We're pretty far apart...

Overlooking the idea of "ordinary language use"... — Antony Nickles

Seems quite an irrational move, remarkably so even, given that ordinary language is one of many irrevocably crucial elemental constituents of ordinary language philosophy.

One would think/believe.

It is an OLP claim that structurally, categorically, the process and identity of believing is not the same as that of thinking. — Antony Nickles

We can think about something without believing it. So, they are different. However, the process of believing is fundamentally the same as thinking. Both consist entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between different things. It is only when one becomes aware of their own fallibility that the two are no longer the same. It is only when we begin to consider whether or not some thought or belief are true, that there can be a difference between thought and belief(that we can think of something without believing it). Generally that is some proposition or another or perhaps carefully contemplating some foreign linguistic framework/conceptual scheme.


I'm not even sure how many different acceptable uses/senses/meanings are attributed to the words "ordinary language philosophy". Thinking about which popular philosopher is and which popular philosopher is not rightfully called some name or another presupposes a criteria or standard for what counts as such. The same problematic scenario underlies many philosophical discussions, and the following questions ought be asked with regard to so many of our own conceptions, notions, ideas, thoughts, and/or beliefs about the world and/or ourselves.

Does the name in question pick out that which existed in it's entirety prior to our picking it out of this world to the exclusion of all else? Are we the final arbiter; do we have the final say, regarding what counts as an "insert name here"?

It's worth mention that the ground of a "no true scotsman" is a refusal to accept that other people use the same name to pick out very different things(what counts as, or the set of characteristics that one must have in order to be rightfully called "a scotsman" - or - the referent of "scotsman", in this case).

However...

It quite simply does not follow from the fact that there is more than one use for the same term that all uses have equal footing, are equally justified, are equally warranted, have equal explanatory power, do the same thing, afford us the same capabilities, etc.

So...

What is the benefit of our taking such a careful account of, and/or placing such high regard upon ordinary language use?

Well...

Our account of everyday ordinary language use must meet certain standards in order for it to be true. Those standards are nothing less than the way that different people across the globe use the same terms.

What's philosophically interesting to me is that we begin to use language as a means to communicate our thoughts, beliefs, needs, wants, desires, expectations, etc. long before we begin taking account of our already having done so; long before we begin talking about doing so; long before we begin to consider our own thought and belief as a subject matter in and of itself. So, in this way, ordinary common use has primacy in that our account of that use can be quite wrong.

Has the conventional academic use "belief" become something quite different than the ordinary everyday use(s) of those same marks? Does academic convention pick out the same things as everyday ordinary people? If academia has altered the use of ordinary terms, and the different senses of the term are incompatible with one another, if the one negates the other, then which sense warrants our assent?

By what measure do we then further discriminate between the two incommensurate notions/ideas?

How are we to possibly determine which of two equally coherent uses of "belief" is better? Coherency is the result of consistent terminological use. If all use of "thought" were different to all use of "belief", then it would not ever be the case that either "thought" or "belief" could be used without meaningful loss. Much more often than not, they can.

Thinking that a mouse ran behind a tree is belief about the location of the mouse. Believing that a mouse ran behind a tree is thinking about the location of the mouse.

That the connection between logic and reality is a deeply contested issue in contemporary philosophy? — Wayfarer

Presupposing...

...that there is only one connection between logic and reality...

...is a problem.

Hey Jeep!

:smile:

Hope life is treating you kindly.

If legitimacy is attributed to different things that follow the rules that govern how we behave in our lives(the laws of the land), if it is what we say about things recognized within a legal framework, then illegitimacy is what we say of things lacking in those regards.

It says nothing at all about genuine, authentic, or real.

Your use of "conversely" was a bit of rhetoric, as is the purported 'definition' of that use of "legitimacy".

Not all things genuine, real, or authentic are also legal.

Sounds false to me.

More broadly, means 'fixed in law' or 'recognised within a legal framework'. It can therefore be both a moral topic, and a political tool. To claim that something is illegitimate is to denigrate it, conversely, something 'legitimate' is authentic, genuine, or real. — Wayfarer

Do you agree with the above, as it is written?

Because it's good to have a good time. Enjoi your beer, and don't forget to tip your bartender and wear your mask...

:mask:

So your beliefs are composed of actual mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables, rather than visuals and feelings OF mice, trees, cups, cupboards and tables? Lazy thinking on your part. — Harry Hindu

Of course. My beliefs about my cat include the cat. A visual of a cat may not.

Lazy thinking?

Pfft.

:zip:

Harnessing limitless clean energy from magma is a good idea. — counterpunch

I wonder. What are the environmental consequences of doing so? Does the process disturb the natural subterranean environment? Are there any changes in the pressure of the lava chambers/tubes closer to the surface in the surrounding areas?

Don't piss Pele off!

:razz:

Have a good time!

You ask 'how is he great?' He fully approves of himself, that's how. — Bartricks

:rofl:

He tell you that?

What about the rules of logical entailment; do those count as the laws of logic?

What are you talking about when you say "laws of logic"?

I can talk about the content of...
— creativesoul

... a correlation?

Or is it already the content? Of a belief? Or is it the belief? — bongo fury

The content of any and all belief is only understood and/or known by considering the correlation(s) being drawn by the creature in question. The content of any and all belief is naturally limited to and facilitated by biological machinery; that is to say that the content of any creature's belief is naturally limited to what is made possible by virtue of their biological capabilities. This next bit of paving ought go uncontested.

The content of each and every(all) belief includes exactly and only the things being correlated one to another by the very creature drawing the correlations; by the very creature associating between the different things; by the very creature that is making connections between the different directly perceptible things(at first, anyway); by the very creature that is attributing/recognizing causality; by the very creature attributing meaning; by the very creature having conscious experience.

Thus...

A creature devoid of the ocular structures we currently deem necessary and/or responsible for our color vision capabilities will not draw correlations between visible light, the visually perceptible effects/affects of reflected light(color emission), and anything else. A creature devoid of those ocular structure can directly perceive red cups. However, it cannot possibly perceive the color aspect at all, due to the not having the necessary biological machinery to do so. The color of, and/or reflected by the cup, is simply incapable of ever being or becoming part of the experience of such a creature. No such creature can form belief about red or experience red in any way, shape, or form unless it is a creature capable of directly perceiving any single one of a number of different particular ranges of frequencies within the visible light spectrum that we've long since named "red", and drawing a correlation between red and something else.

A creature devoid of olfaction definition will not draw correlations between the smell of an apple pie and anything else. A creature cannot actually form belief about or experience the smell of an apple pie, unless it is a creature capable of smelling apple pies. A creature that cannot smell an apple pie cannot possibly know what it means when someone says that they smell an apple pie, even if they know what counts as "an apple pie".

A creature devoid of language will not draw correlations between language use and anything else, unless it is a creature amidst language creation and/or acquisition. The very ability to create and/or use language requires a creature capable of drawing correlations between language use and other things. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language.



The process of drawing correlations between different things offers us as simple an outline as possible, as it very well must. It's amenable to naturally occurring evolutionary progression. It's capable of growing in it's complexity. Human belief began simply and accrued in it's complexity. An acceptable criterion/description of belief must be capable of taking proper account of all belief, ranging from the simplest through the most complex. Convention seems to be at a remarkable loss for adequate explanation/description of language-less belief, and many analytics and post-moderns outright deny that such a thing even exists. They are wrong.

Many pragmatists, analytics, and post-moderns hold that both meaning and truth are somehow, in some way, existentially dependent upon language. That is quite simply not true. Neither is. We can know that as a result of knowing that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief about what's happened, what's happening, and what has yet to have happened but is expected to(what will happen soon).

There is no such thing as meaningful true belief devoid of meaning and truth.

If we hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language use, then either meaningful true belief can somehow exist without meaning or truth(in the case of the meaningful true belief of a language-less creature), or meaningful true belief cannot be formed by a creature devoid of language; language-less creatures have no belief. Coherency demands that those who hold that meaning and truth are dependent upon language reject the very possibility that meaningful true belief can exist in it's entirety prior to language.

Any and all positions based upon the ideas that all belief presupposes truth and all truth depends upon language arrive at a crossroads of sorts - a choice to be made - when considering whether or not language-less creatures are capable of presupposing truth(having belief). Coherence alone demands rejecting the claim that language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, for all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and those who hold this view believe that truth depends upon language.

At what cost do we continue to maintain this basis of falsehood? At the cost of successfully acquiring a basic understanding of human thought and belief.

Language-less creatures most certainly form, have, and/or hold belief. If our accounting practices, if our linguistic devices, if our linguistic framework, if our conceptual schema, if our worldview, if our belief system, if our definitions, if our philosophical beliefs and/or positions cannot make sense of language-less belief while avoiding self-contradiction, then that does not constitute adequate ground for believing that language-less creatures do not have belief. To quite the contrary, it serves as more than adequate ground to realize and/or conclude that we've gone horribly wrong somewhere along the line.

If language-less creatures are capable of forming, having, and/or holding belief, if all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it, if all belief presupposes it's own truth somewhere along the line, and some language-less belief is true, then it must be the case that both meaning and the presupposition of truth somehow exist in their entirety prior to language use.

I've been setting out exactly how that happens; how truth and meaning both emerge from within the process of belief formation(drawing correlations between different things).

Does that answer your question?

:wink:

Yep, those too are part of it.
— creativesoul
What else would there be? — Harry Hindu

Mice, trees, cups, cupboards, and tables...

What does science say about what we ought do?

:brow:

Nice link. Thank you!

:smile:

I say start by completely dehydrating yourself.

Visuals, sounds, smells, feelings, etc. — Harry Hindu

Yep, those too are part of it(some of the content of some language-less belief).

Thinking in words is no different than thinking in visuals and sounds. — Harry Hindu

That is not true. All words are visuals and/or sounds. Not all visuals and sounds are words.

I can talk about the content of my cupboards. I can talk about the content of my cat's stomach. I can talk about the content of the ocean. I can talk about the content of...

I can talk about the content of the government. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the government is propositional in form.

I can talk about the content of a proposition. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of a proposition is propositional in form.

I can talk about the content of a lemon. My account comes in propositional form. It does not follow from that that the content of the lemon is propositional in form.

I've some sympathy for the idea that the limit of one's language is the limit of 'one's world', if by that we mean worldview or belief system. However, Banno proudly conflates word and world, by not drawing and maintaining the actual distinction between belief statements that are about language use and belief statements that are about mice and trees. Part of that comes as a result of overstating the strength of the case that the belief that approach makes. Another part comes from the idea that truth is unanalyzable. Another from his preference for a redundancy approach. Another from a conflation between truth as coherence and truth as correspondence.

Truth - as correspondence - is presupposed in all belief statements. That's how/why "is true" becomes a redundant use of language. However, "is true" is not equivalent to truth. "Is true" marks belief(assuming sincerity), and belief while it is necessary, is also insufficient for truth. <-----Banno would object to the necessary part, but the objection is based upon a misunderstanding. Belief is necessary for correspondence between belief and fact(what's happened) because when and where there has never been meaningful belief, there could never have been a meaningful correspondence between belief and what's happened. It's insufficient because some belief is false.

Human thought, human belief, meaning, and truth are all things that exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them. Those sorts of things are peculiar in that it requires language to become aware of them and their role in our lives, and we can most certainly get them wrong.

Since all belief is meaningful, being meaningful requires meaning, and language-less creatures can form, have, and/or hold belief, it only follows that meaning is prior to language.

The question then is what does such meaningful belief consist of? Hence, this debate.

Not propositions.

Gotcha! My better half just informed me that Turkish coffee is quite strong, and too strong for her, which is saying something. You must prefer very strong coffee. Kona is more smooth, so. You're right then. No match for what you like!

:wink:

Go dark roast then! French press is not finesse! Makes the boldest flavour.

The general form of a correlation: P(x,y) — Banno

I'm not going to allow you to continue conflating our account of another's belief with the others belief. — creativesoul

Try 100% Kona. Freshly ground and prepared with a French press.

Besides that, don't worry about me... I'm just fine! My position has served me very well in real life... I do put it into everyday practice. Yup... obsessive, but well worth it!

:wink:

Obsessive?

:gasp:

Has any philosopher ever been anything but?

:smile:

All meaning is attributed. — Banno

Ah!

An important point. I would concur!

We draw correlations between different things for all sorts of reasons, as a means for doing all sorts of things.

Talking about how we use our beliefs, or how we use language(doing things with words) neglects how we form belief. How we form belief is germane to all belief, not just how we use our beliefs, or what we do with language. I'm not even sure if it makes sense to say that language-less creatures use their beliefs, so...

I'm having trouble understanding how talk of language use is relevant to the content of language-less belief, aside from supporting the claim that all belief is correlational in content, but never admitting that much.

Did I assent to "All belief is meaningful"? Must have been a moment of weakness. — Banno

You did. Should the time ever come when I finally convince you to incorporate correlations into your position regarding meaning(and truth), I will have done my job.

:wink:

Left unexplained is how drawing a correlation is not propositional. — Banno

The latter requires language, the former does not always. That explanation has been expounded upon throughout the entire debate.

Try this:, talk of meaning here is revving the engine without engaging the clutch. — Banno

Interesting that you'd draw correlations between talking of meaning and revving the engine without engaging the clutch, and in doing so change the focal point from how things become meaningful to doing it by virtue of drawing correlations between different things...

And then expect payment for borrowing the shovel.

Better self-worth comes from working to achieve worthwhile goals. — Bitter Crank

:up:

Are you denying that all belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief?
— creativesoul

Do you have issues making sense of the above? — creativesoul

What does it do? Paraphrase it in terms of use. — Banno

It directs our attention to what we ought be paying attention to when taking account of another's belief; the content thereof.

What is meaningful and how does it become so?

I'm left a bit confused regarding how you've no problem assenting to "all belief is meaningful" but balked at "all belief is meaningful to the creature having the belief".

:brow: