So you're including what you know about Jack's belief in your account of Jack's belief. What justification do you have for including that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why would what I know about Jack's belief not be included in my account thereof? It's my account afterall.

I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm the one making the positive assertion. The burden of proof is mine. Should you say I'm wrong, the burden of showing how is on you. I've more than satisfied my burden.

Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic... — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's one way to put it. It's not the job of common language to take proper account of propositional logic. If common language talks about things that propositional logic is incapable of, then we ought not fault the common language, for common language is not the accounting practice that has been found lacking...

Should your account of Jack's belief reflect what he doesn't know about his belief? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It should if Jack's belief is false.

I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same.

Your account of what Jack knows about his belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Jack's belief is false. Jack does not know that. My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't.

Some Trump followers believe a lie. They do not know that there was not wide-spread election fraud significant enough to have altered the outcome of the 2020 election. They believe there was. Their belief is false. We know this about their belief. They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Believing that a stopped clock is working is no different in that regard. We can know Jack's belief is false. Jack cannot. The clock was stopped. His belief was about that stopped clock. He did not know it was stopped. Hence, otherwise he would not be able to believe that it was working.

It's not that difficult to understand...

Is it?

The importance of rigid designators...

The first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?

To my view the two should match. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?

Surely not.

How about this:

First, lets substitute 'a' for 'the'.

Jack believes a stopped clock is working.

What is Jack's belief about? We have to say: A stopped clock.

Can Jack have a belief about a stopped clock if he doesn't know that he's looking at a stopped clock? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I've seen no good reason for denying that we can. Available evidence proves we do. I would venture to say that surveys would show us that it happens far too frequently to deny without sticking our heads in the sand.

Here's my question to anyone who denies this much...

What reasoning and/or justificatory ground could we possibly offer for doubting that we can look at a stopped clock and mistakenly believe that it is working? Surely, we do not surmise such a counterintuitive thought based upon the fact that we do not know it has stopped. That's makes no effin sense at all. As if we must know that a clock is not working in order to believe that it is?

That's patent nonsense. Reductio ad absurdum.

Jack believed that a stopped clock was working. His belief was about a stopped clock, despite the fact that he did not know it had stopped. We cannot say the same about ourselves...

Cue Moore's paradox...

The reason 'why' we can say that it is raining outside, and that another person does not believe it but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is simple. We cannot know when we're mistaken unless the mistake is somehow pointed out to us and/or otherwise brought to our attention. It always takes another, in some way shape or form, to show us our mistakes. Another's explanation is necessary for us to become aware of our own false belief.


Occam's razor applies.

In other words: even though the clock is stopped, Jack's belief isn't about - a stopped clock. it's about a clock. — ZzzoneiroCosm

See if this helps at all...

Jack does not know that the clock he believes to be running has stopped. Jack does not know that his belief about the broken clock is false. We do.

The cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree. <------that's holding a belief.

The cat's owner saw the same events. The owner also believes a mouse is behind the tree, and that "a mouse is behind the tree" is true.<--------------that's holding something to be true.

I need you to show me an example of the difference between holding a belief and holding something to be true — Harry Hindu

Read the opening and second posts in the debate.

I see no reason to suppose that in order to have a belief one must be aware of the fact that they do. Not all belief anyway. Let's say Jack became aware of how he had luckily arrived at his true belief that it was three o'clock by virtue of having the fact that he believed that that stopped clock was working explained to him in those terms. If asked, he would certainly agree that he had believed that that particular stopped clock was working. How else would he come to believe that it was three o'clock after looking at it?

I'm just at a complete loss to explain how any objection to this makes sense in light of what I've put forth here. It's as if the simplest of adequate explanations for some of the simplest beliefs can no longer be understood as a result of placing far too much unquestioned faith in some of the conventional accounting (mal)practices historically and currently used for taking an account of belief.

We can and do have some beliefs without knowing that we do...

the relation between intension and intention. — Banno

The simplest explanation is the best, assuming there is no loss in explanatory power.

What I've presented here is as easily understood as it is explained. It's true and verifiable. It is impossible to believe that it's three o'clock after having looked at a clock that says so without believing that that clock is working. The same holds good of looking at and believing stopped clocks.

What twaddle.
— Banno

There we have it. It's all twaddle. :smile:

"Twaddle" is a nice word. :smile: — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yeah. That's odd to me. Not the word. The word I've seen and used. Odd that Banno would object to such a clear cut case.

For Pete's sake...

If we knew it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!

If we believed it was not running, we would not believe that it was telling us the right time!

We believed it was telling us the right time, because we believed that that particular stopped clock was working!

When we want to know what time it is, and we look towards a clock to tell us the answer, we believe that that clock is telling us the right time. We believe that that clock is running. If that clock is broken, we believe that a broken clock is telling us the right time.

We do not know that that clock is broken. We do not believe that that clock is broken. We believe that that broken clock is telling us the right time.

I don't think it is really accurate to say that he believed the clock was working, because if he had thought about it — Janus

There it is!

If he had thought about his belief that that particular clock was working...

Why would he do that? He wasn't engaged in a metacognitive endeavor. He was wondering what time it was. We do not go around second guessing such things as whether or not all our clocks are running when we look to them to know what time it is. We believe that they're working, unless there is some blatant-in-our-face-reasons to doubt that.

Where's the ambiguity? We're talking about a particular clock, a particular person, and a particular belief that that person has about that particular clock.

Are we taking our critical thinking caps off?

So, Jack looked at a clock that he did not believe to be working in order to tell time?

I'm amazed here. What is so difficult to understand about the stopped clock? I think it goes to show us how mistaken convention can turn into dogma.

I am denying that it makes sense to say that Jack believed a stopped clock was working — Janus

Was the clock he believed to be working not stopped?

...Jack didn't know the clock was stopped. So he didn't believe a stopped clock was working, he believed a clock was working. — Janus

Jack believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was one that had stopped. Jack believed that a stopped clock was working.

Which premiss are you denying?

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that the stopped clock was working?

As am I.

My own...

Influence? The scope is far too broad to say. Some influence is unknown as well.

:wink:

There are arguments made throughout that thread. It's been quite a while since I've read it, but I am confident that the outline could be put to good use here, for I'm rather certain that it's past use has influenced my contributions.

There's much to be read here

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?
— creativesoul

I see what you're saying... — ZzzoneiroCosm

Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form?

:smirk:

Would you like to see the basic ontological arguments/framework grounding the claims regarding language less belief? We were heading there earlier, but then you changed your line of pursuit. No problem from here. You're free to do as you please, of course.

We are thinking about belief here. So, the meta-perspective is par for the course. It's not a flaw, it's a feature of our doing so. We can know that Jack's belief is false without Jack knowing it. Moore's paradox is also relevant here, for the exact same reasons. The task at hand is an accurate accounting practice of another's belief. When another's belief is false, they do not - cannot - know that much. We can.

That said...

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?

To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said. — Janus

There are some crucial distinctions to be drawn and maintained when discussing belief.

If Jack wants to know what time it is, and he unknowingly looks at a clock that has stopped working at 3 o'clock, and by coincidence it was 3 when he looked, then Jack will believe it is 3 o'clock. But that's not the end of the story here regarding Jack's relevant belief, for belief is not equivalent to a single statement/proposition that can severed and isolated from the individual's worldview as a means for examination. That's what convention does and has done. It's been a mistake to do so, for beliefs are far more entwined with one another, and sometimes when we sever them, we do so at the peril of our own understanding. Russell's clock shows this well.

Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. So, he did not have an attitude such that he held that proposition to be true, but he clearly must have believed that that clock was working, otherwise he could not have arrived at the belief that it was 3 o'clock. Change the time on the stopped clock in the example, and what I'm saying becomes undeniable.

This poses significant issues for the notion of belief as propositional attitude, for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer. However, it would be if and when Jack became aware of his mistake(his own false belief). If it was pointed out to Jack, he would certainly agree that he had believed that the broken clock was working.

...i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed. — Harry Hindu

No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.

A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.

the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true — Harry Hindu

Yes.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form? — Harry Hindu

Correlations.

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? — Harry Hindu

Yes.

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. — Harry Hindu

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.

What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true.

I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into. — Harry Hindu

Indeed.

I'm not sure what you're doing here recently. The quality of your contributions has taken a sudden slide downhill... Too bad.

You're conflating your account with what's being taken into account.

While you both seem fine with not incorporating meaning into this discussion concerning the content and form of language less belief, I'm not. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it. So, it seems to me that meaning is always a part of belief.

So, before humans... reality took the form of a proposition: subject-predicate?

We know better.

when taken account of with naming and describing practices.
— creativesoul
I don't think you need this bit. I don't think the naming and taking account play a role. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Denying the role of naming and descriptive practices seems to miss the boat entirely.

From whence comes propositional form, if not as a direct result from naming and descriptive practices?

To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said. — Janus

I've no issue talking in terms of belief being about something.

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true.
— creativesoul
I'm not sure that I see the difference. — Harry Hindu

As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so.