It’s often said – not in so many words – that there exists an X such that 1) X provides purpose in the world, and 2) if there be no X, then there is no purpose, that the world is without purpose. By purpose I tentatively mean, subject to adjustment, that which gives ultimate underlying meaning and significance. — tim wood

"X provides purpose" is about X, where all subsequent qualification of "X" is bound by/limited to that which is capable of providing purpose. If X provides purpose, it must be the sort of thing that it makes sense to say is capable of doing so(providing purpose). For example, we could not substitute "potato chips" for 'X' and make any sense at all. Potato chips are not the sort of thing capable of providing purpose. They could help provide a feeling of satisfaction/contentment. Even then without eating them, that purported 'purpose' is left empty, unfilled, unmet, unsatisfied, unrealized. So, potato chips alone are not enough, nor are potato chips the sort of thing capable of providing purpose.

What thing(s) is(are)?

Seems to me that purpose presupposes agency. All things purposeful are so in strict relation to one's(the presupposed agents') aim, goal, prediction, and/or expectations.


The last claim in the quote at the top of the post asks the reader's acceptance of the author's potential future equivocation of the term "purpose". It also invokes "meaning" and "significance". All three presuppose agency.

Meaning and significance are not limited to providing purpose. They provide (mis)understanding. They provide a worldview. They provide the necessary preconditions for agency and hence help lay the groundwork needed for purposes to emerge. Purpose is nonexistent is complete absence of meaning and significance. Seems to me that meaning/significance is necessary but insufficient for purpose.

Thinking processes 'give' meaning and significance. The scare-quotes are intentional. By my lights, meaning and significance are not the sorts of things that can be given to another like a physical object. We could be said to 'give away' meaning and significance to another by virtue of helping them to draw correlations between the same sorts of things that we are/do.

Teaching a child how to use "tree" is a prima facie example. Teaching a child how pick oranges helps them to draw many of their own correlations between oranges and other things.

While both meaning and significance play a role in the child's mind/thought/worldview prior to learning how to pick oranges and/or call trees by name, there's no argumentative ground for attributing much along the lines of purpose to the child, as if they have one, or they've found other things useful.

Let X be at least one(although there are countless ones) creature capable of drawing correlations between different things, where at least one of those things is want/desire/aims/goals of the agent and another is a means to that end.

Without that, there is no purpose.

...religion is about the dimension of our existence called value. Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance

Metaethics is discovered IN the analysis of mundane ethics. — Constance

Religion is about metavalue, metaethics, metaaesthetics. — Constance

It follows that religion is about that which is discovered IN the analysis of mundane ethics. That's not true either. Religion was around long before we began doing that sort of analysis.

Religion is about metaphysics...
— Astrophel

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right. — creativesoul

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right.
— creativesoul

But metaphysics is not about thinking practices. — Constance

Red herring.

Some religion was before all such practices began. Not all religion is/was about thinking practices. Metaphysics IS a thinking practice. Some religion was before metaphysics.

Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry, and the narrative account is the first thing to go. — Astrophel

How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes?
— creativesoul

One discovers the basic level through inquiry. — Constance

Do you have a list of things found at the most basic level of inquiry?

If you're attempting to equate ethics with "being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights" then I'll have to walk. That makes no sense whatsoever.
— creativesoul

Just ask, what IS ethics? This is not to ask Kant's question, or MIll's, but it is a question of ontology; not what should one do, but what is the very nature of the ethical and therefore religious imposition. So, if you take no interest in such a thing, then you probably should, as you say, walk. — Constance

Who needs goalposts anyway?

Ethics is not equivalent to spinoffs and extrapolations from/of Heiddy's thought.

We move through life never questioning these engagements in a culture, and as a result, we never realize our "true" nature. — Astrophel

That's not true.

You are close when you say "It may refer to the fact that no one chooses the socioeconomic circumstances they are born into." Right. But when one does choose, she is already IN a lifestyle, a language, a body of meaningful institutions. This is one's throwness. — Astrophel

Right?

They don't get to choose so it makes no sense whatsoever to say otherwise...

Geez.

The assertion "Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry" is attributing wants to things that are incapable of forming/having them. I'd charge anthropomorphism; however, humans are not the only creatures capable of wanting things.

Philosophy is something that is practiced. Practices are not the sort of things that 'want to know' anything. Practitioners are.
— creativesoul

"Attributing wants to things"? A bit left fieldish. — Constance

Still having problems with spatiotemporal locations I see.

No, it's right there on everyone's screen!

The narrative account in question refers to the religious narrative that is the stuff that sermons are made out of, and all the bad metaphysics. Not about narrative as such. — Constance

Bullshit.

The narrative in question was all narrative.

...This is the metaphysical ground of ethics, where ethics, and therefore religion, acquires its foundation. — Constance

As if all religion is existentially dependent upon a fairly recent philosophical practice we've named metaphysics?

Nah.

Ideas' meanings are derived from the contexts in which they are found. But contexts are determinative or finite. "The world" possesses in its meaning "that which is not contextual" I am arguing. — Constance

Assertion, not argument.

I referred to metaphysics. This is about the lack of fixity our ideas have at the basic level. — Constance

Ya think?

How do you know without knowing what "the basic level" includes?

Religion is about metaphysics... — Astrophel

Nah. It did not begin by thinking about thinking practices as subject matters in their own right.

To be more considerate, given the historical timeframe of the supernatural stories, and the sheer explosion of very complex human thought and belief emerging from written language, it makes complete and perfect sense that such people used language in the ways they did to come up with such explanations for 'why' things were/are the way they were, and/or 'will be'.
— creativesoul

The Op asks, what is behind "such explanations"? — Astrophel

I didn't see that.

"Behind" here is, of course, not a determinative matter.

Nonsense.

"Behind" is one spatiotemporal location(or set thereof) based upon others. "Behind" is a spatiotemporal relation between things from a particular vantage point. This necessarily presupposes(requires) a plurality of locations. At least three.

"Behind" is also used to determine where we look, as in "Hey Bob, look at the cat. She's behind the fridge!"

Your use of the term is the single greatest determinate of how others take you to mean whatever it is that you claim to mean by such use. You do not seem to be following those 'rules'.

What "behind" means to you, good sir, determines what you mean to say, what you mean by what you say, as well as what I take you to mean after such usage had begun.

Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry, and the narrative account is the first thing to go.

The assertion "Philosophy wants to know what things are at the most basic level of inquiry" is attributing wants to things that are incapable of forming/having them. I'd charge anthropomorphism; however, humans are not the only creatures capable of wanting things.

Philosophy is something that is practiced. Practices are not the sort of things that 'want to know' anything. Practitioners are.

What would 'the most basic level of inquiry' be in complete absence of narrative account. I mean, the suggestion neglects the fact that it quite simply cannot be done. There goes the only means/method available to us for seeking such knowledge.

What does it mean to be "thrown" into a world...

I can think of a few different sensible uses of that term. It may indicate situations when/where one's spatiotemporal location is drastically changed as a result of being hurtled through the air, against their will/choosing/wishes. It may refer to all the different subjective particular circumstances during the adoption of one's initial/first worldview. It may refer to the fact that no one chooses the socioeconomic circumstances they are born into.

...being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights? Ethics does not simply deal with such things; it IS these things...

If you're attempting to equate ethics with "being thrown into disease, and countless miseries, as well as the joys, blisses, and the countless delights" then I'll have to walk. That makes no sense whatsoever.

I do not understand how that counts as being 'on the other hand'. Looks like a different way to say "what causes what", both of which refer to causality, which is what I started with. Occam's razor applies.
— creativesoul

Right. What is IN the causal matrix of the world is not causality itself, but the world that is being observed. — Astrophel

Not only is this a performative contradiction, at best, it is self-contradiction. If we put the first step earlier offered by you into practice now, we would throw out your reply here. Self-defeating, impossible, and/or unattainable standards/criterions are unacceptable.

Givenness refers to "being thrown" into a world that is foundationally indeterminate. How is it foundationally indeterminate takes one to the issue of language. Language deals with the world, but does not speak its presence, so to speak. Long and windy issue. — Astrophel

Yup. Thousands upon thousands of pages. The introduction story in On The Way To Language is some of Heiddy's best work. Too bad he wasn't around enough individual's to grasp the full meaning underlying "that which goes unspoken". He was thrown into a different world, evidently where there were not enough Japanese traditionalists around him to help build correlational content.

Value and ethics are embedded within stories. They grow with stories. They change with stories. So, to say that values and ethics are 'behind' the religious stories, as if they are somehow the basis underlying/grounding of all those stories seems suspect, eh? Cleary not all. Some. Sure.
— creativesoul

It is not the story itself, but what gave rise to the story. Jump to the chase: Religion is all about our being thrown into a world to suffer and die. — Astrophel

Jump over the burden much?

I offered the single most comprehensive description of one thing that helped give rise to religious stories. Narratives such as yours are discussing all the different conditions/subjective circumstances into which one is born in terms of "being thrown into the world". That's certainly not enough to ground the claim that values and ethics are behind all religious stories. Some values and ethics emerge by virtue of those stories. It may be impossible to separate values from the stories in some cases.

Our dispute is beside the point of this thread. Another may be on order.

How would you respond to the trolley problem?

By pointing out that it is based upon impossible scenario. If such a scenario should ever arise, there's much better ethical considerations to be had than which 'choice' one would make. The focus ought be upon how we ever got to that point to start with...

:brow:

...there was a basic problematic built into existence that gave rise to the worshipping and the rest.
— Astrophel

Yup. Ignorance of causality. — creativesoul

As in not knowing, say, disease to be caused by microbiology. — Astrophel

That's a sharper example which makes good segue into broader understanding...

If that particular ignorance of causality is combined with strong conviction that supernatural entities can and do intervene in our lives and such intervention is guided/established by that entity's(or those entities') judgment of our behaviour, the result can be people believing that sickness is somehow, in someway, caused by the entity(entities) as a direct result/effect/consequence of the individual's behaviour. Such people misunderstand(are ignorant of) causality. As you may imply, they've an idea that things happen for a 'reason', so they may have a clue about the fact that they live in a causal world/universe, but are often ignorant of exactly "what causes what". That is ignorance of causality with efficacy(not really ironic, but very curious, nonetheless). Such folk often hold unshakable belief that everything happens for a reason, and that particular reason(say for a loved one's sudden onset of terrible sickness, suffering and death) belongs to the entity. Combine all that with another strong conviction that we cannot know the 'mind' of entity, and the result is we cannot know the reason(s). This is just off the top of my head, and there's a plethora of examples/explications available. For now, suffice it to say, that when all of that was, is, and/or will remain to be the case for some time to come, the inevitable result is a gross misattribution of causal relationships(layer upon layer of belief system/worldview built upon ignorance of causality).

Of course, by my lights, the whole story is permeated through and through with anthropomorphism, but that's a topic in its own right, and is not limited to only such belief systems/worldviews. All that said...

To be more considerate, given the historical timeframe of the supernatural stories, and the sheer explosion of very complex human thought and belief emerging from written language, it makes complete and perfect sense that such people used language in the ways they did to come up with such explanations for 'why' things were/are the way they were, and/or 'will be'.

Such 'compound/complex' ignorance of causality served as purportedly solid ground for scores of different belief systems/worldviews, many, perhaps most of which included some sort of ritualistic practices("worshipping and all the rest").

Not so much about causality itself, but of what causes what. — Astrophel

The part of your reply directly above presupposes relevant significant meaningful distinction between my use of "causality" and your use of "what causes what" aside from merely being two ways of pointing out the same thing. It's odd because I'm fairly sure you agreed with what I wrote... as written.

On the other hand, the question remains, what is there that is IN the causal matrix of the world? — Astrophel

I do not understand how that counts as being 'on the other hand'. Looks like a different way to say "what causes what", both of which refer to causality, which is what I started with. Occam's razor applies.

All one can witness is movement, change, and one can quantify these in endless ways... — Astrophel

Sensible use of "movement" and "change" presupposes some thing(s) to move, some thing(s) change as well as a means of doing so.

...the world as such is simply given. — Astrophel

Presupposes a giver. Occam's razor applies.

...here we find the mystery of value and ethics. This is what is behind all those stories. — Astrophel

A mystery is behind the stories? Seems like those stories spell it all out fairly clearly. So, I see no mystery to speak of. The stories are mistaken, but clear enough to be clearly mistaken.

Value and ethics are embedded within stories. They grow with stories. They change with stories. So, to say that values and ethics are 'behind' the religious stories, as if they are somehow the basis underlying/grounding of all those stories seems suspect, eh? Cleary not all. Some. Sure.

In PI 325, Wittgenstein says the following, 'The certainty that I shall be able to go after I have had this experience-seen the formula, for instance,-is simply based on induction.' What does this mean?- 'The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction.' Does that mean that I argue to myself: 'Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?' Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?... — Richard B

I also disagree with "The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction".

Language less creatures can be certain that touching fire hurts, and rightfully so. Being burned by fire causes one to draw the correlation between the behavior and the pain(correctly attribute/recognize causality). It only takes once.

Some who've been burned learn to talk about it, others prior to being burned.

One knows that touching fire hurts by virtue of touching fire and drawing correlations/associations and/or connections between what they did and the subsequent pain. In a language less case, the experience grounds the certainty. There is no justification possible, if that requires language use.

...Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty. Is our confidence justified? - What people accept as a justification is shown by how they think and live."

A language less creatures' certainty is shown, not argued for. That certainty is based upon previous experience, and it depends - in no way, shape, or form - upon "the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty"

there was a basic problematic built into existence that gave rise to the worshipping and the rest. — Astrophel

Yup. Ignorance of causality.

I'd just like to show appreciation and support to the contributors. This thread initially piqued my interest since it seemed relevant to my own position on a few things, but given my lack of knowledge regarding formal logic, I wasn't at all certain. I've chosen silent reading until now. The recent tangents regarding the early development of human thought and belief(mind) have been interesting as well.

I've nothing much to add aside from gratitude.

Mistakes are equivalent to neither, harm nor foul. Mistakes have been made.

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience
— creativesoul

There is a physical activity understood by a certain relation; the relation is then cognized as picking oranges, and THAT is the experience. — Mww

Do you have a valid objection to what I wrote?

I’m never going to be happy with that approach.
— Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary.
— creativesoul

C’mon, man. Really? — Mww

My apologies.

Your proposal has several layers of complexity; several layers of existential dependency. We're looking for a bare minimum form of meaningful experience. We start with us. We set that out.
— creativesoul

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system.
— Mww

In the examination of “us” as the bare minimum form of the possibility of experience is itself a multi-layered complexity. — Mww

Another weird use of "I agree"; as if I said what followed it.

Your proposal is that in order for one to have meaningful experience they must at least be capable of describing the conditions of their own experience to themselves.

I would hazard a speculation... there is no human capable of doing that until long after they've already began naming and descriptive practices in full earnest... oblivious to the fact that they're learning language. Language changes the way the world is. Language changes the way the world looks.

One can be picking oranges as a very young child. Prior to potty training. One cannot describe the conditions of their own potty training until long after they experience it. It is here, at these early developmental stages that your notion of "experience" is incapable of taking proper account of basic simple forms of human thought/belief/experience.

...something we know so little about we are forced to speculate if we wish to say anything at all. — Mww

We know enough to figure some things out.

I've a more holistic approach that makes the most sense of meaningful experience as neither exclusively internal nor external, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively physical nor mental, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively material nor immaterial, but rather consisting of both.
— creativesoul

I’m never going to be happy with that approach. — Mww

Individual personal happiness is not necessary. Either meaningful experience consists of more than just internal parts/components/elements, or it does not.

Experience is an abstract conception, is entirely a mental construct, hence exclusively internal. — Mww

Nah. Maps and territories doesn't quite describe what you're doing here, but it's the same general kind of mistake. Conflation between distinct entities/things.

Picking oranges on a rainy day is neither an abstraction nor a mental construct. It's an experience. Picking oranges on a rainy day does not consist of meaningful marks. All abstract notions do. It does not require meaningful marks in order to happen. All abstract notions do.

Certainly, at numerous times prior to the emergence of humans, oranges were picked. All abstract conceptions are existentially dependent upon language use. Picking oranges is not. Where there has never been language, there could have never been any notion of "picking oranges". Picking oranges quite simply does not share that existential dependency. It's an activity that does not require being take account of.

"Picking oranges" is a grouping of common experience(s). The group itself consists of all the separate instances of picking oranges. They do not require being taken account of. They would all be orange picking either way. Each and every uniquely individual experience of orange picking consists of orange trees bearing fruit, and a creature capable of picking the oranges.

A personal bit of my own life...

There were several different people and/or groups thereof who all participated in picking some very juicy, slightly tart, amazingly sweet and deliciously tangy tangelos from a very particular tree. They were sooo easy to peel, seedless, and virtually no chewy fibrous internal membranes to speak of. We did not reach inside of ourselves to fetch a few seductively acidic sweets. To quite the contrary, we all reached for the tree that grew in yard of the very special lady who cultivated and nurtured that tree. She was very good at what she loved to do. The sheer amount of fruit her plants produced was astounding. The height of that particular tree was such that all the glistening orange orbs were well within reach of the picker/basket she had thoughtfully placed beside the tree, ready at hand. Everyone loved them so much, and she was a very generous soul with them, hanging a basket of freshly picked fruit on the outside of the fence, with a sign bringing people's attention to them. She liked being a positive member of her community, even in such simple ways.

The exact same tree played a pivotal role within each and every single one of our respective individual particular subjective experiences that included fruit from that tree.

Without that tree, numerous experiences never could have happened. That tree was located in her yard. Her yard was not located internally within any single one of the aforementioned peoples' minds/bodies. It was a necessary elemental constituent of each and every individual experience mentioned heretofore.

That's back on topic as well.

...we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. — Mww

Mine doesn’t have form at all... — Mww

Self-contradiction is a form of unacceptable argument.

Meaningful experience requires - at a bare minimum - some things to become meaningful, a biological creature/agent for things to become meaningful to, and a means/method/process for those things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the biological creature/agent. — creativesoul

I agree with all that, which means I accept your general argument, perhaps while disputing the minutia of the grounds for it. — Mww

Perhaps, but I'm leaning more towards the idea that our positions are incompatible as a result of being based upon very different notions of human thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience. Hence, we have incompatible views about the third prong of the criterion. It's became clearer over time that our respective views regarding what exactly counts as the means/method/process for things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the creature are seemingly incompatible with one another.

In my world, apprehending the conditions for(one's own experience), manifests in the same mental process as drawing correlations between. — Mww

Correlations are no longer sensibly called "a mental process" on my view. The very notion of mental implies internal, in the sense of residing/existing/happening completely in the brain/mind, body, etc. I've a more holistic approach that makes the most sense of meaningful experience as neither exclusively internal nor external, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively physical nor mental, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but rather - consisting of both; as neither exclusively material nor immaterial, but rather consisting of both.

The language less creature has no inkling of just how important a role the sun plays in its own existence.
— creativesoul

I submit that kind of creature has insufficient rational capacity to apprehend the conditions by which the sun attains its role in a necessary relation to said creature’s existence, from which follows the only creatures known to function under such criteria, is the human creature. — Mww

I agree, setting aside a quibble about the use of "follows".

Stark differences between our views stem from what rightfully counts as meaningful human experience. I strongly suspect you're already well aware of this. My own view regarding what counts as meaningful human thought, belief, and/or experience permits/admits/allows much simpler iterations/forms of human experience than yours can. Again, on my view, one's position regarding meaningful human experience must be able to take proper account of the evolutionary progression of it. This holds good not only in terms of the overall evolution of the species, but it also pertains to all individual humans' lives. Our thought/belief about the world and/or ourselves(hence meaningful experience) evolves from birth(arguably a few months prior to) until death.

From past discussions, you're already aware of a foundational premise of mine; at the moment of biological conception there is no such thing as an experiencing creature. There is no such thing as thought, belief, or meaningful experience of the creature, for the creature does not yet have what that takes. Thought, belief, and meaningful experience begins simply and grows in its complexity over time.

Question: of all that supposedly attributable to lesser animals, in your opinion which is the primordial consideration such creature must attain antecedent to all else, in order for him to be afforded meaningful experiences? — Mww

This is an interesting question that I find helpful for better understanding the differences between our positions. I'm glad you asked it. The question presupposes any candidate under consideration be capable of what we'd call/classify a "consideration" of some sort or other prior to or perhaps simultaneously with being admitted of having meaningful experience. That's perfectly consistent with your own position. However, I reject that requirement altogether. There is no primordial consideration necessary for admission into the group of creatures capable of having meaningful experience(s). While the ability to consider things highlights perhaps the most significant difference between human minds and other animals'(which I completely agree with), the question points straight at the heart/source/basis of many of the differences between our views. Any notion of human thought, belief, and/or meaningful experience that requires the capability of consideration to admit meaningful experience is utterly incapable of admitting that humans have meaningful experiences prior to and/or during language acquisition; prior to becoming capable of considering anything at all. I'm not at all claiming that language is necessary for all kinds of consideration. However, all kinds of consideration presuppose a creature that knows of more than one option(volition) as well as some basis or other from which to perform comparative assessment.

That basis is past experience.

To put this in the most telling context I can think of at the moment; <-------That's one kind of consideration, and a very complex one at that. Not all are. None are necessary for perhaps the simplest kinds/forms of meaningful human experience. The following example is a favorite of mine.

A toddler need not consider anything at all prior to touching fire for the first time. They learn that touching fire causes pain. They attribute/recognize/discover causality. No language is necessary here. I suspect this holds good for all other language less creatures capable of having meaningful experience. The attribution/recognition of causality may serve as a placemark/benchmark for rationality, reason, and/or the complex sort of cognition your criterion seeks(the distinction between considered acts and instinctual ones). I digress, the toddler is amidst a meaningful experience. The fire becomes meaningful to the creature(toddler in this case) by virtue of the correlations drawn by the creature between the fire, the act of touching the fire(their own behavior), and the immediate subsequent pain that ensues.

The next time they encounter fire, they will consider.

I think it's important to draw a distinction between what's important for the creature and what's important to the creature. The sun is very important for the survival of all creatures on earth, for instance. So, in that sense the sun is significant, it affords the creature the ability to live, etc. However, it is not necessarily the case that the sun is meaningful to the creature. — creativesoul

The sun is a necessary elemental constituent of all interactions between it and other things(all interactions it becomes part of). Not all interaction affecting/effecting individual creatures is meaningful to them. As before, the sun is important - vital, in fact - for all life on earth as we know it to emerge, survive, and/or thrive. The interaction is vital/causal. Significant for the creatures' emergence/persistence, but not necessarily meaningful to the creatures' mind(s).

The language less creature has no inkling of just how important a role the sun plays in its own existence.

Significance to the creature is what we're after here, not just significance for the creature to emerge and/or persist as they do/have.

Meaningful experiences of the sun require creature(s) capable of drawing a correlation, making an association, attributing, and/or otherwise discovering some sort of meaningful connection between the sun and something else. Meaningful experiences of the sun require the sun to somehow or other attain some sort of significance/importance to/within the mind of the candidate under our consideration. It does so by virtue of becoming meaningful to the creature(as compared/contrasted with significant for the creature). This is true concerning previously existing meaningful things as well as novel(newly connected) ones.

Earlier I mentioned the difference between something being significant for a creature and that same something being significant to a creature. In the paragraph above, I offered an outline covering all meaningful experiences of the sun. All meaningful experiences of the sun are meaningful to the creature drawing and/or discovering meaningful correlations, associations, and/or connections between the individual elements of its own thought/belief/experience at that time(to the creature having the experience).

Meaningful experience requires - at a bare minimum - some things to become meaningful, a biological creature/agent for things to become meaningful to, and a means/method/process for those things to go from being meaningless to being meaningful to the biological creature/agent.

The sun is a meaningful part of each and every individual experience of the sun. It is not meaningful to everything that it effects/affects.

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it.
— creativesoul

Oh, absolutely.
— Mww

How do you square that with your minimum criterion presented earlier which demanded being able to describe the conditions of one's own experience in order to count as meaningful experience?

You see the problem?
— creativesoul

There shouldn’t be one. I said describes even if only to himself. To describe conditions to oneself, is to think; to think is to synthesize conceptions contained in the conditions into a cognition. — Mww

Describing conditions to oneself is practicing language. One issue is that your bare minimum criterion for meaningful experience includes/requires language use and yet you've "absolutely" agreed that we have meaningful experience prior to ever taking account of it(taking account of it is necessary on your proposal and doing so requires language use). That is a contradiction. Either we have meaningful experience prior to being able to take account of it, or we don't. Your suggestion fits only into the latter. They are mutually exclusive.

Another issue(shown by reductio) is that the result of the criterion you've suggested, when taken to its logical conclusion, is that only humans capable of describing the conditions of their own experience can be admitted having meaningful experience.

At what age do we begin being capable of describing the conditions of our own experiences?

Bottom line….in examining meaningful experience the first thing to be done is to eliminate instinct, or any condition that could be attributed to mere instinct. And the best, more assured way to eliminate instinct, is to ground the necessary conditions for experience, as such, in reason alone. — Mww

If a cat instinctually chases a mouse, then according to your method, hunting mice is not a meaningful experience for/to the cat. That doesn't seem right M.

Instinct when compared/contrasted to reason is used when setting out why/how creatures behave(what drives/causes the behaviour). It has nothing to do with whether or not that behaviour is part of a meaningful experience for the behaving creature.

I agree we start with us, because “us” is what we know, it is that by which all else is judged. When we examine “us”, we find that the bare minimum form of experience is the very multi-layered complexity of the human cognitive system. No experience is possible at all, without the coordinated systemic process incorporated in human intelligence. — Mww

Thought and belief. Thinking about thought and belief. Thought and belief come prior to thinking about
thought and belief. Some experience does not include a creature capable of thinking about its own meaningful experience. That alone refutes/disproves/falsifies your bare minimum criterion.

If meaning is a relation, wouldn’t the relations need to be describable in order to comprehend that they belong to each other... — Mww

Meaning is not just a relation. We need not comprehend that we are having meaningful experiences in order to have them. That sort of consideration requires talking about our own experiences as a subject matter in their own right. We have meaningful experiences long before we begin talking about it.

What does our own language less meaningful experience consist in/of? Bare minimum criterion.

If meaningful experience happens prior to our awareness of it(prior to language), then any notion of meaning under our consideration better be amenable. Evolutionary progression demands it as well.

how would you attribute meaning to an experience without a description of its conditions? — Mww

Am I answering for your viewpoint or mine?

...the candidate under consideration(the creature having the experience) must be capable of attributing meaning to different things.
— creativesoul — Mww

We must first have an experience as well as the ability to reflect upon it prior to being able to describe the conditions thereof/therein. You're starting at some of the most complex sort of meaningful experience(s) we know of.

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it. I would go as far as to say that meaningful human experience began happening prior to language creation, acquisition, usage, and/or mastery of it.

Some meaningful experience involves talking about it. Not all. We're looking for both kinds of cases some and all.

Seems to me that all meaningful experience consists of an agent capable of meaningful attribution. Attributing/recognizing causality seems a rather uncontentious time/place to think about. It counts as meaningful experience. If the endeavor of meaningful attribution does not count as meaningful experience, then nothing will. We attribute meaning to many different things within our personal experience. This approach promises to offer a glimpse of all sorts of different creatures drawing correlations between different things.

This language less creature need not be able to describe the conditions of its own experience in order to be capable of having it solely by virtue of attributing meaning to different things. It is capable of having meaningful experiences even if language is not a part thereof; even if it has no capability of describing anything at all; even if we never know.

The candidate under consideration(the creature having the experience) must only be capable of drawing correlations, associations, connections, etc., between different things in order to attribute meaning to different things. Language use is not necessary for the emergence of meaningful experience. Despite the fact that it has long since become an inevitable/irreplaceable/irrevocable part of ours. It was not always that way. It does not begin that way.

We are a fine example proving both, that your criterion is shared by most humans, and that a more foundational one must be shared by all. That is also the aim.

If we are capable of having meaningful experience prior to and/or in complete absence of language use, then that fact and that fact alone demands explanation/answer. Any adequate bare minimum criterion for/of meaningful experience will be amenable.

Dunno….maybe too analytical on my part. — Mww

No such thing! :wink:

We're getting somewhere. I'll give the last reply it's just due upon returning. I think I'm understanding our positions better insofar as they compare/contrast with one another. I hope you are as well. Seems that way to me!

Kudos and thanks for the engagement.

Soon.

Things that grab the creature's attention 'stand out'. Anything external to the creature may 'stand out', given the creature is capable of perceiving it. Those things that 'stand out' may already be meaningful to the creature. They may not. That's often the first step in becoming meaningful.
— creativesoul

Do you count anything which does not stand out as being perceived? Per the question I asked you above, everything perceptible in your external environment is currently broadcasting information in the form of light, sound, smell, and tactile sensation to your eyes, ears, nose and skin. Would you say all that counts as being perceived merely by virtue of that information affecting the body? — Janus

I initially misunderstood you yesterday. My apologies. It seems our positions may be very close. I prefer "meaningful" where you may prefer "significant". They are used synonymously sometimes, so it may not matter much.

The bit above applies to both of our positions accordingly, I think. Current knowledge shows us that not all things interacting with our bodies at a given time are being perceived at that time, or at least not in a manner we'd call "consciously perceived".

Circling back...

I think it's important to draw a distinction between what's important for the creature and what's important to the creature. The sun is very important for the survival of all creatures on earth, for instance. So, in that sense the sun is significant, it affords the creature the ability to live, etc. However, it is not necessarily the case that the sun is meaningful to the creature.

Can we say that a percipient has perceived something if it does not stand out in some way? — Janus

Stand out in some way? I think that's far too broad/loose a claim for now. A creature is capable of perception if it is equipped with biological machinery capable of interacting with distal objects.

Things that grab the creature's attention 'stand out'. Anything external to the creature may 'stand out', given the creature is capable of perceiving it. Those things that 'stand out' may already be meaningful to the creature. They may not. That's often the first step in becoming meaningful.

We largely agree upon the requirement of/for biological machinery, so that's good!

So, only previously meaningful things are perceived?
— creativesoul

I think that's right. — Janus

How does anything become meaningful before it is ever perceived?

I have not said that cats perceive trees as trees, but they perceive trees as some kind of affordance or other (although I am not saying they could conceive of it linguistically as an affordance or as anything else)
— Janus

That's what I was thinking with the term, too -- objects with affordances make sense of a cat's or a bat's experience being different, but still about the same objects all while their experiences are probably different... — Moliere

What the mouse is behind? Where the bird is?

Perception is necessary, we agree presumably. The tree is perceived as something it affords the creature? A place to sleep? Does the bear perceive the cave as a place to sleep? Bears go there to sleep, but unless they think about the cave as a subject matter in its own right, they do not perceive it as anything. They perceive the cave. The cave is part of the bear's experience. The cave is meaningful to the bear. Going back to the cave is a meaningful experience to the bear.

For me, seeing something is always seeing something as something. So I think anything perceived, in the sense I use the word, is always already something interpreted, and I think that interpretation is not dependent on language, and that in fact language could never get started without it already being in place, and I think it is the case with the other animals just as it is with us. — Janus

Interpretation is always of something already meaningful. The meaning is what is being interpreted. So, only previously meaningful things are perceived?

All experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Perception is necessary but insufficient for attributing meaning to different things; meaningful experience.
— creativesoul

It depends on how you are using "perception". For me, seeing something is always seeing something as something. So I think anything perceived, in the sense I use the word, is always already something interpreted, and I think that interpretation is not dependent on language, and that in fact language could never get started without it already being in place, and I think it is the case with the other animals just as it is with us. — Janus

Sometimes. Not all the time.

Perceiving the tree in the yard does not require perceiving it "as a tree". Surely, we perceive the distal objects being named, right? See it "as a tree" presupposes naming and descriptive practices. Cats interact with trees all the time. They do not perceive the tree, "as a tree". That invokes a middleman where none is necessary, indeed where none can be. It could be that the tree in the yard is being directly perceived in direct relation to the rest of the hunters' mind, the tree is what the mouse is hiding behind. That's all it is at the time. It is and remains the tree, nonetheless.

Perceiving a tree "as a tree" only makes sense to me when we're referring to those who know how to use the phrase.

I think one important thing to keep in mind is that meaningful human experience happens long before we begin to take account of it.
— creativesoul

Oh, absolutely. — Mww

How do you square that with your minimum criterion presented earlier which demanded being able to describe the conditions of one's own experience in order to count as meaningful experience?

You see the problem?

I'm saying that direct perception of distal objects is necessary for all cases of human perception, and that there are many other creatures capable of it as well.
— creativesoul

I agree with that as well, with the caveat that mere direct perception is very far from meaningful experience... — Mww

Agreed. Necessary but insufficient.