...If I think I am right saying abortion is wrong, how would there be a real effort in determining what is true or false about that belief? — Blue Lux
The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.
1h — creativesoul
We're talking about, and fleshing out the details for a criterion; what counts as thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul
Enjoi your weekend, my friend. — creativesoul
False analogy. — creativesoul
So the relevant question is...
Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?
I think not. — creativesoul
There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices. — creativesoul
A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief. — creativesoul
I actually I do agree, but would add that we may not ever know if it is actually ontic, because of this liability.
— Cheshire
The proposition that there is nothing ontic directly entails the following: — javra
Well, there's certainly a difference between "nothing ontic" and lacking the knowledge that a thing is ontic. So, the explanation that follows doesn't really fit the claim I'm making here. — Cheshire
Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided. — javra
In other words, your use of knowledge here is that of an absolute, or infallible, knowledge. That "we may not ever know if it is actually ontic"—for example—is only a problem when one believes such infallible knowledge can be had. Come to believe that we cannot hold infallible knowledge in practice for anything, and this problem fully dissolves, for we then can and do fallibly know "if its actually ontic"--and no other form of knowledge is possible. — javra
I found your statement somewhat ambiguous and was doing my best to cover all the bases, just in case. — javra
Implicit in this sentence, hence proposition, hence thought is an assumption of held ideal knowledge. If it weren’t, I don't see how this would be an issue. — javra
We do operationally know when we are in possession of objective (which I interpret to mean what I previously specified as “ontic”) truth. This, again, because our beliefs of what is ontically true are well justified to us and, in the process, not falsified as in fact so being objectively true. But as to holding an ideal knowledge of this, this cannot be had till infallible truths and infallible justifications can be provided — javra
P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not... — creativesoul
This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about. — creativesoul
I still disagree, but I'm starting understand why...I think. To dodge a bit of confusion, I'm reading [absolute, infallible, ontic, ideal, and objective] knowledge to be the same thing. — Cheshire
I disagree that it is a problem to not know when our knowledge infallible, so I don't see any reason to subscribe to the notion we can't have it — Cheshire
I'm reading "operationally" to mean subjectively or non-ideal; Really, the above sounds contradictory even though I'm pretty certain it isn't intended to be read that way. It's the "..so objectively true" that I'm confused about. — Cheshire
1. A person may know something objectively true and objectively know when they know it is objectively true. — Cheshire
2. You can not 'subjectively/operationally' know when something is objectively true by definition. — Cheshire
P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not...
— creativesoul
To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice. — javra
How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language. — javra
Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken). — creativesoul
This presupposes that belief does not begin already being well-grounded. — creativesoul
What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul
Innate beliefs can be argued well-grounded due to evolutionary processes upon genotype appearing in phenotype. This is their means for being well-grounded, yet fallible. — javra
You’ll have to better explain your stance... — javra
I believe that there is such a thing. I'll go first. As always, we look to set out a minimalist criterion, which when met by some candidate or other, serves as a measure of determination. All things that meet the criterion qualify as being an unreflective belief.
What are your thoughts on such a method? — creativesoul
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