For me saying that we see representations is more problematic and less parsimonious than saying we simply see things. — Janus
Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the worl — Luke
And yet you seem to be completely incapable of saying why I am wrong. — Janus
you seem to be saying that colours and seeing colours are the same thing. — Janus
However, the part of the process that is prior to awareness seems irrelevant to the question of whether we see things or merely representations of things. Of course, we can say either and there is no matter of fact there but just different interpretations. — Janus
I would have thought it clear i was using your term here, hence the inverteds. — AmadeusD
It's important insofar as it is the indirect cause of sensation — AmadeusD
Is the experience (G) different to the perception? Some might say that perception refers to our sensory experience of the world.
— Luke
That's true, some might say that. But it makes no sense to me... — AmadeusD
The Problem of Perception is a pervasive and traditional problem about our ordinary conception of perceptual experience. The problem is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perceptual experience be what we ordinarily understand it to be: something that enables direct perception of the world?
A.D. Smith claims that what most authors have in mind in talking about the Problem of Perception is the “question of whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world”
I assume it makes more sense of direct realism. — creativesoul
Does this mean that abstract concepts such as beauty are real? — RussellA
I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real. — Mww
My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object. — Luke
True, perceptions are of many things. I'm not sure what your point is though. — Janus
Am I being that unclear? My point is not that perceptions are of many things. My point is that perception is not just "seeing an object", you have to at least conceptually recognize both phenomenal awareness and object awareness. — hypericin
My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. Instead, the representation helps to form the perceptual experience, which is then directly of its object.
— Luke
What exactly are we doing then, when we smell something but are unaware what it is? — hypericin
you have to at least conceptually recognize both phenomenal awareness and object awareness. — hypericin
Perception need not entail recognition or identification of objects. We can have a perceptual experience of an object (e.g. for the first time) and be unable to identify the object. — Luke
My position is that perceptual experiences necessarily involve representation, but that we do not perceive a representation. — luke
I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.
Anyone here have an answer? — creativesoul
In your account, when we smell this unidentifiable smell, you say the perception involves a representation, but we are somehow unaware of this representation. — hypericin
I am interested in dropping the description and unhelpful arguments about what's "real". Seems the approach I've offered allows that to happen and focuses upon the effects/affects. — creativesoul
Now, whatever shall we do with realism?
— Mww
That which is real has affects/effects. — creativesoul
….the divorce of perception and reality has even less appeal to me. — creativesoul
I also do not place much value on "the given". — creativesoul
I’d eliminate abstract conceptions having affect/effect from being real.
— Mww
What if abstract conceptions only have effects if they are actually thought, and every actual thought is a neural (i.e. real) event? — Janus
I really don't know what you are talking about. You still haven't answered my question as to whether colour and seeing colour are the same thing. You seemed to be implying that they are. If you don't believe they are then fine, we agree on that much. — Janus
There would not seem to be any imaginable more direct ways of accessing perceptible objects — Janus
Doesn’t that just say neural events are real? No one doubts that, but no one can map from such physical neural event to a metaphysical abstract conception with apodeictic certainty, either. — Mww
It could be said that a perceptual experience simply is a representation. However, I made the weaker assertion that representation is only involved in a perceptual experience, because language and knowledge can also form part of a perceptual experience. — Luke
Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation. — Luke
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