Janus is correct. You've drawn an equivalence. He asked about it. You've squirmed.

All meaningful experience consists of correlations being drawn between different things. Correlations can only be drawn between different things if the creature under consideration somehow perceives the content of their own correlations. Language less beasts do not draw correlations between language use and other things. Some can see green cups. Some can peek into their opening. Some can draw correlations between green cups and feeding. They do not know that the cups are green. They cannot.

A creature incapable of detecting certain ranges of the visible spectrum cannot draw correlations between the colors that that range helps enable us to pick out and anything else.

A creature that cannot know the names of colors but can see them nonetheless cannot possibly draw correlations between color names and other things. Nevertheless, some language less creatures can see green cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup. Some creatures perceive green cups without knowing that they are. We can know that they are though.

If the green cup is meaningful to the creature, it cannot be as a result of language being meaningful to the same creature. They cannot know that the green cup has become especially meaningful/significant to them. But green cups can and do become quite meaningful to language less creatures, despite all that, if for no other reason than by virtue of pure repetition alone.

Given enough time, the color of the cup can become background noise. The creature will no longer pause and take note of the color. Rather, it can become immediately taken note of. The creature can know to run towards the green cup instead of the polka dotted ones and we can watch them do so, immediately upon being released - without any hesitation. They have no idea that those cups are polka dotted or solid. They directly perceive differences. The latter are clearly meaningful. They associate those cups with eating. The polka dotted ones are meaningful as well. They are not the ones that contain food.

....a perception in the brain... — NOS4A2

Needs substance.

Of course that's 'the way it is', because I merely stated a consequence of what you're arguing for. If you believe that touching fire is not directly perceiving fire, then there's not much more I can say.
— creativesoul

You are not making arguments, but merely appealing to common sense. There are venues where appeals to common sense carry some weight, this is not one of them. — hypericin

You could not be more wrong. Perhaps I'll be able to show you soon. The gross neglect has not happened unnoticed.

Like our herring well done, eh?

You can know with 100% certainty that logical possibility alone does not warrant belief.

Touching the fire, on your view, is not directly perceiving the fire. Nonsense.
— creativesoul

Yup. That's the way it is, your common sense opinions notwithstanding. — hypericin

Of course that's 'the way it is', because I merely stated a consequence of what you're arguing for. If you believe that touching fire is not directly perceiving fire, then there's not much more I can say.

Of course, but neural events are not that which is given to the senses to be represented. Neural events in the senses just are the representations the senses afford. — Mww

Our overall worldviews/positions are very close to one another.

I think perhaps the differences can be teased out in our respective notions of mind. However, we do both seem to hold that all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things(here is where perception first happens). Our differences may be a matter of taxonomy. Maybe not if you're a mind/body dualist or physical/mental dualist. We're very close to one another though. At least, I think we are.

So, there's only two choices? Indirect realism/perception and naive realism?

Nah.

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer?
— creativesoul

I have an answer no one has given yet that I think is the correct one: lower organisms that do not use representational perception perceive directly.

Think of an amoeba, light hits a photo receptor, and by some logic the amoeba moves one way or the other.

If you regard this as "perception", then this is direct perception. — hypericin

Hmm...

Like the motion sensor outside my shop.

There's an evolutionary gulf between single celled organisms and us.

So, by definition then... how convenient. Reminiscent of the 'hard' problem.

If however perception for you entails the kind of representational perception we use, where the brain generates a virtual world for the centralized decision maker to evaluate and respond to, then perception is inherently indirect. — hypericin

Here is an example of disqualifying us from directly perceiving by using our biological machinery and how they work as reason.

Makes no sense to me.

Touching the fire, on your view, is not directly perceiving the fire. Nonsense.

...my senses will never be given my neural events... — Mww

Senses include neural events.

Why must one know what it is they are perceiving in order to be perceiving it?

That makes no sense.

It sems to me that some arguing against direct perception use the complexities of biological machinery as 'reason' to deny direct perception. Others include thought, belief, reasoning, and conceptual schema into their notion of perception and then use that as reason to deny direct perception. Others seems to presuppose that we need to perceive everything in order to perceive anything directly.

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer?

I am interested in dropping the description and unhelpful arguments about what's "real". Seems the approach I've offered allows that to happen and focuses upon the effects/affects. I'm not sold on it, but the divorce of perception and reality has even less appeal to me. I also do not place much value on "the given".

I'm not clear on how belief in trees and rivers change the world for anybody, especially when compared to ghosts and fairies. — Manuel

Belief determines/underlies actions.

The issue is, how can we accommodate beliefs which are specific to some individuals (ghosts and fairies), versus other beliefs which are agreed by everybody: rocks, rivers, grass, people, etc. — Manuel

Well, it may help to begin by not categorizing everything as belief.

Hmm.

Could you spell out what is being eliminated and how that is done? I assume it makes more sense of direct realism.

"Maps and territories" seems apt here. I'm afraid I'm no longer as hopeful about this conversation as I once was.

Either Bernie Sanders' worldview is not rightfully called "a populist" one, or the title is refuted.

I mean I see the intuitive appeal but, are we then going to say: ghosts are real and so are trees and rocks? — Manuel

Sure. Ghosts are characters in fairy tales/explanations. Fairy tales/explanations persist via linguistic tradition. Some people believe in fairy tales, and act in their namesake. The world changes as a result.

Are we to say that ghosts are not real for us, but real for them? — Manuel

Ghosts are real in the sense that when they/we think about ghosts, they're/we're affected/effected by those thoughts. Seems to me anyway...

Absurd to deny, I should think, and thereby easily dismissed.

Now, whatever shall we do with realism? — Mww

That which is real has affects/effects.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?..............I'd like to read your answer to the question above
— creativesoul

I agree that the proposition in language "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are in the world Cypress trees lining the banks.

However, the question is, where exactly is this world. Does this world exist in the mind or outside the mind. — RussellA

:yikes:

Evidence/remnants/consequences of linguistic bewitchment(radical skepticism/idealism).


We spoke earlier about this. The trees are in the Mississippi delta backwaters. We could increase specificity. Hone our aim, as it were. There's a small bayou named "Manchac". I could show you a map. I could take you there and show you in person. Coming off of the bayou Manchac and then reconnecting to it are canals. All along the banks of some of those canals are docks, decks, houseboats, houses, and living areas. There are sometimes adjacent swampy areas close by. Bald Cypress grow there.

None of those things and none of those places are in my mind.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.
— creativesoul

I could say "I perceive the colour green" or "I am conscious of the colour green". These mean the same thing, on the assumption that perceiving requires consciousness, in that I can only perceive something when conscious. — RussellA

What I'm saying is that it is possible for a capable creature to directly perceive green cups but because they do so by means of ways that they are completely unaware of, they're not conscious of perceiving. They're just doing it.

House cats can see green cups in cupboards and have no idea that they're called "green cups".

Because they are unaware of the fact that they are perceiving green cups, they do not have conscious awareness of the fact that they are perceiving a green cup while they're watching another creature hide by moving around to the other side.

The cat is now paying very close attention to the green cup. S/he's watching the edges. S/he's anticipating seeing the mouse. The cup may not appear the same to her/him as it does to us, at least regarding the color.

It seems that some here think that having biological machinery somehow discounts any and/or all capable creatures from directly perceiving things. As if having eyes somehow disqualifies one from even being able to directly perceive the green cup in the cupboard. "The green cup" is a rigid designator.

When looking at the same object, I may perceive the colour green and the other person may perceive the colour blue. I can never know what colour they are perceiving, not being telepathic. However, if the other person is perceiving the colour blue, then one of us is not seeing the object as it really is. — RussellA

If the object has no inherently existing mind-independent property of color to speak of, then it makes no sense to accuse either one of you of not seeing the object 'as it really is'(whatever that's supposed to mean). It's appearing green to you and blue to them makes no difference - if the object has no inherently mind independent property of color.

Someone recently accused indirect realists of working from the same mistakes as naive realists.

If the object appears green to you and blue to them, it is because the object both of you are directly perceiving has different effects/affects on different individuals. It does not follow from that that we do not or cannot(which is what some seem to suggest) directly perceive the object under consideration.

The cat can too.

We do not perceive mental concepts.
— creativesoul

We perceive a tree. A tree is a concept. Therefore we perceive a concept. — RussellA

Trees are in the yard. Concepts are in the language talking about the yard. Both are in the world. Concepts are in worldviews. Cypress trees are in the backwaters of the Louisiana delta.

there is ample evidence of perception and thinking being entangled. — wonderer1

I think that the latter is existentially dependent upon the former, but not the other way around. Seeing a green apple as a green apple is both perception(seeing the green apple) and thinking(seeing the green apple as a green apple).

Some language less creatures can see green apples but cannot see green apples as green apples.

The post hoc naming of certain wavelengths (or reflective surfaces) using the name of the sensation ordinarily caused by such wavelengths seems to be leading you and others to equivocate. — Michael

I'm curious if you'd show me how I'm equivocating.

For something to be true, there must be a reason why it is true
— Lionino
That does not look right. — Banno

My first thought as well...

Perhaps by "reason" he means truth conditions must be met?

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.
— creativesoul

Exactly, it is a question of linguistics. — RussellA

Not what I said. I'm making the point that to see the green apple as "a green apple" requires language use, whereas seeing the green apple does not.

In a world independent of humans are elementary particles, elementary forces in space-time. When we look at such a world, we directly see the world as it is. — RussellA

Weird that you're claiming to look at a world independent of humans and in doing so claim to be abke to directly see that which is imperceptible to the naked eye. Weird indeed.

That looks like special pleading for elementary particles. What makes them different from Cypress trees? We name them both. Both exist long prior to our awareness of them.

We can see the trees though. So, if either of the two is under suspicion of whether or not it is dependent upon us, it would certainly seem that the tree was safer from that charge.

You can only know that you are looking a a mkondo in the world if you already know the meaning of "mkondo". It is true that humans may impose their concept of a "mkondo" onto the elementary particles and elementary forces that they observe in space-time, but this mkondo wouldn't exist without a human concept being imposed upon the elementary particles and elementary forces that do exist in space-time.

So what are we perceiving?

On the one hand we are perceiving a set of elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, meaning that we are directly perceiving the world as it is, and on the other hand we are also perceiving a mental concept, meaning that we are also indirectly perceiving the world as we think it is.

Perception needs both aspects, something in the world and something in the mind. — RussellA

I think your use of "perception" is stretched beyond sense ability. We do not perceive mental concepts. This does mark at least one of the aforementioned significant differences between our views.

You look at the world. Do you see a mkondo?

You obviously cannot know whether you are seeing a mkondo or not until you know the meaning of "mkondo".

IE, you have to know the meaning of "trees lining the banks" before knowing whether you can see trees lining the banks. — RussellA

That's not right though. I'm talking about seeing trees and your talking about knowing about that.


A capable creature need not know that they're seeing a Cypress tree in order to see one.

I need not know what "trees lining the banks" means in order to see trees lining the banks. If that were the case, and we took it to the extreme, language less animals could not see Cypress trees, whether that be lining the banks or otherwise. Further, I suppose it would follow from what you claim that they could not see anything at all.

I wrote that I can never know what someone else is thinking. However, sometimes I can guess. Though, I can never know whether my guess is correct or not. — RussellA

You need not know that your belief is true in that case in order for it to be so.

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green"... — RussellA

That requires knowing how to use the word "green" to pick out green things. Knowing how to use the word "green" requires knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of tasting something bitter"...

Paying attention to bitterness does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of an acrid smell"...

Paying attention to an acrid smell does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of a sharp pain"...

Paying attention to a sharp pain does not require knowing how to use language.

..."I am conscious of hearing a grating noise"...

Paying attention to a grating noise does not require knowing how to use language.



One of those things above is not like the other.

...Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing.

That only follows from the outlier above.

Being conscious of perceiving requires language use. Otherwise, one merely perceives. One can be conscious of what they're perceiving, but one cannot be conscious of the fact that they are perceiving until and unless they have language use as a means to talk about that as a subject matter in its own right.

Drop everything after the term "sight", and I would concur that that follows from what preceded it.

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

I've done that to help make it clear what I'm asking. So, I'd like to read your answer to the question above. There's also more you wrote a few days back that I'm working on addressing.

:wink:

Seems you and I are largely in agreement on direct perception, which did not really surprise me.

I would say that "I am conscious of seeing the colour green", "I am conscious of tasting something bitter", "I am conscious of an acrid smell", "I am conscious of a sharp pain" or "I am conscious of hearing a grating noise".

Therefore, in my mind I am conscious of perceiving a sight, a taste, a smell, a touch or a hearing. — RussellA

If we draw enough meaningful correlations between green things and other stuff, we can become conscious of green things. That's not the same as being conscious of seeing green things. The apple is green. We can become conscious of green things before we know it. Being conscious of seeing the colour green is knowing how to group things by color and being aware of doing it. Being conscious of a big green monster does not require being conscious of seeing a green monster.

Seeing the color green as "green" is what we do after talking about it.

Not all discussion requires argument. I like to think we've helped one another in some way.

If it weren't for you and other folks like you, Idah been arguing with myself. I appresheeightcha.

:wink:

Nice stuff recently!

Are they seeing Cypress trees or are they seeing the way the Cypress trees appear to them? Are they smelling fresh ground Kona coffee, or the way fresh ground Kona coffee smells to them? Are they tasting cauliflower, or the way cauliflower tastes to them? — creativesoul

We're not smelling our subjective individual conscious experiences. We're not tasting the way coffee appears/interacts to/with our biological machinery. Our sense of taste is equivalent to the way the world appears to our tastes.

If it were the case that the object of our rational attention was the way the world appeared to us, then we would already be knee deep in metacognitive content. For we cannot be captured by the way the world appears to us until we draw a distinction between the world and how we see it. Until then...

We're captured by the world.

Terms of evolutionary progression.  

I'm asking if "There are Cypress trees lining the bank" states the way things are if and when there are Cypress trees lining the banks?
— creativesoul

I think it is right as you have done to distinguish words within exclamation marks to refer to thoughts and language and words not in exclamation marks to refer to things in the world. — RussellA

:smile: