have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus
There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it.
— frank
I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus
So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism". — creativesoul
I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not. — creativesoul
PM me and I'll give you the primo reading list. — frank
Aborigines had no word for the number 114. How do you translate when they dont have the word? — frank
I would. I would also agree that Davidson is more deflationary regarding all talk about what makes sentences true, as well as all the historical baggage accompanying notions of "fact". Thus, he grants(demands) coherence and meaning as the starting point for what counts as an acceptable conceptual scheme. This is exactly what we're talking about. Coherent accounts of this world.
He's delineating the target, and setting the boundaries of the scope of our inquiry... all at the same time. — creativesoul
So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism".
— creativesoul
I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul
I read the rejection of the conceptual scheme/ empirical content duality to be a rejection of the idea that there are "two major categories of things"; in other words a rejection of the notion that there is empirical content outside of any conceptual scheme; but I could be misinterpreting Davidson... — Janus
I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.
You interpret this as...
...the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul
...? — ZzzoneiroCosm
...what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of
sensory experience," and "physical evidence"...
Is it fair to say you you've underscored the temporal aspect of the scheme-content dyad to arrive at the idea of "something waiting"?
We make maximum sense of the word and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement.
I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus
I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.
You interpret this as...
...the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul
...?
— ZzzoneiroCosm
No. Clearly not the same distinction. Below shows this well enough...
...what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of
sensory experience," and "physical evidence"...
Is it fair to say you you've underscored the temporal aspect of the scheme-content dyad to arrive at the idea of "something waiting"?
No. Although, I do underscore temporality. — creativesoul
2) is a conditional. If I say "If and only if snow is white" I haven't said anything about snow or a fact or an experience.
Hence no reference to actual snow, or a fact or an experience.
Open to any criticism of the above. — ZzzoneiroCosm
if there is no reference to snow, then what does it mean to say snow is white? — Marchesk
Davidson's rejection of partially incommensurable conceptual schemes is just the observation that sometimes people have different beliefs to us - that there is no clear way to distinguish an incommensurate conceptual scheme from a differing belief. As he says, there is no way to decide between a difference in beliefs and a difference in conception. — Banno
I'm not sure what this means. To me this is not so much a philosophical matter, but more a matter of simple common sense and usage. I can't imagine why anyone would want to claim that 'snow' does not refer to snow, regardless of their philosophical position; realist, idealist, anti-realist, solipsist or whatever. Likewise i think 'snow is white' refers to the state of affairs of snow being white, and I don't think any amount of stipulation can eliminate that fact from out of Tarski's T-sentence.Just trying to locate Janus philosophically. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Two things - the attribution of beliefs, and the interpretation of sentences - underpin understanding what someone is saying.
When using "beliefs" here I take Davidson as implicitly including other propositional attitudes - knowing, wanting, intending, wondering and so on. — Banno
But this is no different than the logic of correspondence, which can be seen in Aristotle's classic formulation: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". — Janus
"To say of what is that it is" IFF to say of what is that it is. — creativesoul
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