Hyenas go for the tentacles... — Marchesk

Strange balls...

:yum:

How can a language less creature believe that a proposition is true, unless - at the very least - that creature understands the proposition?

Cat's do not understand that "the floor is solid" is a proposition, let alone whether or not it is true.

He shows that he believes the proposition is true?

His behaviour shows that he believes "the floor is solid" is true?

Jack takes it to be the case that the proposition is true?

:brow:

How would Banno answer that question?

You should know by now. — Banno

Humor me. You've offered different answers at different times.

How are propositions involved your cat's belief?

I don;t think that such an eventuality would be a good thing. — Banno

It will not happen, because brains are not enough. Physiological sensory perception requires something to be perceived, and something capable of perceiving it. The brain is just part of what makes perception possible, and perception is just a part of what makes belief possible.

Recognizing and/or attributing causality is primal in that it is something that all thinking and/or believing creatures do...

We can watch it occur, in controlled environments and in the wild... on cable news!

:wink:

There's a link! Hume be damned, because it does not require a pattern of the same events taking place in the same order over and over again!!!

Since a proposition is involved... — Banno

How is this so regarding your cat's belief?

Statements, propositions, assertions, taking 'X' to be the case, and other such predication based constructs will not cut it here, unless pre linguistic belief somehow consists of the same structure as ones expressed in language. But all that talk about structure is wrong minded. When we look at the structure of belief statements and expect prelinguistic belief to somehow have the same structure, we're thinking in the exact reverse fashion that evolutionary progression can possibly allow.

Prelinguistic belief, if it can be said to have a structure, would exist in it's entirety prior to language use. So, we ought expect statements of belief to have somehow evolved from the structure of prelinguistic belief... not the other way around!

I can't make any sense out of the idea that before there was a language there were no beliefs. — Sam26

Neither can Banno.

It's the strongest evidence possible for rejecting the framework altogether.

:wink:

I don't see how we can show you what we believe without showing you what the belief is about. — Sam26

Not us... Banno's cat.

Do you think it is possible that Witt was making a concerted effort to make sense of Moore's claim while remaining consistent?

Do you agree with my earlier explanation regarding Moore's language use? Was he showing you what he believes or was he showing you what his belief is about?

This is a hand. Here is another. These are hands.

Time passed, folk talked about beliefs as if they were things we had... — Banno

What does it mean to say that all belief has propositional content?

The only evidence brought to bear in support of that claim are reports about your cat's belief.

That distinction between the report and what is being reported upon matters.

if you are going to use the word one way, you can't come back and tell those who use it differently that they are wrong.
— Banno

This is quite disingenuous. Look back over our exchange... — Isaac

I do not think that that was a veiled charge towards you... personally. "You" was a hypothetical. Replace "you" with "one"...

Banno is right to bring this to light. You, I, and he are all using "belief" in our own respective ways.

He has been consistent. The quotes you focused upon show that. He also clearly acknowledged and 'granted' your use... which is different than his and mine, without saying you or your use was wrong...

I am much more prone to say that about both of your notions of belief... but haven't here!

:wink:

It's the drive for evolutionary amenability!

:wink:

Tired. Hungry.

Shoots!

I'm still struggling to understand what motivated Witt to advocate the idea that all knowledge needed to be dubitable.
— creativesoul

Justified true belief. — Banno

Touching fire causes pain. Touching fire provides the strongest possible justificatory ground for believing the fire caused the pain.

No one who has ever been burnt by flame could possibly doubt that touching fire causes pain or that "touching fire causes pain" is true aside from all those creatures capable of touching fire and drawing a correlation between the act and the ensuing pain, but utterly incapable of talking about it.

Unexpressed...

Non linguistic...

Not propositional in content...

The attribution/recognition of causality does not require language. It does count as belief.

285. If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there.

I just do not see that these support the invention of a special category of beliefs that would be entitled to the label "prelinguistic" or "nonlinguistic" — Banno

I'm inclined to agree. I think Sam would be ok with that as well. He's already expressed as much. Earlier he mentioned not following Witt's reasoning about everything.

So...

Grant his consideration about language users...

Apply it to language less creatures...

Can we say the same thing about a language less creature's belief that we say about our own, when looking for something?

Bedrock belief of the linguistic variety are those which somehow offer ground for others. These can be well reasoned or not. Some of these need no justification because they are the very pieces needed in order to play the language game.

I'm still struggling to understand what motivated Witt to advocate the idea that all knowledge needed to be dubitable.

"This is a hand" is a perfect example of a bedrock belief capable of lending support to each and every subsequent claim about hands. If you doubt that that claim is true, it is only because you do not know the language. For everyone and anyone who speaks the language, there can be no doubt. Each and every proposition about hands rests it's laurels upon it. Each and every subsequent assertion about hands hinges upon knowing what hands are called.

Moore knows/knew that what he was showing is/was a hand. He also knew that "this is a hand" - when accompanied with his gesturing - was true. He was showing someone how to teach another how to talk about hands(what the word "hand" can refer to). He was stating the obvious for those of us who know how to talk about our hands.

We really should move all this off Sam26's thread. — Banno

Sam is one of the most patient and kind people I have come across while on forums such as this one. He's interested in basic bedrock belief, of both the linguistic and non linguistic variety. If we tie it in we'll be fine.

:smile:

What might be philosophically interesting is the extent to which a belief must be held positively... perhaps a new thread. — Banno

Why new?

You've already done the work.

:wink:

...there seems to be an incipient idealism in some of what Isaac says. — Banno

I'm reminded of apo... but noticeably nicer. Brainpharte comes to mind as well.

I'm taking it to be the case that I understand you. However, according to you, I need not pay attention to your words in order to do so.

Now do you see the problem?

IF you doubt this(all belief has propositional content), you should be able to give an example of a belief that is not a belief that such-and-such is the case. — Banno

All language less belief is not.

I'm impressed how you're arguing for the idea that all belief has propositional content without using the terms... until you invoked logical accounting practices and "p"....

If I was to boil all of this down into one fundamental thing, it would have to do with the nature of belief, i.e., what do we mean by belief? How do we normally use the word belief in a variety of contexts, we would have to look at it in terms of its Wittgensteinian grammar. — Sam26

Hey Sam! Sorry about temporarily hijacking your thread, my friend. Hope this finds you well.

:smile:

It seems to me that you may be glossing over something that is of utmost importance. You talk about the nature of belief, but then go on to focus upon the different senses of the term.

The classic roadblock ending in comments about definitions, and being true by definition, etc. A rabbithole most of the time. However, if we are judicious about decision regarding how to use the term, we must realize that we are picking something out of this world that exists in it's entirety prior to language. That has to be kept in mind. I find it most helpful to do a bit of philosophical reasoning and/or critical thinking here, and let that guide the methodological approach.

Some common sense...

If there is such a thing as prelinguistic belief then it exists in it's entirety prior to language use. That which exists in it's entirety prior to language use, is not existentially dependent upon language in any way shape or form whatsoever. Whatever such belief consists of, we can be absolutely certain that language is not a part of it's elemental constituency. Such belief cannot have propositional content unless propositional content also exists in it's entirety prior to language use(unless propositions are not existentially dependent upon language). That would be to claim that propositions exist prior to language use... somehow.

For some reason, there are a number(the majority perhaps???) of professional philosophers who take that to be the case. I've seen it asserted that propositions somehow carry meaning... meaning transcends the user via propositions, or some such. That's not too far off, but it is far enough to be wrong.

It shows that an inherent misconception and/or gross misunderstanding of how meaning emerges onto the world stage is at work. That's no surprise to me though, the historical discourse about meaning is fraught, to say the least. That continues to this day. One of a few banes of philosophy.

So, if non linguistic belief does not consist of propositions or statements what could it possibly consist of that would allow it's evolution over time to include predication, statements, and/or propositions?

This combination of things must somehow provide the creature the ability to presuppose correspondence with what's happening/happened and it must be meaningful to the believing creature.

All that without the need for the creature to be a language user.

Does this make sense to you?

It requires that meaning exist in it's entirety prior to language.As it stands, the only notion I'm aware of is one that conflates meaning and causality. They are closely related, particularly in the context of both being imperative for pre linguistic belief. One of the most rudimentary beliefs I can think of is the attribution/recognition of causality. The fire example.

Anyway...

Can we get somewhere new this time around? I've found a bridge, sort of, between Banno's position and my own. But I'm not sure if he's going to agree with the suggestion about adding a timeline to his report of his cat taking it to be the case that the floor is solid.

We'll see.

:wink:

I am not the only philosopher who has raised the issue of pre-linguistic beliefs, there are others. However, it is not something that is prevalent. It is good to think outside the box, but often we are wrong; sometimes we get it right, but it takes a while for the idea to catch on. — Sam26

Indeed, you are not.

if you wanted to present an argument that the tendency to treat the floor as if it were solid was not represented somehow in the brain of the animal, you'd have to provide an alternative explanation for the effect of changes to the F5 region in treatment of object shape and density. — Isaac

There is no doubt to me that there are certain physiological structures, including but not limited to brain parts, that are required in order for the ability for certain thought and belief to form. However, I'm not at all fond of the underlying suppositions that seem to ground your explanations...

To be clear...

It seems that what you've offered here works from the basic assumption that we cannot directly perceive stuff... to put it roughly. Would you agree with the idea that all we have to work with is our perception of reality... our perception(representation, if you like) of the tree. That seems to be underwriting your position.

Am I mistaken about that?

The tree is itself a belief... — Isaac

I'm done here. Thanks.

:kiss:

Stolen cows...

If you want to say the solidity of the floor is not represented in its brain you are just flat out wrong about that. — Isaac

I would say that. Does the above hold true regardless?

you're asserting that not all cows are assets. I'm asking you for some evidence or line of reasoning to back up that assertion. — Isaac

Mad cows...

"Taking to be the case" does not seem to me to need include "giving one's attention to"... — Banno

An elucidation upon the earlier "off you go" comment...



I thought we were taking account of your cat's belief; what your cat takes to be the case regarding the solidity of the floor. That does not include language use... that's for sure. Yet that's your focus?

I'm stumped and tired...

:meh:

My apologies if needed.

Language less belief is chock full of meaning, and yet devoid of all propositional content.

Or...

Not all belief is meaningful and/or propositional content exists in it's entirety prior to language use.

Either a language less creature's belief does not have propositional content or propositions somehow exist prior to language use.

I chose the former long ago.

Add the timeline first suggested and all remains well.

Off you go...

Taking it to be the case that the floor is solid requires paying attention to the floor.

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

The cat does not pay attention to what it's taking to be the case.

That's a problem, isn't it?

The sense in which one might think that the cat takes the floor to be solid is that it does not even pay attention to the solidness of the floor. — Banno

That's what I'm attempted to unpack... or targeting.

Maybe this helps???

One cannot take it to be the case that leaves are green without thinking about the color of the leaves.

Yet, it seems your position forces any and all adherents to admit/assent to such. Lest, we would arrive at self-contradiction, incoherence, or an equivocation of terms.

Right?

:brow: