...your contention that something prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent on it is false in terms of experience... — Blue Lux

Saying it doesn't make it so.

Experience at t1 is prior to experience at t2. The former cannot be existentially dependent upon the latter.

The former would be throwness if the person has yet to have begun thinking about his/her own belief. The latter experience could be when one is beginning to question one's own belief.

↪creativesoul Poorly written? — Blue Lux

Yes. And that continues, I see.

Set out the difference between belief and knowledge.

That will set you straight.

You have never known something and then later found out it was incorrect? — Cheshire

No.

I have believed something and later found out that I was wrong. I believed that things were a certain way, and it turned out that they were not.

... Knowledge intends to be true. — Cheshire

Knowledge is not the sort of thing that is capable of intention.

Oh, I would say it was knowledge and had since been falsified. It doesn't make sense to have falsified knowledge... — Cheshire

There's the nonsense and/or self-contradiction.

:wink:

...we cannot tell the difference between what we actually know and what we think we know until it's proven wrong. — Cheshire

Sure we can. It's the difference between belief and knowledge. The former presupposes it's own truth, and the latter is true.

According to you, they are still knowledge.
— creativesoul

Did you mean to say this the way you said it? — Cheshire

Yup.

I do not agree with Sam regarding what counts as justified belief. It does not require being argued for(the act of justification) on my view.
— creativesoul

It has to arguable, but doesn't have to have been argued? — Cheshire

No.

It always has to be well-grounded, and it doesn't always have to be argued for.

How's that?

:wink:

"The earth is flat,"

"The sun revolves around the earth."

Both of those were once thought to be true, but never were. They were called knowledge because they were believed to be true, and the evidence at our disposal at the time supported the ideas.

According to you, they are still knowledge.

You're conflating being justified true belief with being called such. The two are not one in the same.

The president has never been Tom Cruise.

"Tom Cruise is president" is false.

According to your logic, we can know that statement.

Need it be?

You claim that one can know a false statement.

That is nonsense.

No one has any problem saying knowledge is true, but suggest it can also be false... — Cheshire

The suggestion is nonsense, and leads to self-contradiction.

I do not agree with Sam regarding what counts as justified belief. It does not require being argued for(the act of justification) on my view.

Conflating between truth and belief...

Knowledge 'ought to' be true, but often it is not... — Cheshire

If it ain't true, then it ain't knowledge.

Change my mind. — Cheshire

JTB is all about how to differentiate between knowledge claims...

I'm not following Banno. How does the cartoon show that the thread topic is reducible to how we use words?

Being happy is not being depressed.

Being sad is not being at ease.

How does one measure the morality of such a choice?

Look at the consequences of everyone doing the same thing. Would the world be a better place?

That's a good start.

Everyone with a complex enough belief system has ideas about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Some are better than others. All instantiate morality. Returning something accidentally acquired is admirable behaviour, particularly when one suspects that the item in question has value, meaning, and/or some other type of remarkable significance to the rightful owner.

One who finds oneself in the accidental physical possession of something that does not belong to them is faced with a moral judgment that has yet to have been made.

One knows that it is not theirs.

It's said that depression never goes away, you just learn to cope with it. I tend to agree. I've been dealing with depression for quite some time now, and my life has turned into a constant battle with it. I almost live in fear from my depression. When I'm happy, I'm still depressed over the prospect of getting depressed again; but, when I'm sad I feel at ease... — Posty McPostface

I don't believe you.

↪creativesoul I did, several times, and decided not to respond.

this thread is nothing more than a discussion about how we use words like "proposition"
— Banno

That's what the thread reduces to, even if it does not say that in the OP. — Banno

How we use words like "proposition" counts as current language use. Current language use requires language.

Some thought and belief do not.

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

Some thought and belief are prior to language. Some thought and belief are prior to our use of "proposition". This thread covers both. Our use of "proposition" is not the only thing this thread is about.

Any reduction in scope that leads to a sole focus upon terminological use is inherently inadequate. Your suggestion is this.

Experience exists prior to subsequent experience but is existentially dependent on subsequent experience. — Blue Lux

This is very poorly written.

Do you have a specific example?

That's what the thread reduces to, even if it does not say that in the OP. — Banno

Don't tell me. Show me.

Talking about where to find thought and belief is nonsense.

Thought and belief are not the kind of things that have spatiotemporal location.

It seems to me, and I have said it before, that Creative reifies thought and belief. I think that is an error; thought and belief are not things... — Banno

It seems to me that both words are nouns, and nouns are persons, places, or things. Thought and belief are not persons or places.

I've also asked several times for you to argue for this gratuitous assertion that I'm reifying thought and belief. I'm not conflating material things with abstract things. I'm not conflating concrete things with abstract things. I'm situating thought and belief where it belongs, based upon what all thought and belief have in common. The argument I offer has the strongest possible justificatory ground, and I would guess that you are well aware of this...

...an individual or group can adopt an attitude towards a given proposition, such that they hold the proposition to be true. We call this belief.

It's from here that the discussion should proceed. — Banno

Proceed? That's been adequately exhausted more times than I care to remember. You really should pay a bit more attention. This isn't our first time going over this...

An attitude towards a given proposition is metacognition. Metacognition is thinking about thought and belief. Thinking about thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Some thought and belief is prior to language. That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Some thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon propositions or language.

This thread is nothing more than a discussion about how we use words like "proposition", "belief", "justification", "knowledge'. — Banno

May I suggest that you re-read the first page?

:wink:

You seem to have confused "number" with "numeral". There's a difference between these two, — Metaphysician Undercover

Both are existentially dependent upon language. So the difference doesn't make a difference here.

Have fun.

Why is a religion so good at commanding people to behave a certain way... — Posty McPostface

Because many, if not most, hold that there is some absolute, higher power that has made the rules.

A "quantity" is always a number of units. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish.

Numbers are names of quantities. Numbers are existentially dependent upon language. Quantities are not. Quantities exist prior to numbers. Thus, there were quantities prior to numbers.

A quantity is not always a number of units.

Some emotion is prior to valuing things. Some is after. Some is a result of valuing things. Some is not. I do not think that there is a direct simple connection between value and emotion.

Nope.

Meaningful attribution is how we value things...

Wittgenstein goes on to demonstrate that Moore's propositions/beliefs are hinge-propositions. It seems odd to me that you would suggest otherwise. — Sam26

Does he?

Where at in OC does he clearly call Moore's propositions "hinge propositions"?

By the way, I'm not judging either way whether or not Witt himself held that hinge propositions were beliefs. It seems that he would have. I'm bit baffled why you would think that I've suggested otherwise. I merely pointed out that I cannot remember any of his notes including "hinge beliefs"...

What I clearly remember is his description of bedrock beliefs, and talk of the spade turning up. This fed into his expression of not being able to get beneath language. If hinge propositions are bedrock, and the spade turns up here, then given that propositions are existentially dependent upon language, it would seem that we cannot get beneath propositions(language). He then goes on to further bolster this notion by pointing out how all examples are linguistic/propositional.

That's my down and dirty quick review of his overall thoughts on the matter.

Here's my critique...

An example of thought/belief is a report thereof. A report is not always equivalent to what's being reported upon. JTB is inherently incapable of drawing and maintaining the distinction between beliefs and reports thereof simply because all knowledge claims accompanied by the act of justification are reports. JTB was originally meant to provide a useful outline for further discriminating between knowledge claims. The notion of belief is left sorely neglected. This is clear as JTB fails to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. One must believe a proposition... That's all the attention that was ever really paid to the belief aspect of JTB.

Witt was working on parsing this out, I believe. His talk of arational beliefs, and propositions falling outside the conventional notions, suggested that knew that some belief were not arrived at via rational/reasonable means such as argument, etc. I suspect he knew that not all belief were grounded upon other belief. There had to be an 'end' to justification. It seem that that would be at the beginning of thought and belief. However, because he delimited his own pursuits by staying within the bounds of language, he could not conceive that simple, rudimentary beliefs are not existentially dependent upon language.

What besides bias for the premises necessitates the sweeping of Dennis 1967-2018 under the rug in favor of smaller bites fitting conveniently in the mouth of the argument? — HuggetZukker

Gotta love the rhetoric! It's a shame that so many people are more persuaded by it than good sound reasoning...

Dennis 1967-2018 is not a valid counterexample. That's what...


Specifically, Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to something else, if the something else is a heart transplant that occurred in 2010.

There are two clearly defined variables - that which exists prior to something else, and something else. You've not satisfied those parameters. A valid counterexample must...

Is the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 a valid notion? — HuggetZukker

Sure. I mean it could be if it fits into some coherent scheme. All alone, strictly speaking, it cannot be valid. Validity is a measure of coherency/consistency. That requires following the rules of correct inference. Loosely speaking...

Sure...

Is the outline meant to deal with any and all valid notions of existence? — HuggetZukker

It does...

If yes to both, Dennis 1967-2018 is a counterexample. — HuggetZukker

Come now, you'll have to do better than this. The existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is not an example of that which exists prior to the heart transplant. It is an example of that which exists prior to and after the heart transplant. So, while the existence of Dennis 1967-2018 is an intelligible notion, it is not a valid counterexample to the outline.