We do not have the kind of knowledge about our own minds; about our own thought and belief; about our own imaginings, experience; worldview; about our own operative influences that I'm talking about simply by virtue of growing up and learning English at the same time. If such knowledge acquisition were that easy, none of us would be wrong. — creativesoul
That doesn't answer the question. You clearly disagree with the dictionary definition which states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You already agreed earlier that our disagreement was over whether or not rules must be made explicit: — Luke
That is, unless you can explain how "explicit or understood" means only "explicit". — Luke
What do you mean by "Your use"? I posted a link to a Wikipedia article. — Luke
There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity". — Luke
Oh? What does the OED definition #1 say? — Luke
Don't blow a gasket, sweetheart. I never mentioned the word "agreement".
You asked how can a rule be public if it is not explicitly stated. I indicated my answer by linking to the Wikipedia article on conventions. It appears you do not disagree that conventions are public, nor that conventions are not explicitly stated. Perhaps you disagree that conventions are rules? Your argument appears to be that conventions cannot be rules because it isn't necessary to follow conventions. But how are explicitly stated rules any different in that respect? Rules are made to be broken, as they say.
If there is any sort of agreement in conventions, then "This is not agreement in opinions, but rather in form of life" (PI 241). Google defines "convention" (in the relevant sense) as: "a way in which something is usually done." Is this a rule? Well, I'd say it is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity", so yes. — Luke
What's nonsense is your relentless twisting of words and meaning. The dictionary definition of the word "rule" states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". According to your own personal defintion of the word "rule", you want to exclude the "understood" and leave only the "explicit". — Luke
Let's sort out what a rule is first, and then we can discuss rule following. — Luke
A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true.
— creativesoul
And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement? — Mww
Part of what Witt is trying to do is elevate the publicness of our communication. — Antony Nickles
That I disagree with a proposed definition does not mean that I think it is incorrect, it simply means that it's not a definition I would use for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover
Language allows for the existence of rules, which are expressed via language, and therefore cannot exist without language. — Metaphysician Undercover
We will not ever sort this out, because it always depends on how the word is used, in context. Otherwise, I will refer to definition #1 "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform", and you will refer to definition #2 a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things", and we will always disagree as to "what a rule is". — Metaphysician Undercover
I've asked a few different questions, and raised a few different concerns. Do you believe that you've answered and attended to those satisfactorily? — creativesoul
Upon what ground, by what standard are we further discriminating between different uses, aside from some are native, common, everyday uses and some are not? * * * By what measure to we intend to judge which of these terminological uses is worth saving and which deserves forgetting? * * * Which is more valuable to us, as an accounting practice, and how? — creativesoul
"575. When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed [had the hyposthesis] it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing... — Antony Nickles
Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition. — Antony Nickles
We aren't discriminating between "uses"... — Antony Nickles
he examples we imagine are even how they are used in philosophy but they have to be put in a context--which traditional philosophy doesn't do--of when we express our concepts, like "believing"... — Antony Nickles
The approach depends upon a metacognitive endeavor; to make that which remains implicit, explicit. Exposing and/or discovering the implicit content of some particular language use is the aim of the OLP endeavor. It is an aim that is satisfied solely by virtue of offering an adequate account thereof. — creativesoul
All accounting practices require something to be taken account of, something to take account of it, a means in order to do so, and a creature capable of doing it.
Hopefully I've accounted for all of this.
— creativesoul
OLP is taking account of... how it takes account. — creativesoul
The aim is the implicit meaningful content accompanying specific instances of ordinary language use. — creativesoul
Not that we don't have misunderstandings, but that it is not a confusion between your meaning and my understanding — Antony Nickles
I'm not sure what metacognitive means — Antony Nickles
...what is meaningful to us are our shared judgments. — Antony Nickles
"575. When I sat down on this chair, of course I believed [had the hyposthesis] it would bear me. I had no thought of its possibly collapsing...
— Antony Nickles
When one has never even had the thought of the chair collapsing, there could be no possible belief that it would not. Believing a chair will bear our weight is to consider whether or not it will collapse under our weight, and believing that it will not. — creativesoul
Then these claimed criteria of our concepts like thinking, knowing, intending have to account for the issues of the philosophical tradition.
— Antony Nickles
Those who hold that all belief content is propositional are using different senses of the term "belief" that cannot possibly take proper account of belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language use. Thus, such a notion leads - on pains of coherency alone - to a denial of language-less thought and belief.
Like that? — creativesoul
If you could, would you mind revisiting the post where I described Gettier's mistake? Imagine, before you do, that I'm employing a similar approach to OLP. I'm setting out what Smith(anyone and everyone in that same situation) must mean if he's(they are) talking about himself(themselves), which he purportedly is.
"Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona". — creativesoul
I'm not sure what metacognitive means
— Antony Nickles
Thinking about thought, belief, and language use as topics and/or subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul
There are multiple sensible uses of the term "belief". Not everyone knows and/or uses them all. Some of them are in direct conflict with others. — creativesoul
Witt's failures(on my view) are what so many people hold with high regard(the claims about not being able to get beneath language, the limits of one's language is the limits of one's world, and that sort of thing). — creativesoul
I've no issue at all with rejecting the idea of private language. To reject private meaning however, shows an inherent inability to take adequate account of language creation and/or acquisition, successful communication, and/or the minds of any and all creatures prior to having done so. — creativesoul
What purpose? — Luke
Now that you have finally acknowledged that a rule can either be explicit or non-explicit, as per your own OED definitions #1 and #2 of the word "rule", then you must also acknowledge what I have been telling you for five pages: a rule does not have to be explicit. — Luke
Do you agree that we can move forward with our inquiry by using definition #1, and rejecting definition #2 as irrelevant? — Metaphysician Undercover
A statement can be certain and false, and uncertain and true.
— creativesoul
And? Not....or? For a, re: singular, statement?
— Mww
Yes... I left the rest unspoken... — creativesoul
Because some belief statements can be both uncertain and true, and certain but false, it only follows that certainty has nothing at all to do with truth. — creativesoul
The attempt to create a dichotomy between belief and knowledge is asinine. It's akin to creating a dichotomy between an orange and a valencia orange. Knowledge is a kind of belief. — creativesoul
There's a delicious irony here: you demonstrate that you have understood my point that a rule can be defined as either #1 or #2 - as explicit or understood - but you refuse to explicitly state that you were wrong. I have no interest in "moving forward" with "our inquiry", thanks. — Luke
I repeatedly said that you can use "rule", or define it however you want. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no rule which dictates how "rule" must be used or defined, that was my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you now want to argue that you can give "rule" whichever definition you want, #1, #2, or any other random definition — Metaphysician Undercover
in reference to that particular context in which it has been used, then the actual context of that particular usage gives me grounds to judge your proposal as right or wrong. Notice that I am not referring to a rule to make this judgement, I am referring to the particular context. — Metaphysician Undercover
You were the one arguing that such rules of usage exist. — Metaphysician Undercover
139. When someone says the word “cube” to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind when I understand it in this way?
Yes; but on the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp at a stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?
Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word “cube”, say the drawing of a cube. In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”? — Perhaps you say: “It’s quite simple; if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.” — But doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.
The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently. — Wittgenstein, PI
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