...For obvious reasons it's difficult to talk about non-linguistic thought and belief. — Eee

Call me what you may, but I've not come across any reason worthy of being called "obvious".

I've begun clearing the path of debris. Something wrong with my approach?

All statements of thought and belief presuppose truth somewhere along the line. All statements of thought and belief are meaningful to the speaker.

Agree?

I quote the words that we already know how to use. — Eee

Not a good start. I'll overlook it for now.

I like the avatar picture. Reminds me of an old forum long ago.

To be continued...

Snow is directly perceptible.

By Davidson's method, convention T is capable of accounting for two languages picking out the same entity to the exclusion of all else. Davidson seems to want to be able to say that that re-attaches us to the unmediated world, and I would agree for it demands our focus upon directly perceptible things. Things that can be picked out to the exclusion of all else by a plurality of names. Common referents are key.

Convention T does not offer a method of translation described by Davidson(common referents) so much as a method of drawing an equivalence between two schemas talking about the same thing.

I'm not sure the worth of such an equivalence. The translation occurred prior to it's being used to fill out convention T.

I agree with Davidson's conclusion, I just arrived at it by virtue of taking another path. Shared meaning happens long before we become aware of it. Shared meaning is what makes language possible. Leaving it out renders any subsequent reporting unacceptable.

Assuming that those things are unnecessary for translation is not just a garden variety assumption, but it is an assumption none the less, and one that needs argued for.

Here it is... the shared referent of two different languages. It's always something other than both. There is the opening back to the actual world...

Read the end again...

Davidson could've used some prior focus upon shared meaning, although I understand he wants to avoid an uninterpreted world, it seems to me that clearly establishing a world including shared meaning would pick out individuals to the exclusion of all others. Hence, my earlier pleasure with Banno when he mentioned Kripke...

What we need is a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared meanings, concepts, or beliefs.

I wonder if valid argument to arrive at all of those things is acceptable?

Yeah... ...you haven't told me what you think either of them consist of... — Pfhorrest

First time for everything I guess...

:razz:

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things. The only difference between thought and belief regarding the ordinary everyday use of the terms is immediately discernable during a.)suspending agreement, assent, and/or judgment, and/or b.) deliberate misrepresentation of one's own thought and belief. Those thoughts are more complex beliefs, and as such the two cannot be interchanged in such circumstances without losing meaning. So, there is a distinction between thought and belief, but not at the pre-reflective level.

Just wanted to mention that - after some much more careful and slow re-reading - I've come to realize that Davidson may be correctly interpreted as rejecting the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language, and that which did not, by virtue of rejecting an uninterpreted world. If he wholly rejects the very idea of an uninterpreted world, then it would be both quite difficult and quite necessary for him to make sense of the common part of conceptual schemes when comparing different native tongues when that common referent clearly existed in it's entirety prior to our naming it.

So what sounded at first like a thrilling discovery - that
truth is relative to a conceptual scheme - has not so far been
shown to be anything more than the pedestrian and familiar fact
that the truth of a sentence is relative to (among other things) the
language to which it belongs.

The above is important to understand. Davidson's not wholly agreeing with the claim "truth is relative to a conceptual scheme". Rather, Davidson is clearly explaining it's inherent inadequacy for taking proper account of truth. He's saying that the truth of a sentence is relative to more than just a conceptual scheme.

He does grant the truth of all coherent ones as a means to show that they can be translated one into the other. His method is important to note here...

Towards the bottom of page 17, Davidson wrote:

I turn now to the more modest approach: the idea of partial rather than total failure of translation. This introduces the possibility of making changes and contrasts in conceptual schemes intelligible by reference to the common part. What we need is a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared meanings, concepts or beliefs. The interdependence of belief and meaning springs from the interdependence of two aspects of the interpretation of speech behavior: the attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sen-
tences...

The emphasized portion MATTERS!!!

But do we really use some device to understand 'thought' or 'belief' in ordinary language? — Eee

Language is a device. Why quote the terms? I'm not talking about the language use. I'm using those two terms as a namesake for the same referent. That referent is prior to language. That referent is an integral element within all thought and belief, those existentially dependent upon language use notwithstanding.

What if an investigation of thought leads to the conclusion that no device constructed by this or that philosopher can ever get it just right? — Eee

Then we ask...

What counts as "just right"?

...and we comment...

My criterion for "just right" includes a basis borne of universal criteria.

After all, any investigation of the notions of thought or belief must already use these words and their naive meanings. We use the supposedly broken thing in order to fix it, proving that it wasn't so broken.

I guess. Who says it's broken? All sensible use of the terms must be accounted for, and this includes ordinary language. It seems to me that there is no way to avoid placing existential value upon ordinary use. If we are to develop an acceptable working theory of human thought and belief, it must be amenable to evolutionary progression. Human thought and belief must begin simply and accrue in it's complexity. History shows this nicely. There are arguments about the source of novelty, but that's not in question, nor does it matter. "God did it" doesn't work any more than "Aliens did it" any more than "The Flying Spaghetti Monster" did it...

What we need is knowledge of what all thought and belief consists of. Then, and only then, can we determine what the particular thought belief is about. This is too much a bit too fast, but hopefully you'll get a gist for the position I'm arguing for/from.

The above sums it up thus far for me. I would be happy to end it here, if you still want to do so after reading my last two posts.

I described thought as reflexive mental activity. If that wasn’t clear then I think you’re not understanding anything I’ve said. — Pfhorrest

I'm understanding just fine. You've described thought in all sorts of ways. You've named different kinds. You've made all sorts of comments. You've neglected a valid objection to something you have written, in lieu of talking about something I've not objecting to.

What you have yet to have done is offer a bare minimum criterion for what counts as thought and belief. Such a standard/criterion is the device we use to determine whether or not some situation counts as a case of thought and belief.

Why do you claim reflexive mental activity requires naming or other linguistic capability? — Pfhorrest

I did not claim that, nor did you offer that as a criterion for thought and belief.

I did argue against the criterion you did offer for thought and belief by first granting it and then explaining exactly how it fails to account for language less thought and belief.

You can disregard everything I write if you want. I'm very very critical. I'm of the well-considered opinion that you've followed philosophy proper down a mistaken path. I'm focusing upon that.

You've gotten human thought and belief wrong, and you're not alone. Like I said, you may ignore me if you like, or if you'd rather not get into it, then I'm good with that too.

Think about this either way...

If you are indeed mistaken about human thought and belief, then you are also mistaken - in some way or other - about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered. The scope of rightful application could not be broader.

Well done.

:clap:

...talk about the truth of beliefs (as opposed to the truth of statements) cannot be encompassed in prosentential theories, which is why I don't think Davidson does away with conceptual schemes simply by declaring them necessarily translatable...but that argument seems to be falling on deaf ears, so I suspect perhaps I'm wasting my time... — Isaac

Depends upon who you talk to about it. I see I'm not the only one who agrees with you here. :wink:

I also do not think that Davidson is doing away with conceptual schemes. Rather, it seems he's rejecting the idea that two schemes talking about the same world are not translatable one to another.

Or try this (it may be clearer): To say of snow that it is white is true if and only if it is white. How would that logically differ from Tarski's sentence? — Janus

The number of terms... but I see what you're getting at. It is quite similar in semantics.

But this is no different than the logic of correspondence, which can be seen in Aristotle's classic formulation: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". — Janus

"To say of what is that it is" IFF to say of what is that it is.

Nope.

Not the same.

Two things - the attribution of beliefs, and the interpretation of sentences - underpin understanding what someone is saying.

When using "beliefs" here I take Davidson as implicitly including other propositional attitudes - knowing, wanting, intending, wondering and so on. — Banno

Here, if I'm using "A" to pick out an individual entity normally called "B", then understanding me would require knowing that, and knowing that would provide the translation necessary. However, convention T doesn't seem capable of doing this.

Davidson's rejection of partially incommensurable conceptual schemes is just the observation that sometimes people have different beliefs to us - that there is no clear way to distinguish an incommensurate conceptual scheme from a differing belief. As he says, there is no way to decide between a difference in beliefs and a difference in conception. — Banno

Do differing beliefs impede and/or prohibit translation?

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.


You interpret this as...

...the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

...? — ZzzoneiroCosm

No. Clearly not the same distinction. Below shows this well enough...

...what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of
sensory experience," and "physical evidence"...

Is it fair to say you you've underscored the temporal aspect of the scheme-content dyad to arrive at the idea of "something waiting"?

No. Although, I do underscore temporality.

So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism".
— creativesoul

I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

I read the rejection of the conceptual scheme/ empirical content duality to be a rejection of the idea that there are "two major categories of things"; in other words a rejection of the notion that there is empirical content outside of any conceptual scheme; but I could be misinterpreting Davidson... — Janus

I'm just pointing out that the duality of empirical content and conceptual scheme is not equivalent to the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.

That's not what Davidson called the "third dogma".

That's all I'm getting at here regarding that bit.

There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it.
— frank

I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus

What determines the referent within Davidson's use of 'Snow is white'?

...

My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so.
— creativesoul


By "so" do you mean "true"? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes.

Do you agree that Banno's interpretation of Davidson is more deflationary than your own? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I would. I would also agree that Davidson is more deflationary regarding all talk about what makes sentences true, as well as all the historical baggage accompanying notions of "fact". Thus, he grants(demands) coherence and meaning as the starting point for what counts as an acceptable conceptual scheme. This is exactly what we're talking about. Coherent accounts of this world.

He's delineating the target, and setting the boundaries of the scope of our inquiry... all at the same time.

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm

On my view, no. My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so.

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these things make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think Davidson is opposed to calling events and happenings "things". He says no thing make a sentence true. An event is comprised of a group of things. My skin being warm is not a thing.

I think that Davidson hold sfirm to the notion that truth of sentences is inseparable from language and thus translation. I suspect, even if it's not expounded upon, that Davidson does not believe that the truth of sentences is all there is to truth. Rather, I think he's argues that it's all that's needed here as a means to assess the translatability of one scheme into the other.

Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes
in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has come down, then,
to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual
scheme or theory if it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in
order to allow sharers of a scheme to differ on details. And the
criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now be-
comes: largely true but not translatable. The question whether
this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we under-
stand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent of
the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not
understand it independently at all...

A thought is a perception of a feeling coupled with a desire for that feeling to remain, or else whatever feeling is desired in its stead: basically, a thought is what you feel you ought to feel, the mental states you judge to be the correct ones. — Pfhorrest

Desiring for a feeling to remain is to know that they do not always. Knowing that feelings are fleeting requires being able to think about one's own thought. That requires naming and descriptive practices for one's own mental ongoings.

Language less creatures have none.

How do you reconcile this problem?

A thought is a perception of a feeling coupled with a desire for that feeling to remain... — Pfhorrest

All thoughts?

But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson doesn't make this claim though...

He clearly talks about his skin being warm...

So, re the example I gave of Chinese and Western medicine; of course they can both be expressed in Chinese or English or presumably many other (but not all?) languages. What then does it mean to say that one conceptual scheme must be translatable into the terms of another or else one (or both?) of the conceptual schemes cannot be "true and meaningful"? — Janus

Might want to ask the person who said such a thing.

By stipulating all schemes as coherent, we're granting as well as also demanding consistent terminological use. It side steps the issues. I suppose it could be said that it eliminates them as well.

I'm hesitant to agree with the idea that convention T offers an adequate means for translation.
— creativesoul

Perhaps its more of a minimal translation. — Banno

Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and theories true:
not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a
sentence true. That experience takes a certain course, that our
skin is warmed or punctured, that the universe is finite, these
facts, if we like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true.
But this point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence
"My skin is warm" is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here
there is no reference to a fact, a world, an experience, or a piece of
evidence.



In giving up dependence on the concept of an uninterpreted
reality, something outside all schemes and science, we do not relinquish the notion of objective truth quite the contrary. Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth
of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with thefamiliar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false.


Davidson has (in his eyes) eliminated "truth relative to a scheme." Beyond that he wants to eliminate truth relative to a fact and truth relative to an object.

That leaves us with the T-sentence, and nothing else.

So me and Banno were talking about how a T-sentence can be used without reference to a fact or an object. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What has happened, and/or is happening...

My skin being warm... etc.

He then hesitantly refers to the actual events, the case at hand, what's happened as 'facts', and further shows his displeasure with the term by qualifying it with "if we must talk like that", or words to that effect/affect.

I do not think that he eliminated truth as relative to a scheme so much as granted them all... assuming coherency.

Do you see all of this as a kind of skepticism? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I see it as an outright rejection of the idea that there can be such things as schemes about the world that are not translatable one into the other.

I think Banno is quite right in connecting this paper to Kripke's.

↪creativesoul Exactly. — Banno

Now, if I can just stay on track!

:wink:

I'm hesitant to agree with the idea that convention T offers an adequate means for translation. I think Davidson needs that to be the case to make his own.