I’m distinguishing between the relationship structure it defines and the more complex relation it refers to. — Possibility

What does the term "it" pick out here to the exclusion of all else?

...you don't consider " plausible premises" to be already more than mere logical possibility? — Janus

Perhaps. You've made me regret writing "plausible premisses"...

:wink:

If it is the case that in order for some statement or other to be true, certain other things must have happened and/or be happening, and we know that they have not, or that they are not, then there is no warrant to believe the statement under consideration despite it's being logically possible.

‘Causality’ as signifying a meaningful relation ignores the limited understanding of relationship structure to which it refers, and claims to signify the whole relationship. The ‘relationship that exists in its entirety prior to meaning’ here refers to an ‘event horizon’ of sorts: awareness of a more complex qualitative structure that transcends the meaningful relation we define as ‘causality’. Same with ‘spatio-temporal relationships’. — Possibility

What do the scarequotes mean? Are you talking about the words themselves? — creativesoul

...

Or perhaps I’m just approaching it from a perspective that you’re struggling to relate to - it certainly wouldn’t be the first time... — Possibility

I thought you were asking about my position...

I have to ask: by exist, do you mean in relation to a self-conscious subject? — Possibility

That's one kind of relationship.

tell us what would make a belief warranted. — Janus

More than just logical possibility alone.

.. being coherent is not by itself reason for believing... that much is obvious — Janus

Do you agree that a belief system's being reasonable requires only coherence and plausible premisses? — creativesoul

Those conditions seem uncontroversial. — Janus

Ok, then surely you'll take the next step, and realize that the following is not true.

If it is reasonable it must be warranted... — Janus

Everyone has beliefs — Wayfarer

Indeed, and all statements thereof are meaningful to the creature making them, and presuppose truth, insincerely made ones notwithstanding.

In other words, is ‘meaningful’ an inherent property of some relations, or a possible attribute of all relations? — Possibility

Are those the only options?

:yikes:

If some relations can exist ‘prior to’ meaning, and some cannot exist as a meaningful relation in absence of a self-conscious subject, who’s to say it isn’t the same relation, which exists meaningfully only in the presence of a self-conscious subject, yet also exists in its absence, ‘prior to’ or regardless of meaning? — Possibility

I don't think you grasp what's being written. Some more connections need to be made.

Causality is an example of a relationship that exists in it's entirety prior to meaning. Spatiotemporal relationships are another. Shame is a relationship that cannot exist in the absence of a self-conscious subject.

Are you really asking me who's to say those aren't the same relation?

:brow:

That for something to be reasonable it must be warranted? — Janus

.. being coherent is not by itself reason for believing... that much is obvious — Janus

Ok. Do you agree that a belief system's being reasonable requires only coherence and plausible premisses?

Thought. — Sir2u

:smile:

I should have further qualified... some things... are in relation to a self-conscious subject, and cannot exist in absence thereof.

Edited to add:

Oh, never-mind. I already had properly quantified that claim.

Given the ending, I would say that that much is clear.

Being reasonable(coherent) means following the rules of correct inference. A belief system can be both perfectly reasonable(coherent) and false. Thus, being reasonable(coherency alone) does not guarantee truth. Given that all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and coherency alone(being reasonable) does not guarantee truth, it only follows that being reasonable(coherency alone) does not constitute sufficient/adequate reason for our assent/belief(warrant).

Not all...

As always.

:lol:

If it is reasonable it must be warranted,
— Janus

...I think that is what is in contention. — Banno

Yep.

Logical possibility alone does not constitute sufficient reason to believe(does not warrant belief).

I do not just mean that things exist in relation to a self-conscious subject, but some meaningful relations certainly do, and cannot exist in absence thereof.

Funny thing is that I read the entire OP without ever speaking aloud.

Meaning without purpose, aye? Can you demonstrate that? — praxis

Well, I'm not sure what would count as a successful demonstration to you, but I could try...

Touching fire causes pain. One can learn that touching fire causes pain by virtue of touching fire, feeling pain, and drawing a correlation between the touching and the resulting pain. The fire becomes meaningful to the creature by virtue of doing so. The creature has attributed/recognized causality, and has done so correctly in this case.

Where would purpose fit into this? The creature didn't aim to get burnt.

...would you agree that any possible relation is meaningful? — Possibility

I wouldn't. I would completely agree that many relationships exist prior to any and all language use(causality, spatiotemporal, symbiotic, existential dependency, elemental constituency, significance, familial, biological, etc.); that some relations do not(they depend upon language use for language use is part of the relationship); that some language dependent meaningful relations exist prior to an individual language user's acquisition thereof; that some relationships exist prior to meaning; etc..

...but I would not agree that all relations(or any possible relation) are(is) meaningful.

"Meaning exists in it's entirety long before we've acquired the means to discover and/or take proper account of it" was just making the point that (some)meaning exists in it's entirety prior to language. — creativesoul

So you’re saying that meaning may exist prior to language, but we have no means to discover it as such. — Possibility

I'm saying that meaning exists prior to language, and language is the means by which we can discover and take proper account of that.

How would you know that it exists fully formed, then? — Possibility

Well...

We can know that meaning exists in it's entirety prior to language use(naming and descriptive practices) by virtue of using language to acquire knowledge of how all meaningful language use works; how meaningful things become meaningful to us; how successful communication happens; how all successful translation happens; how all meaningful thought and belief that are formed via language use can be, and then discovering that there is a basic autonomous process underlying all this that makes it all possible, and that that process does not require naming and descriptive practices to be a part of it. Rather, we can know that language use becomes part of this already ongoing process, adding to it's complexity.

We can know that meaning exists in it's entirety prior to language use(naming and descriptive practices) by virtue of knowing that language-less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought and belief about what's happened, is happening, and/or is about to happen, in very much the same way we do(by virtue of the same basic process) and knowing that all thought and belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it.

Purpose.

It's the aim of all translation... — creativesoul

Aside from the bit above, I'd say that that's as close as any other besides...

Meaning. All purpose is full of meaning. Not all meaning is full of purpose.

Hey Praxis!

Hope this finds you well.

To say that meaning emerges by virtue of drawing correlations only ‘between different things’ rules out the possibility of meaning emerging from a correlation between a ‘thing’ and some undiscovered existence of meaning. — Possibility

This deserves revisitation.

That's not what I said.

Can't wait for the disappointing answer to this hot mess of a riddle. — Nils Loc

A nice bit of rhetoric. Lacks quite a bit of meaning. Enough to sound profound to some, I'm sure. Not I.

It's also poisoning the well.

Either way, I misinterpreted your statement here:

It exists in it's entirety long before we've acquired the means to discover and/or take proper account of it.
— creativesoul

as existing prior to emerging. — Possibility

I see. Understandable.

"Meaning exists in it's entirety long before we've acquired the means to discover and/or take proper account of it" was just making the point that (some)meaning exists in it's entirety prior to language.

In the above, we could exchange "exists" with "emerges" and lose nothing meaningful. Emergent meaning is newly formed. I would not agree that meaning exists prior to being formed, although I realize that several schools of thought believe otherwise.

Yup. The Kantian difference. Judgement as a talent.

:wink:

Be well.

Those are meaningful things.

...given that meaning exists before it emerges... — Possibility

That's not a given. How can something exist before existing? Emergence is coming into existence.

To say that meaning emerges by virtue of drawing correlations only ‘between different things’ rules out the possibility of meaning emerging from a correlation between a ‘thing’ and some undiscovered existence of meaning. — Possibility

I'm not sure what you're saying here. Could you provide an example of some undiscovered existence of meaning?

Witt is helpful in expanding our understanding of what all goes into some meaningful expression or another. Witt's failures(on my view) are what so many people hold with high regard(the claims about not being able to get beneath language, the limits of one's language is the limits of one's world, and that sort of thing). Those are the sorts of considerations that made it so tempting to link him to folk like Heiddy. Both had a clue of the impact that language has upon one's life and worldview, but Witt's was just an inkling of a clue that could not be developed to the extent that understanding results as a result of his pre-existing beliefs being too unshakable. Heiddy just failed to make much sense because he did not quite have the basics down in order to be able to effectively take proper account of the affects/effects that language use has upon it's users.

Anyway, I'm busy in real life. Sorry if I seem short here, but my full attention is needed elsewhere.

Take care. Be well. Until next time...

:flower:

There are multiple sensible uses of the term "belief". Not everyone knows and/or uses them all. Some of them are in direct conflict with others.

That does not bode well for what you've been arguing here.

...what is meaningful to us are our shared judgments. — Antony Nickles

That's quite the impoverished notion of what is meaningful to us...

I believe my work is done here.

I'm not sure what metacognitive means — Antony Nickles

Thinking about thought, belief, and language use as topics and/or subject matters in their own right.

My only quibble that I can see is that it emerges by virtue of drawing correlations, full stop — Possibility

Cool. I'm listening. Quibble away.

:wink:

Not that we don't have misunderstandings, but that it is not a confusion between your meaning and my understanding — Antony Nickles

A misunderstanding is a lack of shared meaning.

Usually, when one misunderstands another, they've misattributed meaning somewhere along the way. However, in the case of Mrs. Malaprop, understanding another requires misattributing meaning to the speaker's actual words, because those words were misspoken to begin with. Hence, both speaker and listener misattribute meaning to the speakers own words, and successful communication happens despite the speaker's mistaken language use.

What a boring bunch.

:mask: :smirk: :mask:

he examples we imagine are even how they are used in philosophy but they have to be put in a context--which traditional philosophy doesn't do--of when we express our concepts, like "believing"... — Antony Nickles

Concepts...

Muddle on top of misunderstanding.

We aren't discriminating between "uses"... — Antony Nickles

Sure we are. It's a bit curious that you'd deny that that's exactly what we're doing.

Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition. — Antony Nickles

Those who hold that all belief content is propositional are using different senses of the term "belief", ones that cannot possibly take proper account of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language use unless they somehow attempt to claim that propositions can exist prior to language in such a way so that they can be the content of language-less belief. All propositions are proposed. All propositions require language. Language-less belief cannot. Thus, such a notion(that all belief content is propositional) leads - on pains of coherency alone - to a denial of language-less thought and belief.

Like that?

:wink:

We arrive at different acceptable senses of the same term.

Then what?

:brow: