Which uses maths to account for anomalous observations... — Wayfarer

Here's my take...

When observable entities are smaller than a planck length and the act of observing them includes shining light on them then the observation itself begins a causal chain of events as a result of the mass of the photon influencing the path(location) and movement speed(acceleration) of the subatomic particle being observed.

Hence... The Uncertainty Principle.

There's nothing random about it.

Yup. Not sure about my memory, but it seems to me that some of our very first conversations were on this topic. Do you recall?

It's much more than just asserting a novel distinction, although I am prone to do just that. This is a bit different...

To conclude that quantum mechanics operates on a more fundamental level is very questionable. It becomes apparent that that is gravely mistaken if and/or when we continue on to say that randomness is fundamental in it's relationship with causality. Quantum mechanics cannot effectively exhaust cause and effect. That's not a feature. It's a flaw.

That alone is adequate reason to deny placing much value upon the idea that quantum mechanics id somehow fundamental to classical mechanics.

If it were the case that randomness is more fundamental then we would need to ignore overwhelming fractal evidence to the contrary in order to sincerely assert this. Fractals are patterns. Pattern cannot happen without sequences of events. Sequence cannot happen without predictable time increments. Pure randomness has no predictable sequence. Randomness falls well short of the mark. It cannot produce what we do witness.

Math doesn't do anything observable. It's a tool of measurement. Quantum mechanics is math. Quantum mechanics is understood if someone understands the formulas, principles, and rules of doing it. The results of different experiments began a race to explanation. Hence, the different 'interpretations', all of philosophy, not science. All three of the most popular'interpretations' employ the normal everyday notion of causality and differ only insofar as they set out different consequences from different assumptions about the same experimental results.

The results were witnessed.

But with quantum mechanics, what is witnessed... — apokrisis

There's when you went wrong.

Not interested. I don't even know what you meant.

Clearly we can be wrong when we attribute causality. We can also be right.

Which did I write?

Well, why not? Why shouldn't a cause happen after the event? — Banno

Do you mean "after the effect"?

Some events are causes. Causal events influence subsequent events. They are called "causal chains of events" because of that. We call the aforementioned influence - the "effect" - of the cause. We did not arrive at causality by virtue of inventing and/or imagining it. We arrived at causality by virtue of witnessing it happen... over and over and over again...

I greatly doubt that we’ll find common ground. I’ve also lost the desire to further debate this issue. I’m giving a partial reply so as to not be utterly off-putting: — javra

Thanks.

In general, I find that we agree on much more than we disagree. However, regarding this particular topic of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language, there are indeed stark differences in our views.

This became clearer to me after you denied that belief must begin simply and grow in it's complexity.

I would be more than willing to discontinue discussing everything else except one thing...

I would like for you and I to set out the bare minimum criterion for what counts as belief. I think a comprehensive comparison between the two(I'm assuming that there will be some differences) will lend itself to a much greater understanding.

I haven't been able to ascertain yours. I've definitely tried to. On my view, there must be something that all belief have in common which makes them belief aside from just calling them all by the same name...

A bit on reflective thought...

I find that reflective thought can be both, prior to thinking about one's own thought and belief and after. The content of the reflection is memory. Memory does not require thinking about thought and belief. For that reason, positing it alone is utterly inadequate for helping us to delineate thought/belief that is not existentially dependent upon language from that which is. However, we could determine the content of the memory as a means to ascertain whether or not that content is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief. We could also determine whether or not that content is existentially dependent upon language.

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things.
— creativesoul

Yet this does not distinguish thought from belief so as to define what belief is. — javra

At the language less level there is no difference. At the rudimentary level there is no difference. They both consist of the exact same things - correlations. All thought and all belief consist of correlations. All differences in either are determined precisely by virtue of the content of the correlations.

The meaningful difference between the terms "thought" and "belief" has to do with the attitude of the user... uncertainty. Uncertainty arises from becoming aware of our own fallibility. The ability to consider some statement or other without necessarily believing that it is true(the only difference between thought and belief) requires rather complex language replete with proxies(names) for one's own mental ongoings.

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this?

Example: I see an odd shaped red apple on the table for the first time. I'm not at all familiar with this type of apple. — javra

Claiming that you are not at all familiar with a type of apple is a performative contradiction. You are obviously familiar with it enough to categorize it as an apple.

I either trust that it is there as seen, trust that it is not as seen, or trust that both possibilities might be valid; the latter being an instance of uncertainty while the two former cases are instances of certainty. Regardless, all three scenarios are initially experienced by me without without a sense of familiarity, without thought, and without beliefs about beliefs (belief is what we're addressing to begin with, so I'm assuming you were here addressing beliefs about beliefs).

I may be wrong here, but it seems to me that you're wanting to say that language less creatures are capable of trust(without familiarity) by virtue of trusting their physiological sensory perception when encountering novel things. Not having the ability to doubt the veracity of one's physiological sensory perception and/or rudimentary thought and belief is not equivalent to trusting it. Any such notion of trust which would allow such a loose criterion(trust equaling all reliance upon something) would lead us to claim that vehicles trust their parts.

The notion is unacceptable as it is. It obviously requires some refinement.

Your example above is chock full of thinking about thought and belief all the while simultaneously denying that.

I find that physiological sensory perception alone(not the kind of 'perception' informed by language) is inadequate for thought and belief. A creature can perceive something without drawing correlations between it and something else. Such things are not meaningful/significant to a language less creature.

For the record, the Wiktionary definition is what everyday notions of trust entail. It is a long standing wiki page, after all. — javra

The definition, as it was written, led to the conclusion that a vehicle trusts it's parts and the people who maintain/built them.

That is prima facie evidence that that definition is unacceptable, regardless of how long it's been a Wikipedia page...

The dog can sit on the treat intentionally as a means of gathering resources without ever needing to consider the other dogs' mental ongoings...

If non-linguistic belief is correlations drawn between different things such that it presupposes its own correspondence to fact/reality then this belief will be acquired, hence learned, via the different things that become correlated. The belief then “comes about”. And unless lesser animals’ beliefs are always fully devoid of error, there must then be a means by which well-grounded beliefs attain this property in their initial formation.

You seem to however insist otherwise. — javra

Not really. I think that you're making it more complex than it need be.

Drawing correlations is thought and belief formation. Being well grounded, on my view, means having sufficient reason to believe... being warranted. I think it is a mistake to call this a 'property' of belief. It adds unnecessary complications...

A language less creature can learn that touching fire causes pain/discomfort by virtue of touching fire for the first time. That creature's belief is not that "fire hurts when touched" or that "fire causes pain/discomfort". Those are our reports of that creature's mental ongoings(belief). They can be accurate enough descriptions without being equivalent in content. They must be in order for us to sensibly talk about it.

The creature's belief cannot consist of propositional content. Propositions aren't meaningful to the creature. I referred to this earlier, when cautioning about what need be kept in consideration when reporting upon belief that is not existentially dependent upon language.

The creature draws a correlation between it's own behaviour(touching fire) and what happened afterwards(the onset of pain). That is thought/belief formation that is not existentially dependent upon language. The creature's belief consists of the correlation. The belief is existentially dependent upon the content of the correlation itself(touching fire and pain). All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. The fire becomes significant to the creature by virtue of belief formation. The creature attributes meaning by virtue of drawing these correlations.

Regarding whether or not this particular example of belief is well grounded...

What better reason is there to attribute/recognize causality?

You, however, have not provided a single interpretation of what belief is. Describing that a belief about belief is not the belief itself does not define what you mean by belief. Give it a go. What is belief to you? — javra

All thought and belief consists of mental correlations drawn between different things.

I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about.
— javra

Are you asking me to use my own philosophical position to offer an alternative account of the dog's behaviour? — creativesoul

That conversation hinges upon what counts as deception. I would deny that the dog deliberately sets out to trick another dog.

I would also like to learn of your views regarding dogs' deception and the nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about. — javra

Are you asking me to use my own philosophical position to offer an alternative account of the dog's behaviour?

"The nature by which well-grounded-ness comes about" is an odd phrasing. Again, it presupposes that being well grounded is something that happens after thought/belief formation. At the language less level there is no arguing for one's own belief. There is no act of justification.

Some belief on the language less level is well grounded upon it's initial formation. It doesn't make sense to talk about these beliefs in terms of how their well-grounded-ness 'comes about', unless my answer satisfies that query...

If the extrapolation is valid, then trust can be non-linguistic, genetically inherited, and does at all times affirm (else, makes firm within the respective mind) that which is true—but this without a necessary conscious understanding of the relation implied by notions of truth as we linguistically express it. Trust's contents, then, form the given belief. — javra

No.

If the extrapolation is valid, then it follows from it's premisses. That does not make it true. The definition has consequences that are unacceptable. Therefore, the definition is unacceptable. The definition is a premiss of the extrapolation. False premisses cannot validly lead to true conclusions...

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.
— creativesoul

On what grounds do you affirm this? — javra

On the ground that any and sensible notions of trust must include - in some fundamental sense - what our everyday notions of trust include.

Trust: (1) confidence in or reliance on some person or quality.
— Wiktionary

From this I extrapolate the following as a cogent facet of trust: To act and/ or react (either physically or mentally such as via intentions) to something being ontic devoid of rationality for the given something in fact being ontic is, in itself, a process of trust. The quality one here has confidence in or reliance on is property of being ontic.

On what grounds would one disagree with this extrapolation? — javra

The same grounds as above, and on the ground that that definition inevitably leads to aburd consequences(reductio ad absurdum).

The performance of a vehicle relies on all sorts of different qualities and people. It does not trust.

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like...
— creativesoul

For the record, though I too hold an ego, I have no problem in being shown how my beliefs could be improved upon or else how they are wrong. — javra

All belief presupposes it's own correspondence somewhere along the line. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of presupposing it's own correspondence.

All belief is meaningful to the creature. All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between the two. Positing belief at the genotype level is to posit belief that is inherently incapable of being meaningful to the creature.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language...
— creativesoul

Can you provide, or point to, a concrete example of such belief-that which is not propositional? — javra

No. It cannot be done. Nor does it need to be. The question doesn't help.

We're looking to take proper account of something that is not existentially dependent upon language. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which exists prior to language cannot consist of propositional content.

I can provide you with an example of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. It will not follow the belief-that format. It will put the otherwise useful knowledge gleaned from that approach to good use. The belief will consist of correlations drawn between different things. It will presuppose it's own correspondence to fact/reality. It will effectively attribute meaning. It will be meaningful to the creature.

OK, chap.

To first get this out of the way:

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name...
— creativesoul

I've provided definitions for all belief types I've utilized and support. As to defining belief in general, I’ve already done that as well: trust-that. If you have objections to any of my definitions then so state with reasons for your objection. Otherwise, this post of yours to me looks like an example of spin. — javra

From earlier because it is relevant here...

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted... — javra

This seems to be the basis for the belief that approach. It certainly lends support to the method, regardless of whether it is intentional or accidental. Typically, when we talk about one believing something, we're saying that one believes that X is true; is the case at hand; is the way things were, are, and/or will be; corresponds to fact/reality; etc. Let X be a statement or proposition.

That is all perfectly understandable and acceptable at the level of reporting upon belief. Here, the content of our report is propositional. X is equal to some proposition/belief statement. This method shows us that belief presupposes it's own truth, and that adding "is true" to a belief statement adds nothing meaningful to it. Here, it makes perfect sense to draw an equation between trust and belief, for the two terms are easily interchangeable without self-contradiction.

However, we are talking about belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. Such belief can be reported upon. Our reports will have propositional content. The kind of belief that we're reporting upon cannot. Belief that is not existentially dependent upon language must consist of something other than propositional content, even though our report of it must. All this must be kept in mind when using the belief that approach as a means to take account of belief that is not existentially dependent upon language...





How does a creature believe/trust something that it has never thought about?

You've actually posited trust/belief at the genotype level of biological complexity. That would require that the content of what's being trusted(belief on your view) is something that exists in it's entirety at that level and can transcend the believer on a physical level through reproduction. That's a big problem for your notion of belief for all sorts of reasons. We could explicate those consequences if you'd like...





Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity, and there is more than one kind of familiarity. All familiarity requires thought and belief.

Familiarity requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is trusted. Trusting the content of thought/belief cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level.

Here, the two terms are not so freely interchangeable. Trust is not equivalent to belief.

Familiarity requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is not trusted. So it is clear that trust and belief are distinct.

Trust is most certainly being built during the formative years of initial language acquisition. Contentment and familiarity with one's caregivers. That is prior to language acquisition. That seems to be where knowingly relying upon something(trust) comes from...

One learns how to talk. Necessarily, one comes to know one's first language without a language. — unenlightened

Yes, all of what language acquisition requires in order to begin happening exists prior to and/or emerges simultaneously with language acquisition itself. We can acquire knowledge of these things...

Skills, for example, can clearly be independent or not fully dependent on language. Babies function before they can speak. — Baden

Yes, some functions/functioning happens prior to language. We can acquire knowledge of such functioning...

One way to acquire knowledge of orange juice is to taste the orange juice -- then you'd know how the orange juice tastes. — Moliere

How would we go about reasoning that knowing how the orange juice tastes is knowledge of something that exists prior to language? Orange juice certainly is not existentially dependent upon language. The act of tasting orange juice is not existentially dependent upon language either. So a language less creature can drink orange juice. Does drinking orange juice provide knowledge of how it tastes? Lots of creatures can drink orange juice.

Seems we need a criterion.

Glad to hear. Still, I have no interest in rereading the entire thread on a daily basis to see which newly lengthened posts require my re-reading due to me not being informed of the lengthy additions in a timely manner—and this after I’ve already taken time to reply to them. Ya know? I get it. It was a lack of ideal tact—something which I obviously lack as well. Nevertheless, that and a lot that I’ve addressed and/or asked which has not been addressed in turn presently leaves me wanting to leave our discussions as-is. — javra

That's too bad. I'm not sure which posts I've altered after you replied to an extent that would've changed anything you may have gleaned from it. I certainly haven't attempted to do anything deceptive.

As a measure of good faith(a gesture of good-will), I woud be glad to address anything that you've written that you do not feel has been given due attention.

My former belief that this debate between us has been one of honestly reasoned enquiry has now eroded. — javra

This presupposes that you believe that I'm not speaking sincerely. That's too bad. I am many things, but dishonest ain't wunuvem. Tactless??? Sure. Having 'no filter'??? Certainly. Dishonest? Only on very very rare occasions...

You've conflated your thoughts about me with me...

What makes it new?

That was a crosspost from my seat. I'll leave my latest post untouched.

Thank you for the time and attention.

Time for a new thread...

I've enjoyed this one for the most part. Unfortunately though, I am left with the faint impression that I've done it yet again. I apologize if I've caused you to take a fighting stance.

Innate beliefs, learned beliefs, metacognitive beliefs, unreflective beliefs...

The number of different kinds of belief is growing quickly.

Remove all of the individual particulars(that which makes them all different from one another) and then set out what it is that they all have in common that makes them all what they are... beliefs... aside - that is - from our just calling them all by the same name...

↪creativesoul

Are we of a sudden skipping back to the issue of pre-linguistic justification? — javra

Oh no. Pardon my spaciness...

Upon perusing the thread... I just found that that question had went otherwise unanswered. It deserved to be answered.

The following bears repeating...

Here's something that looks quite promising...

"Un-reflective belief"...

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet this criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief. That criterion is evidence of our knowledge about unreflective belief. That criterion needs to be properly accounted for. I say "accounted for" here quite intentionally. Because we are reporting upon thought and belief, we must keep in mind that our account can be wrong when it comes to that which is not existentially dependent upon our account. Un-reflective belief is one such thing.

We're reporting upon that which existed - in it's entirety - prior to our account/report.

Unreflective belief is a particular specifiable kind of belief. Our knowledge of it is existentially dependent upon written language. It is not. To be a kind of belief, is to be one of a plurality of different kinds of the same thing. This necessarily presupposes a universally applicable and/or extant set or group of common denominators. These can be thought of as individual elemental constituents. Perhaps "ingredients" is best? Each of these are an irrevocable element, for they all play their own role in all belief... statements thereof notwithstanding.

So again... as always, we look to set out a criterion...

What counts as belief? What is the criterion which, when satisfied by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for saying that that candidate is belief? This criterion must be met by any and all sensible; consistent; coherent usage of the term "belief". I say that that criterion must set out the aforementioned group of common denominators that all belief share, and that none of these ingredients can be existentially dependent upon written language, for all reflection is to think about one's own thought/belief, and that is existentially dependent upon written language. — creativesoul

Prior to sensibly discussing unreflective belief, we must first have some clue what that is. I'm offering a method, which if followed, provides the strongest possible justificatory ground for arriving at just such a criterion.

I'm waiting on your criteria.

While I'm waiting, please remember to answer this issue:

The unanswered question remains: How do learned beliefs become well-grounded? Are some learned beliefs well-grounded and others not solely due to happenstance? Or Is there a third alternative you have in mind that explains why some learned beliefs are well grounded and others are not?
— javra — javra

What makes a "learned belief" different than other kinds of belief? More importantly what makes them similar enough to still qualify as belief?

What are you waiting for?

It strikes me as putting the cart before the horse. Else as tautological and hence as much ado about nothing: "everything this is an unreflective belief as per some definition qualifies as being an unreflective belief per stated definition

If not, explain. — javra

Explain what? Tautological is a derogatory charge meant to be applied when discussing purely inductive reasoning(arguing by definitional fiat). The method which you're calling 'tautological' is deductive, and is no such thing. It's common sense based, has the strongest possible justificatory ground, and works from the fewest unprovable assumptions.

I suspect that you're aware of this...

I'm working upon the explanatory power.

You’ll have to better explain your stance... — javra

Very intrigued, but relaxed. A piqued interest. A conversation long waiting to happen. Seated.

:wink:

Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible. — javra

Innate beliefs are a kind of belief that you're proposing/asserting exist. What makes them belief? What is the criterion which, when met by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for claiming that that candidate is belief?

Re-read that post, if you will. Everything you need to know in order to agree or disagree is there.

Here's something that looks quite promising...

"Un-reflective belief"...

I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet this criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief. That criterion needs to be properly accounted for. I say "accounted for" here quite intentionally. Because we are reporting upon thought and belief, we must keep in mind that our account can be wrong when it comes to that which is not existentially dependent upon our account. Un-reflective belief is one such thing. We can also get it right.

Unreflective belief is a particular specifiable kind of belief. Our knowledge of it is existentially dependent upon written language. It is not. To be a kind of belief, is to be one of a plurality of different kinds of the same thing. This necessarily presupposes a universally applicable and/or extant set or group of common denominators. These can be thought of as individual elemental constituents. Perhaps "ingredients" is best? Each of these are an irrevocable element, for they all play their own role in all belief... statements thereof notwithstanding.

So again... as always, we look to set out a criterion...

What counts as belief? What is the criterion which, when satisfied by a candidate, offers us the strongest possible justificatory ground for saying that that candidate is belief? This criterion must be met by any and all sensible; consistent; coherent usage of the term "belief". I say that that criterion must set out the aforementioned group of common denominators that all belief share, and that none of these ingredients can be existentially dependent upon written language, for all reflection is to think about one's own thought/belief, and that is existentially dependent upon written language.

What are your thoughts on such a method?

What criterion for what counts as "un-reflective belief" are you working from/with?