I'm going to wait a bit prior to replying to you. I implore you to re-read the post that you're replying to.

The important - dare I say crucial - consideration here(by my lights anyway) is that that part of Kripke's account is not about hypothetical scenarios. Rather, it's about actual world scenarios and what's going on within them. Thus, a valid objection to that can only be showing otherwise. Kripke uses what's going on in this world when we posit possible world scenarios with proper nouns as justificatory ground. The only objection capable of diminishing the brute strength of Kripke's justificatory ground would be one providing a possible world scenario using a proper noun that shows his account to be in error. — creativesoul

I'd like to say a bit more here...

What Kripke says about our use of proper nouns and/or descriptions as a means for hypothetical discourse is true. That is what makes it such strong justificatory ground. The strength of justificatory ground is determined(on my view at least) by virtue of it's being true. There is no better standard.

However, I realize that some people may rationally infer that I'm talking about something other than that. I'm not. I'm not commenting upon it's scope.

All knowledge of elemental constituents is existentially dependent upon naming practices. Not all elemental constituents are. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon naming practices. Some elemental constituents are not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of them. That which is existentially dependent upon neither naming practice nor our knowledge cannot consist of either. Some elemental constituents consist of neither name nor knowledge.

You see what I did there?

:brow:

Kripke's notion of "rigid designator" includes proper nouns used within possible world scenarios, and excludes description used within possible world scenarios. Kripke's ground for that is how we use proper nouns and descriptions within possible world scenarios.

:wink:

Because there are better fish to fry in the third lecture. — Banno

There is no need to fry the best fish.

Of course common naming of kinds and attributes is necessary for description, but proper naming is not. — Janus

The above is about existential dependency. I do not think that you understand what Kripke is getting at. I think that understanding what Kripke is getting at is itself existentially dependent upon drawing and maintaining the distinction between "necessary" as the term is used in modal discourse and something's being necessary for another thing's existence(existential dependency).

I do not think that you're keeping that much in mind.

And as for proper names being rigid designators 'The man who was president of the US at such and such a time and date' is as much a rigid designator as 'Donald Trump' because the latter must be shorthand for ' The man who was named 'Donald Trump' at such and such a time and date.' There could be many other individuals named 'Donald Trump', so the name alone would not seem to be a rigid designator. — Janus

I'm in agreement with the hairy man on this one. I do not think that you've given due attention to the bits of Kripke's lectures that deal with these objections you're levying. I'll attempt to clearly explain this here and now.

Kripke begins these lectures(ignoring the introduction) by pointing out what we're doing when positing possible world scenarios(hypotheticals) while using proper nouns. Kripke notes that these hypothetical scenarios always include usage of the proper noun accompanied by and/or placed into some alternative set of circumstances. He further notes that our doing this does not stop us from knowing who(or what) we're talking about. That's what's going on when positing hypotheticals with proper nouns.

The important - dare I say crucial - consideration here(by my lights anyway) is that that part of Kripke's account is not about hypothetical scenarios. Rather, it's about actual world scenarios and what's going on within them. Thus, a valid objection to that can only be showing otherwise. Kripke uses what's going on in this world when we posit possible world scenarios with proper nouns as justificatory ground. The only objection capable of diminishing the brute strength of Kripke's justificatory ground would be one providing a possible world scenario using a proper noun that shows his account to be in error.

So, as this all pertains to your criticism above...

"The man who was president at such and such a time and date" picks a unique individual out of this world just as well as "Nixon" does. However, the reason your criticism falls flat on it's face here is due to the fact that "the man who was president and such and such a time and date" is not an example of a possible world scenario using a proper noun. That is precisely what grounds Kripke's discourse here.

Furthermore...

Kripke calls both names and descriptions "designators". The difference between "rigid" designators and "non-rigid" designators is that the former retains the ability for successful reference in all possible world scenarios using proper nouns whereas the latter does not.

Sure, the actual world is a possible world. — Banno

All possible worlds, according to Kripke, consist of stipulated alternative circumstances. The actual world does not.

Designation includes naming but ostension and/or description does not. All cases of successful reference are dependent upon one or more of these three 'kinds'.

So, naming is not necessary for successful reference. "Necessary" in the sense of existential dependency which is not determined by how we posit hypotheticals...

Is that what you're claiming?

So, reference by designation includes naming but reference by description and/or ostension does not?

Ok.

Seems agreeable enough.

He says that it is not the case that cats could turn out to be robots. That if it turned out that cats were automata, we should say that what we had thought to be cats were not cats, but robots.

TO be a cat is necessarily to be an animal. — Banno

I'm a bit skeptical regarding this use of "necessary". Is Kripke showing and/or arguing that acceptable cases of essentialism can be adequately exhausted, and thus properly accounted for, by possible world semantics or by what we're doing during such hypothetical discourse?

Maybe you're right Banno... lecture three looks like we're getting into the good stuff.

:wink:

Could that which is called a "marsupial" have been called by some other name? Sure, but it wasn't. Could marsupials have a different set of common denominators than the ones they all shared prior to our discovery of them, prior to our calling them by the name "marsupial"?

Surely not, for the same reason that water could be nothing other than hydrogen dioxide.

You see the difference here... right everyone?

Now, I think Kripke's claim is that all designation requires a designator. Both names and descriptions count. Proper name usage during hypothetical discourse retains our ability to successfully refer by virtue of still being able to pick out the specific individual even though we can stipulate wide ranging circumstances(all of which are descriptions), whereas descriptions can and do change. Thus, proper names are called "rigid designators" on Kripke's view because they always retain the ability to pick out the referent despite stipulating a wide range of different circumstances. He always left room for certain versions of essentialism/elemental basic constituents.

Lecture three seems to begin the long awaited subsequent demarcations...

Being a marsupial includes but is not limited to being one of things that we have named "marsupial". All things we call "marsupials" share a set of common denominators. That common set includes but is not limited to the name "marsupial". The commonalities also include that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness, and thus prior to naming practices.

Anyone here care to take this to task?

It's sorely needed.

What is that additional something that all designation has that no other successful reference by ostension and/or description does? I mean what does reference by designation include that reference by ostension and/or description does not?

Rest well. I hear ya. I think all of it is much more simple than these accounts make it seem to be.

That reply did not answer the question. It was straightforward.

That said, that reply did skirt around some interesting things that Kripke does. Can you further elaborate?

That makes two of us. What's their relevance?

Since you seem to have more time than earlier... I'm curious about the other stuff.

Well yes, to an observer. But this is trivially true and the author didn't seem to state otherwise. — Wallows

Ah, whatever...

Keep talking like that. My chair gave me a splinter. The splinter gave me pain. The meter bar does not give me either. My chair does not give me meaning. Neither does the splinter. Nor does the meter bar.

Why?

Because meaning cannot be given to someone, even by a creature capable of giving things away. Rather, meaning is attributed and emerges onto the world stage within thought and/or belief formation itself. That's too far out of the scope here, so don't ask me to elaborate or what I mean. If you are sincerely interested, click on my avatar and look at any one of several different topics. They will answer any question you may have. If not, post there about it.

Furthermore, inanimate objects have nothing in their possession to be given away to begin with. Such language use is utterly inadequate for understanding meaning... That was why I objected.

The original description under our mutual consideration was "the president of the United States".

You're changing targets.

Are meter bars the sort of things that are capable of giving anything at all?

The manner of speaking regarding the author of that text...

No, because that can be used to pick out trump in all possible worlds. We are always necessarily speaking in "this world, at this time" just as texts speak in this world, at the the time of writing...when else? — Janus

What are you talking about Janus?

"The president of the United States" cannot be used to pick out Trump in all hypothetical scenarios because some of them specifically stipulate circumstances about the president of the United States and not all of them stipulate that that is Trump.

It’s important here that ‘one meter’ is not introduced as a synonym for ‘the length of the standard meter bar.’ If it were, it would pick out different lengths in different possible worlds. Rather, it is introduced as the name for a particular length, the same in all possible worlds. We identify this length by pointing to the standard meter bar. The meter bar serves to fix the reference of ‘meter’, not to give its meaning. — John MacFarlane

This is standard rubbish based upon a gross misconception of how meaning is always attributed...

The meter bar fixes the reference by virtue of a capable creature drawing a correlation between the term "meter" and it's referent(the bar).

Sigh...

:brow:

Drawing that connection is the attribution of meaning. The meter bar is not something that gives anything to anyone or anything else.

In short, proper names seems to always allow successful reference during hypothetical discourse, whereas descriptions of the thing being named do not.
— creativesoul

Does not "the present president of the US' unfailingly pick out Trump? — Janus

In this world, at this time... sure. That entirely misses the point though doesn't it?

I fail to see the importance of that as it applies to my last couple of posts. That does not mean that it is not. It means that I have not drawn correlations between the same things as you. Help me out by connecting the dots - your dots - for me. I do not have unshakable conviction. I am certain.

Are you invoking the notion of individuation? I don't think Kripke spells that out, does he?

While paving the way to where we are... Kripke's use of the term "individual" referred to the unique 'object' picked out of this world by virtue of being given a proper name. Moreover, he clearly showed that in such cases, we can keep the name, stipulate a wide range of circumstances involving that particular individual and retain our ability to successfully refer. I do not have a problem with any of that on it's face. It is crucial, I think, to remind ourselves that Kripke was not talking about just any object. Rather, he was talking about objects that we had named by virtue of proper noun.

So, he was talking about individuals objects that we pick out by virtue of our naming practices(proper nouns, mind you). Overall, by and in large, I was left with a good impression.

However, I would strongly object to anyone who wants to use the fact that we can use a proper noun as a means for successful reference when positing hypotheticals as ground for saying much anything else aside from we cannot seem to do the same thing by virtue of using any of the particular circumstances that we believe to be the case regarding the named individual. In short, proper nouns - when used alone - seem to always allow successful reference during hypothetical discourse, whereas descriptions of the thing being named(by virtue of proper noun) do not.

I do not see adequate justificatory ground for much else. So...

What am I missing?

SO you claim that Kripke is wrong? — Banno

I'm claiming that that bit is wrong. If we have called someone or something "X", and we later come to learn that X is not what we thought it was, it's still X. It's just that X is not what we thought it was.

We are not wrong to call a specific celestial body in the evening "Hesperus". We are wrong to think Hesperus is a star.

So, if it turns out that the celestial body we thought to be Pluto is not a planet, then we were wrong to think it was Pluto?

Yeah, something is most certainly amiss with that accounting practice.

If it turns out the fellow we thought was Nixon was an automata, then we weren't wrong to think he was Nixon. Rather, we were quite wrong to think Nixon was anything other than an automata. He wasn't a fellow at all, unless automatas can be fellows. They can certainly be Nixon if that was the case.

He says that it is not the case that cats could turn out to be robots. That if it turned out that cats were automata, we should say that what we had thought to be cats were not cats, but robots.

TO be a cat is necessarily to be an animal.

SO if it turned out that the fellow we thought to be Nixon was actually an automata, then we were wrong to think he was Nixon — Banno

This seems quite wrong...

So, we refer by ostension and/or description.
— creativesoul

Yes, that is precisely what I have been arguing... — Janus

I think that you and I hold very similar views regarding several different aspects of this topic. Even during the objections I didn't see that much difference aside from you presenting a view that kept existential dependency in the forefront of thought, whereas I have not been consistent regarding that.

I began my considerations by carefully thinking about what we're doing when positing hypothetical scenarios(possible world scenarios) involving proper nouns, because that is Kripke's ground/justification.

...we also refer by designation and the fixing of designation is dependent upon ostention and/or description... — Janus

Let me see if I understand this part(the notion of designation) according to your position. I'm assuming, based what's written in the above quote, that you're argument/position here goes something like this...

Some successful reference is by designation. All designation is dependent upon the fixing of designation. All fixing of designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description. Therefore, all reference by designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description.

Given that...

The notions of designation and fixing the designation cannot be equivalent to ostension and/or description. This holds because you agreed that we successfully refer with both ostension and/or description, and made a point to say that we "also refer" by designation. This clearly implies a remarkable (ontological?)distinction between successful reference by ostension and/or description and successful reference by designation.

If all reference by designation is dependent upon ostension and/or description, and there is a remarkable difference between successful reference by ostension and/or description and successful reference by designation, then it only follows that not all ostension and/or description includes(or is) designation. So, cases of successful reference by designation are more complex, and thus they must include something aside from just ostension and/or description. This additional element, part, feature, etc. must also be something that neither ostension nor description is dependent upon. Neither can include it. Furthermore, this extra bit must be something that neither can account for.

So...

What is that additional something that all designation has that no other successful reference by ostension and/or description does? I mean what does reference by designation include that reference by ostension and/or description does not?

...I think perhaps what Kripke wants to argue is that description is also dependent on designation (we must name things before we can describe them, we must name the descriptive attributes themselves) whereas designation can be independent of description, by depending only on ostention, when the named (designated) entity is present. — Janus

Keeping in mind that Kripke said early on that the term designator is one that can be used to cover both, names and descriptions.

When one holds that description is dependent upon designation, and descriptions are one kind of designator(names are the other), then one must also hold that at least one kind of designator(description) is dependent upon designation. It only follows that designation is not description. This seems compatible/coherent so far...

If designation can be independent of description, and all designation is dependent upon a designator, then it would only follow that some designators are not descriptions. Again, that's no problem as far as I can see. I mean, it's perfectly consistent with what I've understood about Kripke's terminological framework. Both names and descriptions are designators.

Do you find it lacking somehow?

The semantics of possible world discourse is established by virtue of how we use the relevant terms in the actual world. The actual world does not consist entirely of descriptions. Possible worlds always do. Some possible world scenarios consist of true descriptions, some do not. Which one a possible world consists of is determined solely by virtue of what's happened and/or is happening in the actual world. To hold otherwise is to conflate validity with truth.

Definite description is capable of being used to successfully refer to something other than the unique object which satisfies the conditions therein. That is always the case regarding false descriptions of someone regardless of whether or not anyone else actually satisfies the conditions of the description.
The conditions of the description "the man who killed Bob" could not be satisfied if a woman was the murderer. Yet, "the man who killed Bob" can be used to successfully refer to someone other than the murderer, regardless.

Jane's case exemplifies this.

Definite description is also capable of being used to successfully refer to the unique object which does satisfy the conditions of the description.

A proper account of Jane's case(including Allen) shows that.

What all this clearly shows is that the unique individual satisfying the conditions of a definitive description is not always the referent of a speaker using that definitive description, and thus... the referent of a speaker using definitive description is not always determined by the truth conditions of their belief statement(definitive description), and/or the unique individual satisfying those conditions.

More importantly, as a result of not taking the speaker's belief into proper account, if we are claiming that definite descriptions are adequate for picking out a unique individual, and we're not drawing and maintaining the crucial distinction between statements of belief and definitive descriptions, then we are conflating truth and belief. This is clearly shown because we are forced to say things like Jane's referent is Allen because Allen uniquely satisfies the conditions within "the man who killed Bob". Jane is not referring to Allen. So our saying that is quite simply not true. That notion of reference consists of false descriptions about what we're doing when we draw an other's attention to the same thing that ours is already upon in cases like Jane... and the champagne case as well. That account is unacceptable.

Kripke points this out, or so I am told, as a problem with versions of descriptivism. I would agree. While Kripke did not attempt to clear up what was going on. I have been.

Respectfully Banno...

While I am all for using the simplest framework possible for taking proper account, I am also all for taking proper account. If the possibility for direct substitution is hampered by virtue of taking proper account, then it is not an issue with the proper account my friend. It's an issue with the inherent inability of formal logic to offer a proper account of belief.

Knowing what "the man who killed Bob" means is quite simply inadequate for successful reference if knowing that is equivalent to knowing which man uniquely satisfies that description. Knowing that Allen killed Bob does not help a listener at all when it comes to knowing who Jane is talking about. — creativesoul

Furthermore, knowing who Jane is talking about does not help a listener at all to know which man satisfies that description...

"The man who killed Bob" is a definite description as a result of the fact that there is only one man who satisfies the conditions of the description. Jane's case shows that one can use a definite description in order to successfully refer even when it is the case that the language user does not know who actually satisfies the conditions therein(even when their belief about who satisfies those conditions is false).

And yet, the definite description "the man who killed Bob" sets out conditions that only Allen satisfies.

One can use a definite description to successfully draw another's attention to the same thing that one's attention is already upon even when that thing does not satisfy the description. That's because doing so is belief based. It is also the case that the DD is satisfied by a unique individual. That's because doing so is truth based. Belief presupposes truth. Hence, Jane can successfully refer to Joe by virtue of using a definite description that only Allen satisfies because she believes that Joe satisfies it.

So...

Jane's case clearly shows the irrevocable role that belief plays in all successful reference. It doesn't matter whether or not the definite description(belief) is true of Jane's referent when it comes to her being able to successfully draw an other's attention to the same thing that her attention is already upon.

However, Jane's case does not warrant concluding that definite descriptions are inadequate for successful reference. Rather, it shows that definite descriptions are capable of being used in more than one way as a means for successful reference.

So, we refer by ostension and/or description. We do so prior to taking what we're doing into account. Our accounts are existentially dependent upon our doing so, but not the other way around. What our doing so is existentially dependent upon, and what our accounts of doing so are existentially dependent upon have two distinct sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, and/or elemental constituents. Doing so does not require thinking about thought and belief. Accounting for doing so does. Doing so does not require true description of what we're referring to. Accounting for what we're doing does. Better have thought/belief right...

Jane can refer to Joe by saying "the man who killed Bob" even when Joe did not, because she believes Joe killed Bob. She need not know Joe's name. It is arguable whether or not she needs to know something else(have some other true belief) about Joe. We cannot take proper account of what Jane is doing by virtue of using description if our descriptions of what she's doing are false.

What she's doing is drawing an other's attention to the same thing that her attention is already upon by virtue of expressing her own thought and belief. Those belief statements need not be true in order to be about Joe. They need not be true in order to draw an other's attention to Joe. That is because they need not be true in order to be meaningful. A listener of Jane's(when Joe is not present) can know who she is referring to by sharing her belief about Joe, or by knowing that she believes it. Neither person here needs to know Joe's name. Both would need to know what Joe looks like in order for the description to successfully refer.

This is the interesting part...

Knowing what "the man who killed Bob" means is quite simply inadequate for successful reference if knowing that is equivalent to knowing which man uniquely satisfies that description. Knowing that Allen killed Bob does not help a listener at all when it comes to knowing who Jane is talking about.

Well early on Kripke says that 'designator' is a term that covers both, names and descriptions.

One is about the report of the thing, the other is about the thing. Sometimes we talk about the report. Is that not the thing in those cases?

The distinction is very nuanced however, and that rendering cannot capture all that convention says about it. The SEP article ought be confusing enough for anyone's joy.

I like the idea of substitution without losing meaning as a means for adequate translation. It's handy for checking on the coherency of terminological use. It also often renders the notion of 'logical' entailment useless. Gettier plays on it when the substitution quite simply does not hold. What is claimed to be entailed by 'X' can have different truth conditions... different meaning.