Nuh. Epistemology. — Banno

What kind of epistemology?

But arguing in this way is misguided since there is considerable (understatement) overlap. — Banno

Overlap with what?

Pfff. Do some of the work for yourself. Consider it homework.

Pfff. Do some of the work for yourself. Consider it homework. — Banno

Point me in the right direction, kind Sir. What pages should I cover? I'm almost close to the end of the lecture I.

@creativesoul, waiting on you.

Yes that's right and you only know that by ostention and/ or description which has been my point. — Janus

You know Nixon in the actual world a posteriori. And it's true that we know him by his story. So it's troubling that we can think about a Nixon with an alternate story.

I think there are a variety of approaches to that question and Kripke was vague enough that he invites differing interpretations.

How do you assess our ability to think of a Nixon with an alternate story, when we know him by his story?

How do you assess our ability to think of a Nixon with an alternate story, when we know him by his story? — frank

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon.

For me the question would be as to how alternative the story could be without Nixon ceasing to be Nixon. — Janus

So we would change a few things and it's still Nixon. Then we keep changing things and somewhere prior to imagining Nixon as a golf ball, we say that couldn't be Nixon?

Perhaps we don't need to go as far as the golf ball to lose Nixon. Could Nixon still be Nixon if he had had different parents and also looked completely different or was a woman, for example?

Perhaps we don't need to go as far as the golf ball. Could Nixon still be Nixon if he had had different parents and also looked completely different or was a woman, for example? — Janus

Different biological parents: Kripke would say no. A hyper-anti-essentialist might say yes.

Looked different? That just takes a wig and some make-up, so I think only the hyper-essentialist would say no.

Woman? Mr. Sperm has a Y chromosome. If he had an X, would he be the same sperm?

So how do we separate the name 'Nixon' and its referent from the associated definite descriptions of the referent; 'the man who had these biological parents', 'the entity who was a man' and so on?

So how do we separate the name 'Nixon' and its referent from the associated definite descriptions of the referent; 'the man who had these biological parents', 'the entity who was a man' and so on? — Janus

Kripke doesn't suggest that we ever do that. The hyper-anti-essentialist does.

Kripke just notes that we do easily speak of alternate Nixons. The concept of the rigid designator seems to apply to a scenario where we lay possibilities out in a row on a table, so to speak.

If you speak about alternate Nixons, are you thinking of it spacially in that way? Or do you imagine this universe as a script, and think of a re-write? Or what?

Kripke doesn't suggest that we ever do that. — frank

It's a long while since I read (and studied) Naming and Necessity, but as far as I understand Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description. Nothing I have read in this thread has convinced me that he succeeded, or even could succeed, in doing that. So I thought when I studied it, and still tend to think, that it is "much ado about nothing".

If you speak about alternate Nixons, are you thinking of it spacially in that way? Or do you imagine this universe as a script, and think of a re-write? Or what? — frank

I think we can quite coherently imagine that Nixon could have had a very different life-course. What exactly it is that is most minimally necessary and sufficient to make someone count as being Nixon is not so easy to pin down. This would seem to be related to Wittgenstein's critique of essentialism in terms of "family resemblances". It is not a precise science.

...but as far as I understand Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description — Janus

Reference? I think it's more about identity. If I write about an alternate Nixon, I shouldn't have any problem picking out which character in my story is Nixon. If you read my story and have difficulty, that means I suck at writing.

It's not a precise science. — Janus

Kripke agrees. Schopenhauer strongly disagrees.

Reference? I think it's more about identity. If I write about an alternate Nixon, I shouldn't have any problem picking out which character in my story is Nixon. If you read my story and have difficulty, that means I suck at writing. — frank

Reference and identity seem to be inseparably related, though. You can write about (in the sense of stipulate that you are writing about) an alternative Nixon, but does that character have some ineliminable relation to the actual Nixon, or is the relation merely an arbitrary stipulation; a "because I say so"?

It's not a precise science. — Janus


Kripke agrees. — frank

Well, "rigid designation" suggests precision whereas descriptions are always imprecise. Perhaps Kripke is ambivalent or inconsistent?

You can write about (in the sense of stipulate that you are writing about) an alternative Nixon, but does that character have some ineliminable relation to the actual Nixon — Janus

I would say yes. The actual Nixon, at a certain point, had the potential to either win or lose.

I understand what you're saying about reference. I'll have to think about it.

Kripke wants to separate the idea of reference from any dependence on definite description. — Janus

Indeed he does, or so it may seem...

That is the bit that I'm currently attempting to summarize. I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity. It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...

It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this... — creativesoul

But, if every name is a rigid designator, then we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity. How do you deal with this?

I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity. — creativesoul

By "name as identity" do you mean "name as identifier". The problem I see is that many people can have the same name, and when we use a name to refer to someone we need supplementary descriptions (unless we are right there in which case pointing (ostention) will suffice) to enable us to identify who the name is being used to refer to.

Of course I agree that a description or any set of descriptions is "adequate for identity" but a description may be adequate for identification.

I would say yes. — frank

No matter how attenuated the fictional characters connection (in terms of description) to the real Nixon is? Are you thinking it is so simply on the basis that you (the author) think of your character as being somehow an alternate version of Nixon? Would it matter if others found the identity connection unconvincing?

It also seems that he's using modality(possible world semantics) as a means to argue this...
— creativesoul

But, if every name is a rigid designator, then we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity. How do you deal with this? — Wallows

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think.

Assume he is talking about every name, for the sake of argument...

What do you mean "we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity"?

I'm not sure that every name is a rigid designator for Kripke. Proper names are what he's dealing with... I think. — creativesoul

Yes, I'll settle with that. I might be wrong of course about every name being a rigid designator. Of course, some names can have empty referents. Like, Pegasus, or Harry Potter.

Assume he is talking about every name, for the sake of argument...

What do you mean "we're left with necessary existents that instantiate necessity"? — creativesoul

Well, what "structures the world" according to my reading of Kripke are necessary existents. That's all I meant by it.

No matter how attenuated the fictional characters connection (in terms of description) to the real Nixon is? Are you thinking it is so simply on the basis that you (the author) think of your character as being somehow an alternate version of Nixon? — Janus

No. In any possible world that includes Nixon, there are characteristics essential to him. He has to be human-shaped, for instance. He can't be a golf ball.

Would it matter if others found the identity connection unconvincing? — Janus

That would suggest that I'm straying either from facts about Nixon or logical possibility.

I think it amounts to the difference between the meaning of a name and a name as identity. He actually has a few examples where a description is clearly inadequate for identity.
— creativesoul

By "name as identity" do you mean "name as identifier". The problem I see is that many people can have the same name, and when we use a name to refer to someone we need supplementary descriptions (unless we are right there in which case pointing (ostention) will suffice) to enable us to identify who the name is being used to refer to.

Of course I agree that a description or any set of descriptions is "adequate for identity" but a description may be adequate for identification. — Janus

That was put poorly by me...

He repeatedly talks of the consequences for a theory of meaning and a theory of reference as they apply to his offering. So, it seems clear from that that Kripke is at a minimum showing the difference between them. Further seems that he's tying definite descriptions to theories of meaning and not to identity.

What I find intriguing is that he's using possible world semantics as a means for reduction...

What can we take away and retain the identity? You and frank have been discussing this and it's consequences. Kripke notes several times that there are essential parts, and that those are not the aim of his paper... So, it's scope of application is limited.

Seems that one of his main points is to displace the commonly held view that that which is necessary is also a priori. Another is to render the distinction between a priori and a posteriori flawed at a minimum, and useless at a maximum.

My own position is at odds with much of what Kripke is arguing from, and even a bit of what he is invoking on his own. However, I've decided to set difference aside here simply for the sake of understanding Kripke. Later on I think it would be beneficial for us to show the pros and cons of what Kripke is arguing for. This is a reading group, so expressing flaws or shortcomings is acceptable for me at some point after everyone who's interested in and capable of understanding what Kripke is getting at does.

Some have said that modal talk has an inherent issue. Namely(pun intended), that identity cannot transcend from our world to a hypothetical one(all possible worlds are hypothetical). Kripke shows that that is not always the case. He further sharpens his response to that particular criticism by virtue of clearly explicating between cases when identity cannot transcend between possible worlds(when essential parts exist), and cases where there is no problem whatsoever(when the description of an object is utterly inadequate for referring to and thus identifying the object of reference). He admits of the former(the existence of essential parts), and clearly states that. He further explicates that those cases are not the aim. He continues to explicate upon the latter.

Some have said that definition requires a description of the object being defined, and that identity is determined by such. Hesperus and Nixon are prima facie examples of cases where that quite simply does not hold up to scrutiny. We can easily posit possible worlds where descriptions of the object are not necessary to identify the object.

Hesperus could've gotten knocked of it's course. Some object of equivalent mass other than Hesperus could have come to rest 'at' the same spatiotemporal location. That possible world scenario does not make Hesperus something else. That possible world scenario does not make the other purely hypothetical object Hesperus. Rather, it shows that definite descriptions are not necessary for identifying Hesperus. "The evening star" is a description that is not necessary to identify Hesperus.

Had other events taken place, Nixon could have lost the election. Someone else could have won. This would not make Nixon a different object. This would not make the other person Nixon. It shows that descriptions of Nixon as president are not necessary for referring to and/or identifying Nixon. He was Nixon prior to his presidency after-all...

Well, what "structures the world" according to my reading of Kripke are necessary existents. That's all I meant by it. — Wallows

...When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid...

I'm concluding based upon the above that - according to Kripke's scheme - a necessary existent is equivalent to an essential property...

...a property can meaningfully be held to be essential or accidental to an object independently of its description...

The above seems to argue in defense or support of essential and/or necessary properties. What I do not get, cannot quite square, is the above with the below, which he wrote early on in the first lecture...

..A much worse thing, something creating great additional problems, is whether we can say of any particular that it has necessary or contingent properties, even make the distinction between necessary and contingent properties. Look, it's only a statement or a state of affairs that can be either necessary or contingent ! Whether a particular necessarily or contingently has a certain property depends on the way it's described...

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?

Anyone here that care help me out?

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects? — creativesoul

I don't think so. He meant any particular thing.

Evidently there's a meaningful distinction to be drawn and maintained between particulars and objects?
— creativesoul

I don't think so. He meant any particular thing. — frank

Hmmm...

I'm not so sure.

If the paper arrives at self-contradiction, how far does the consequence of incoherency travel?

If it doesn't matter to some of the points he makes, then perhaps it be best to set it aside and bring it up at a more appropriate time.

Can anyone help here?

Perhaps he was giving an account of Bertrand Russell’s and John Searle’s theories of descriptors? I don’t know. I’d have to read the paper again.

. In the second quote he's complaining about the problems that arise from using descriptions. What seems to be contingent will turn out to be necessary.

In the second quote he's going to explain how that confusion can be resolved.