawing correlations that include the words 'a [ ] clock is working.'" So his belief is propositional. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You've just attributed true belief to Jack. Jack's belief is false.

What seems to be an underlying issue here is whether or not it makes sense for me to say that at time t1, Jack believes that a broken clock is working. It does, but that does not seem to have been rightly understood. Some have argued that I am attributing a contradictory belief to Jack. That argument is based upon a fair amount of misunderstanding, all of which stems from a reading of my accounting practice based upon the mistaken tenets of mutually exclusive accounting practices.

As they are written, the words "a broken clock is working" could be rightly said to introduce a nonsensical utterance if and when that judgment is based upon the obvious failure of using the terms in congruence with everyday linguistic practices. I totally agree that such an utterance is either meaningless nonsense or else incoherent if and when we're judging the coherency of the language use(the words as they are written). We do not use the term "broken" to describe things that are not. It is also the case that such an utterance simply cannot be true. It is never true. It is incapable of being so for other reasons as well. It is literally a contradiction in terms.

So...

Based upon all this, some have concluded that when I say that at time t1, Jack believes a broken clock is working, that I am attributing to him a belief that is nonsensical and/or contradictory, and that it is impossible to hold such a belief. It is not impossible to hold such a belief. It is only impossible to knowingly hold it. Jack does not know that he holds it. They do not understand that I am not attributing those words to him as though his belief consisted of those words, which would be contradictory and/or nonsensical. Rather, as I said in so many words at the very beginning of this particular dispute, I am attributing to him an attitude towards the broken clock such that he believes it to be a reliable source of information regarding what time it was. That's what we do when we look to clocks to tell the time.

It seems that my objectors/detractors do not understand that the content of Jack's belief is not propositional. He is not drawing correlations that include the words "a broken clock is working". It is only if he were doing so, it is only if I said he were doing so, that I would be guilty as charged regarding attributing a contradictory belief to Jack. Jack's belief does not come in propositional form, unless "a broken clock is working" counts as a proposition. I do not think that it does, regardless of which sense of "proposition" we're considering.

It seems that my objectors do not understand that all false belief, each and every one, is had by a creature completely unaware of having it while they do. They do not understand that it is impossible to knowingly have false belief, to knowingly believe a falsehood, and/or to knowingly be mistaken. But we have false belief, we believe falsehoods, and we are most certainly mistaken at times, nonetheless. They do not understand that when we become aware that some belief we have is false, it is no longer even possible to continue having it.

They do not understand that an accurate report of false belief will provide that which is and would be impossible to knowingly believe.

Propositions are not.

We are talking about the beliefs underlying the terms of the proposition, right? — Michael Sol

I'm not even sure what that is supposed to mean, so I hesitate to answer either way.

The matter under contention was whether or not all belief content is propositional. That was what the original debate between Banno and myself was about. The current discussion began by my claiming that conventional practices cannot properly account for belief like Jack's. The alternative renderings have all sorts of problems like some have left the broken clock out of Jack's belief altogether. Others are true belief, when we know Jack's was false. Others add words that do not change the fact that Jack believed what a broken clock said(so to speak).

There are only a couple of alternatives that are not guilty of at least one of these errors. Those are the interesting ones to me. Neo seems to be grasping at the straws of misattribution as a means to find flaw in what I've been presenting. There are a few simple true statements about belief that go a long way in supporting what I've been arguing here in addition to driving a death knell into the coffin of the idea that all belief are equivalent to propositional attitudes.

True belief cannot be false. False belief cannot be true. It is impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. It is impossible to knowingly be mistaken.

The tenets directly above place any and all attempts at rendering false belief in terms of propositional attitudes in serious trouble.


Jack is unaware that he believes a broken clock while he does. Jack's not talking about it at the time. Jack's also not even thinking about his own belief at the time.

I'm also not all that impressed with what counts as being "logically correct" these days. I reject the purported rules of 'logical' entailment, for example. I can and have shown how they are in error. Gettier and all...

Uh, isn't this a lot of parsing for no real good reason? If we were not trying to study language and, specifically, the Proposition, for clues as to Reality, why would we care? — Michael Sol

It's about belief. Get that wrong and you have gotten all sorts of things wrong. I could not care less about the failings of convention. It just so happens that, weirdly enough, many of the problems are dissolved by my understanding of belief.

Belief is not equivalent to propositions, or attitudes towards them. Convention has yet to have figured this out, evidently.

So it seems that one thing you want is to compare/contrast the respective renderings of Jack's belief at time t1.

At time t1, Jack believed that clock was working.

At time t1, Jack believed that broken clock was working.

You're claiming the first is more accurate. I'm claiming the second is.

Prior to continuing... Do you agree with that much?

The practice you've been using sometimes attributes true belief to one who holds false belief.

a false belief is not a contradictory belief — neomac

False belief cannot be knowingly held.

At time t1, Jack believed of a broken clock that it was working.

This example also seems to come in a form that is impossible for Jack to believe at the time. However, there are a few unnecessary terms. The terms "of" and "that it" are superfluous. We can remove them entirely and lose nothing meaningful. The simplest explanation is the best provided there is no loss in explanatory power. Occam's razor applies. We are left with...

At time t1, Jack believed a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

There is loss of explanatory power, b/c by removing those parts you are attributing to Jack a contradictory belief so you can not distinguish a case of ignorance from a case of irrational belief... — neomac

I've not attributed contradictory belief to Jack. It's always a case of ignorance when one believes a broken clock.

First three methodological considerations:
1. If you want to answer my questions you should specify which ones by quoting them and then answer them. If you think they are flawed, you should specify which ones by quoting them and explain why they are flawed — neomac

That's neither a methodological concern, nor consideration.

If I spent the limited time available going over all of the problematic and/or invalid questions, concerns, and/or objections that you've raised in order to explain the issues with them, no time would be left for the relevant concerns(of which there are a few). I've already quoted you in recent past, and subsequently explained the problems. The response ignored the issues and aimed at me personally.

If you claim that we can establish if “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, based on what we take belief to be, and your definition of belief is “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”, then I expect you to show exactly how this definition helps you establish “At t1, Jack believes that broken clock is working” is more accurate than “At t1, Jack believes that clock is working”, all the more because you claim that your definition of belief is of “immense explanatory power”. But in your last post you never used such a definition. That’s fishy. — neomac

There you go again, making claims for me that I've not made.

I've already explained Jack's belief in terms of correlations being drawn between a particular broken clock and Jack's own inquisition regarding what time it was. In fact, I've explained Jack's belief at time t1 in as many congruent but different ways as I see possible.




What's fishy is your acting otherwise.

What's fishy is when one individual holds another to a strict standard that they themselves cannot meet.

What's fishy is when one individual makes a concerted effort to cast doubt upon another's notion of belief after handwaving away and/or glossing over the fact that their own notion has been found wanting.

There are 2 distinct tasks in our common belief ascription practices: to identify a belief and to assess its truth-value. — neomac

Jack's belief at time t1 is false no matter how it has been parsed. You've offered and we've discussed some candidates that were true. I've objected to those based upon that.

Besides, a belief that is not analytically false, can be either true or false (for logic reasons)

Some beliefs are the sort of things that can be either true or false. I mean, not all belief are true. Not all belief are false. Not all belief are truth apt at the time. However, no true belief are false, and no false belief are true. So, if it is the case that we know that a belief is false, it makes no sense to say that it could have been true. No. It could not have been.

I mean we would need to stipulate an entirely different set of circumstances with a different clock in order to support such a possible world, and in doing so, lose sight of this one by completely changing the content of Jack's belief.

What would it have taken in order for Jack's belief that that particular clock was working to have been true at time t1?

If that particular clock at time t1 had been working, Jack’s belief would have been true.
— neomac

Is it possible for broken clocks to work? — creativesoul

No... — neomac

Then Jack's belief could not have been true. That particular clock could not have been working, for it was a broken one.

At t1, Jack believes that p (first task) — neomac

Believing that a broken clock is working is not something that can be properly taken account of by such practices. If we use them and correctly attribute the belief that a broken clock is working to Jack, we end up saying that he believed the proposition, which is a contradiction in terms. This is what you are doing, not me. Hence, you keep claiming over and over again that I am attributing a contradictory belief to Jack when I am not. You are.

You presented "a broken clock is working" as a contradiction. Going on to then say that I am attributing a contradictory belief to Jack by saying Jack believes that a broken clock is working at time t1.

I did not say that Jack believed "a broken clock is working".

Evidently you do not see the difference between believing "a broken clock is working" and believing a broken clock is working. The former is belief about language use, and the latter is belief about broken clocks. The former has propositional content. The latter has broken clocks as content. The former is amenable to and basically amounts to saying that Jack believes the statement at time t1, or that Jack holds some attitude or disposition towards that particular proposition at time t1. Neither of those claims are true.

I am rejecting that parsing of Jack's belief altogether. Jack's attitude and/or disposition is neither about nor towards a proposition. To quite the contrary, Jack's belief is all about the trustworthiness of one particular broken clock. His disposition and/or attitude, if he can be said to have one, is towards the clock, not propositions about or involving the clock.

There are mistaken and/or false beliefs such as these influencing our lives, thoughts, and behaviours that we are completely unaware of. Jack has exactly such belief. These sorts of beliefs are those which we could not knowingly believe. Such beliefs cannot be anything other than mistaken and/or false. Hence, when reporting upon another's false belief, our accounting practices, if the gold standard is accuracy or truth, ought produce examples of belief that cannot be knowingly believed/held.

At time t1, Jack believed of a broken clock that it was working.

This example also seems to come in a form that is impossible for Jack to believe at the time. However, there are a few unnecessary terms. The terms "of" and "that it" are superfluous. We can remove them entirely and lose nothing meaningful. The simplest explanation is the best provided there is no loss in explanatory power. Occam's razor applies. We are left with...

At time t1, Jack believed a broken clock was working.