This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language
— Banno

Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?
— creativesoul

Of course we can be wrong.

We can be wrong without knowing in what way we can be wrong. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Undoubtedly, it is quite possible(probable even) to be wrong without knowing in what way. However, discussing some of the ways that we can be is not impossible, and I find it necessary for understanding all belief, from the language less about events to those about events including language use through those about belief and language use itself.

If it's certainty you're looking for you had better start with ascription. Otherwise, you'll have to begin with an inference or assumption: there are languageless creatures who hold languageless beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I granted that we ascribe beliefs to language less creatures because we do, and I like to work from agreement. That was one.

We could also 'start' with an assumption or inference, but I'm not keen on saying that we're starting this endeavor with any of those suggestions. Afterall, we are where we are in this discussion as a result of a long history of socially constructed narratives, and without such a history the words we're using would be meaningless. The starting point of belief formation, if there is such a thing(it sounds wrong as a result of belief having no spatiotemporal location) is none of the three suggestions.

Does the cat (fallen among language-users) have a beetle in its box? Maybe, maybe not. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I would think that the private language arguments are inapplicable to language less belief.

This ought be re-parsed as simply that we ascribe beliefs, and all the ensuing intentional structure, to creatures that do not have language. — Banno

Indeed. We most certainly do. Can we be wrong, and if so in what way?

All languageless belief, though non-propositional, takes the general form of a proposition and can be apprehended or expressed in the form of a proposition by a language-using creature. — ZzzoneiroCosm

All things we name and describe, though some are non-propositional in their content, take the general form of a proposition when taken account of with naming and describing practices.

As compared to believe that - event/situation - is true? I've no issue that I see with belief - that - event situation, but it's the "is true" part that is problematic for me.

So then, back to where we were...

What can we know, beyond any doubt, about language less belief?

If X is equal to a mouse is behind a tree, then X is either the belief or the events/situation. Are you saying that in the belief that approach it is the latter of the two? Because it seems to me that it is the former.

To me that's very close to saying the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means (signifies; is correctly* associated with the idea that) there might be a tasty treat in the kitchen. — ZzzoneiroCosm

This sounds more like the conventional theories of meaning which presuppose symbolism. I'm not averse to them entirely.

Obsession is a kind of inspiration. I'm familiar with it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I find it absolutely necessary in order to achieve many goals, particularly those involving inventing new things. Novelty.

Obsessed. :lol:

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?
— creativesoul

Yes, and in so equating, how does belief-that-X not entail an upheld implicit attitude that X corresponds to what is - thereby, the implicit attitude that X is? An attitude what leads to some form of surprise or bewilderment when and if it turns out that the mouse is not behind the tree. — javra

Having an attitude that X corresponds to what is amounts entirely to an attitude about X. If X is the belief, then having an attitude towards X is having an attitude towards the belief. Do you see the problem here?

Playing around

My own appraisal is that you’ve misread what I’ve said: entails the attitude that X is true; not the fact that X is true. — javra

Perhaps, but is it of any consequence?

X equals there is a mouse behind the tree does it not?

Are those the only options, and are our options mutually exclusive? I would say that the first steps would be more of an armchair approach to set out the necessary criterion. What counts as a language less belief? There are certain things we already know cannot be included in such belief.

I reject the rules of entailment on the grounds that using them to characterize another's belief can lead us to say that another believes something that they do not. Gettier shows this nicely. The rules of entailment allow a change to the truth conditions of Smith's belief, which is to change the meaning of his belief entirely, and proceed to talk about something other than what Smith believes. So, just because "I have ten coins in my pocket and I will get the job" entails "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", it does not follow that Smith's belief was true because it was not about someone else, it was about himself, and thus, his belief could only be true if he got the job. The second case is a bit more complex, but amounts to the same thing; an accounting malpractice.

That much aside...

The belief that approach is about statements of belief. Language less creatures do not make those. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree requires only a creature capable of directly perceiving the events leading up to the situation. A cat can believe that a mouse is behind a tree without having the attitude that "a mouse is behind a tree" is true. The former is about the mouse, the tree, and the relationship between them, whereas the latter is about the belief.

How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?
— creativesoul

It sets a boundary to our philosophical forays. We'll run up against the unknowns of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So, because language less animals cannot speak, it makes it impossible for us to know what language less belief is about or what it consists of? Surely, we need not know everything about language less belief in order to know some things about it. There will always be unknowns. I say that a very disciplined approach to what we can and do know will yield results that are both well-grounded and true.

Can you exemplify a belief-that-X wherein X is not upheld to be true? — javra

If you go to the opening post of this thread, you'll find a link to the debate that this thread is about. My opening post in that debate does exactly that.

When I say the cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen I mean the cat has made an association between the sound and the treat. I don't mean the cat is able to think about its beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I've no qualm with that. As before, I agree that the sound is meaningful to the cat, and it seems we also agree upon how it became so. It was the bit about the cat holding the account to be true that was the problem.

If by "holding a belief" you mean having the psychical capacity to think about one's beliefs, sure, then probably a cat doesn't hold beliefs. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I do not. The ability to think about one's beliefs is not equivalent to the ability to hold and/or have beliefs. Clearly the former is existentially dependent upon the latter. I've no issue with saying that cats can have and hold beliefs about what's happened, is happening, or is about to happen.

We don't know what goes on in the mind of languageless creatures. They won't tell. :) — ZzzoneiroCosm

Indeed. They will neither confirm nor deny with language use. They won't tell. Banno has said much the same thing on any number of occasions, telling me to ask Jack(his cat of days gone by).

How does this make it impossible for us to glean knowledge about language less belief?

Name calling is not nice.

:wink:

b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
— creativesoul

I think here is the point of disagreement.

So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?

Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche. — ZzzoneiroCosm

While I agree that that is one point of divergence between our positions, I'm not keen on invoking psychological terminology. It seems unnecessary, and looks to be quite unhelpful for the task at hand. It has made the issue even more complex than it already is, and in doing so increased entities without adding clarity. I do not share the belief that the task aims at the unknown, or unknowable. Although acquiring knowledge of language less belief requires a stringent methodology replete with certain specific criteria based upon actual differences, it's certainly not a 'fait accompli' situation. The questions can be put as...

1.What sort of things are held to be true?
2.What does holding things to be true require such that some creatures are capable of doing so while others are not?

There is an actual distinction to be drawn and maintained between holding something as true and holding a belief, for they are not always the same, even though some beliefs are held to be true. This may seem to be splitting hairs, but it is imperative to do so for that distinction both honors and subsequently bridges the gap between belief and thinking about belief, whereas the latter requires language use, and is necessary for holding something to be true. Such belief is about language use, and amounts to a charitable reading of Banno's position(belief as an attitude towards some statement/proposition such that they believe it to be true).

I cannot possibly stress how many 'different' historical philosophical problems arose from neglecting that actual distinction(between belief and thinking about belief). From Plato/Socrates to Aristotle to Locke, Hume, and Kant to Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, all the way through Frege, Russell, Witty, and Moore to Gettier to Quine, Davidson, Rorty, Chalmers, Searle, Dennett, and beyond, there's been a gross misconception of belief at work, and accounting malpractices thereof have been and remain the result.

The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?

All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm

"The sound of the electric can opener means that there might be something tasty in the kitchen" is an accounting practice. Attributing that practice to a language less creature is a mistake; a conflation of belief and thinking about belief. What you've suggested is an example of thinking about belief. All thinking about belief requires language use.

While I've no issue agreeing that that account is an accurate enough one regarding what the sound means to the cat, I do not agree that the cat also holds the account to be true. The cat cannot hold an accounting practice to be true, for it cannot understand such practices, and in order to hold something as true, one must first understand what's being held so. At the very least, one must believe they do.

In this example, it makes perfect sense to me for us to say that when the cat hears the can opener it believes it is about to eat, thinks so, even expects to, or perhaps that it thinks or believes there is or will be food in the kitchen, so it goes to check.

Interesting. On my own view, the cat draws correlations between the sound and eating afterwards, and that's how the sound becomes meaningful. The notion of association works okay here too. To be clear, that is a very basic and incomplete account, for those meaningful correlations are far more complex by virtue of including far more things, but simplicity is good for now.

I'm still struggling to understand how the cat holds the meaning to be true.

To me, it hears the sound, it believes it is about to eat as a result of drawing much the same correlations that made the sound meaningful to it to begin with.

While I hold that language less belief can be true, I think that holding something as true requires a.)something that can be true in addition to b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. Seems to me that meaning is not the sort of thing that can be true, and the cat is not capable of holding something to be true.

A bit more background regarding my position...

Meaning is required for correspondence with the way things were, are, and/or will be. Meaning is required for coherency. Meaning is required for truth conditions. Indeed, it seems clear to me that meaning and truth are inextricably entwined in belief. However, holding something to be true and holding true belief seem to have remarkably different necessary preconditions.


I wanted to say a bit more about this...

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I agree that statements are not always necessary in order for a capable creature to attribute meaning(for things to become meaningful to that creature).

Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)?

The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.

The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.

I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

You're correct that our positions differ here.

I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view?

Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus

I've little to no issue with the claim that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. That's what we do when taking account of another's belief. My issue arises when we conflate the content of our reports with the content of what we're reporting on.

I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:

How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul

Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus

Yeah! That's the one I could not find. I think that expectation is belief about what's not yet happened. I'm not at all keen on the idea of propositional form somehow existing in such a way that a language less creature's belief could be a kind thereof.

I'm not at all inclined to speak in phenomenological terms. So, if the conventional notion of intention means being of and/or about something, then I find it best to talk in those terms, unless "intention" adds explanatory power that is otherwise somehow missing without it.

The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus

That's the way I've always understood it. However, that understanding has been challenged as incorrect by a few around here.

Akin in saying that all you can say is that we can know that there are unknowns...

This:
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
— creativesoul

--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation. — ZzzoneiroCosm

On my view, the only things we hold to be true(in the relevant sense) are statements. On yours, are there other things that are capable of being held true, such that a language less creature would be capable of doing so?

So where Banno is content to say an unknown is statable, creative would like to place the unknown beyond the "limits of language." This is the portion of his world beyond the limits of language. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Nice summary! Indeed, on my view the unknown is akin to Kant's Noumena in that very specific way.

...we have an unknown that you say is statable but at this time no one on earth and nothing in the universe can state it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That reminds me of "falsifiable", when it comes to true statements. Seems to me that true statements cannot be false, therefore are not able to be falsified or shown as false. I'm probably just not understanding correctly though.

:wink:

I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That makes perfect sense, for they were further set out in the second post.

1.)Beliefs about events, particularly those that can happen in places and times where naming and descriptive practices are non-existent. Believing that a mouse is behind a tree serves as an example thereof. These might be described as language-less beliefs, for they are not at all about language.
2.)Beliefs about events that can be and/or are uttered by an unreflective* language user(*say someone learning how to use names and descriptive practices such as a young child). One who sees a mouse run behind a tree and then states "A mouse is behind the tree" offers one such example.
3.)Beliefs about whether or not some statement is true.

The first two are about events. The third is about language use, particularly whether or not some statement is true.

A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Indeed. Understood. Trump is a symptom of much deeper issues in the US I'm afraid. I think that I've a fairly decent grasp of how the ground was cultivated over the nation's history, with particular interest on the past fifty years in order to give Trump a foothold, but that's too far off the main topic here... for now at least. Perhaps we could circle back later if the right circumstances arise.

Be well.

I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures. — neomac

I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.

Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe. — neomac

I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion...

Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken. — creativesoul

Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working.

I'm unsure of the difference between those. What do you mean?

To be clear, I'm here because the topic is of great interest to me personally, and I'm fairly certain that understanding how belief works is imperative, crucial even, to understanding ourselves and the world around us. I'm here because I've found doing philosophy with certain individuals has provided enrichment to my life. Banno is one such individual, although certainly not the only one.

So, could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect?

Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? — neomac

The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. Beliefs do not refer to anything. Names do that.

I do think you've set out something that can be used to help improve the discussion, and move it along.

I've no issue with claiming that some belief amounts to an attitude towards some proposition. To be clear. Just not all. We could say that such belief are linguistic - resulting from correlations including language use. Whereas non linguistic would be those resulting from correlations not including language use. I'm not married to that taxonomy, but there needs to be something of that sort.

Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What do you mean "not"? Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion.

Putting language less creatures' belief into the form of a propositional attitude does not make the belief have propositional content. It makes it able to be described using propositional content. Those are two very different claims, and you noted as much yourself, not long ago earlier today.

The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks. — creativesoul

You asked for a distinction. There it is. Seems simple enough to me.