How does a belief become well-grounded in the absence of actively manifesting language. — javra

This presupposes that belief cannot begin well-grounded. That was a very helpful... and thus good... question, by the way!

Cheers!

I realize that there are significant differences in our taxonomies/frameworks. I'm trying to write in such a way as to avoid using terms that you define much differently than I do. It's proving difficult at times, bit I do know a 'trick' that I have yet to have performed here. We may, and I suspect must, get into how we've arrived at some of these definitions/conceptions/criterion as a means for assessing warrant, should we want to argue about which framework is superior and why/how. However, that's not necessary unless we want to argue about that stuff. I do not, at least not without provocation, and you do not seem to be looking to provoke... so... neither will I.

:wink:

I no longer have the impression that you're working from/with methodological naturalism. Of course, you're surely aware that I am, or at least I make a very concerted effort at finding the simplest adequate explanation possible. I'm also neither a monist nor a dualist. Nor am I whatever those people call themselves who've (mis)attributed meaning to Spinoza and arrived at all life being conscious in some minimalist sense. Are you one of those people? Oh yeah, pardon my forgetfulness and candor here... Now I remember... panpsychists. Your repeated assertion that you grant awareness to all life lends itself to such a view.

What follows is what I believe we agree upon. I'd like to check though, and then perhaps set out the disagreements as well, and then take it from there. That ought make this more like a real worthwhile discussion...

Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon language(written or spoken).

Hmmm...

:rofl:

Care to add to this? I'm less certain than I realized after re-reading things...

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not...
— creativesoul

To some degree this is already so. But, yea, it would be nice. — javra

To add a bit to this...

This topic(thought and belief) is my forte, my life's work(in philosophy) as it were. Roughly put, I've found considerable reason to believe that the whole of philosophy has gotten thought/belief wrong. The consequences of not drawing the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief manifest themselves within nearly all of the greats I'm aware of, all the way up until today.

The evidence of this is clear. Convention still has it that belief content is propositional. Your claim that awareness entails some form of belief-that follows convention in this way. The belief-that approach is very useful in helping determine things about belief statements, and positive assertions in general. Hell, speaking in general for that matter. Namely, what statements presuppose and even a bit about the attitude of the speaker as well as a bit about meaning.

The approach lends itself and/or leads to reductionist and redundancy accounts of truth(although I reject those on the grounds of invalid reasoning/conclusion as a result of conflating "is true" with truth). They all still are capable of helping us to better understand ourselves and the world around us by virtue of having a good grasp upon thought, belief, truth, meaning, and how they all work together.

I do not think that any major philosopher has gotten it all wrong, per se, regarding thought and belief. Rather, it is my contention that no one has ever drawn and maintained the aforementioned distinction. The proof of that is everywhere in philosophy.

So, back to the current discussion...

This notion of "unreflective awareness" allows and/or must admit of a creature being aware of something that it's never thought about.

Just read your most recent reply to me...

I think we're making progress, which is saying something. It's not so much that we're in agreement, but rather that the point(s) of divergence is becoming clearer. That is, the points where we choose alternative explanations for the same thing...

I want to do that reply justice...

I'm working on it.

:smile:

P.S. I'm still not quite sure that we completely disagree. I mean, our viewpoints still may be commensurate with one another to much greater extent than not...

What sort of thing could a meaning be? — Banno

A correlation drawn between at least two things.

Words are a part of the correlation. All attribution of meaning regarding words is drawing a correlation between the words and something else.

Witt and the speech act theorists seized upon the different ways that we attribute meaning. Clearly more than just referential.

Yes, one can easily say almost anything.

What doesn't make sense?

Our discussion has gotten off the OP. That is clear because we're no longer discussing it's relevance to the OP. However, it is still relevant to the OP. Because it is still relevant to the OP, but we're not discussing that relevance, it makes perfect sense to say what I did.

What's 'this'? What doesn't make sense?

...If I think I am right saying abortion is wrong, how would there be a real effort in determining what is true or false about that belief? — Blue Lux

You're talking about belief regarding what's considered to be acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. "Wrong" here isn't equivalent to having false belief. Rather, it's equivalent to agreeing or disagreeing with standards of moral belief(codes of conduct).

None of this is applicable to a language less creature. Those creatures cannot have these sorts of beliefs.

You're missing the point.

We're talking about, and fleshing out the details for a criterion; what counts as thought and belief that is not existentially dependent upon language.

The conversation has gotten of the OP. It still applies. None of us are applying it.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief. — creativesoul

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. — javra

False analogy.

You've offered purported examples of things that one can be aware of without being aware that it has thought or belief about those things. What's being discussed here - what you've objected to - is what it takes to be aware that one is right/wrong.

So the relevant question is...

Can any creature be aware that it is wrong/right about those things without being aware that it has true/false belief about those things?

I think not.

There's a remarkable difference between being right/wrong and being aware of that. Being wrong/right is having true/false belief. Given that, being aware that one is wrong/right is being aware that one has true/false belief. Nothing else suffices.

A language less creature can form and have true/false belief without being aware of it. It can experience unexpected events(and confusion) as a result. I'm not arguing against the notion of a non-linguistic creature having true/false belief. Thus, I'm agreeing that such a creature can be right/wrong. I'm arguing that such a creature cannot be aware that it is right/wrong without being aware that it has true/false belief.

You've not offered a valid objection to that. I'm fully aware that you disagree. However, your disagreement alone does not make my position erroneous. Nor does your position on the matter serve to be very convincing when it is stated without supporting argument. That's gratuitous assertion, and obviously unacceptable as a means of objection.

I'd like to not reply until after this weekend my time. — javra

Take your time. I'll be much less wordy in what I offer between now and then. It seems we've reached a point that we can discuss where our differences lie. I want to do that in the best possible way.

Enjoi your weekend, my friend.

You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief.
— creativesoul

OK

P3 is to me not true/right/correct.

By analogy: I can be aware of time (as can most any lesser mammal, for example) without needing to have an awareness about me having a belief about time. Same with space. Same with quantity and rudimentary arithmetic. Same with the law of noncontradiction. Same with values we term “bad” and “good”. Don’t tell me we humans now have a conclusively definitive understanding of what time, space, mathematics, laws of thought, and the meta-ethical reality of bad/good are … Nevertheless, we now as adults—just as we did as infants—hold an awareness of them … one that does not existentially require a belief/thought about our belief/thought prior to the very awareness being present.

Same type of pre-linguistic, pre-meta-cognitive awareness can be had in relation to error/non-error in manners a priori to an awareness about the belief that one can be erroneous/non-erroneous. — javra

That seems to be where(and/or what) the bulk of our disagreements rest(upon).

Basically giving a shout-out to good quality research in the fields of psychology / cognition. — javra

Yeah well... without access to the details of the experiment, I cannot know if it's good quality or not. Do you have access to the details?

Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. — creativesoul

Do you agree with these two claims?

There are two veins of thought here...

One about the experiments, the other about what awareness takes...

I want to continue, but keep them in separate posts. I'd like for you to continue here. Would you, could you, in a box? Would you, could you, with a fox? On a boat, with a goat?

Don't mind my silliness. It's a coping mechanism. :wink:

I want to continue, but want you to trust that it's worth it. It is to me.

Having both engaged in independent psychological (cognitive science) experiments (particularly, in the importance of eyes v. mouth in human non-linguistic communication concerning emotions) as well as in a neuroscience lab (experiments on zebra finches learned capacities to recognize and produce song patterns via brain lesion to critical areas in chicks, etc.)—both some twenty years ago—my personal experience illustrates to me that well done psych. research can hold far, far fewer confounding variables and, therefore, far greater statistical integrity than the often termed “hard sciences” of biology/neuroscience. Take it or leave it. They’re nevertheless my experiences. — javra

Look javra I can more than appreciate that experience, and don't take the "soft science" comment personally, it wasn't about you. It was about the fact that there are several equally compelling equally valid explanations for any given set of non linguistic behaviours. Hence... the crucial need for a sound philosophical approach to what counts as thought and belief, particularly what counts as non-linguistic thought and belief.

Surely you can understand my trepidation regarding the conclusions in that article, given that I do not have access to the details of the experiments performed?

An awareness for the capacity to be right/wrong requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. Thinking about one's own thought and belief requires the ability to become aware of, isolate/identify, and subsequently further consider one's own pre-existing thought and belief. That requires written language. Thus, an awareness of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken as well as an awareness of the capacity to be right/correct requires written language.

A language less creature does not have what it takes to be aware of the capacity to be wrong/mistaken or right/correct.





You've disagreed with the first claim above, which was being used as a premiss. It needs set out so that you can address it's ground, prior to it's being used as a premiss.

p1. In order to be right/wrong, one first has to have true/false belief about something or other.
p2. Having belief does not require language.
C1. One can have true and false belief(one can be right/wrong) without language.
p3. To be aware that one is right/wrong is to be aware that one has belief.
p4. Being aware that one has belief has - as the 'object' of awareness/consideration - the belief itself.
C2. Being aware that one has belief is thinking about belief.

There is a remarkable difference between noting differences and noting errors.

I would be willing to bet that there is nothing in either experiment or study to justify saying that the dog noticed an error rather than saying that it noticed a difference between the equations it was presented with. Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. Again, I do not have the studies or experiments on hand, however, I would be willing to bet that the dog drew correlations between some symbol or sign and a quantity. — creativesoul

Do you not even grant these points?

Hey, I’m trusting the info based on what I take to be the fact that the information on both sciencenews and Wikipedia would not be up there were it to be uncorroborated, merely anecdotal, or hearsay. Both sources heavily rely upon peer-review, after all. — javra

There's a reason why psychology is called a 'soft' science, and an appeal to authority is rather unconvincing, particularly nowadays given the way science is funded...

It's just now getting to the important bits...

Ah well, if you ever want to do some philosophy here on this topic, I'll gladly re-join.

We've not even gotten to the point where we know what the disagreements are.

...mental capacity to distinguish the category of right/correct/etc. from the category of wrong/incorrect/etc. — javra

I've yet to see you present an argument for this capacity to be innate. You asserted it multiple times. That is to presuppose precisely what needs argued for.

I've presented an argument which negates that ability, and situates it at a minimum level of written language. That argument has not been directly addressed, although you've openly expressed your disagreement with it, and even 'strongly' disagreed with it calling it "in error" or words to that affect/effect.

That's not acceptable to me at this juncture...

Can't say when my next reply will be. But I would like to focus on the two empirical data addressed: that of dogs' capacity to discern error in 1 + 1 = 1 and that of dogs' having a very rudimentary theory of mind (more specifically, both belief and thought as regards other minds when these other minds are deceived). — javra

I would need to see the actual studies and experiments that these conclusions were based upon in order to offer a more informed opinion of the reliability of those conclusions. However, some things can be said without my having access to that.

There is a remarkable difference between noting differences and noting errors.

I would be willing to bet that there is nothing in either experiment or study to justify saying that the dog noticed an error rather than saying that it noticed a difference between the equations it was presented with. Recognizing differences doesn't equate to recognizing errors.

Counting is not the same thing as recognizing different quantities. Again, I do not have the studies or experiments on hand, however, I would be willing to bet that the dog drew correlations between some symbol or sign and a quantity.

That said...

It seems that there is a fundamental difference between our views here. It may prove to be irreconcilable. In addition, you've now presented a strawman argument on multiple occasions. You've adamantly rejected things that I've not claimed. It is always better to actually present the argument and then clearly express which premisses or conclusions you disagree with and offer some valid objection for that disagreement.

I do not want to get into yet another discussion where one participant is criticizing another's position/argument without first granting the terms. That is the bane of philosophy.

Trust is most certainly being built during the formative years of initial language acquisition. Contentment and familiarity with one's caregivers. That is prior to language acquisition. That seems to be where knowingly relying upon something comes from...

Thought and belief are indistinguishable at this level. The only difference between the two happens on a metacognitive level. Non linguistic creatures are incapable of deliberately suspending their judgement about whether or not to believe something. Being able to do that requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. It is a precautionary measure that can only be taken by a creature with written language that has become painfully aware of it's own fallibility.

Aside from thought like that... there is no difference between thought and belief.

How does one trust something that it has never thought about? Your framework admits of this, doesn't it?

Trust requires a remarkable 'sense' of familiarity.

Familiarity(the kind that produces trust) requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is trusted. This familiarity cannot be had if innate fear takes hold of the creature. One cannot trust that which aggravates instinctual/innate fear, at least not one at a language less level.

Here, the two terms are not so freely interchangeable.

Familiarity(the kind that destroys trust) also requires a succession of the same or similar enough belief about that which is not trusted.

Well, again, for me to believe is to trust that; and a belief is the contents of that which is trusted... — javra

This seems to be the basis for the belief that approach. It certainly lends support to the method, regardless of whether it is intentional or accidental.

Typically, when we talk about one believing something, we're saying that one believes that X is true; is the case at hand; is the way things were, are, and/or will be; corresponds to fact/reality; etc.

Let X be a statement or proposition.

Here, it makes perfect sense to draw an equation between trust and belief, for the two terms are easily interchangeable without self-contradiction.

Also, can you provide any example of a belief whose contents are not trusted to be by the respective being? Else, can you explain where the difference lies between trusting that something is and believing that sometimes is? — javra

Well, I've already set out my position on this... all belief is existentially dependent upon and consists of correlations. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content.

On my view, the belief content is the content of correlation. This seems to be in agreement with your framework, aside from the equation you've drawn between trust and belief, which causes me pause...



Trust, to me, is pivotal though. I mean, we both place tremendous value upon trust. On my view, it is best understood as an unavoidable human condition arising from our being interdependent social creatures.

By my lights, you're attempting to situate trust into the timeline before it can be rightfully accounted for. The criterion for it seems to be so minimal that trust could be had by a creature that is completely incapable of doubting anything at all.

That seems problematic.

...nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor. — Blue Lux

I just thought about this another way...

If offering an accurate account of nonlinguistic belief by means of art, music, poetry, and/or metaphor qualifies as 'capturing nonlinguistic belief', then I may actually agree...

I mean, I could put my own words to music or in poetic verse...

Metaphor can't do it though.

Art has a broad enough definition of what qualifies as art than I could envision some forms of art(music and poetry) doing it too...

Music and poetry, art and metaphor is not conventional language. There are aspects that are expressed in these things that transcend a linguistic expression, thus they become poetry. Poetry is not language. Lots of poetry, grammatically and with regard to standards of language in an essay for instance, is completely nonsensical if viewed this way. One can say that these things express a communicability, but definitely not a language, for a language has an organized structure of sign and meaning, including bits of an organized method. This is nonexistent in poetry, art and music. There is music theory... But you won't find Beethoven in music theory. — Blue Lux

Music, poetry, and metaphor are definitely language. Saying otherwise is just plain asinine. Art is a social construct that is existentially dependent upon language.

None of these things contradict what I've claimed, nor negate it. If you believe otherwise, then that alone is adequate evidence to conclude that you've not quite understood the position I'm arguing for.

All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things.
— creativesoul

I don't know that I agree with this. For instance, in Kant's contention that existence is not a predicate. — Blue Lux

Make the argument, we'll discuss it further. Otherwise... hand-waving and gratuitous assertions won't do here.

A complete aside...

But if this minimalist notion of thought and belief sets out what is the case prior to our setting it out, then the rightful application of it will produce consequences decimating many a philosophical 'problem' across a very broad scope/range...

A furthered honing for the criterion could and ought be had by virtue of setting out the things between which the creature makes the connections...

Adequacy matters.

An amoeba...

Mmmmm....

Have not gained enough confidence to clearly draw a line in the sand. However...

It does not seem to have the physiological makeup. Stimulus response satisfies the avoidance of danger and the gathering of resources. I've no supporting evidence nor argument for granting meaningful mental correlations that presuppose their own correspondence.

But to better understand: with the process of thinking in mind: can a thought, of itself, be defined as not necessarily consisting of a consciously understood abstraction (regardless of the degree of abstraction)? For instance, could we settle on correlations between percepts being an act of thinking? This would not require language nor consciously appraised abstractions. Still, the implications of so defining thought would then be fairly expansive (e.g., if an ameba can make correlations between its percepts than it would be engaged in an act of thought while eluding predators (e.g. bigger amebas) or while searching for prey. Amebas can easily be discerned to elude predators and search for prey—which takes a bit of autonomous order within an environmental uncertainty to accomplish—but I mention them because, obviously, they are rather “primitive” lifeforms.). I lean toward a more inclusive understanding/definition of thought and, therefore, thinking—again, favoring the outlook of gradation rather than that of division. But I’d like to know your general position as regards the nature of thought before I reply. — javra

We agree regarding the gradation aspect. That is particularly amenable for me with regard to initial thought formation and it's successive continuation all the way through the transformative correlations that only spoken language, written language, and then again, metacognition have the goods to deliver...

In order to remain sensible and have the strongest possible justificatory ground, all that we call "non linguistic thought and/or belief" must share the same basic elemental constituents with conventional notions of thought and/or belief statements. The groundwork is imperative.

All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon predication. All predication is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. All examples of thought and belief are existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things.

Given that all thought and belief is meaningful and presupposes truth(as correspondence) somewhere along the line, the presupposition of truth(as correspondence) and the attribution of meaning(being meaningful) seem to be irrevocable. They ought be considered as part of an adequate minimum, and thus need to be part of the criterion for thought and belief.

So, that's three different elemental constituents that have been identified. Namely... 1.being existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between things, 2.being meaningful, and 3.presupposing it's own correspondence.

All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon the existence of something to become a sign or symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing a mental correlation between the two. All such correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent qualification).

Pavlovs dog was clearly proven to have made a connection between the sound of a bell and satisfying innate hunger. Involuntary salivation. He drew a correlation and/or association between hearing a bell and what happened afterwards. That bell became significant to the dog solely by virtue of the attribution of meaning which led to clearly held belief about what may come... expectation.

A dog doesn’t hold a conscious understanding of “alternatives” regarding some given nor of “right and wrong”. Nevertheless, to the extent that intelligent creatures, dogs included, can become uncertain of givens, they will actively experience competing alternatives which they must choose between so as to resolve the uncertainty. — javra

To me, that's contradictory on it's face, therefore unacceptable. Choosing between competing alternatives is existentially dependent upon knowing of them. Knowing of competing alternatives is existentially dependent upon understanding them. To be more precise, this bit began with claims about a non linguistic creature being aware of it's own fallibility. That cannot happen.

Becoming aware of one's own fallibility is to become aware that one has false belief. Becoming aware that one has false belief requires one knowing that one has belief to begin with. Knowing that one has belief requires being able to think about one's own belief. Thinking about one's own belief requires identifying it and isolating it for further contemplation. Identifying, isolating, and further contemplating one's own belief requires written language.

Becoming aware of one's own fallibility is existentially dependent upon written language. A language less creature has none.

...if there is uncertainty about something, what other mechanism can be at play other than that of competing alternatives for what in fact is?

Uncertainty is the mechanism. It is fear based. A dog can have expectations. Those expectations can be jolted into fearful uncertainty(anxiety) about what's happening or what may be about to happen, by the unexpected happening and negatively affecting the 'sense' of familiarity that the dog had until then.

There is no need here for the dog to be aware that it had false belief, nor is it even possible.

Though I’d like to avoid metaphysical issues, I find I can’t address this properly without eventually mentioning something of metaphysics. To be relatively informal about it, there are metaphysics of sharp and absolute division pertaining to different life forms’ abilities and, on the other side, there are metaphysics of gradations. Doesn’t matter if its Richard Dawkins or many, but not all, Abrahamic fundamentalists, here there is a metaphysical divide between man and beast. I take the latter metaphysical position, one of gradation which, when sufficiently extended, results in sometimes expansive leaps of ability. I also don’t approach things from a physicalist account; pertinent here is that to me there is a non-subjective objectivity at play in reality at large: justness—this just as much as the laws of thought—is to me an aspect of this non-subjective reality which is equally impartial to all discrete givens. Why this is important: in the latter position, we do not learn of justness conceptually in order to sense right and wrong, no more than we learn of formal laws of thought in order to operate via laws of thought. It is not something acquired from language but, instead, it is a universal facet of mind which language expresses, however imperfectly. Here there is no absolute metaphysical division between man and beast; both are, in a very trivial way, equal facets and constituents of nature. It is not that a less intelligent being is metaphysically apart from the laws of thought, or from the universal of justness. It is only that less intelligent beings are in due measure that much less capable of forming abstractions about these universals—which, as metaphysical universals, concretely dwell within all of us (with or without our conscious understanding of them) as innate aspects of what, or who, we are as sentient beings.

So, potential debates galore on this issue—and the issue can sprawl in myriad directions. I’ve highlighted some of my beliefs, though, only to better present my disposition. — javra

All good.

Differences are certainly between our views. However, I'm not interested in fleshing those out unless they matter directly to the topic at hand. While I do often enjoy argument for it's own sake, not here, not now, and not with you about this topic. That said, we are much more alike than unalike here.

You may want to know that I reject many an inadequate historical dichotomy. The objective/subjective one notwithstanding. All those that I reject I do so on the same ground. They cannot take account of that which is both and/or neither...

To be blunt about it, I've no interest in metaphysics for it's own sake. None whatsoever.

nonlinguistic belief can be captured in art, music, poetry and metaphor.
— Blue Lux

Of course. Very good points — javra

Come on javra. Those points miss the point entirely. Non linguistic here means thought and belief that exists in it's entirety prior to language. It does not mean unspoken thought and belief after language acquisition...

Besides that, music is language, poetry is language, metaphor is language, art... well who determines what counts as art? Does that determination require language in order for it to happen?

Surely.

None of that is language less... None.

I find that you’re thinking of right/wrong in too abstract a manner—as only relatively mature humans can do. Yet very young children sense when they do wrong things (cheat, act aggressively, etc.) just as much as when they do good things (overlooking the more fuzzy grey areas). What’s more, so do dogs. — javra

Nah. I'm talking about what a language less creature is capable of. With regard to a language less creature's thought and belief, they are rudimentary, very basic level simple correlations drawn between things that exist in their entirety prior to being a part of the correlation. Then there are the more complex products of the correlations themselves(when they become part of another correlation).

A sure sign that we've gotten something wrong here - when discussing non linguistic thought and belief - is if and when it is too complicated. Simply put, non linguistic thought and belief cannot be that complicated.

Regarding my earlier criticism that you're referring to in the above quote...

I'm talking very specifically - as precisely as possible - about what it takes to become aware of one's own fallibility, which is a much 'cleaner' way to say "become aware of one's capacity to be right/wrong". I offered an argument for the position I hold. It's been sorely neglected. That argument is based upon something very important. The distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief that the whole of philosophy has neglected to draw and maintain...

Regarding the bit about morality. Morality is all about what counts as acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Right and wrong in a moral/immoral sense as compared contrasted to a true/false sense.

The children you speak of are in the process of acquiring moral belief. Dogs do no such thing. The commonality between the two is that both dogs and young children will draw correlations between what they do and what happens afterwards.

I'm going to take that last post in chunks...