Seems that Kripke - for some inexplicable reason - is demanding that a description about someone be true in order to identify the person. Names are not even truth-apt. Why ought descriptions be true in order to identify an individual? He also has no issue with positing false descriptions as possible world stipulations.

"The first man who walked on the moon" picks out Neil Armstrong. If someone other than Neil Armstrong was the first man who walked on the moon, then the description which picks out Neil Armstrong is false. It still picks out Neil Armstrong and will continue to do so until the believer no longer believes that Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the moon.

Kripke wants to say that we can talk about Neil Armstrong in a possible world scenario without losing his identity even when we stipulate that he did not walk on the moon.

So...

He's ok with falsehood being used as a means to deny that true descriptions are necessary and sufficient for identity.

He's not ok with using falsehood as a means for identity.

:worry:

If, as (3) proposes, one of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely, then the reverse should follow; the name ought pick out the thing described, uniquely.

But it doesn't. — Banno

I do not think that Kripke's examples have what it takes to dismiss essential parts/properties wholesale. He uses another's false belief about both Einstein and Godel to show that the description is false. It does not show that the description does not identify Einstein and Godel to the believer.

The believer does not know that the description is false.

It does not follow from the fact that one holds false belief about Einstein that that false belief does not identify Einstein. Descriptions are sometimes about an individual, and as a result they can and do pick out a unique individual regardless of whether or not they are true.

I can say that I imagine a world in which Richard Nixon did not do any of the things that he is infamous for. I can use the name Nixon, and stipulate all sorts of circumstances that are contrary to Nixon's. I can say all sorts of things about Nixon that simply are not true within my hypothetical possible world scenario surrounding Nixon. I could, in fact, deny every specific circumstance that Nixon was ever involved in, and yet we would still know who I am talking about...

How? Not because proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity. Rather, because we already know who Nixon is by virtue of knowing the circumstances that he was involved in.

That is what makes possible world talk possible.

One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. — Banno

Why the "uniquely"?

If Kripke is simply granting another's notion to show it's flaws, then that's fine. However, if that is the case, then there are other issues with that.

Some 'properties'(scare-quotes intentional) make people who they are, but do not pick them out uniquely, for many folk share such 'properties'. It doesn't follow from the fact that some property is not necessarily unique to an individual that that property is not an essential part of who that person is... of that person's identity.

Not all possible world scenarios are counterfactual.

The name Prothobis is used by community X. By way of your amazing detective skills, you discover that all definite descriptions used by this community in regard to Prothobis are wrong. Nobody in this community knows anything true about Prothobis and they never have. They don't even know that it's actually a piece of software. They think it's a guy who frequents a coffee shop. — frank

Yes. This is a case of mistaken identity. That is, everyone who uses "Prothobis" think that it identifies a guy who frequents a coffee shop; this guy.

All possible world scenarios regarding the above are cases of mistaken identity, unless they include circumstances where Prothobis is not a guy at all, but rather is a piece of software.

Nixon is a golf ball.

Under what possible world circumstances would we have a clear-cut case of mistaken identity? Surely our hypothetical meanderings are prone for such. It seems to me that Kripke's account cannot take that into account.

Ok. I'm over it. This is more inline with Kripke's lectures...

Are there specific circumstances that are essential to making Nixon who he is? What's left of Nixon when we posit a possible world where everything that makes Nixon Nixon is changed(when we stipulate alternative circumstances that quite simple cannot produce Nixon)? Is there a point in continuing to call this hypothetical person by the same name?

How would it not be a case of mistaken identity? Are there such cases in possible world semantics?

There most certainly are specific circumstances which influence who people are, what people are, and how people are. We know that circumstances influence one's thought/belief system(worldview). We know that one is born without a worldview. We know that one's worldview influences one's decision making and behaviour.

Nixon ordered illegal behaviour. We know that presenting himself in the best possible way to the American public was very important to Nixon. We know that Nixon did not want to be thought of as a crook. These are all things that made Nixon Nixon.

Can we imagine a possible world where Nixon had no political aspirations? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not care if people thought he was a crook? Can we imagine a possible world in which Nixon did not look like, nor act anything like Nixon - and yet still somehow maintain that we're talking about the same person?

At what point are we stipulating circumstances which contradict the essential circumstances that are a part of what made Nixon who he was/is?

It's just another name for "possible world"; plausibly without bringing as much baggage with it.
— Banno

I think we should adopt the term here from henceforth to dispell he metaphysically of what creativesoul has been wallowing about/'Over. — Wallows

I'm actually pointing out what Kripke's lectures do not cover. Nothing I've said here contradicts anything Kripke says about proper names as they apply to possible world scenarios and/or our ability to use proper names across them as an exclusive means of identity.

I agree with Kripke regarding all of his points - as they apply to what's going on in possible world talk(semantics). I simply disagree that that warrants concluding that proper names are both necessary and sufficient for identity in all circumstances. Possible worlds talk? Seems so.

If your reality is all a result of your ideas, your design...

Then why the fuck are you asking anyone else anything at all? Better yet...

How?

Why does it have to be one or the other?

There is no Reason without emotion. That is Hume's fatal flaw. He is not alone.

We're left with the dire need for a standard by which we can determine what is both necessary and sufficient for being X, when X is a composite(a group of things that already exist in their entirety prior to being/becoming a part of X).

That is the problem... always was... Kripke is of no help.

Sure we can talk about electrons... talk about electrons is not talk about this table. We can talk about this table without talking about electrons.

We cannot posit this table in a possible world scenario where there are no electrons.

Kripke uses possible world semantics without ever considering what they are existentially dependent upon... there's nothing enlightening about using rubbish as a means for alternative rubbish production.

Morality is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Morality is a human condition. We are interdependent social creatures by our very nature. Rules for behaviour are inevitable.

Would you agree that if the entire world took the rules "Thou shalt not kill (except for when it is an unintended side-effect of self-defense)" and "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's assets" to heart and would follow them devoutly, the world would be a better place? — Tzeentch

What an overly simplistic and naive way to think...

Tell that to the down trodden poor folk who suffer at the hands of the richest in their communities...

Die.

Sorry ladies and gentlemen...

I'm going to retire from this one. I've struggled as much as I can take to set aside the fact that I reject possible world talk(the notions of contingency and necessity to be exact) for completely different reasons than Kripke is offering.

The rest of you enjoi and thanks!

:wink:

Possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought/belief. There's much groundwork already laid long before we begin carefully considering alternatives to what we already believe. Part of that groundwork is complex language acquisition itself. During such, we learn to use names to identify things, as well as a means for directing another's attention towards something, getting what we want, and perhaps for other purposes as well. We do all this long before we begin talking about possible world semantics. This already involves the use of definite description as a means of reference/identity.

When there has never been definitive descriptions as a means for reference, there can never be talk of leaving them aside.

Possible world semantics are existentially dependent upon definitive descriptions. When we're amidst language acquisition, we will further describe - in great detail - some thing to another person. We begin by using the name of that thing. Or at other times, we're describing - in great detail - the thing itself and we're looking to learn the name of it. The elucidation, either way, is meant to help us understand what it is that we're talking about. All of that happens before any discussion such as this one.

I don't think that Kripke would deny any of this.

There is no such thing as identity without definitive description until long after we've already known how to describe things as a means for identity.

Ok. Looks like we're on to the second lecture. I'm good with that, but just wanted to say one last thing regarding some ongoing disputes between several different participants...

Alright, so some are thinking/believing that Kripke is offering an unconvincing 'argument'. I suspect that that belief is ill-founded. While I cannot deny that Kripke's paper is unconvincing for many an issue, I suspect that those are not the aim to begin with.

For example, I see no reason whatsoever to think/believe that Kripke wants to completely separate definite descriptions from identity. He's not divorcing the two on all counts. He's just not. That much is clear because he repeatedly grants essential parts.

Rather, he is divorcing essential parts from possible world semantics.

Coming from one who prides himself on brevity...

Thanks!

:smile:

I think I'm beginning to understand Kripke's take here... and his aim... but I'm still left feeling like there are some other well-known philosophical issues being addressed by him, and they are still, as of yet, unbeknownst to me. I'm certain of it, as a matter of fact.

Your knowledge of identity comes from your involvement with a community that calls a particular by a certain name. — frank

Hmmm... "a particular"?

Particulars are stipulated though, right? Objects are named. Otherwise, the aforementioned self-contradiction...

So...

What is your take on what's most important for the reader to firmly grasp in lecture one? I'm almost certain that I'm missing something somewhere along the line...

Kripke talks about rigid designators as a way to capture more clearly what we mean by such speech. It's not a philosophical device. He's only using jargon for something that didn't previously have a name.

So in your first quote, he's venturing away from total reliance on descriptions. He doesn't leave description behind entirely and doesn't leave us with a very clear idea where we should draw the line. — frank

Okay.

So, Kripke is summarizing what's going on when we talk about possible worlds. He's noting(and naming) the different kinds of designators as a means for pointing out some things that had not been pointed out in past. He ventures away from total reliance upon definite descriptions. I think I agree with him on that much...

If it is the case that we cannot stipulate particulars(at least some alternative circumstances), then there can be no possible worlds talk at all, for it is the particular alternative circumstances that make them what they are. Those are stipulated.

Clearly, as skirted around above, the identity of the object in question is not always dependent upon definite descriptions. However, it seems impossible to not use the same name. So, possible world talk happens. We all make some sense of it. Clearly this is because we do no entirely depend upon definite descriptions as a means of identifying the object we're talking about. However, we always use the same name...

Is that about right, on your understanding?

...

Most statements of that sort(possible worlds) aren't aiming to say something about the nature of the universe, though. Often they're just about logical possibility. — frank

I agree. What follows below is a bit off topic, my own take on a few things, and disagrees sharply with the convention grounding Kripke's thoughts in a few ways...

It is worth mention that possible world scenarios can consist of true statements. What makes these statements true matters. I'll say more about that momentarily...

In order to be logically possible, a statement must follow the rules of correct inference. Conclusions are statements that follow the rules of correct inference. Logically possible statements are conclusions that follow the rules of correct inference. Valid conclusions are logically possible.

True statements are existentially dependent upon truth. Some logically possible statements are false. Some logically possible statements are true. Therefore, logical possibility alone is insufficient for truth.

If... all known properties of an object are necessary.

This would mean all statements about alternate possibilities are false. — frank

Unsure how this addresses my last post. Nonetheless, it makes no sense to me.



If all known properties of an object are necessary, it would mean that all statements about alternative properties are about that which is not... necessary.

Yup. That must be the case...

In the second quote he's complaining about the problems that arise from using descriptions. What seems to be contingent will turn out to be necessary.

In the second quote he's going to explain how that confusion can be resolved. — frank

He argues in favor of the first quote. He argues in favor of the second quote. The result is obvious self-contradiction unless there is a distinction to be drawn and maintained between objects and particulars.

Particulars are stipulated?

If the paper arrives at self-contradiction, how far does the consequence of incoherency travel?

If it doesn't matter to some of the points he makes, then perhaps it be best to set it aside and bring it up at a more appropriate time.

Can anyone help here?

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?
— creativesoul

I don't think so. He meant any particular thing. — frank

Hmmm...

I'm not so sure.

Well, what "structures the world" according to my reading of Kripke are necessary existents. That's all I meant by it. — Wallows

...When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid...

I'm concluding based upon the above that - according to Kripke's scheme - a necessary existent is equivalent to an essential property...

...a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description...

The above seems to argue in defense or support of essential and/or necessary properties. What I do not get, cannot quite square, is the above with the below, which he wrote early on in the first lecture...

..A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described...

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?

Anyone here that care help me out?

Some have said that modal talk has an inherent issue. Namely(pun intended), that identity cannot transcend from our world to a hypothetical one(all possible worlds are hypothetical). Kripke shows that that is not always the case. He further sharpens his response to that particular criticism by virtue of clearly explicating between cases when identity cannot transcend between possible worlds(when essential parts exist), and cases where there is no problem whatsoever(when the description of an object is utterly inadequate for referring to and thus identifying the object of reference). He admits of the former(the existence of essential parts), and clearly states that. He further explicates that those cases are not the aim. He continues to explicate upon the latter.

Some have said that definition requires a description of the object being defined, and that identity is determined by such. Hesperus and Nixon are prima facie examples of cases where that quite simply does not hold up to scrutiny. We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.

Hesperus could've gotten knocked of it's course. Some object of equivalent mass other than Hesperus could have come to rest 'at' the same spatiotemporal location. That possible world scenario does not make Hesperus something else. That possible world scenario does not make the other purely hypothetical object Hesperus. Rather, it shows that definite descriptions are not necessary for identifying Hesperus. "The evening star" is a description that is not necessary to identify Hesperus.

Had other events taken place, Nixon could have lost the election. Someone else could have won. This would not make Nixon a different object. This would not make the other person Nixon. It shows that descriptions of Nixon as president are not necessary for referring to and/or identifying Nixon. He was Nixon prior to his presidency after-all...

I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity.
— creativesoul

By "name as identity" do you mean "name as identifier". The problem I see is that many people can have the same name, and when we use a name to refer to someone we need supplementary descriptions (unless we are right there in which case pointing (ostention) will suffice) to enable us to identify who the name is being used to refer to.

Of course I agree that a description or any set of descriptions is "adequate for identity" but a description may be adequate for identification. — Janus

That was put poorly by me...

He repeatedly talks of the consequences for a theory of meaning and a theory of reference as they apply to his offering. So, it seems clear from that that Kripke is at a minimum showing the difference between them. Further seems that he's tying definite descriptions to theories of meaning and not to identity.

What I find intriguing is that he's using possible world semantics as a means for reduction...

What can we take away and retain the identity? You and frank have been discussing this and it's consequences. Kripke notes several times that there are essential parts, and that those are not the aim of his paper... So, it's scope of application is limited.

Seems that one of his main points is to displace the commonly held view that that which is necessary is also a priori. Another is to render the distinction between a priori and a posteriori flawed at a minimum, and useless at a maximum.

My own position is at odds with much of what Kripke is arguing from, and even a bit of what he is invoking on his own. However, I've decided to set difference aside here simply for the sake of understanding Kripke. Later on I think it would be beneficial for us to show the pros and cons of what Kripke is arguing for. This is a reading group, so expressing flaws or shortcomings is acceptable for me at some point after everyone who's interested in and capable of understanding what Kripke is getting at does.

It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...
— creativesoul

But, if every name is a rigid designator, then we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity. How do you deal with this? — Wallows

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think.

Assume he is talking about every name, for the sake of argument...

What do you mean "we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity"?

Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description. — Janus

Indeed he does, or so it may seem...

That is the bit that I'm currently attempting to summarize. I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity. It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...

I think that prior to getting into the second lecture, we ought offer a summary of the first. This summary ought set out the important distinctions that he set the groundwork for. The last twenty or so pages are important to understand. I'm still working through them. They seem to be explanations of earlier distinctions, but the notion of "fixing a referent" as compared to giving a synonym ought be understood...

This topic is about Kripke's paper/lectures. It is not about the archaic and utterly useless notion of subjective that you've invoked here...

You're excused.

Yes. Banno just elaborated nicely upon my response to you...

This is not the place for it ...