I will point out right now, that we never established that prelinguistic thought/belief is moral in kind. I've considered the the entire discussion that they aren't. Based on that, everything I've said is spot on and mostly coherent. Just reread everything and you'll see. — Merkwurdichliebe

You may be right here. The only issue, or at least the main one, may be due to our not yet having fully developed the evolution of thought/belief from the pre-linguistic through the metacognitive(deliberately naming and further thinking about pre-existing thought/belief). That interim period between adopting and being able to doubt and/or question what one has adopted is crucial to the question in the OP. This is germane to adopting and/or later questioning principles as well.

The invocation of ethical authority made me a bit uneasy. I didn't and still do not think that that time had come yet.

I still suspect that there's a bit of misunderstanding between us. However, I also suspect that it can be reconciled. That's what I'm aiming for at this time. Stand by...

:smile:

There's far too much that we(seem to) agree upon to abandon the discussion.

You've lost the distinction which began this all. Thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. You've also rescinded the earlier agreement regarding what all things moral have in common. You've arrived at incoherence as a result.

Now you're just repeating conventional mistakes. I've no time at present. I can and will point them out clearly later on if you're interested.

Descriptive accounts of acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

The example is this discussion...

Judgment is moral thought/belief. Not all moral thought/belief is judgment.

Drawing and maintaining the distinction must be part and parcel of incorporating the societal aspects. Moral judgment - in the conventional sense - is existentially dependent upon adopting a worldview replete with morality.

It is to voice one's approval/disapproval based upon one's morality. That morality may or may not be the one initially adopted.

It is in situations such as this that the importance of the groundwork becomes realized.

That conclusion is at odds with our criterion for what counts as being "moral", which was arrived at by virtue of what all things moral, and/or called "moral" have in common.
— creativesoul

And what is that. A common mode of belief, that I say has a common function: judgement. — Merkwurdichliebe

You're moving the goalposts. The new setting cannot account for uses of "moral" that do not involve judgment. All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Are you rescinding your earlier agreement?

Moral thought/belief is an entirely different mode of nonmoral thought/belief. Its primary function is judgement. Moral thought/belief requires the faculties of conceptualization and abstraction, which only come after language acquisition and linguistic thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe

It woud only follow from the above that there is no moral thought/belief prior to language. That conclusion is at odds with our criterion for what counts as being "moral", which was arrived at by virtue of what all things moral, and/or called "moral" have in common.

I was just positing the authority of the ethical authority to be absolute in relation to the pupil. That is due to the fact that he judges the ethical pupil, not the other way around. It's not a democracy — Merkwurdichliebe

This conflates power and judgment. The authority has the power to write and enforce the rules of behaviour. There are plenty of examples where pupils morally judge authority despite having no immediately disposable power to write and enforce the rules.

This is what revolutions are made of.

We could say, that early on in the development process of ethical indoctrination the roles are distinct. But as the ethical pupil matures, the roles become equivocal. — Merkwurdichliebe

The lines become blurred as they ought in some cases.

The question becomes, when does the individual cease to respond to the judgement of the ethical authority, and come to rely on his own judgement of himself? — Merkwurdichliebe

This is a good question. It is seems to be about one's own self-image though. Such struggles between indoctrination and self-image are common ans well-known. I think that they point to a deficit in the general understanding and/or certain accounts of morality/ethics.

I'm reminded of the outcasts who are such through no fault of their own.

A sentiment of "You're not ok with me, but I certainly am"...

We need this new reporting to dovetail with the previously established groundwork.
— creativesoul

Not yet... but we are examining internalization and ethical authority, which are variables of societal conditioning — Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. So the story of societal conditioning goes. What I'm prying into is whether or not the story is worthy of assent.

One can know that they do not accept another's behaviour without judging their behaviour in any robust sense of moral judgment.
— creativesoul

That is prejudice - prejudgement... — Merkwurdichliebe

But not moral judgment.

It is time to review our previous talk on morality and prelinguistic thought/belief. I thought we had come to enough agreement to move on to sociological factors, but apparently not. — Merkwurdichliebe

We are reviewing them now. I'm inserting them where they are applicable. The sociological factors cannot be properly accounted for by equivocating previously established key terms. All new terms must be commensurate with what we've already established.

There are also new criterion being employed that are not quite up to snuff. Our foundation for drawing conclusions is supposed to be based upon a universal criterion. New claims are being levied that are not based upon the same solid ground.

If all moral thought/belief is about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour, then it necessarily is about judgement. — Merkwurdichliebe

If all behaviour is judgment. It's not. It's quite a bit more nuanced than that.

One can know that they do not accept another's behaviour without judging their behaviour in any robust sense of moral judgment. Typically moral judgment is to condone/condemn, assent/dissent, etc.

If intellectual assessment is a primary function of linguistic thought/belief, I don't see how moral thought/belief cannot be founded upon it. — Merkwurdichliebe

Some moral thought/belief is existentially dependent upon intellectual assessment. Not all. That is part of the groundwork we've already established.

All things moral are about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Moral thought/belief can be formed prior to language acquisition.

We're teetering on the edge of conflating what moral thought/belief takes with what our knowledge of moral thought/belief takes. Such was the fatal flaw underpinning Witt and many a linguistic since.

Not all moral thought/belief is judgment. And, that didn't answer the question...

What is a moral principle if not moral thought/belief?

I'm struggling to see what good it is doing us to invoke these recent notions of "moral principle", "ethical", "pupil", "authority", and "internalization".

The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot.
— creativesoul

I would go so far as to say the adoption of moral principle depends upon language acquisition, whereas assessment does not. All language that is acquired contains preexisting assessments of the world. — Merkwurdichliebe

So then you agree that not all adoption of moral principle is founded upon intellectual assessment?

Internalizing morality means appropriating it in thought/belief as one's personal morality. It results in moral thought/belief not feeling/intuition. I would say moral feeling/intuition only comes into play when one witnesses an ethically charged situation. And, feeling/intuition becomes most pertinent in certain ethically charged situations that directly involve me - when I become the decisive factor.
(speaking extemporaneously) — Merkwurdichliebe

There's something interesting happening here. I'm unsure where our disagreement lies regarding the above. Yet, your reply leaves me with the impression that you do not see the agreement. Compare the above to excerpts from my initial report upon internalization found below...

All sorts of different thought/belief can become internalized. They become operative in the sense that they themselves have efficacy. — creativesoul

What is commonly called a conscience is the manifestation of past internalizations. Thought/belief is being internalized. It can be about one's self and/or about others. Internalizing a pre-existing morality results in one's moral 'feelings'. These are involuntarily experienced during certain situations that are morally relevant to that particular person's worldview(morality). — creativesoul

There's nothing new here though. Everyone internalizes all sorts of other people's thought/belief. — creativesoul

The collective conscience is the product of the collective group of people all internalizing the same moral(s) and/or sharing the same moral thought/belie — creativesoul

As a side, what does it mean when moral feeling/intuition results in behavior that contradicts one's moral thought/belief?

That doesn't make sense if moral intuition/feelings are products of internalized(unconscious but operative) moral thought/belief.

The adoption of moral principle is founded on intellectual assessment. Appropriation implies that moral thought/belief is founded upon a pre-existing framework of thought/belief about the world. How one appropriates morality is uniquely affected by one's world view. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree with everything above aside from the first claim. The adoption of moral principle can happen during language acquisition. Intellectual assessment cannot.

There seems to be some preconceived notion at work in your reporting. What is a moral principle if not thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

If we are to take account of the societal influences upon morals, and we wish to remain coherent in our account, then that task must be commensurate with our groundwork. We need this new reporting to dovetail with the previously established groundwork.

Unfortunately, this is not the case... yet.

There are most certainly societal influences.

I'm still struggling to understand the difference between how the terms "ethical" and "moral" are being used here.

That's where I'm still at. Equivocation looms. I cannot accept equivocation.

Wouldn't the ethical authority, who believed in relative morality, talk to the ethical pupil about the relativism of morality as though it were absolute? Or, would they say that relative morality is relative too, and as viable as absolute morality? — Merkwurdichliebe

Perhaps.

What do the notions of relative morality and absolute morality add to the discussion?

They've yet to have been breached. Perhaps it is time. For robustness' sake.

I'm hypothesizing that, in a given relation, it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time. Or am I overlooking the possibility that we are both ethical pupil and ethical authority at all times? — Merkwurdichliebe

I would think that it is not at all impossible to do both... teach another and learn from another over the right kinds of discourse(pun intended).

:halo:

If both pupil and teacher are moral agents, and it is impossible to be both ethical authority and ethical pupil at the same time, then moral agents can be both. The ethical pupil can be a moral agent. The ethical teacher can be a moral agent.

The ethical authority has a specific role of exposing the pupil to moral thought/belief. Other than indoctrinating, and then judging the pupil, the work of ethical authority is done. Ethical authority represents absolute right - it has nothing else to prove. — Merkwurdichliebe

The above takes account of some ethical authorities. Not all. Some ethical authorities do not frame ethics in terms of absolute right/wrong.

I feel there is an unequivocal distinction between ethical authority ethical pupil. — Merkwurdichliebe

Perhaps. That distinction cannot be that one is the moral agent and the other is not. It can be the case that they are both moral agents.

I'm just trying to understand what you're referring to.

The term "moral agent" has not been used to differentiate between different kinds of moral agents; those beset with an ethical task and those not.
— creativesoul

I don't understand.. What would constitute a different kind of moral agent, for example, one not beset with the ethical task? — Merkwurdichliebe

It's your distinction. I was hoping you could set it out.

I'm attempting to understand what you're attempting to convey. A moral agent need not have an ethical task assigned to her/him/them in order to be a moral agent. That follows from our groundwork. What sense does it make then to differentiate between pupil and teacher based upon calling only the one assigned an ethical task the "moral agent" when they can both be?

That seems to be what you're doing below, which prompted this exchange...

Is it appropriate to say the the ethical authority stands in relation to the ethical pupil? Can we call it the "moral agent", as in the one beset with the ethical task? — Merkwurdichliebe

The one beset with the ethical task is being called the "moral agent" by you... not I. It's up to you to set it out. That would entail contradicting what we agreed to earlier by offering another definition for what counts as moral. Unfortunately, equivocation is unacceptable, and that is what we'd do here if we followed the suggestion. We would be equivocating the meaning of the term "moral agent". That charge holds unless the earlier agreement is honoured and/or remains upheld.

We do want to do that, keep our terms of agreement, do we not?

:wink:

Self-deception is impossible. One cannot knowingly and deliberately misrepresent their own thought/belief to oneself.

Delusion is the result of holding and/or having false belief. Moral dumbfounding is not always.

Unnecessarily multiplying entities again. I cannot see the good in what this adds.

Is it appropriate to say the the ethical authority stands in relation to the ethical pupil? Can we call it the "moral agent", as in the one beset with the ethical task? — Merkwurdichliebe

We can call the one beset with the ethical task the "moral agent" if we are ok with sacrificing consistent terminological use. Equivocation inevitably leads to self-contradiction and/or incoherence. The term "moral agent" has not been used to differentiate between different kinds of moral agents; those beset with an ethical task and those not.

I would readily agree that the ethical authority stands in relation to the ethical pupil. That relationship changes.

The task is in forming right thought/belief, and then integrating that right understanding into one's behavior - responsibility. — Merkwurdichliebe

Let's continue with well grounded true thought/belief.

Deception is possible in respect to ethical authority, but not with moral principle (excluding self-delusion, moral dumbfounding?). In relation to ethical authority, the moral agent is only right/wrong insofar as he appears to be. But as he is to himself, his morality depends upon his commitment to principle. — Merkwurdichliebe

Deception is the name for a plurality of different things. An authority can deceive a follower with a moral principle. Deception is possible for a moral principle.

Morality evolves. Students can improve on a teacher's work.

Because I hold the above, I cannot agree with the quote above, as it is written.

I'm wondering why you think that you can't know that I'm picturing something if you think that you can know that I'm thinking something then. — Terrapin Station

Not all thinking is picturing. That's why.

I would concur. Parents are part of the community. Usually it is the parents who are the authority, however, it is well worth noting that some cases it is not and in all cases, the morality being implemented is adopted(mostly).
— creativesoul

The notion of "absentee parental figure" is not too much of an issue. In such cases, ethical conditioning bypasses the parental figure, and begins with other societal influences (friends/enemies, teachers, acquaintances, &c.). Everyone is eventually confronted by these influences, and they are all, more or less, quantitatively identical in respect to being an ethical authority. They provide the substantive material which the individual appropriates into a personal morality.

Morality becomes adopted through a complex process of appropriation, in which the ethical authority serves as the primary influence. — Merkwurdichliebe

Yup. As earlier. We all adopt our initial worldview replete with moral thought/belief intact.

...is it possible to view the morals of a community as a sort of 'strongly recommended advice' to people who might wish to join that community without causing significant internal agitation or potentially upsetting another community? — Couchyam

Not all internal agitation is unacceptable. Not all intent to stoke another's moral sensibilities is unacceptable.

Those would be some exceptional cases to the otherwise trustworthy rule of thumb in the above quote. The exceptions require specificity. Part of the specifics include thought/belief that prescribes/proscribes everyone's behaviour.

That is much different than thought/belief that takes account of the relevant common denominators. Those are the bedrock upon which to assess and evaluate the particulars.

The moral particulars.

The earlier bit regarding the term "necessary" is just a vestige of my disdain for the historical philosophical use of the word itself. It is largely the causal factor for my own notion of existential dependency. No worries.

I was being a bit nitpicky... I cringe at the word.

:wink:

I would like to know what others here think/believe to be the difference between what counts as being moral and what counts as being ethical in terms of kinds of belief.
— creativesoul

I've said this before, not sure whether on this thread or not, but I count ethical thought as being a broader category than moral thought; moral thought is concerned with others within the community, that is people and perhaps domestic animals, whereas ethical thought also involves that and additionally, involves oneself as oneself and all of nature. — Janus

I think that was earlier. My apologies for not addressing that at the time. I do remember - now that you've reminded me - wanting to flesh this out a bit. Merk seems to hold much the same view. But I'm wondering a few things in terms of existential dependency. I'm trying to account for what I think you're saying using my own framework. I'm wondering if you would agree to the following...

Ethical thought/belief is existentially dependent upon moral thought/belief. Thought/belief about oneself as oneself is existentially dependent upon ethical thought/belief. There is no thought/belief about oneself as oneself prior to ethical thought/belief.

Is ethical thought/belief ethical because it is thought/belief about oneself as oneself?

Upon what ground do you draw this distinction between ethical and moral?

Are there any examples of either that are not about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour?

I struggle to draw a distinction between ethical thought/belief and moral thought/belief. The most I can say would be that the difference lies entirely in the content. Ethical thought/belief consists of considering an other's morality, whereas moral does not.

It is when conflicting moralities meet at the table of dignified and courteous resolution that ethics begins in earnest.

The notion of "internalize" has been invoked and subsequently discussed. On my view, it is relevant to the autonomous unconscious mental ongoings that only a history of taking account of the world and/or ourselves can produce. I say this to bring attention to the plurality of different kinds of mental ongoings. We need not 'turn on' our physiological sensory perception. However, while internalization requires it sensory perception alone is not enough for internalization as I suspect it is being used here. All sorts of different thought/belief can become internalized. They become operative in the sense that they themselves have efficacy.

Hence, a single word, statement, idea, or even an implication can bring about an entire change in one's state of mind, emotional state, and/or attitude. These are the results of past internalization, and they are not the only ones.

What is commonly called a conscience is the manifestation of past internalizations. Thought/belief is being internalized. It can be about one's self and/or about others. Internalizing a pre-existing morality results in one's moral 'feelings'. These are involuntarily experienced during certain situations that are morally relevant to that particular person's worldview(morality).

The short point...

Internalization is a fancy way to describe part of what's going on when one adopts another's worldview, or some aspect thereof. When one assents to and/or agrees with someone else's thought/belief, it can become influential in the involuntary sense that it can begin to cause certain emotions and govern their behaviour.

There's nothing new here though. Everyone internalizes all sorts of other people's thought/belief. That is how one's own self-worth is cultivated. That is how one can hate another group of people, despite not knowing anything about them from personal experience. On and on...

The collective conscience is the product of the collective group of people all internalizing the same moral(s) and/or sharing the same moral thought/belief. It's not always a good thing, but that part of this discussion hasn't been reached yet.

I must say, I enjoyed your theatricality. :cheer: — Merkwurdichliebe

Thespian for life, I suppose...

:cool:

Your recent summary of merk and my discussion was spot on. The links to harvard have not worked for me. I may have misattributed meaning to your post offering the link to the test. My apologies if that was the case. That is of interest, and relevant in more than one way here.

It is either granted or usurped.
— creativesoul

The result of this struggle to the death is "consensus". — Merkwurdichliebe

Politics=manufactured consent.

:wink:

The first relation between follower and usurper is found between the child and parental figure. I would surmise that in all ordinary cases, the parental figure factors as the first ethical authority for everyone. — Merkwurdichliebe

I would concur. Parents are part of the community. Usually it is the parents who are the authority, however, it is well worth noting that some cases it is not and in all cases, the morality being implemented is adopted(mostly).

This is a nod to the importance of history.

Enlightenment? You're too kind. That has yet to have been determined.

:wink: