patterns of colours — Michael

Fungus huh?

:lol:

If hallucination of an apple amounts to the biological machinery doing the same thing it has done in past, while looking at an apple, then it becomes clear which one is existentially dependent upon the other.

They are not the same. Indirect realism cannot seem to account for that.

There is no difference between the constitution of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes. — Michael

According to the account you're arguing for/from.

Is hallucination of an apple possible if one has never ever seen an apple, if one is completely unaware that there are such things as apples?

So at least according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur. — Michael

Well, whether or not something follows from one's terms is established by one's meaning, not the others'.

If cake molecules entering the body and interacting(physically) with one's biological machinery does not count as direct perception, then nothing will.

In evolutionary progression terms...

I cannot make sense of hallucination unless compared to non-hallucinatory experience. Non hallucinatory experience does not depend upon hallucinatory in the same sense of "depend". Existential dependency. On the indirect realist account, there is no difference between the constituents.

That's just plain wrong.

A hallucination or dream of an apple does not require a distal object(an apple) except sometime in past experience. For that is when the biological machinery does its perception work. In dreams and hallucinations, its (mis)firing as though it has once again perceived or is once again perceiving an apple, despite no apple being perceived.

So, I'm curious and I've circled around some questions I'd like you to answer. I've hinted, I guess is one way to put it. Now, I'm going to directly ask(pardon the pun).

There's some barbecue chicken in the kitchen. I can smell it, because the molecules are entering into my body unimpeded, carried along in the air. My biological machinery is doing what it does.

To me, I am directly perceiving the chicken in the other room, because small parts of it entered my nose.

I'm guessing you'll deny that my perception of the chicken is direct. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the chicken is a constituent of my perception or my experience. I'm guessing that you'll deny that the molecules are a constituent of my perception or experience.

Do I have that right?

Yes, I do believe that the existence of the tree I see is not in question. If I decide to question it and then accept an answer, then, and only then, has belief come into play. In other words, of course all doubt concerning the veracity of our vision is belief based, but I am speaking about the situation prior to any doubt about the veracity of our vision. — Janus

That's when one's initial basic worldview is forming. One is acquiring and accruing belief about themselves and the world around them. Prior to doubting the veracity of one's own vision, one completely and totally trusts their physiological sensory perception(eyes in this case). During these times prior to that awareness... seeing is believing. What I mean is that one does not doubt their own eyes until they become that they are sometimes untrustworthy, by then we're operating under a belief system.

When we begin looking at the world, we believe that there are things all around us, despite the fact that we cannot articulate nor formulate our own experiences. It's impossible for a bike rider to swerve in order to avoid an obstacle that they do not believe is there. Belief is baked into all experiences.

It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives. — Banno

Reminiscent of Kant's Noumena. The whole denial that I know that the heater grate to my right is what I'm seeing. I know what it's made of. I know where it's located. I know the size and shape. I know it's function. I know some dangers it poses to passersby. I know it's not located in my head/body. I know mental representations are. Thus, the grate I'm looking at is not a mental representation.

I don't claim not to have reliable knowledge of distal objects... — Michael

The end.

:wink:

We're in agreement.

There's semantic hijacking going on in here concerning what counts as direct realism/perception. Earlier fdrake posted some SEP stuff that is more in line with where I'm at. I also have sympathy for disjunctive views on this topic.

I also find little sense in a self divorced from physiological sensory perception.

Cut out my tongue, and I'm still me, but there's a bit less. The tongue remains a part of me, just disconnected. Self and sight, hearing, etc. seems the same.

It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank

I almost quoted that paragraph, crossed that part out, and agreed. That part caused me pause as well.

I don't think believing the tree is there is necessary for seeing it. I see the tree there, and the question of whether or not it is really there (answering that question being the point where belief enters into the picture) doesn't arise, certainly doesn't have to arise.

You can say that seeing the tree presupposes believing it, (like the old adage "seeing is believing") and that is one way of speaking about what is happening; I just happen to see that way of speaking as redundant. I think believing comes into play when there is doubt and we decide to go with one possibility or another. — Janus

Do you really believe that the question of whether or not we're hallucinating(whether or not the tree is really there) comes before belief?

All doubt concerning the veracity of our vision is belief based.

A good spinach salad tastes better using chopsticks. Couldn't be more physically direct contact. Could be less links in the chain.

Light directly enters the eye and interacts with biological machinery beginning at the back of the eye and spreading out into the brain. Numerous biological structures are involved. I do not know the names of them all, nor do I need to. There are, and that's what matters. That's all physical interaction. How much more direct can anything be?

We have direct perceptual knowledge of our body's response to stimulation. — Michael

We know a lot about how bodies respond to stimulation. Some of it was inferred, hypothesized, tested and verified. The half second delay between seeing a 100mph fastball and that consciously registering within the batter was discovered. Blind sight, and all that too. Knowledge of our body's response to stimulation is not always acquired in the sense that 'direct perceptual knowledge' requires.

I'd agree with adding "sometimes" to the quote at the top of this post.

Our physiological sensory perception(biological machinery) is in direct physical contact with distal objects. Light directly enters the eye and lands on the structures in the back of the eyes, which are physically connected to the brain via even more biological structures. The same holds good for coffee in the mouth, fire on the skin, cake molecules in the nose, or decaying flesh in both the nose and mouth.

How do you square the physicalist standard you've required for what counts as being a constituent of experience against what's above? Do we agree on the above?

We have names for all the different parts of biological machinery that facilitates our perception of grates.

Light directly enters the eye. The grate in the floor does not. By virtue of the light, the grate, and our biology, we directly perceive the grate. The surface of the grate directly touches the skin. By virtue of our skin, and the grate, we directly perceive the grate. The hot coffee directly touches our mouth parts. By virtue of our skin, our gustatory structures, and the hot coffee, we directly taste the coffee. The cake directly enters our nose, albeit in very small molecular form. By virtue of the cake, the air, and our noses, we directly smell the cake.

It seems that that argument against direct perception amounts to a notion of "direct perception" that cannot include complex biological machinery like ours.

It's like the opponents(arguing for indirect perception) are offering naive realism(like the eyes function like a window to the world) or nothing.

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.
— creativesoul

I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. That said, I don't deny that you can talk about believing that the tree you see is there, rather than simply saying you see it there, but I think the former way of speaking is less parsimonious, even redundant... — Janus

"Redundant" is n interesting choice of terms. So, do we agree that belief is necessary for seeing the tree in the front yard?? It goes without saying that seeing a tree in the yard includes believing that something is there, doesn't it? That necessary presupposition is what makes the terminological use redundant, right?

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.
— creativesoul

I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. — Janus

Waddaya mean "actively"? If you do not actively disbelieve, then by default, you believe something is there, even before learning the name of it. We need not say "I believe a tree is there" to ourselves in order to believe we're looking at a tree. Unless we're one of those people who say they believe that they're not looking at a tree, but rather looking at a representation of one.

We agree that one need not formulate propositional belief to themselves at every moment throughout one's life in order to see trees. I'm attempting to point out that propositional belief are not the only kind. Although, any and all of our candidates will take propositional form in our report of them.

It's all about the necessary elemental constituents. That is determined and facilitated by biological machinery. Physiological sensory perception. Words are not always part of the content, despite being part of the content for each and every report thereof.

The way you're using the term "belief" cannot take all this into account.

By the way, my apologies for how the "shallow" comment came off earlier. "Inadequate" is more in line. Sometimes things do boil down to a matter of how we're using words, and there's no relevant fact of the matter to compare/contrast differing opinions with/to. It doesn't follow that all frameworks are on equal footing. Sometimes there is not a fact of the matter, but rather an abundance of them. All of them are germane. One's notions cannot - ought not anyway - conflict with such facts.

What defines them as being indirect realists is in believing that we have direct knowledge only of a mental representation. — Michael

The heater grate to my right is not a mental representation. It is a distal object. It's made of metal. It has a certain shape. It consists of approximately 360 rectangle shaped spaces between 48 structural members. The spacing is equally distributed left to right as well as top to bottom. However, the left to right spacing is not the same as the top to bottom.

The 'mental representation', whatever that may refer to, cannot be anywhere beyond the body.

According to you, all we have direct access to and thus direct knowledge about is mental representations.

Where is the heater grate?


The irony of the "bewitchment" allusion...

I've had to resort to memory aids even in areas where I used to be articulate
— Vera Mont — BC

Ah, don't feel bad. Humans have been doing that forever. Road signs. Language. Landmarks.

What are hallucinations if not an experience of a distal object without a distal object? — flannel jesus

Malfunctioning biological machinery.

The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences. — Michael

I think what I'm offering here is relevant.

None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.
— creativesoul

I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael

So, what I see is not a constituent of my experience or the heater grate is not a distal object?

None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.

I'm still dyslexic... it's actually to my right.

Funny that.

Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

Okay. So then are distal objects mental constituents of experience?

Physical constituent then?

Okay. I'm currently drinking coffee. Kona coffee to be precise. I'm also talking to you, thinking about what you're writing, and listening to the sounds coming from the other room where some friends of mine are playing cards. I can hear the sounds of shuffling cards. I can hear the sharp smack of card faces against the table as they're being played. I can also hear the clacking of card edges against the table as players contemplate their next move. I can also hear the conversation between the players as it progresses. It includes much more than the game being played.

We're all getting hungry. We've been discussing which bread to use to make French toast. We have different kinds of bread here. Some is frozen. Some not. There are also all sorts of things in my direct line of sight; from the vantage point I'm currently positioned at in relation to all the other distal objects I can see, smell, hear, and feel from here. There's also a faint scent leftover from a particular cleaning solution that we used yesterday while cleaning the house.

Are you saying that none of that counts as a distal object?

Yes. Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Experience and distal objects are in a very literal physical sense distinct entities with a very literal physical spatial distance between the two. — Michael

It follows that no constituent of experience extends beyond the body.

Is that about right as well?

I look out into the distance and see a tree in the yard. There's a squirrel running around the tree, doing its thing. You're claiming that the squirrel and the tree are either not distal objects or - if they are - they are not(cannot be) constituents of experience.

Is that about right?

I don't need to believe it's there in order to see that it is. — Janus

I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.

Why can't distal objects be constituents of experience
— creativesoul

Because experience does not extend beyond the body – it’s the body’s physiological response to stimulation (usually; dreams are an exception) – whereas distal objects exist outside the body. — Michael

Are you saying that distal objects are unnecessary for the response?

Well, if we take it that adiaireta, awareness of something, is a sort of knowledge, it seems like we can possess it without formulating any propositional beliefs about a thing. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for the engagement. I agree that some knowledge(that a thing exists; is there) does not require forming propositional belief about that thing. So, I agree with the above. I've not claimed that all knowledge is existentially dependent upon propositional belief. I'm claiming that all knowledge is existentially dependent upon belief of some sort or another, in some way or another. The sorts and ways are many. There is more than one kind.

Whether or not a case of awareness counts as knowledge that is not existentially dependent upon belief greatly depends upon 1.) what may be called "the object of awareness"(what it is - exactly - that one is aware of), and 2.) the biological machinery of the candidate. Awareness of some things is only possible via language use.

One cannot become aware of something that does not exist(purely imaginary things) without language use.

However, belief about the world and/or oneself is being formed long before language acquisition begins in earnest. So, I would think awareness is needed during those times. I may agree with calling some cases of awareness during such times "knowing"(that something is there).

We can have false propositional beliefs about something... — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. We can.

I'm not sure if we can have a "false awareness" of something. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Depends upon the something.

Secondhand info exists. The recent public usage of "CRT" is evidence of how one can become aware that there is a theory named "Critical Theory" based upon false belief about the theory. If based upon false belief, and it counts as an awareness that there is such a thing as "Critical Theory", it could be said that they know Critical Theory exists. Such awareness/knowledge seems to require propositional belief though, so it's not a good example of the criterion/outline you've offered, although it seems to be a case of "false awareness".

So, at least this sort of knowledge seems possible... — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would think it's impossible to become aware of something that one does not believe exists. I do not see how one can become and/or be aware of something else that they do not believe is there.

...the total reduction of knowledge to propositional beliefs and their truth values so common in modern analytical philosophy. It seems obvious to me that I know my brother for instances, but I can know him more or less well than I currently know him. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed. I've long argued against those practices.

That's the death knell of Cartesian doubt.

Until one becomes aware of their own human fallibility; until one no longer believes their own eyes; until one begins the endeavor of metacognition with a particular focus upon the shortcomings of the human perceptual capabilities; seeing is believing.

I would say 'seeing that there is something to be mimicked', 'seeing that another individual behaved in some certain way', 'seeing that someone did something or other'. Unless the case is that those things were not seen but reported by someone else, in which case 'believing' would be, for me, the apt term. — Janus

Believing another's words is one species of belief; one way to draw correlations; one way to make connections; one way to attribute meaning(in this case to the terms "belief" and "believing").

One way to talk? Sure. A bit shallow though.

the fact that he found it necessary to try and account for the interaction between mind and body through the pineal gland, is also indicative of the sense in which he treats the mind as something objectively existent. — Wayfarer

Hey Jeep.

I thought that the causal closure of the material world and the immaterial world drove the need to explain how it was that minds could effect/interact with bodies and vice versa.

If the mind was completely independent from the body and vice versa, then it would not be possible to think that one was hungry, or in pain, or any number of other reductios.

Do you believe that naive/direct realism cannot deny color as a property of objects? I mean, I suppose I do not see any reason that a position like naive realism cannot correct any flaws based upon newly acquired knowledge such as color perception. — creativesoul

I think that if they admit that colours are not properties of objects then they must admit that colours are the exact mental intermediary (e.g. sense-data or qualia or whatever) that indirect realists claim exist and are seen. And the same for smells and tastes. — Michael

I think that you've given indirect realism too much credit. I see no reason to think that if colors are not inherent properties of distal objects that the only other alternative explanation is the indirect realist one. They can both be wrong about color.

Olfactory and gustatory biological machinery work differently than vision. Light is not part of the objects we see. It helps facilitate seeing. Light does not help facilitate tasting and smelling.

Direct realists claimed that there is no epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are actual constituents of experience. Indirect realists claimed that there is an epistemological problem of perception because distal objects are not actual constituents of experience (and that the actual constituents of experience are something like sense-data or qualia or whatever).

Why can't distal objects be constituents of experience, and color not be an inherent property thereof?

Cheers. I'd rather be encouraging than discouraging. Enacting morality and all.

:wink:

You're often good at that.

Thanks for that. Interesting take on truth.

Could you explain it a bit more while applying it to the context?

The content of the cat's belief is meaningful to the cat.
— creativesoul

Sure. The meaning is just what the cat does. — Banno

Meaning is not equivalent to behaviors. The identity of indiscernibles shows that nicely.

As I just said to Janus, you and I are in near complete agreement when it comes to the OP. Best leave it there with you. I'd rather keep liking you.

:lol:

That is to draw a distinction between mimicry and mimicking for the sake of mimicking.
— creativesoul

I would say the difference there would be intention, not belief. — Janus

The term intention has very different uses, particularly between laypeople and philosophers. I'm guessing you know this already. Just thought it worth mention. It's relatively new to me. That said...

If we're using the layman's notion of intention or the philosopher's, intentionally mimicking for the sake of mimicking requires believing one is mimicking for the sake of mimicking. The object of intention(the philosopher's kind) is the mimicry in both cases, it seems to me. Although, I suppose ridicule could be the object in the deliberate cause of mimicry. The difference between mimicking without knowing one is mimicking and intentionally mimicking is the knowing part. In either case, one knows how to mimic when one mimics.

Both cases require believing that there is something to be mimicked; believing that another individual behaved in some certain way; believing that someone else did something or another.

Earlier you wrote that one without hands cannot plane a board. Strictly speaking that's not true of everyone without hands, but yes... that's the gist of the existential dependency I'm setting out regarding knowledge and belief.

I understand that this is not really germane to the thread topic, but it involves belief, and I'm a sucker for that topic.

:joke:

As far as the OP goes, you and I agree much more than disagree. It's when we unpack our respective notions of knowledge and belief that things begin to get more contentious. It seems that way to me anyway.

I appreciate ya, bruddah.

Aloha! A hui ho.