The difference between justified and well grounded, from my vantage point...

Typically a justified belief, to the best of my knowledge, is one that can be and/or has been argued for. Traditionally, the justification of one's beliefs involved offering the ground; the basis for belief. I mean, I'm fairly certain that the justification method was invoked as a means to further discriminate between conflicting knowledge claims.

Being well-grounded does not require being argued for. Rather, a belief can be well-grounded and formed/held by a language less creature... on my view anyway.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. — creativesoul

That ought be put a bit differently...

The person believes that a broken clock is working... that's better.

I don't see a difference - for they are all cases in which a person acquires a true belief in an epistemically responsible fashion... — Bartricks

Well, that's not true at all actually. Smith's belief in Case I is false. Gettier wants to say that Smith deduces and believes the proposition(via the rules of entailment) "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", which is fine as long as the referent is himself. Otherwise Gettier needs Smith to believe that someone other than himself will get the job... but he doesn't.

Case II is a bit more complicated, but it basically amounts to what Smith's believing the disjunction consists of. Smith believes "'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' because Jones owns a Ford." The disjunction is true, by the well known rules of disjunction... but not because Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief is false.

Seems perfectly clear to me that Gettier put forth an accounting malpractice(of Smith's belief) in both Cases.

The person believes that a broken clock is correct. That belief is false. It also serves as ground for the subsequent belief regarding what time it is. So the belief about the time is not well-grounded. It is based upon false belief.

Russell's clock is really not on par with Gettier. Russel doesn't employ entailment or disjunction; both of which amount to being accounting malpractices of Smith's belief in Case I and Case II respectively. That aside, Russell's clock problem is interesting. I'm also a huge Russell fan, so.

Is it well-grounded to believe that a broken clock is correct?

Plato proposed that knowledge involves having a justified true belief. — Bartricks

Justified... or "well-grounded"? Did Plato use the term "justified"?

knowledge is for Reason to be adopting a certain attitude towards your possession of it. — Bartricks

Same problems as the truth thread. Anthropomorphism... the personification of thinking about thought and belief(Reason). Reason is not the sort of thing that is capable of having and/or adopting an attitude.

Other than that, I'm a bit impressed. Well written OP.

Logic is limited. — I like sushi

I'm denying that the rules of entailment are rightfully called "logical rules", for the reasons given heretofore.

An accountant is one who is taking account. An account is a report of something else. Gettier Case I.

Are you familiar?

Gettier is taking account of Smith's belief.

He was finally banned for setting up two fake membership accounts. — Baden

That's bannable?

:brow:

Oh... fake... like information that contradicts each other?

Now let's go through the looking glass and take a peer at your bizzaro argument, shall we -

All assertions are made by language users.
Reason is not a language user.
Reason does not make assertions.
— creativesoul

Your second premise is just an assertion rather than a self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks

:rofl:

Yeah... whatever dude.. Wie auch immer...

You've reached incoherence my friend. You're equivocating the terms "Reason" and "truth". You've also changed the terms between the premisses and the conclusion on multiple occasions. Not to mention all the other problems you've shrugged off.

Not much more I can do here. The astute reader will be served.

All assertions are made by language users.
Reason is not a language user.
Reason does not make assertions.

Sound. Refutation of the primary premiss.

The second premiss is false.

Many people make assertions.

No, persons refers to individual persons, not groups - so you're just being tedious. — Bartricks

No, "persons" refers to more than one person. That's what the term followed by the letter "s" is doing there. Denoting a plurality...

But to remove any ambiguity, here:

1. Reason makes assertions
2. A person and only a person can make an assertion
3. Therefore Reason is a person

Same argument, and it is valid and sound.

Different argument. Both premisses are false.

It's also an invalid conclusion. Again you've changed the terms between the premisses and the conclusion. A valid conclusion would read...

Therefore Reason is a person and only a person.

We're getting somewhere...

There are several different criticisms being leveled here at the same time. It would serve us best to focus upon them one at a time. Right now, I'm granting your premisses, and objecting to the change in the terminology between them and the conclusion. That is an invalid move.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

The conclusion does not follow.



Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...

...that's what follows.

it entails that Reason is a person. Not 'a persons' - that's just bad grammar. — Bartricks

The rules of entailment allow the truth conditions of a belief to change. That's just bad logic.

No, relevant. It means the premise is true. — Bartricks

The first one is not. You're talking about something other than the first one. Thus...

Irrelevant.

I've refuted the first. Whether or not the second is true is irrelevant. The argument is refuted.

I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss.
— creativesoul

No, premise 2 is true, you just don't understand what it means — Bartricks

Irrelevant.

If you think groups of persons can assert things, that's because you've committed the fallacy of composition. — Bartricks

Rubbish. If groups cannot assert things there could be no groups asserting things. But there are, and they are everywhere asserting all sorts of things.

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

I've already adequately refuted the primary premiss.

I'm now granting it and focusing upon the invalid inference. After you grant that mistake, I'll continue along the path of showing you how a valid inference results in being a problem with your analysis of truth.

With me?

:brow:

Here is the relevant argument:

premise 1: Reason makes assertions
premise 2. Persons and only persons make assertions
Conclusion: therefore Reason is a person.

Now, which premise are you taking issue with? — Bartricks

Now we've gotten somewhere. The conclusion does not follow.



Therefore Reason is persons and only persons...

...that's what follows.

Pointing out the problem in that argument.

Reason, being an asserter of things, must be everyone who asserts.

It makes no sense to pick out an individual, which is what you've done on multiple occasions. Reason, being an asserter of things, need not be a single asserter. Rather Reason must be all that assert(everyone who asserts).

I validly concluded that Reason, being an asserter of things, must be a person — Bartricks

All asserters of things are Reason... it would follow... not a person. All people who assert.

I use language to make assertions. I make the assertion, not the language. — Bartricks

Assertions require a language user, something to talk about, and assertions about that something.

Reason is not a language user. Reason does not have what it takes to make assertions.

Note: objecting to a view, or to the holder of it, does not an objection make. — Bartricks

More of the same meaningless incoherent nonsense.

You have said precisely nothing in objection to that view — Bartricks

Another accounting malpractice...

You're attributing the capability of making assertions to that which does not have what it takes. You're assuming that Reason makes assertions. That is false, by definition. We make assertions. Language users make assertions. All assertions are made in language.

Reason is not the sort of thing that uses language as a means to make assertions.

We are.

Again, if the most we can ever say in support of any view about anything - including any view about what truth is - is that it appears to be being asserted by Reason... — Bartricks

Then we better find a better way to talk...

Reason is thinking about thought and belief.

Any and all arguments appeal to apparent assertions of Reason. So it cannot coherently be denied that Reason makes assertions. — Bartricks

Not very good at that are you?

Assertions are made with language use. Reason is not the sort of thing capable of using language. Reason cannot make assertions.

I am mocking you. — Bartricks

Looks like an accounting malpractice to me... from what propositions are... through what an argument is... through what sorts of things are capable of making assertions... and all the way into the quality of my objections and/or your purported 'arguments'.

Now you're presupposing that I've told you how I won a game of chess?

I've not.

Thus...

premise 1: Reason makes assertions

Premise 2: Minds and only minds make assertions

Conclusion: therefore Reason is a mind

Which premise is false? And provide evidence, don't just blurt. — Bartricks

Both the primary and the secondary premiss is false. The conclusion is rendered irrelevant.

Reason does assert things! "If a proposition is true, do not also believe it is false" - that's an assertion. — Bartricks

You made the assertion. You are not Reason.

It's in the OP. Look, it isn't my fault you don't actually know what an argument is.

Let's go though it, shall we - baby steps.

The question is "what is truth?"

Because no-one currently seems to know - there are several theories, but none enjoys universal support among those who are clever enough to be paid to think about such matters - it is worthwhile stepping back a mo and asking a slightly different question: when would all of those clever enough to be paid to think about such things be happy with an answer? They're not currently, but when would they be?

Well, surely they would all be happy with an answer when it is clear to the reason of all of them that the answer is endorsed by Reason - that is, when their reason represents the answer to be true. — Bartricks

There are a plurality of assumptions within the above quote. Despite that, you assert the following...

Now, that's one of my 'assumptions'. Challenge it if you like. I think you won't succeed, but by all means try. — Bartricks

That is gibberish.

Indeed, how does Reason assert anything? — tim wood

Yes.

What are the sorts of things that we say are capable of making an assertion?

Either locate a fallacy, or dispute a premise. — Bartricks

You're not very good with the spatiotemporal aspects of your own worldview are you?

Both of those endeavors are existentially dependent upon having an argument with premisses clearly demarcated. Otherwise, I'm shooting blind-folded.

Gotta argument?

According to your definition of philosophy, which is necessarily limited by your unshakeable faith in Reason. — Possibility

You're granting too much... even here. The 'ole chap is not even using the term "Reason" in accordance with it's original usage.

Tell. Me. How. My. View. Is. Inconsistent. With. Dialetheism.

I. Think. You. Can't. Do. That. — Bartricks

That is precisely the belief that you're working from.

There are true contradictions.

Thus, you shrug off the LNC, on pains of coherence.