So, to stipulate something according to Kripke is to name something or give it a description? — Wallows

I don't think that that's quite right. I'm thinking that his use of "stipulate" is very specific here. It's being used as a means to isolate the different content of possible worlds, with the rigid designator(the name) being one component and the alternative circumstances being the other. The former remains across all possible worlds, whereas the latter does not.

↪creativesoul AH! You got it. Cool! — Banno

:wink:

Maybe.

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that.
— Wallows

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds. — creativesoul

Still confused. Thanks anyway — Wallows

What's confusing to you?

What does Kripke mean when he says that objects and their names are "stipulated" in possible world's? Kind of confused about what he means by that. — Wallows

I'm not sure he says that. Objects, as far as I understand, according to Kripke are picked out of this world - by virtue of naming them - and posited in another set of circumstances. The other circumstances are stipulated. The other circumstances are possible worlds.

Kripke mentions early on that some problems of trans-world identity come from conflating epistemological issues with ontological ones. There are starkly different criteria here. What our knowledge of something requires is not the same as what that something's existence requires. Kripke does not claim to have solved all trans-world identity issues. Wallows' earlier quotes elucidate upon some of those.

When an object's elemental constituents are necessary for the object to exist, then when and if we attempt to stipulate that that object does not include it's elemental constituents, we are stipulating a possible world without that object. Kripke acknowledges these sorts of issues, while simultaneously allowing us to continue to sensibly discuss possible worlds scenarios regarding these objects, by virtue of talking about these objects without needing to discuss their essential parts.

We can talk about a table in another possible world without needing to talk about it in terms of it's molecules. I think he goes farther by implying that if talk of it's molecules does not or cannot effectively exhaust talk of it in terms of it's being a table, then something is clearly missing from the account. Molecules alone, specific kinds of wood alone... these things may be essential 'properties' of this table, but they are most certainly not sufficient for being a table, nor are they necessary. Not all wood molecules are tables. Not all tables consist of that type of wood.

There is something inherent to the identity of that table such that part of it's being that table is the fact that we call it such...

Possible worlds are stipulated. All possible world scenarios pick out something in this world and stipulate that something in a different set of circumstances. We begin with an object and then we ask what might have happened to it. We do not begin with worlds whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us and then ask about trans-world identity. Kripke writes on page 44...

A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it...

...There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him...

Kripke on page 48 writes...

Let's use some terms quasi-technically. Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal course of things. When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

So while it is certainly possible that Nixon may not have been president, no one other than Nixon may have been Nixon. Thus, proper names are rigid designators, but are not necessarily strongly rigid. Strongly rigid designators are of necessary existents. Necessary existents exist in all possible worlds.

It seems that Kripke wants to say that being an essential property of an object does not require that that object necessarily exist(in all possible worlds). I think that this is him continuing to drive a wedge between the historical notions of a priori and necessary. Just because something is known a priori, it does not follow that what is known is necessary...

Kripke re-visits what he wrote earlier on page 49...

Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

Because possible worlds are stipulated, and some properties are results of circumstances, and we can stipulate different sets of circumstances...

...whether an object has the same property in all possible worlds depends not just on the object itself, but on how it is described...

But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question... — Kripke pg. 53

"Resembling"...

Why ought an apple pie resemble all of it's parts as a pre-requisite to insisting that there are no sensible possible world scenarios that imagine apple pies without apples?

...the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities... — Kripke pg. 53

My side issue with this concerns certain situations where the object in question is existentially dependent upon it's parts(emergent things/objects). Kripke's scheme cannot take account of those situations. Earlier, I mentioned an apple pie and apples. Kripke stated of such situations...

Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so... — Kripke pg. 53

I would think that the value we place upon possible world semantics(imaginary counterfactuals) ought be established, in some strong sense of the word, by virtue of correctly identifying the object(by our knowledge about the object in question when it is in fact an existentially dependent composite of other parts). If there can be no A without B, then a possible world scenario positing an A without B would be saying something like that we could imagine a world in which there were apple pies without apples, and that such an endeavor would be somehow useful for attaining/acquiring knowledge and/or understanding of apple pies.

:yikes:

Yes. I agree with that. It seems that if we do not do that, then possible world semantics lose coherency...

What do you mean? — Wallows

I need a quote of me from you to me.

Then, I may answer...

I hope the idea of fixing the reference as opposed to actually defining one term as meaning the other is somewhat clear.

This seems pivotal as well...

A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described. This is perhaps closely related to the view that the way we refer to particular things is by a description...

I think that this bit above underwrites quite a bit of these lectures. I do not concur. However, it is important to understand what Kripke is getting at...

SO, are there any problems with transworld identification? Can we move on, accepting it as simple stipulation? — Banno

There are still some problems with transworld identifications, but I do not think that Kripke's language use grasps them. He has addressed some though...

For the sake of the read, and to understand his critique, those(remaining unaddressed issues) can be set aside...

I read Kripke as setting up a grammar that allows coherent discourse on modal issues. Hence it is especially important to recognise the way he seperate names from descriptions, necessity from the a priory and the analytic, and so on. — Banno

Yes.

Sittin' here puzzlin' over how you managed to get things so wrong, again. — Banno

Hmmm...

"So wrong"

"again"

Puzzlin' indeed.

The take home is that we can stipulate possible worlds as things that are stipulated. If we want to think about possible worlds that are found, we are free to do that as well, unless you know of some reason we shouldn't. — frank

Nah. Possible worlds are a metacognitive endeavor. There are no possible worlds without extremely complex language.

All you'll find is language use.

What profound philosophical questions?
— Banno

Heraclitus type questions like those Wallows has mentioned. — frank

Yeah, I think Kripke takes care of Heraclitus' 'same river' pseudo-problem. It's untenable... utterly untenable.

Does the 'problem' of ' transworld identification' make any sense? Is it simply a pseudo-problem?
[...]
Similarly, given certain counterfactual vicissitudes in the history of the molecules of a table, T, one may ask whether T would exist, in that situation, or whether a certain bunch of molecules, which in that situation would constitute a table, constitute the very same table T. In each case, we seek criteria of identity across possible worlds for certain particulars in terms of those for other, more 'basic', particulars. If statements about nations (or tribes) are not reducible to those about other more 'basic' constituents, if there is some 'open texture' in the relationship between them, we can hardly expect to give hard and fast identity criteria;
[...] — Kripke, pg.50

Emphasis mine

Yup.

That's what I'm talking about Banno. What if they are??? Those are unaddressed issues.

In support of Kripke... his point - if I read him correctly - is that there are times(anytime???) when we do not need to talk about the fundamental elemental constituents of something in order to sensibly discuss the thing(object) we're discussing. I would agree that most often we do not.

What have I written here that is incommensurate with anything you've quoted?

:brow:

Where yat Banno?

:cool:

So this notion Kripke invokes on page48...

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

...is quite intriguing by my lights. It not only allows the discussion of basic, foundational, and/or otherwise irrevocably important necessary elemental constituents, but he goes even farther and offers a special status for them(what counts as a strongly rigid designator)!

A rigid designator of an essential property can be called strongly rigid.

Perhaps it may be worth mentioning and/or asking ourselves the following...

Aren't we talking about the object of our thought when we're identifying and subsequently providing so-called "counterfactual" possible worlds scenarios in light of it? Aren't we then saying that after we identify this thing(this object of thought), whatever else we may say about it, if it is to qualify as being rigid, can only be strongly rigid.

Rigid designator. Strongly rigid designator. Accidental/nonrigid designator.

Circumstances(states of affairs that can be stipulated without changing the identity) can only be accidental/non-rigid designators.

Elemental constituents then - as a result of being necessary for the very existence of the thing being identified - remain intact across all possible worlds scenarios for a different reason than a name does.

If it is the case that all A's consist of B's, then there is no possible world scenario that can be coherently posited about A's without B's, for that would be to talk about something other than this A.

There are no apple pies in any meaningful possible world if there are no apples in that possible world. There are no apple pies without apples... not counterfactually, not sensibly, not intuitively...

"Apple" is a strongly rigid designator.

I do find it interesting that he allows for 'essential properties' in several ways but asks to set them aside...

Kripke, it seems to me, strongly believes that possible world semantics are intuitively useful. His strong assertion...

When you ask whether it is necessary or contingent that Nixon won the election, you are asking the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, this man would in fact have lost the election. If someone thinks that the notion of a necessary or contingent property (forget whether there are any nontrivial necessary properties [and consider] just the meaningfulness of the notion) is a philosopher's notion with no intuitive content, he is wrong.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

You can, with the actual indexical, produce an necessary, a posterior identity statement, like:

"The actual 1970 US president was Nixon."

Don't worry that there are possible worlds in which that statement, if spoken in that world, would be false. It's still true with respect to that possible world.

Right, Banno? — frank

Yeah, I dunno about this take...

Seems to me that the very use of "actual" eliminates coherent use of possible world semantics.

I think this goes back to your reply to my question about the "criteria of/for identity".

I'm currently on page 60 of the book. — Wallows

I suggest that you back up and re-read the bit about the meaning of a name and the meaning of a reference(pg. 32, 33, 34). Kripke draws a distinction between the two. Theory laden... sigh. For me, understanding this takes setting aside pre-existing certainty about some things. the more I re-read, the clearer it seems.

Kripke is not offering a theory of the meaning of a name. He is arguing for a theory of reference. The two are not the same by any stretch.

"Nixon", as a referent, is adequate and necessary to identify and refer to this man. That holds good in all possible worlds. That is a theory of referent(what counts as such).

"Nixon", as a name, identifies this man and everything that makes this man who he is(surely some circumstances are irrevocable - say if this man has one hand as a result of warfare). That is a theory of the meaning of a name, and as such it does not hold good in all possible worlds. To quite the contrary, it is to change the circumstances while retaining the identity of an object of thought that makes possible world semantics what they are.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.
— creativesoul

I'm not quite sure. It seems to me that the rigid designator isn't the state of affairs here because those can be contingent... — Wallows

I agree that the rigid designator in this example is Nixon. I didn't mean to imply otherwise.

Designators can be contingent. Kripke makes a point to distinguish between rigid designators and accidental/nonrigid ones. As you say, because possible world semantics allow us to change the circumstances(Kripke calls these 'properties') and retain the identity of Nixon(the object of thought).

So: the question of transworld identification makes some sense, in terms of asking about the identity of an object via questions about its component parts. But these parts are not qualities, and it is not an object resembling the given one which is in question. Theorists have often said that we identify objects across possible worlds as objects resembling the given one in the most important respects. On the contrary, Nixon, had he decided to act otherwise, might have avoided politics like the plague, though privately harboring radical opinions. Most important, even when we can replace questions about an object by questions about its parts, we need not do so. We can refer to the object and ask what might have happened to it. So, we do not begin with worlds (which are supposed somehow to be real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are per­ceptible to us), and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of the objects.

This piques my interest. I agree to some extent. However, this assessment is already theory laden with notions that I reject for various reasons. Kripke is rejecting them as well as some of the conventional 'takes' based upon them, but he's also accepting them, in some strong sense, as useful(intuitive).

His distinctions, I think, are key to understanding his lectures on Necessity and Naming.

Honestly Banno, I am struggling to set aside my own position. It must be done in order to grasp what Kripke is getting at. One must also have a good grasp of all the notions(possible worlds semantics, a priori/a posteriori, and types of truth) that he is working with besides setting out his own theory of identity.

So while being president of the U.S. in 1970 designates Nixon, it is a nonrigid or accidental designator.

He wants to say that we only need the name to maintain identity across possible worlds, and that there is no problem with trivially stipulating different properties to that object. There is no problem with saying that Nixon may not have been president in 1970, and so it is intuitively clear that being president in 1970 is not necessary and/or essential to being Nixon. Being president in 1970 is not an essential property of Nixon.

When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.

One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned above: although someone other than the u.s. President in 1970 might have been the U.S. President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon. In the same way, a designator rigidly designates a certain object if it designates that object wherever the object exists; if, in addition, the object is a necessary existent, the designator can be called strongly rigid. For example, 'the President of the U.S. in 1970' designates a certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g., Humphrey) might have been the President in 1970, and Nixon might not have; so this designator is not rigid.

In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator, we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity' have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that 'transworld identi­fications' are unproblematic in such cases.

So, here Kripke clearly argues against the idea that all circumstances(properties) definitively establish identity(are essential). He does however, allow room for such essential properties by stipulating that essential properties are true of that object in any case where it would have existed.

Interesting take that Kripke has...

By virtue of talking about Moses in another possible world, all we've done is posit the exact same thing(Moses) into another set of circumstances(those of our own imagining). If it is - in part at least - the circumstances themselves that definitively determine what counts as Moses, then we've just committed an error in thought/belief by stipulating different circumstances to the 'same' thing. Different circumstances will produce different things when circumstances themselves are part of what definitively establishes identity.

That is the case with Moses.

Kripke showed the incoherency/self-contradiction that results from attempting to use particulars as a criterion for identity across possible worlds by showing that if we attribute different circumstances(possible worlds) to the same thing, we end up saying some thing both... was and was not... the thing that 'X'.

So... the idea itself comes from thinking about one's own thought/belief?

No, you're not.

How is a better question. It's already been answered.

What sort of question is that Posty? Ask a better question.

Your confidence does not exist independently of your thought/belief.

As before, the emotional content is not always a part of 'expressed' correlation except that there is - at the very least - fear and/or contentment 'buried' somewhere in all the thought that led up to asserting and/or expressing that proposition. The expression is built upon and/or grounded by some previous thought. Somewhere along the 'line', fear and/or contentment is part of the correlation itself. It is one of the things being connected, as compared/contrasted with being just a smaller part of one of the things being connected.
— creativesoul

But, there really isn't anything emotional about expressing the proposition that 1+1 is 2. Is there? — Posty McPostface

Are you uncertain, certain, or neither?

Which of these is not emotional?

This notion of not being able to be certain about anything at all, including our own thought/belief...

Where did it come from?

But the proposition such as 1+1=2 is an emotionally devoid proposition. No? — Posty McPostface

No.

As before, the emotional content is not always a part of 'expressed' correlation except that there is - at the very least - fear and/or contentment 'buried' somewhere in all the thought that led up to asserting and/or expressing that proposition. The expression is built upon and/or grounded by some previous thought. Somewhere along the 'line', fear and/or contentment is part of the correlation itself. It is one of the things being connected, as compared/contrasted with being just a smaller part of one of the things being connected.

Hence...

One who is entertaining thoughts that his/her spouse is unfaithful, could be drawing correlations between the fear, all of it's affects, and the idea that the spouse is being unfaithful(whatever that idea includes).

So, can one have a thought without emotion? — Posty McPostface

No.