It doesn't resolve it because I don't know which side to take. Do I accept that, as a categorical imperative, I ought not kick puppies, or do I accept that categorical imperatives make no sense? — Michael

Divorce the utterance from the label and walk away a free man. "One ought not kick puppies" is both sensible and true. It's definitely sensible, and that's enough, if you'd like to set the truth issue aside. If categorical imperatives make no sense, and "one ought not kick puppies" makes perfect sense, then "one ought not kick puppies" cannot count as a "categorical imperative", for the claim cannot do both, make perfect sense and make no sense..

Time to choose between the archaic taxonomy(categorical imperatives) and what you know is true despite not fully understanding how and/or why it is.

The end.

When person A says to person B "I promise, I'll make sure you have a rose garden on Sunday", then come Monday person B ought have a rose garden. That is true because it corresponds to what A was doing when making the promise. That's what promising means.

There's your resolution regarding the dissonance.

As an aside, Proust caused a severe case of cognitive dissonance within me after following his logic as he set out Gettier during a lengthy conversation he and I had over a decade ago. That was my first full fledged experience regarding deep considerations of the Gettier problem. That resolution wasn't nearly as neat or as tidy as this one.

:wink:

Does it? I mean justificatory regress has to stop somewhere, right? Why not right there?

it hasn't been proven that the categorical imperative "one ought not kick puppies" is true. — Michael

Need it be 'proven' in order for you to know it?

Ah... sorry, I'm a bit late to the discussion and I did not perform the due diligence of reading enough to know that...

Perhaps dropping the notions of categorical and hypothetical imperatives would help?

Ah I see. So that serves as a clear cut counterexample to the notion that all claims in the form of "One ought not X" imply conditionals.

What I was getting at is that the unconditional phrase "one ought not X" being true is vacuous. It is only meaningfully true if implying something like "according to Y, one ought not X" or "one ought not X or Y will happen". — Michael

"One ought not kick puppies."

How do your claims quoted above cover that one? Seems perfectly meaningful and true from where I sit despite not needing to be bolstered by what you suggest all such claims require.

Drawing and maintaining a distinction between reward/punishment and causality is not unnecessary regarding (2).

Your rendering makes (2) true. Mine does not.

So, (1) and (3) but not (2) on my rendering and all three on yours.

Here, we look at the consequences of drawing the distinction or not, and we can all see that it is not an unnecessarily pedantic endeavor.

My use of the phrase "reward and punishment" was an inclusive phrase to account for any desirable or undesirable consequence. — Michael

Unnecessarily multiplying entities. Reward and punishment requires a judge. Causality does not.

So, (1) and (3) but not (2) as written???

Because there is no need for a rule giver(God) or reward/punishment but rather just good ole knowledge of causality. Hence, it is not the case that obligation is vacuous sans a rule giver and/or reward/punishment.

b) (as mentioned by Anscombe, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer) the very concept of obligations sans a rule-giver or punishment and reward is vacuous, and — Michael

That may not be true.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment. Look no further than the sheer numbers of Americans who rightly do not trust politicians as proof of the vital importance of all that. Knowledge of inevitable consequences seems to me to do a better job than God or reward/punishment when it comes to knowledge of how keeping one's word is imperative to a successful society of self-governing interdependent people. I think that that is true regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

This, in summary, is where the confusion lay: I was thinking you were saying us contemplating what is acceptable/unacceptable counts as moral facts when, if I am understanding you correctly now, you are not saying that. — Bob Ross

Not what I said then or now.

It's not that simplistic. I have no "access" to your parents and yet I know that they're different. — Michael

Are you claiming my mom is to my dad as perception is to reality(as Kant's Noumena/phenomena distinction)?

Which one is the parent in itself?

:wink:

Ok, but, like I said before, someone being in the event of making moral judgments (“considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”) is not a moral fact in any meaningful sense. — Bob Ross

Where do I start? Sigh...



All practiced usage of a term, any term, counts as a 'meaningful' sense(scarequotes intentional) of that particular term. Oddly enough, the term "meaningful" is superfluous here. All senses of all terms are meaningful to the practitioners.

I'm not alone in holding that events are facts. You insist that in order for me to be arguing in the affirmative for moral realism I must use the subjective/objective dichotomy as well as the mind dependent/independent dichotomy. That's not true.

"Being in the event of making moral judgements" is not something I would condone writing. That just IS categorizing thought, belief and/or behaviour as acceptable/unacceptable in some set of specific circumstances. It just IS practicing the application of one's moral belief/code. Moral judgments are not equivalent to moral facts. All moral judgments are acts. Not all moral events/facts are acts of moral judgment.

Hence, in short summary, the quote directly above contains a non sequitur followed by a textbook demonstrable falsehood.



True to a strong methodological naturalist bent, on my view, the simplest moral facts existed in their entirety - they emerged onto the world stage - long before our picking them out to the exclusion of all else with our naming and descriptive practices. They do not consist of language use.

Some events count as moral because they share the same basic common denominator that all moral things include. Morality, after all, boils down to coded of conduct. Ethical considerations, after all, are always about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. All things moral include that. There are no exceptions. There is no stronger justificatory ground. That all serves as more than adequate ground to discriminate between facts. Moral facts involve what I've been setting out. Non moral ones do not. That commonality makes all ethical considerations and all moral discourse count as moral.

What grounds your rejection of using the same common denominator to discriminate between kinds of events/facts/states of affairs/happenings?

Literally every moral anti-realist position agrees that there are people “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”--the disagreement is about whether those considerations are about mind(stance)-independently existing morals. Your view, I think, just completely sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion....

I get that you define ‘moral fact’ in a way such that a promise is one, being an event which has to do with “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, but that, again, is just sidestepping the issue... is that promise, or that “considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior”, about something objective? It seems as though your use of ‘moral facticity’ just doesn’t find this question relevant...

It's irrelevant for different reasons. I've not used "moral fscticity". May I suggest you reread our exchange?

What you characterize as "sidesteps the actual metaethical discussion" I see as dissolving the issue by virtue of realizing that the problem is and always was the language use itself. The inherent inadequacy of the objective/subjective distinction seems like a novel consideration here.

You seem to find considerable difficulty accepting the facts for what they are when I'm saying stuff that you agree with. That's quite strange to me. What's the title of the thread again? What would a solution be like if not at least somewhat agreeable?

If moral facts are just events where someone is considering what is acceptable/unacceptable to do, then it isn’t necessarily the case that their judgment (conclusion they make) about what is acceptable/unacceptable corresponds to what mind(stance)-independently exists. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that ‘moral facts’ exist in any metaethically meaningful sense of the term.

The last statement is phrased as though it is a conclusion. It does not follow what preceded it. It does not follow from the fact that I'm not using your preferred terminological framework that what I'm arguing does not make sense.

↪hypericin Good article. You should consider starting a thread specifically on it. It might be fun. — Banno

I agree.

I, too, strongly suspect that morality is inevitable as an evolutionary feature/consequence of our being interdependent social creatures.

Don't thank me, thank the one I adopted that from... probably A.J. Ayer.

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.
— creativesoul

Sorry, just to be clear, you're indicating a Kantian "We know we don't see things as they are" position is untenable? — AmadeusD

Yes. In order to know that there is a difference between two things, one must have access to both in order to compare them.

i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

That's up... out of the bottle. Not down.

:wink:

Well, I reject Kant's Noumena as well as phenomenalist approaches on the obvious grounds that drawing the distinction between the world and perception of it requires a comparitive analysis of both. By definition, we have no access to Noumena. By definition, all we have are our perceptions(Stove's gem). Hence, if that is the case, there is no way to know that our perceptions do not match up to the world, so...

Seems to me that such positions are inherently flawed in that they are untenable and/or self-defeating.

Interesting. As you'll have seen, It appears i must necessarily be heading toward that conclusion. But i will explore every alcove on the way down haha — AmadeusD

Strictly speaking, everything ever thought, believed, and/or uttered comes through a subject, so in that sense, nothing thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise expressed/uttered is strictly objective. The dichotomy also fails in all the same ways as the internal/external dichotomy fails. That is, they are both inherently incapable of taking account of that which consists of both, and thus is neither one or the other. Truth, thought, belief, and meaning are all precisely such things. But I digress... that's another topic altogether.

Those dichotomies as well as a few others add nothing but unnecessary confusion/overcomplication to philosophy.

...nothing is objective. — AmadeusD

If that's the case, then the term "subjective" loses all its meaning and use because it loses the ability to discriminate between different kinds of things. Hence, it is best to abandon the dichotomy altogether, which is what I've done...

My problem is that I don’t think there are any moral facts, period. — Bob Ross

Your problem just may be the terminological usage you've confined yourself with. Are you using the terms "moral" and "facts" consistently? If so, exactly what counts as "moral" and "fact"?

So, correct me if I am wrong, a moral fact is an event such that there is someone in that event that is considering what counts as acceptable or unacceptable behavior? Am I on the right track? If not, then please elaborate on that portion (of the quote above). — Bob Ross

Yes. The basic dichotomy I'm setting out and working from is moral and not.

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

No, that’s fine; but I am only not going to break that obligation (when push comes to shove) if I have obligated myself to fulfilling my professed obligations (promises): are you denying that?

Yes, I am denying that.

By virtue of promising, one already obligates themselves to make the world match their words(keep their promise). That's the whole point of promise making. If one does not already obligate themselves to keep their word, then they do not intend to make the world match their words, and hence they've not made a promise at all, for they did not believe what they said. They've just plain lied. The moral obligation remains regardless. The moral fact is such that one made a promise. True statements about that moral fact will correspond to it.

Hence, if today you promise to plant me a rose garden on Monday, then come Tuesday I ought to have one. That's true by virtue of corresponding to the relevant moral fact of the matter at hand.

What are you saying you are setting out to do? Setting out to denote how hard it is to nail down what counts as morally factual?

No.

Either way, you should be able to give a definition of what is a moral fact, no?

Yes, and I have repeatedly done so from the very beginning of this exchange.

To satisfy a moral arealist such as Bob Ross I think they must be context independent. — hypericin

Moral facts, on Bob's view, cannot exist for they must be mind-independent(whatever they are), objective entities and given that all things moral directly involve unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour and all unacceptable/acceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour is existentially dependent upon minds and contexts, then it only follows that there is no such thing as moral facts.

A large part of the problem involves the underlying dichotomies at work.

I have no problems with that SEP article: I think it is a good outline of the landscape. — Bob Ross

Okay. Good. Do you understand that I'm setting out the bit I bolded?

...you are trying to imply that there are moral facts simply because there are people engaging in morally signified events... — Bob Ross

No. I'm clearly delineating, not implying, that all facts are events(what happened or is happening) and that moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

No. I only have an obligation to do X upon promising X if I am equally obligated to fulfill my promises. — Bob Ross

Promising is voluntarily entering into an obligation to make the world match your words. Are you denying that much?

From the SEP's article on moral realism...

It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true. Moral realism is not a particular substantive moral view nor does it carry a distinctive metaphysical commitment over and above the commitment that comes with thinking moral claims can be true or false and some are true. Still, much of the debate about moral realism revolves around either what it takes for claims to be true or false at all (with some arguing that moral claims do not have what it takes) or what it would take specifically for moral claims to be true (with some arguing that moral claims would require something the world does not provide).

The debate between moral realists and anti-realists assumes, though, that there is a shared object of inquiry—in this case, a range of claims all involved are willing to recognize as moral claims—about which two questions can be raised and answered: Do these claims purport to report facts in light of which they are true or false? Are some of them true? Moral realists answer ‘yes’ to both, non-cognitivists answer ‘no’ to the first (and, by default, ‘no’ to the second) while error theorists answer ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second. (With the introduction of “minimalism” about truth and facts, things become a bit more complicated. See the section on semantics, below.) To note that some other, non-moral, claims do not (or do) purport to report facts or that none (or some) of them are true, is to change the subject. That said, it is strikingly hard to nail down with any accuracy just which claims count as moral and so are at issue in the debate....

They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.
— creativesoul

Can you elaborate on this a bit? I note a distinction in a way that one could be 'telling the truth' that they believe something which runs counter to a fact of the matter.

But I can't see how this removes the element of 'truth' in a given fact (if established as such) — AmadeusD

Truth is correspondence between what's happened or is happening and thought, belief, and/or statements thereof. Facts are events(what's happened or is happening).

"Telling the truth" is actually a very misleading phrase or way of speaking, but it's for another thread. But yes, one could be telling the truth, if that means stating what one believes to be true, and say something that runs counter to what happened, is happening, or will happen but has yet to have done so.

So are you saying that the moral facts are events which are of acceptable or unacceptable behavior, but that acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior is non-factual? — Bob Ross

No. I said, facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so. Facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). What has happened and/or is happening are matters of fact. Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve actively considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, whether that be our own or others'.

I don’t have an obligation, prior to promising X, to do X—its not a moral fact that I ought to do X. — Bob Ross

I never said that that was even the sort of thing than can be a fact, of any kind. You seem to be consistently arguing against an imaginary opponent here. Utterances of ought are judgments, not facts. They can be true/sound. Facts cannot. Odd that you keep arguing against stuff I've not said nor does it only follow from what I have said.

A question...

Do you have an obligation to do X after you've made the promise?

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, so I wouldn't say they are even normative facts: it is a hypothetical imperative--i.e., it is a subjectively utterance of obligation. Moral facts are about obligations which are true independently of what a subject obligates themselves to do (viz., independently of what they decide to promise or not). What do you think? — Bob Ross

What you claimed to be your problem has nothing to do with what I wrote. I've no problem at all with the statement you focused on. I agree that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, nor do they need to be in order for there to be moral facts and true statements and/or sound judgments about those facts. Facts, on my view, are not truth apt. They are not the sorts of things that can be true/false. Rather, they are part of what makes it possible in order for truth apt things to be so.

As I said, my position is that all facts are events(as compared/contrasted to true statements, propositions, and the like). Moral facts are distinct from all others in that they directly involve considering what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour whether that be our own or others'. Hence facts that do not involve contemplating acceptable/unacceptable behaviour are amoral facts.

When one promises to do X, it is not a hypothetical imperative. It is the act of giving another the added additional assurance that one will keep their word(to make the world match their words).

You seem to be talking about normative ethics, applied ethics, and/or descriptive ethics. I'm talking about metaethics. — Michael

My apologies.

As is typical with me sometimes, I packed way too many things in that post without enough connective tissue, so to speak. I understand what you are saying. I understand the distinctions between kinds of ethics, and what academia categorizes as moral statements(utterances of ought). I also understand that current convention divides all theories of meaning into two categories, both of which presuppose symbolism.

Do you disagree with my saying that all meta ethical endeavors share the same basic elemental constitution... thinking about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour?

The starting point of any metaethics is the question "what do moral statements mean?". — Michael

So what's the difference between metaethics and metalinguistics?

Ethics first. Metaethics second. Meta ethics endeavors to think about behavioural codes. Not all codes are on equal evolutionary footing. Not all metaethics precede language acqusition. Some does. Prior to the ability to take note of, bring attention to, and/or subsequently begin discussing ethics as a subject matter in and of itself, we're already figuring out how we're supposed to act by thinking about our own behaviours at the time as well as the events that immediately followed.. We're already taking part in meta ethical endeavors. We just do not know it at the time we're doing it. The question neglects to keep our early years in mind.

Some creatures begin drawing correlations between their own behaviours and what else is going on around them at that particular time. That's the basic connection from which all others diverge. All things metaethical involve thinking about acceptable and/or unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. The question neglects the fact that we're already figuring out what's acceptable or not(acceptable/unacceptable behaviour) long before the ability to talk about and discuss things like the meaning of terms.

We're discussing that which existed in its entirety prior to our naming and describing it. We're thinking about the social norms, i.e., regularly practiced codes of conduct that influence each and every one of our worldviews, particularly during our early formative years. We were figuring out how we're supposed to act. We draw all sorts of correlations prior to and during language acquisition. Some are between our behaviours and what else was going on at the time(what immediately followed). Such experiences were and are meaningful to the language less creature under consideration.

Speaking of "meaning" and theories thereof...

All that to ground saying that there are better questions. What counts as "moral/ethical"?

I see. So the problem I have is that promises are not normative statements which exist mind-independently, — Bob Ross

That's not a problem for me. Why does it cause you pause?

Close. Promises are moral facts.

So, you've said a lot since I last posted. I wonder if you saw Hume's answer to the question you've posed?
— creativesoul
I posted 2x quotes from Treatise of Hume, and also added some explanations to them on how the belief arises on the existence of the External Word / Bodies. — Corvus

Was the answer to your question clearly stated in those quotes? If not, if not, then what's the point of qouting the question? Why answer like that? Normally when one quotes a question, they offer an answer.

I agree with you points, although personally I feel also our memory and inductive reasonings in some degree play part working with imagination for invoking beliefs in the existence of unperceived existence. — Corvus

Hume's problem of induction seems to apply here, if one places value upon it in this situation.

I'm not a Hume fan, so.

I certainly know that the universe existed long before me. I also know that there is no good reason to doubt by thinking that there will no longer be one after I cease to exist. If there are some words written by someone that - after reading them - cause you to doubt any of that, I suggest you use that fact as a reason to commit them to the flames.

Hi Bob.

Facts are what has already happened and/or what is currently happening. Sometimes people speak in terms of states of affairs, the way things were/are, the case at hand, etc. Moral facts, states of affairs, cases, etc. are events involving situations where we judge whether or not someone should or should not do something or another, given some specific set of circumstances. That someone can and often does include ourselves. These are moral facts, state of affairs, cases, situations, etc..

Note here that I'm not using the term "moral" as a synonym for what counts as acceptable or as a means of assent or acceptance, so its compliment is not "immoral" but amoral... meaning not moral in kind. "Right" and "wrong" are the terms are used to express assent/dissent(moral judgment).

When promises are made, at least one person voluntarily enters into and/or creates a moral scenario, situation, case, etc. Solely by virtue of meaning alone, if I promise to plant you a rose garden tomorrow, then you ought have a rose garden tomorrow. That last statement is true because it corresponds to the fact that I promised to plant you a rose garden, and that's exactly what my doing so means. When we make a promise, we voluntarily enter into an obligation to make the world match our words.

There are moral facts as well as true moral statements and sound moral judgments.

I think that qualifies me as a moral realist.

So, you've said a lot since I last posted. I wonder if you saw Hume's answer to the question you've posed?

You asked: What reason do we have to believe in the world(external objects/things) if and when we're not perceiving it(them)?

According to Hume, either our perception of fact and/or our memory thereof are reason to believe that the world exists even when we're not perceiving it.