Some. Not all.
— creativesoul

Which world(s) do the others live in? Is that a support for conceptual schemas? — Marchesk

Davidson draw a distinction between kinds of possible worlds. He focuses upon the second in which there is one world and all the different views, because that is the kind underlying the belief that there are incommensurate schemes.

Which basically amounts to abolishing he notion of conceptual schemas... — Marchesk

Some. Not all.

l So he means coherence among existing beliefs? A web of belief kind of view of truth? The sun's setting is coherent if it adheres with other beliefs about the world? — Marchesk

Keep in mind his aim. He is proposing a method of approach to the very idea of conceptual schemes. He grants them all coherence and meaningfulness and in doing so eliminates all questions involving what makes belief true.

Do you understand this?

Davidson also rejects talk of the facts, if for no other reason than such talk is somehow inadequate for translatability.
— creativesoul

If you have a minute to explain that further, I'm interested. — ZzzoneiroCosm

See my exchange with Marchesky...

Being true is Davidson's focus.
— creativesoul

And what does it mean for a statement to be true? Is it enough to say, yep looks like the sun is setting! — Marchesk

"Being true" is Davidson's focus. Davidson kicks out correspondence. His doing so leveled the playing field by requiring only coherence. In this way they are all equal. All coherent views are meaningful to the the agent. So, translatability involves precisely that.

Althogh it is improtant to note that, so far as that essay implies a form of correspondence theory of truth similar to Austin's, Davidson later rejects any notion of correspondence making sentences true - in the article that this thread is about, as it turns out. — Banno

And yet, we all know that correspondence must be adequately accounted for... it is after-all the default position of unquestioned naive realism that we all have in common.

Davidson also rejects talk of the facts, if for no other reason than such talk is somehow inadequate for translatability.

But I think it illustrates why truth is not quite so simple. — Marchesk

Being true is Davidson's focus.

Relevance?

See Banno's verbatim report of Davidson's own words... the paper we're discussing... in the beginning if memory serves me.

Davidson rejects truth makers...

SO the sun is not the thing that makes "the sun is setting" true...
— Banno

Particularly since it's not true that the sun does set when speaking of the actual sun. — Marchesk

Don't bite Banno.

It's too easy, and the interesting stuff we're heading towards has yet to have come...

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism?
— Banno

Yes, he rejects the conceptual scheme/ empirical content dualism, and with that rejection I agree. — Janus

That's not the distinction I've raised though. I reject both rationalism and empiricism on the same ground.

So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism".

The astute listener/reader could then also add, "He did reject the conceptual scheme/empirical content dualism, though. I agree with that rejection."

:wink:

I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

Isn't that the distinction Davidson rejects as the third dogma of empiricism? — Banno

That's an interesting take. The words aren't the same. Are the referents?

But it wouldn't eliminate eliminative materialism, as Banno suggested. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I cannot speak to that.

I am of the view that there is one world, and it includes us. I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not. The overlap is the interesting bit here at least. It includes all naming and descriptive practices that are already in use prior to any individual user.

I'm not in disagreement. Uncharacteristic of me... sure. Nonetheless, sometimes convention agrees and/or supports my own position. Davidson has influenced me... through you.

:wink:

From long ago... that very notion... still underlies much of my own approach to thought, belief, and statements thereof.

That's why Davidson moved on from such an approach, right?

I think the point about the ministry was that a change in terminological use alone does not always guarantee talking about the same things(referents). Hence, for all I know... the person could be using new phrases as names for the same old notions.

Was it Davidson who claimed that if we know what it takes for a statement to be true, then we know what the statement means?

Is convention T showing this?

Belief as a propositional attitude; something perhaps you cannot accept. — Banno

Yep. That's a sticking point for me... as a general criterion. However, in this context, I can happily accept it, for it is imperative - I think - to grasping the totality of the denial, which I completely agree with. Pre language thought and belief are irrelevant here, for they cannot count as conceptual scheme. Although, they are a part of the world prior to sentences, that may not be a problem.

You've offered different descriptions regarding kinds of thought and belief. You've not offerd a universal criterion for what counts as thought and belief such that when we're assessing whether or not a candidate of our choosing counts as being a case of thought and belief it counts as such by virtue of satisfying that criterion.

Are you saying that language less creatures can form, have, and/or hold thought about how the world is and/or ought to be?

Any given conceptual scheme must be both true and meaningful - if not to us, then to those who understand it. Consider someone who has found an incommensurable conceptual scheme. They must be in a position to say "here is a conceptual scheme that is true and meaningful to those who adhere to it, and yet is not translatable into our conceptual scheme".

Now, how could they recognise it as meaningful and true, and yet not have some translation of it?

That is, if there were incommensurable conceptual schemes, we could not recognise them as such.

Hence consideration of incommensurable conceptual schemes makes no sense - literally, is meaningless. — Banno

This is the part that I completely agreed with earlier...

The only sticking point to me is the criterion of being both true and meaningful. I'm not sure why a conceptual scheme must be true, unless being true is equivalent to being coherent, consistent, lacking self-contradiction. If that's the case, then I've no issue. Re-reading you, that seems to be your take, but I didn't note Davidson saying as much when reading the paper. Did he? Is it irrelevant to the main thrust?

I do not think that conceptual schemes inhere in the mind without or prior to language. To quite the contrary...
— creativesoul

Glad to hear it. But sometimes. — Banno

Sometimes... I'm either not clear enough, or you misunderstand. As you well know, my own position regarding thought, belief, and meaning is unique.

What do you make of Davidson's take on the need for a workable theory of meaning and an acceptable theory of belief?

From the top of page 18...

I suggest, following Quine, that we may without circularity or unwarranted assumptions accept certain very general attitudes towards sentences as the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation. For the sake of the present discussion at least we may depend on the attitude of accepting as true, directed at sentences, as the crucial notion. (A more full-blooded theory would look to other attitudes towards sentences as well, such as wishing true, wondering whether true, intending to make true, and so on). Attitudes are indeed involved here, but the fact that the main issue is not begged can be seen from this: if we merely know that someone holds a certain sentence to be true, we know neither what he means by the sentence nor what belief his holding it true represents. His holding the sentence true is thus the vector of two forces: the problem of interpretation is to abstract from the evidence a workable theory of meaning and an acceptable theory of belief.

"The crucial notion"...

Belief.

...And what do all those examples of thought and belief have in common such that having it is what makes them thoughts and beliefs instead of something else?

Do language less creatures form, have, and/or hold thought and belief? It seems to me that you cannot admit that without incoherence and/or special pleading. The notion of thought you've advocated for does not allow it, despite your suggestion at the end.

That sound like an answer to my question about the meaning of descriptive statement, — Pfhorrest

Ok. Good. Would you now answer my question?

What does all human thought and belief consist of, on your view?

Believing in human races makes one a racist. Saying what's on your mind makes one a good president. There seems to be a pattern here of utterly inadequate criteria at work...

After a quote from Feyerabend he considers what would be involved in the case where the content was held firm while the conceptual scheme changes, and one finds oneself in a different world.

A favourite argument of mine comes next, one I have borrowed many times, so I will quote at length:

Suppose that in my office of Min- ister of Scientific Language I want the new man to stop using words that refer, say, to emotions, feelings, thoughts and inten- tions, and to talk instead of the physiological states and happen- ings that are assumed to be more or less identical with the mental riff and raff. How do I tell whether my advice has been heeded if the new man speaks a new language? For all I know, the shiny new phrases, though stolen from the old language in which they refer to physiological stirrings, may in his mouth play the role of the messy old mental concepts.

Thus falls the Churchland's attempt to eliminate folk psychology. — Banno

This dovetails nicely with thought, belief, and meaning as correlations. In this case, shiny new phrases play the role of the messy old mental concepts solely by virtue of shared referent.

What do statements about the world and/or ourselves mean???

That's a strange question. I mean, strange that one would not know this already, at a very early age without knowing that they do. That such a question is even given credence attests to the gross misunderstanding of human thought and belief at work in the background...

The meaning of any and all things meaningful consists entirely of the correlations being drawn. The meaning of any description depends upon the naming and subsequent descriptive practices. It depends upon what's being focused upon in addition to what's being said about that focal point. There is no one size fits all answer. It's not as if they all have the same meaning. They cannot unless they all draw correlations between the same things.

Does this satisfy your curiosity?

What kind of political system does the U.S. actually have? — Enrique

Plutocracy in the guise of a republic with democratic traditions...

Are you talking about what thought and belief refer to? Or are you talking about the nature of thought and belief? — Marchesk

I wanted to redress this. My last comment came off as a bit too snarky for my own tastes. My apologies.

The latter...

Which domain sets out what all thought and belief consists of?

He then proposes that translation provides a way to compare conceptual schema. Not translation merely from one language to another, since folk with differing languages may share a conceptual scheme; but translation from one conceptual scheme to another. In this way one might be able to identify each conceptual scheme in terms of the way it translates, one into the other.

There's a possible objection here in that one might argue that conceptual schemes somehow inhere in the mind without or before language. Sometimes creativesoul seems to think something like this. I'd suggest that if this were so, then either this purely mental stuff can be translated into our everyday language, in which case its purpose is lost; or if the mental stuff cannot be translated into our everyday language, then it are irrelevant to the discussion, dropping out like a boxed beetle. — Banno

Interesting thread Banno. Just to set aside any misunderstanding, I do not think that conceptual schemes inhere in the mind without or prior to language. To quite the contrary...

Conceptual schemes are metacognitive guidelines of sorts. They are existentially dependent upon rather complex language use. If they alone determine what sorts of things we say are real, then they are a standard for use of the notion. So, rather than thinking that conceptual schemes inhere in the mind without or prior to language, it seems to me that some of the basic elemental constituents of conceptual schemes do, namely rudimentary level thought and belief and all that that requires.

I am in near complete agreement with you and Davidson here, if I understand correctly.



I've recently used the term "incommensurate" to characterize the relationship between two differing views, particularly when there are fundamental differences in frameworks/taxonomies such that they do not translate one into the other as far as certain key terms go. Simply put... one term... more than one referent. The point, I think being made by Davidson and yourself, is that by virtue of my being able to understand that much, by virtue of being able to discern the different referents, the two schemes are translatable one into the other.

Moreover, if there is but one world, this would have to be the case.

What exactly about reason is in need of an explanation? — Pfhorrest

Everything. What is the minimum criterion that need be met prior to our assent that the candidate under consideration qualifies as a case of reason, or Reason, or...

What does all reason consist entirely of?

...one thing signifies another thing, because of the correlation between those things...

Sometimes.

If so, what do you take statements that purport to describe reality to signify, or correlate with -- what do they mean? Or if you somehow object to asking that question, can you explain why?

What do statements about the world and/or ourselves mean?

Does that work for you? Is that close enough to your questions?

All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.
— creativesoul
I don't understand what you're trying to say. — Pfhorrest

Did you understand the first claim?
— creativesoul
You'll have to tell me if I understand you right. That sounds to me like you're saying all meaning is of the type meant by expressions like "clouds mean rain" and "smoke means fire": one thing signifies another thing, because of the correlation between those things. Is that what you mean by that claim? If so, what do you take statements that purport to describe reality to signify, or correlate with -- what do they mean? Or if you somehow object to asking that question, can you explain why? — Pfhorrest

Do you know what all attribution of meaning consists of?

Not one type.

Does that help?

All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.
— creativesoul
I don't understand what you're trying to say. — Pfhorrest

Did you understand the first claim?

Why?

Do they say stuff like that too?

There wasn’t really any ‘rhetorical drivel’. You make a claim and I asked for clarification; you refuse with venom — I like sushi

As I said... groundless pretension.

I don't completely understand what you're saying, but it sounds to me like that's all aiming to answer the question about the meaning of descriptive statements. So I'm still not sure what questions you think are lacking. — Pfhorrest

All attribution of meaning consists of correlations drawn between different things. I would not pursue a question about the meaning of descriptive statements.

According to the position you're arguing for and/or from, what does all human thought and belief consist of?

No thanks. Your questioning is chock full of groundless pretention. I'm not in the mood to indulge your rhetorical drivel.

Let me know when you can keep up. Until then, I suggest a careful re-reading...