"And just because there’s a metaphysical explanation for why and how it happened doesn’t make it any less amazing". — Michael Ossipoff

I remember a few incidents when I was younger when I was suddenly shocked that there was anything at all. — ff0

Yes, the question "Why is there something instead of nothing" is an often-asked question.

Michael Faraday answered that question in 1844. I couldn't find details of what he said, but what I found agrees with the metaphysics that I've been proposing. Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark have proposed similar things, but it seems to me that they've both missed the mark in a few ways..

Anyway, the metaphysics that I've been proposing answers that question, in terms of systems of inter-referring inevitable abstract facts.

I was also shocked by the specificity of what was. 'It is exactly this way and no other. There are three weeds at this Northeast leg of the park bench. That particular plane with its particular passengers flies overhead.'

Kenneth Patchen wrote, "In general, why is everything so specific?"

As we were discussing, the particular way that this world is, is one of infinitely-many ways that the infinitely-many worlds are. There are infinitely-many of them, and ours is one of them.

The world that you were born in likely had something to do with the person that you were. (even if there isn't reincarnation),

These days I have a better argument for brute facticity, and yet it's rare to feel wonder as I did once.

I'm biased towards brute facticity because it makes the world new.

But it would still be new by my metaphysics (which doesn't have any brute-facts), as your life-experience possibility-story plays out.

But I also think it's logically necessary

All that's logically-necessary for our universe is a system of inter-referring abstract facts. Because those facts are inevitable, there's no brute-ness

"Time is short. It isn’t the usual state of affairs". — Michael Ossipoff

I know what you mean, but in a way it is the only state of affairs.

...until we reach the end of lives (or the end of this life if there's no reincarnation) and reach the timeless sleep.

We live either one finite lifetime, or a finite number of finite lifetimes. ...and then timeless sleep.

Finite time in life, and then timeless sleep.

So time isn't the only state of affairs. In fact, timeless sleep predominates, although of course sure, we aren't there yet, and won't be for a while. ...either at the end of this life, or (more likely) after a sequence of lives.

More tomorrow.

Michael Ossipoff

Everything we see and experience is transposed. We don’t see a color. We perceive it as such, but really it’s the absence of the color in the spectrum. — Brianna Whitney

If you look at a green Christmas tree light, it looks green, because either it's emitting green light, or because its colored glass is absorbing all the visible wavelengths but green, or absorbing at &/or around green's complementary wavelength,(Magenta.. Green and Magenta are complementary to eachother.)

If you look at a yellow Christmas tree light, it looks yellow because either it's emitting yellow light, or because its colored glass is absorbing all the visible wavelengths but yellow, or absorbing at &/or around yellow's complementary wavelength (Blue)..

Cold is the absence of heat.

...but cold is perceived as a separate sensation of cold.

Dark is the absence of light. Substance is perceived by the space around it’s form,

Well, we perceive a substance by itself. It's primarily the object itself that you perceive. But sure, if it's the same color and texture as its surroundings, then you might not notice it. Of course many insect, birds, reptiles and mammals make use of that principle for concealment.

The facts here, are mostly facts of physical science. ...not metaphysics or other philosophy.

But it should be emphasized that people's color-perception has as much to do with human design as with wavelength...to a greater extent than most people probablly realize.

...but that still isn't philosophy. It just means that biology is involved as well as wavelength.

These things function through laws of entropy.

Entropy governs some events in thermodynamics.

But, as I said above, this is all physical science (and sense-biology too, in the case of color-perception).

If you assume metaphysics is true...

There are uncontroversial facts about metaphysics that can be said with certainty.. It probably isn't provable that any metaphysics, alone, is true (and that part of some other metaphysics isn't true along with it). That's because most proposed metaphysicses are consistent with our observations (otherwise they wouldn't be proposed)..

It certainly can't be proved that no metaphysics is true.

...and expand from there, you’ll stumble on odd laws of our world.

Negative.

Physical laws don't contradict any reasonable proposed metaphysics. If physical observations contradicted a metaphysics, then that metaphysics would be abandoned by most people who are interested in metaphysics.

Be willing to kill it if it no longer serves purpose or starts driving you over the edge crazy.
Real or not, it’s a waste of brain space if it doesn’t serve a purpose.

Recommendation: Then you might prefer engineering.

But we here, at these philosophy forums, like philosophy.

Michael Ossipoff

Isn't the past/present/future thing a bit artificial?

What we call the present--Isn't it really just the recent past and immediate future? No point trying to quantify its duration, as if it were a real distinct division into actual different periods..

Michael Ossipoff

Are there things that exist right now that are physical that science hasn't yet explained? — Harry Hindu

Of course. For example, maybe the most notable and dramatic instance these days is the acceleration of the recession-rate of the more distant galaxies. But a lot of other things too, of course, such as the observed system of particles, etc.

...because physics isn't completed, and probably never will be.

For that matter, ball-lightning hasn't been given an explanation satisfactory to all who study it.

Michael Ossiopff

I’d said:
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Because there are infinitely-many such systems, it's hardly surprising that there's this one. ...one that is the way this one is. There are also infinitely-many other ones, which are infinitely-many different ways. — Michael Ossipoff

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You replied:
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But why isn't all the more surprising that there are infinitely many?

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Yes, I see what you mean. I just meant that it’s metaphysically unsurprising. But yes, it’s fantastic. But the fact that this life started at all is just as fantastic. So, as Jack Nicholson’s character said, in Wolf, “I’m hard to surprise today.”
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And just because there’s a metaphysical explanation for why and how it happened doesn’t make it any less amazing.
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The metaphysical explanation is good, as far as it goes, but this life can only remain surprising.
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And, as I mention below in this post, maybe, even though we’ve been in this life so long that it’s what we’re used to, maybe this life in time and events isn’t the usual or most “natural” state of affairs.

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One of the anti-metaphysical axes I like to grind is a sort of smugness that I feel in the 'nothing here to see, folks' approach.

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Of course that’s standard, from Scientificists, “Ignore that man behind the curtain, and his blatant brute-fact.”
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I don't mean to accuse you personally of smugness. I'm just talking about a kind of stubborn resistance to confessing any sort of experience of wonder (or terror) at finding oneself alive and mortal.

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Metaphysical explanation doesn’t diminish the wonder and amazingness of the fact that this life started.
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From my point of view, there's a kind of pasting over of this wonder-terror by very plausible sciency sounding phrases.

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Academic philosophers use a lot of what seems to me to be pseudoscientific, pseudomathematical jargon, inventing and debating fine-points not of interest to anyone else.
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There’s a lot of philosophical Greek used here, but I realize that it makes for concise, precise expression.
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I mostly use ordinary English, but metaphysics has to be discussed in a science-like way, because it’s a conceptual logical subject, and uncontroversial statements can be made, and conclusions arrived at.
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But that certainly doesn’t lessen the wonder.
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But I personally can't buy it. I do believe, of course, that humans can (for a long time even) remain un-freaked-out. It's not exactly convenient or practical to be freaked-out by existence all the time. But I suspect that most of us experience moments from time to time when all of the impressive words fall away and we stand before the roaring of the there that we are and the there that we are surrounded by. We are thrown into a drama that we don't remember choosing.

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Certainly. It’s remarkable and unbelievable that this life started. No doubt it was incomprehensible on the first day too, and remains no less amazing or surprising now.
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We’re just used to it, because we’ve been in this life for so long. But metaphysical explanation doesn’t make it less amazing.
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Whether someone believes in reincarnation or not, our time in life is finite. But the sleep at the end of lives (or of this life if you don’t believe in reincarnation) is timeless. This life has been going on for so long that we’re used to it, but, being finite, in comparison to something else that’s timeless, this life that we’re so used to is just a finite blip in timelessness. Sleep at the end of lives is timeless. Time is short. It isn’t the usual state of affairs. One dictionary definition of “natural” is “usual”, and, by that definition, the Timelessness at the end of lives is what’s natural.
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So shall we call our material world of time and events the Supernatural? :D
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Thrown into a face and language. Thrown into relationships with particular human beings, each of them also thrown. All of us mortal. All of us improvising, keeping the ship afloat or occasionally scuttling it to do away with the drama.

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Of course suicide greatly increases and worsens the drama, and puts a persistent strongly negative cast on it, a dive into longterm unhappiness.
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This is where religion/philosophy as the non-cute stuff really kicks in. Your theoretical vision of the world is interesting enough, but surely you live in a world of people and objects.

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Sure, but the larger metaphysical basis, substrate, environment of a person’s life is of interest in that life. The overall nature and character of what metaphysically is, has a lot to do with how we interpret and feel about this life. As I mention below, what is there when we look up from our day-to-day business?
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Sure we’re involved in day-to-day details, but the overall picture is relevant to how we interpret, perceive and feel about it. As you mentioned, there are times when we aren’t really busy with details, and that wonder comes to us.
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By no means am I trying to censor you. I'm just pointing at the gap between our creative theoretical fictions and the vivid world of people and objects we actually live in, work in, suffer in, enjoy ourselves in.

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But maybe we don’t suffer as much, or more than necessary, depending on our perspective on what there is, and what’s going on.
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But you acknowledged the wonder that this life started at all. We aren’t always preoccupied with the details. What’s there when we look up from the details? The overall matter of what is, what’s going on, the bigger metaphysical picture, is the background, setting and environment of our day-to-day lives.
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Michael Ossipoff

When it comes to what we care about, no. In my opinion. It may be an exaggeration to get the point across. Accusations of anthropomorphism don't ring true for me. What's the 'sin' here? I think the sin is supposed to be that we are less accurate about reality because of a bias toward human-likeness. Sure. QM violates ordinary experience. But it works. So we endure it. On the other hand, it makes no sense to worship or revere anything unrelated to the human. Not to me. 'God' or X has to be 'good' in some way, good-for-humans, good-for-me.

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Of course, I agree with all of that. The Atheist philosopher’s attribute-less god doesn’t make sense to me either.
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Let me just clarify about my Theism:
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It seems to me that metaphysics leads to the conclusion that what there metaphysically (describably, discussably) is, is insubstantial and ethereal. …implying an openness, looseness and lightness, …and something really good about what is, in a way that’s difficult to describe, explain or specify.
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…a feeling or impression that there’s good intention behind what is.
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That’s it. That’s my Theism. It’s an impression and a feeling. I don’t ordinarily call it Theism, because, as you suggested, “-ism”s are more for arguing…compartmentalizing and dividing people.
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But, it seems to me that what I’m talking about is something also evidently felt by many Theists, including those who believe in Literalist allegories. …but more significant than the Literalist allegories. So even though I don’t share all the beliefs of the Biblical Literalists and the more progressive selective Literalists, many of them are still onto something, …what they likely emotionally mean when they speak of God. Of course some Theists, maybe usually the more progressive ones, are more consciously aware of that than others.
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As I said, it’s an impression or feeling. It isn’t something to assert, and can’t be proven to someone else, but I don’t doubt it either. Sureness without proof isn’t scientific? Fine. As I said, proof and assertion are only for logic, mathematics, physics and (to some extent) metaphysics. It would be meaningless to speak of proof, or need for doubt without proof, for a meta-metaphysical impression. As I said, it would be like speaking of electroplating an adverb.
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I’d said:
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Though metaphysics isn’t the same as science, it’s like science in some ways. Definitions should be explicit and consistently-used. Statements should be supported. Metaphysics, like physics, doesn’t describe all of Reality, but definite uncontroversial things can still be said about both

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— Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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Perhaps. But this is your assumption. This is the loaded 'how' that you bring to the situation. But my 'how' is the tendency to think this 'how' and get behind this 'how,' to open up the situation.

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But I only apply that “how” where it’s called-for and appropriate. I don’t mean it or offer it outside its range of applicability. I often criticize Scientificists for wanting to apply science outside it legitimate range of applicability. You’re, quite rightly, saying that too, about the “how” of metaphysics, logic, and mathematics. Yes, I’m always criticizing that over-application of science’s approach. And yes, of course that goes for metaphysics too, which has a similar approach.
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What if language isn't what you need it to be here? What if strict definitions force you to abandon the fluidity of language in ordinary life?

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But I only talk that way in metaphysics and when I talk about logic, mathematics or science. I agree that the language of metaphysics isn’t for everyday life, and is only verbal argument. And, in fact of course, verbal description or explanation doesn’t, at all, ever even come close to experience or Reality. …and of course I realize that the metaphysics that I talk is entirely verbal and conceptual. …and couldn’t describe or substitute for experience, or describe or explain Reality.
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I often use the analogy that the difference between metaphysics and Reality, experience, is a bit like the difference between a book all about how a car-engine works, vs actually going for a ride in the countryside.
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Your system seems well thought out, better than average. But from my point of view it's still a kind of theoretical construction that a philosopher comes up with at his desk, alone in his study. Then he goes outside and immerses himself in the usual inexplicit knowhow of moving among objects and interacting with other human beings. His conceptual art falls away. It doesn't describe the way he actually lives. It's a sort of model airplane building, fun for a certain kind of conversation.

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Of course. Agreed. I like metaphysics.
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But you aren’t saying, are you, that the matter of what metaphysically is, doesn’t meaningfully and relevantly relate to our larger lives?
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For me, the metaphysical medium and basis in which this life is, and has been, happening is worth finding out about.
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No, metaphysics doesn’t describe or explain experience or Reality.
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But that metaphysical medium and basis is still part of the life story. That story has a physical aspect, basis and medium, and unsurprisingly it has a metaphysical aspect, basis and medium too.
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The fact that metaphysics isn’t everything doesn’t mean that it isn’t part of the story.
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I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that. I'm just pursuing my own notion of 'objectivity' that does justice to non-theoretical life. I want to open the window of the study and let the storm of life in. We are mortal, loving, fearing, lusting, etc., human beings first and system-builders second. In my view, the system builders (cosy in their study) forget the storm.

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Not necessarily always. For example, I realize that physics or metaphysics aren’t, and can’t describe or substitute for, experience. And life is experience in the present, without regard to maps or formulas, teachings, or anything written. As you said, life and experience are something else from logical study.
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So they bring their systems to those immersed in life and meet with bewilderment.

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I know that most people aren’t interested in philosophy. There was even a thread here about that, a few months ago.
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But let’s not imply that the study of metaphysics (or physics, mathematics or logic) prevents someone from being immersed in life.

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But what of love and relationships? And how do these fit in to our theologies?

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Physics and metaphysics are each about an aspect of substrate, medium or basis, on which we live. As relevant as they are, in that regard, of course they don’t tell us how to live.
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Hinduism, particularly in its Vedanta versions, says something about metaphysics. I don’t entirely agree with any of its metaphysics versions (unless maybe part of what they’re saying is intended as meta-metaphysical, in which case the metaphysical part might not really differ.) But what I’m getting to is that Hinduism also has a lot to say about the purposes in life (Purusharthas).
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The ancient Indian writers seem competent, qualified and informed about the various things they wrote about, and they wrote about a number of aspects of life.
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The gist of the summaries that I’ve read referred to four Purusharthas: 1) Kama: What we like; 2) Artha: Getting by; 3)Dharma: Right living (ethical, considerate, caring, moderate, responsible to ourself and others); and 4) Moksha: Eventual life-completion, after a life (or sequence of lives) with the preceding three purusharthas.
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#2 is just practical necessity. #4 is just a culmination after having lived a complete life for a long time.
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So #1 and #3 seem to be the requirements. The Hindus say that a life deficient in one of those is an inadequate, incomplete, insufficient life. And, when your life has been inadequate, incomplete and insufficient, then you aren’t done, and there isn’t resolution or completion.
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Of course these verbal overviews/suggestions aren’t the same as life or experience, any more than metaphysics is. I mention them to answer what you said about life purposes.
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As for the relation between Theism and love and relationships: Well, I spoke of the good intent behind what is. Gratitude for that is a reason to try to embody it, repay/share some of it, at least within our limited human ability, in our own lives, actions and relations. As Theists often say it (and as you suggested), God is Love.
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Michael Ossipoff

(Sometimes nested quotes don’t seem to work. In this reply I sometimes use them, but sometimes just write the inner quote in ordinary quotation-marks. ..just experimentally.)
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“Maybe, but explanations of God are a largely Atheist topic.” — Michael Ossipoff
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In my experience, there is here and there a metaphysical theist on philosophy forums.

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Sure, there are Theists who like metaphysics, and there are Theists who regard religion as metaphysical. Of course those categories overlap. I think most Atheists, here and elsewhere, regard religion as a metaphysical belief, though they don’t express it that way.
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I just meant that, at philosophical forums, not all Atheists are Materialists. Elsewhere they pretty-much are (I’ll address your disagreement about that when I get to that other posting).
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I’m only here to discuss metaphysics, and I don’t consider Theism to be within metaphysics. But I answer about Theism when Theists or Atheists bring it up—and Atheists always bring it up a lot more often & more assertively than Theists do.
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My criticism is that Atheists seem to believe that the beliefs of Biblical-Literalists are the beliefs of all Theists, and that the God believed in by Biblical-Literalists is the One True God for Atheists to believe in assertively disbelieving in.
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It’s as if I commented about Vedanta as if all Vedantists were Advaitists. …or if I commented about Buddhism as if all Buddhists were Theravada.
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Of course it could be asked why I always feel obligated to butt in to correct Atheists about those misconceptions about Theists. Good question! I’ve got to quit that habit. I don’t do that in politics. I have nothing to do with political debates.
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I was trying to make clear that my mention of the limits of scientific explanation wasn't some covert introduction of some other kind of explanation. Indeed, both kinds of explanation [physics and metaphysics] have the same shape in my view.

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Sure, in a way.
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Objects are understood within a nexus of necessary relationships.

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That’s a reasonable comparison.
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The 'supernatural' is just a different understanding of the natural insofar as one does a kind of science.

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I don’t believe in the Supernatural. I don’t believe in Werewolves, Vampires, or animated mummies or skeletons that chase people. …but it makes for some good movies.
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The Supernatural, in general, means contravention of established physical laws, especially in scary movies or other works of fiction.
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Yes, I realize that “Supernatural” is defined more broadly in dictionaries. But my definition, above, is what that word means to pretty much everyone.
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Materialists, especially the ones who call themselves “Naturalists”, use “Supernatural” to refer to everything not part of their Materialism metaphysics.
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So, the fundamentally, objectively existent physical world believed in by Materialists as a brute-fact--an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition--is “Nature”, or “The Natural”, and so anything else is “The Supernatural” :D
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Still, I don't believe in an afterlife. So that gives my perspective an atheistic feel. That is arguably the real issue: is this all there is? A brief embodiment? I think yes. But I don't claim to have some 'proof.' I can emit 'reasons' for this belief. I can cough up words.

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I don’t think any position can be proved, regarding what comes after this life.
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But there are a few things that can be said about that matter.
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One thing for sure is that you’ll never experience a time when you don’t experience. Only your survivors will experience that time.
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Oblivion never arrives. Sure, you arrive at sleep, but you never experience complete unconsciousness.
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“Assertion and proof are meaningful only in logic, mathematics, physics and (limitedly) in metaphysics..” — Michael Ossipoff

We might even drag the word 'God' in for this largeness of life that dwarfs our systems. But I'm not attached to this or that word. Life is bigger than our words.

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Words don’t describe Reality. At these forums, it’s nearly always Atheists who talk about God. Even elsewhere, it may well be that, on the average, a typical avowed Atheist talks about God a lot more than does a typical Theist.
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I only speak of God when replying to someone else who has. And my use of that word doesn’t imply an anthropomorphic belief, or all the beliefs of the Biblical-Literalists.
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But at least many Biblical-Literalists believe or feel more than the allegories that they take literally…the only thing that Atheists see about Biblical-Literalists. …and attribute to all Theists too.
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“Speaking of "Creation", in regards to religion, is anthropomorphic.]
— Michael Ossipoff

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In my view, it's all anthropomorphic.

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Wait a minute. Isn’t there anything that isn’t anthropomorphic? Surely that’s over-broad.
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If you mean that Theism in general is anthropomorphic, then that’s what I mean by assumptions about other people’s beliefs.
…by what I’d consider a meaningful definition of “anthropomorphism”.
Merriam-Webster says that it’s about attributing human characteristics or attributes. (plural). So, attributing as many as two attributes (but not just one) in common with humans is anthropomorphic?
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To me, Merriam-Webster’s definition of “anthropomorphize” is better: To attribute human form or personality.
…or, I’d also say, inaccurate attribution of one or more human attributes. (where of course anyone can judge for themself what’s inaccurate, meaning that anthropomorphism is just a matter of opinion.)
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So I prefer those last two definitions, enclosed by asterisks.
But, admittedly, yes there are some definitions of “anthropomorphism” that describe all Theisms. Houghton-Mifflin, for instance, doesn’t always have the plural-attributes requirement.
I disagree with that definition, because I feel that “anthropomorphism” should (and usually does) only imply incorrect or inappropriate humanization.
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We only really give a damn about the human-like.

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We at these philosophical forums discuss much that isn’t human-like.
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We can do without the human body (sort of) in a Deity.

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“Sort of “? I’d bet that only a small percentage of Theists believe that God has or needs a body. Many don’t believe that God is a being.
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But take away human virtues...

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Though most Theists don’t believe that God is a person, and many don’t believe that God is a being, is there a Theist sect that believes in a God that has no namable attribute in common with some humans?
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The attribute-less God is more the invention/theory of the theologically-inclined Atheist. (…and yes there contradictorily are those at these forums.)
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and we have only a machine, a pathetic patch over our ignorance.

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That may very well be the theory or position of Atheist theologians.
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I'm not trying to start a religious debate. I don't debate religion. I'm just clarifying that many Theists don't believe in a God that is an element of metaphysics or needs a creator. — Michael Ossipoff

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You aren't hurting my feelings, and we don't have to debate religion if you don't want to. But I don't see why debating religion should be a bad thing.

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It isn’t a bad thing. It just isn’t meaningful or conceivable (to me), because (to me anyway) religion, and Theism in particular, isn’t about assertion, debate or proof at all. It’s like speaking of electroplating and polishing an adverb.
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To me it’s about impressions, feelings.
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Impressions and feelings aren’t debatable, provable, or assertable.
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But I invite people to debate metaphysics. If anyone disagrees with my metaphysics, then I ask them which part of it they disagree with. I claim that it doesn’t say anything that anyone would disagree with. I claim that it’s completely uncontroversial.
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For me philosophy is something like the religion of those who like to think of themselves as 'rational,'

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Of course it isn’t for me to say what is or isn’t a religion to someone else. I know, for instance, that the worship of Science is a religion to many, including many here.
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I also call that religion “Scientificism”, Some prefer “Scientism”. But, the trouble with “Scientism” is, what do you call an adherent of Scientism? A Scientist? No, that word already means a practitioner of science (not a believer in Scientism). Hence my preference for “Scientificism”.
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Every religion has a metaphysics. The metaphysics of Scientificism is Materialism. I think that it can be convincingly argued that Scientificists and Materialists are the same set of people.
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Atheism is a belief of Scientificists/Materialists. But, as I mentioned, not all Atheists are Scientificists/Materialists. (I’ll just say “Materialists” for short.)
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a word [“rational”] with a rich and slippery meaning.

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Amen!
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We needn't debate it. (..and let's not). But do you think that the discussable, describable subject called metaphysics describes all of Reality, or that you could understand or know all of Reality? Maybe it would be more modest to not make such an assumption.

—Michael Ossipoff

Hell no. I'm an anti-metaphysician.


Is that the position 1)that metaphysics is entirely unknowable, or just 2)that it doesn’t affect our practical day-to-day decisions, or 3) that its statements are meaningless, or 3) that, though not meaningless, it’s all untrue?
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I claim that most who denounce metaphysics are believers in the metaphysics of Materialism. For example, in the radio show Philosophy-Talk, I’ve heard espousal of both anti-metaphysics and ”Naturalism”.
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Perhaps my fundamental theme at the moment is the gap between life as it is lived and the small 'piece' of it that we can make explicit and rational.

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Yes, what can be explicitly and rationally discussed certainly isn’t all of Reality. …and of course isn’t even everyday experienced Reality. Description or evaluation has nothing to do with experience or Reality.
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As far as modesty goes, that's a tricky issue. One can be immodestly 'modest.' The real conversation is going to happen or not according to whether we have the guts to say something stirring, even if we might change our minds about it. We've got to take risks, clash, be distinct personalities.

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Sure, not many differences can be discussed or (maybe) resolved without risking starting an argument, making someone angry, getting criticized, etc.
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Some might imagine themselves as doing a kind of science here. I don't see it that way.

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Though metaphysics isn’t the same as science, it’s like science in some ways. Definitions should be explicit and consistently-used. Statements should be supported. Metaphysics, like physics, doesn’t describe all of Reality, but definite uncontroversial things can still be said about both.
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But I recognize their right to project any kind of minimally civil personality they wish. That keeps things fresh. To me this is a place of wild and often impressively articulate conversation.

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Quite so.
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Let's say our physical universe is such a system [as I described]. Why is it specifically the way that it is? Why is it here in the first place?

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There are abstract facts, and there couldn’t have not been abstract facts, for reasons that I’ve discussed in previous replies. …and infinitely-many inter-referring systems of them. Those things are inevitable.
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The specific way that our physical universe is, is one of the infinitely-many ways that systems of inter-referring abstract facts are. Inevitably, there is each one of those systems or ways. …including this one that is the context and setting for our lives.
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Michael Ossipoff

"But no, we don't need that brute-fact. There's no particular reason to believe in it. There's no particualr reason to believe that our physical universe is other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetics. ...one of infinitely many such complex abstract logical systems". — Michael Ossipoff


Let's say our physical universe is such a system. Why is it specifically the way that it is? — ff0

There are infinitely many abstract if-then facts. There are infinitely-many inter-referring systems of if-then facts. There are infinitely-many of those that are complex enough to be what we'd call a "physical universe".

Because there are infinitely-many such systems, it's hardly surprising that there's this one. ...one that is the way this one is. There are also infinitely-many other ones, which are infinitely-many different ways.

Why is it here in the first place?

In my post that you're replying to, I discussed why there couldn't have not been abstract facts.

...and, therefore, systems of inter-referring abstract facts. ...such as the complex abstract logical systems that is our universe.

As I emphasized in my post that you're replying to, I feel that it's more meaningful to speak of individual life-experience possibility-stories, instead of objective 3rd-person whole possibility-worlds. Those individual life-experience possibility-stories, likewise, are inevitable systems of inter-referring abstract facts about hypotheticals.

In reference to your question, I emphasize the word "inevitable".

Michael Ossipoff

To be clear, 'God' explanations run into the same problem. — ff0

Maybe, but explanations of God are a largely Atheist topic.

Many Theists don't regard God as an element of metaphysics. Metaphysics is about explanations, and things discussable and describable.Many Theists don't assert to you about God.

Assertion and proof are meaningful only in logic, mathematics, physics and (limitedly) in metaphysics..

Let's say, for instance, that you have a theory of everything that fits on a T-shirt. Unless that theory explains why it has the shape it has (which sounds absurd to me, like God not needing a creator)

Speaking of "Creation", in regards to religion, is anthropomorphic.

And, in any case, it would be absurd to speak of a "creator",of what isn't an element of metaphysics. ..or a need for a creator for what isn't an element of metaphysics.

I'm not trying to start a religious debate. I don't debate religion. I'm just clarifying that many Theists don't believe in a God that is an element of metaphysics or needs a creator.

We needn't debate it. (..and let's not). But do you think that the discussable, describable subject called metaphysics describes all of Reality, or that you could understand or know all of Reality? Maybe it would be more modest to not make such an assumption.

, it's a mysterious brute fact. It's the mathematical structure that the quantifiable aspect of shared reality just happens to have. We are no less thrown into the world, having merely found some patterns in the way stuff moves.

Yes, the fundamental existence of the Materialist's objectively-existent physical universe is a brute-fact.

But no, we don't need that brute-fact. There's no particular reason to believe in it. There's no particualr reason to believe that our physical universe is other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypothetics. ...one of infinitely many such complex abstract logical systems.

Michael Ossipoff

Since this is metaphysics, there isn't a foolproof argument that will convince everyone.

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There are uncontroversial metaphysical statements and arguments. I propose a metaphysics based on those. …an uncontroversial metaphysics.
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But someone could ask what the explanation for a mind-independent world is.

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If it just consists of abstract facts, then it doesn’t need an explanation. There inevitably are infinitely-many abstract facts, and infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract facts. They don’t need explanation.
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Could there have not been abstract facts? We’ve discussed that. We’ve discussed why there couldn’t have not been abstract facts. So I think we agree on that, and so I needn’t go into it here.
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We do have cosmology to help with that\

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No, cosmology is part of physics. Physics describes how the physical world works, and what it’s like, but it doesn’t say anything about why there’s a physical world.
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, but maybe we do end up a brute fact of existence eventually (the quantum vacuum perhaps).

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That would be positing (some theory of) the physical world as a brute-fact. For one thing, any particular physics theory will most likely be replaced, updated, expanded and improved-on by a more comprehensive theory.
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For another thing, the Materialist’s brute-fact physical world is an unnecessary brute-fact.
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It's just that we don't have to invoke bruteness until there is no explanation available. And we do have that for the world we perceive.

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Yes, but it can’t be a physical explanation. Physics can’t explain why there’s a physical world.
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Now, about Realism vs Anti-Realism:
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How we talk about that depends on what the Realist is saying there is. So, when I speak of that matter, of course it’s necessary for me to do so in terms of what I claim there is.
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There are abstract facts. There couldn’t have not been abstract facts. Shall I go into the discussion that we had about why there couldn’t have not been abstract facts?
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If there were no facts, then the fact that there are no facts would be a fact.
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But could there have obtained a fact that there are no facts other than that one fact that there are no other facts?
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For one thing, that would be a special brute-fact, calling for an explanation, but not having one (How could it, if there are no other facts?)
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For another thing, as I mentioned above, an abstract fact, or a system of inter-referring abstract facts is completely isolated and independent of any context outside itself, or any global permission, or any medium in which to be.
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…so a global fact that there are no other facts would be meaningless.
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I usually give several examples of inevitable abstract facts:
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A proposition can’t be true and false.
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If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
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If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4.
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(…with an obvious reasonable definition of 1, 2, 3, & 4, based on the multiplicative identity and addition.)
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As described above, those things are just true, with or without minds, and without existence or realness in some larger context, or any global permission, or any medium in which to be.
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…and not subject to some global negating-fact.
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Sure, only sentient beings can discuss those logical facts. But we can also discuss them with regard to a hypothetical universe in which there's no life. We can say "If, in that world, there were Slithytoves, Jabberwockeys, and the quality of being 'brillig'..." or "If, in that world, there were four objects to count in various ways, and someone to do the counting..."

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A proposition can’t be true and false, and so we don't live in a willy-nilly-self-inconsistent impossibility-world. That's why I say that logic has authority over experience,
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The metaphysics that I propose is an Anti-Realism, about an experience-based possibility-story, for each of us.
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For each of us, that life-experience possibility-story is a complex system of inter-referring if-then facts about hypotheticals. It’s valid in the sense that it's as valid as any other abstract fact, or system of them. It's one of infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract-facts.
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But its abstract facts aren't really different from all the other abstract facts, which, likewise, each have their own local validity, quite independent of anything else.
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So that's why I claim that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.
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Michael Ossipoff

"Because mathematics is a logic subject, I have no doubt that the same mathematics obtains in every possibility-world, and in every life-experience possibility-story" — Michael Ossipoff


I think we are trapped/guided (delete as inappropriate) by logic as humans, but what if logic is illusory? Is it possible to talk about such a thing (as logic being illusory) even? — Jake Tarragon

I'd say it isn't.

A proposition can't be true and false.

If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jabberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.

If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4

(by a reasonable, obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition).

Each of those abstract facts is valid with or without minds, or any larger context or medium.

Sure, only sentient beings can discuss those logical facts. But we can also discuss them with regard to a hypothetical universe in which there's no life. We can say "If, in that world, there were Slithytoves, Jabberwockeys, and the quality of being 'brillig'..." or "If, in that world, there were four objects to count in various ways, and someone to do the counting..."

A proposition can;t be true and false, and so we don't live in a willy-nilly-self-inconsistent impossibility-world. That's why I say that logic has authority over experience,

I think it's important to emphasize that isolation and independence of an abstract fact, or an inter-referring system of abstract facts. ...complete independence from any external context, or global rule, or medium in which to be.

The metaphysics that I propose is an Anti-Realism, about an experience-based possibility-story, for each of us.

For each of us, that life-experience possibility-story is a complex system of inter-referring if-then facts about hypotheticals. It's as valid as any other. It's one of infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract-facts....and individual abstract facts too.

But its abstract facts aren't really different from all the other abstract facts, which, likewise have their local validity, quite independent of anything else.

So that's why I claim that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.

Michael Ossipoff

(revised reply)

"everything is true as we experience it, "— Michael Ossipoff

Where does 'being wrong about something' fit into that?

I didn't mean that the way it probably sounded. I didn't mean that our interpretation, conclusions or explanation about what we experience are necessarily true. I merely meant that the raw data we experience is so, as (meaning "when") we experience it.

Like the sound of an engine, even if it's only a motorcycle, when we think it's an airplane.

Alright, that doesn't say a lot.

I was only agreeing with something said by the post I was replying to, about experience.

MUH, a Realism, emphasizes mathematics, but, because I suggest an experience-based possibility-story, then experience of whatever kind is to be emphasized--experienced facts that aren't necessarily mathematical (...but are, when the physical world is closely studied). But the requirement remains that your experience not be outright self-contradictory...meaning that logic still has authority over experience.

I think litewave was right when he said that realness or existence depends on non-contradiction. That might resolve the awkward problem about impossible, inconsistent worlds.

Michael Ossipoff

I’ve missed the definition of “instrumentality” that’s being used here. According to dictionaries, “instrumentality” means “use for a purpose”.
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I don’t understand what is meant by that word’s use here. If everything you do is for a future purpose, then you don’t have a life. If you’re saying that all of a person’s life is like that, there are people who say that we needn’t live that way, and that it’s a reliable formula for unhappiness.
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No, this [a sequence of lives] would be a grotesque horror show when seen from an objective viewpoint. Not only instrumental for 80+ years, but for eternity. Ugh.

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1. Life needn’t, and shouldn’t, be primarily instrumental. Sure, we plan for the future and do things for the future, but plainly the present, not the future, is what life really is. Not everyone lives in or for the future. As stated above, that’s a reliable formula for unhappiness.
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2. If life would be bad with more than one life, then it’s also bad with one life. If any life is bad, then your message is gloom and doom. Presumably you’re saying that a rational person regards this life as something to just somehow get through, in order to have the sleep at the end of life? (…with the assumption that there’ll just be this one life.)
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But what’s the consequence of a life that’s regarded only as something to get through, to get overwith, for something better later? Of courses that’s another instance of living for the future. …a recipe for misery, as described in #1 above.
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…because the future never arrives, as you well know.
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3. According to the Eastern traditions that speak of reincarnation, the sequence of lives isn’t eternal. It’s always finite. Everyone eventually achieves life-completion, life-resolution (often called “Liberation”), and the resulting end-of-lives. But, the Easterners (reasonably) say that you won’t reach that by wishing for it and living for the future.
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4. A life has good parts. And remember that life needn’t and shouldn’t be instrumental. Do you really think that there aren’t things that you like, for their own sake, not for a future purpose?
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5. Whether people who reproduce are causing births that otherwise wouldn’t happen, depends on your metaphysics. You’ve agreed about that. If you could achieve a goal consisting of convincing everyone on Earth to not reproduce, that will prevent some births if you’re a Materialist. By my metaphysics it won’t prevent any births, but will just remove one planet, in one possibility-world as a birth-location.
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6. What’s the conclusion of that gloom-&-doom view? You seem to be implying that, not only is life bad, but what is, must be bad too. …a nightmare conclusion. Do you really think it’s that bad? Even suicide won’t help anyone escape from that bad Reality that you claim. It’s just plain doom.
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By the metaphysics that I propose, what metaphysically (describably, discussably) is, is insubstantial, ethereal. …implying an openness, looseness and lightness that’s opposite to grim Materialism.
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That’s a reason why I say that what is, is good, beneficent, implying benevolence.
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...and what do you expect, and what would you prefer, after this life? Quiet sleep? But do you feel calm, quiet, completed, resolved and restful enough for that to be likely?

— Michael Ossipoff
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Well, here is the crux of antinatalist dilemma. People rather have eternities of experience in all its forms than some sort of non-existent sleep.

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Then you’re saying that you don’t believe in sleep at the end of life, for anyone? …and that everyone has eternal experience?
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Well sure, that can reasonably be argued. You’ll never experience a time when you don’t experience. Oblivion never arrives. Of course that’s the problem with rejecting life, and waiting and hoping for the end of experience. It never arrives.
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As I’ve said, at the end of lives (the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation), there comes a time during the death shutdown, when the person doesn’t remember that there ever was, or could be, such a thing as a worldly life, identity, time, or events. That person has reached Timelesssness. Yes, their body is about to shut down, after which their survivors will know that they aren’t experiencing anything. But by then (but before the complete shutdown of awareness) you don’t even know that there ever was or could be a body or a life anyway.
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(If there’s reincarnation, then most people won’t reach that deep stage of shutdown, because, while (and because) you still have your subconscious needs, wants, inclinations and dispositions, you’re someone who is starting a life, in some life-experience possibility-story. In other words, the reason why you’re in a life now, will still obtain at the end of this life.)
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However, in the meantime, more people are born that need to expend energy to maintain their comfort, deal with their own personal burdens, entertain their minds, and survive.

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No, they don’t only need. They also like. That’s what you people are missing. There are things that you like and enjoy, in the present, in this life.
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Michael Ossipoff

Revised post (original was canceled):

Presumably that we suffer only for us to continue to suffer. We don't go anywhere, nothing changes. It's a whole lot of effort for nothing. — darthbarracuda

How awful. You really believe that?

What should change? Why should there have to be a purpose? Why is it bad if there isn't one?

As we all know, life isn't all bad. Most any life has good parts, and some lives have mostly good parts.

If there's reincarnation, then it averages out. If there isn't, then you needn't now be concerned with birth, and it doesn't matter what other lives are like, because this is your only one. One finite life, followed by quiet, peaceful deep sleep.

Some argue that that sleep isn't available if you still feel agitatedly-inclined.

Anyway, by my metaphysics, but maybe other Idealisms too, what is, is good.

Michael Ossipoff

Then I apologize for misunderstanding you. You were kidding, and didn't mean that biological explanation as the full explanation.

Michael Ossipoff

We're in life because our parents had sex, an egg was fertilized, we were successfully carried to term and born, and we haven't died since. — T Clark

Thank you,, Mr. Science-Worshipper.

Yes, that's what they told you in school, and it's true, as far as it goes.

No one denies the material account, the science. But this is a philosophy forum, not a science forum.

Of course, if you're a Scientificist, then you're a Materialist, and you're legitimately expressing your metaphysics of Materialism. Acknowledged.

But your Materialist metaphysics has (or is) a big brute-fact.

Your belief in a cause-less brute-fact is an act of faith.

And, even if the causeless, brute-fact, fundamentally-existent, physical world that you believe in objectively exists, then it superfluously exists alongside, and duplicates, the inevitable complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts whose events and relations it matches. ...making the proposal of your objective physical world an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition.

Michael Ossipoff

Presumably that we suffer only for us to continue to suffer. We don't go anywhere, nothing changes. It's a whole lot of effort for nothing. — darthbarracuda

How awful. You really believe that?

What should change? Why should there have to be a purpose? Why is it bad if there isn't one.

As we all know, life isn't all bad.

Michael Ossipoff

What is the most common sexually-transmitted disease?

Birth. — Michael Ossipoff

I got that quote from the Internet, and of course there's something to it, because birth, and what follows it, isn't easy, is often uncomfortable and always entails suffering. But it isn't possible to objectively weigh the suffering against the good parts of a life, or to say it isn't worth it.

In the sense of a disease as being something undesirable or wrong with us, I don't perceive life that way.

Sure, the Eastern traditions seem to imply that. Nisargadatta said that birth is a calamity, and I don't doubt that the peaceful and quiet sleep at the end-of-lives, for the (rare) life-completed person is a good thing.

It seems to me that we're each here in life because there's a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story about us, as its protagonist...a hypothetical experiencer who wanted or needed life, or was in some way inclined or disposed toward it, at least subconsciously.

Maybe that want, need, inclination or disposition was misguided, and it would have been better to leave well-enough alone, but that's moot now. We're in life now, involved, and sometimes the more we do, in an effort for satisfaction and completion, the deeper we get involved.

It's a bit reminiscent of the Uncle Remus story about Bre'r Rabbit punching it out with a dummy made of tar, which had been set up for him as a trap The more he punched it, the more he got stuck to it.

...so we must punch it out with the gummy-figure until we really achieve life-completion. ...having gotten started in life..

...until we resolve life, the situation that we've gotten into by our want, need, inclination or disposition.. It's obvious that that resolution isn't usually going to happen in one lifetime.

I can't prove that there's reincarnation, though my metaphysics implies it.

But if we're in life because we're the hypothetical protagonist of a hypothetical life-experience possibility-story, and therefore someone disposed toward life...and if that disposition is unchanged, or even increased at the end of this life, then the reason why we're in a life will remain at the end of this life.

If we're still wrapped up in life, then next will it be that peaceful quiet rest, or will it remain life, because we're still slugging it out with, and stuck to, the gummy-bear?

Shakespeare said, "...to sleep, perchance to dream." Maybe it's the eventful, emotional dream, instead of the quiet, peaceful deep sleep, for people who haven't yet resolved the dream.

Anyway, if we aren't yet life-resolved, which would we prefer?

Speaking for myself, I think a next life would make perfect sense. Sure, It would be a bit scary, both from my point of view now, and from how it would seem then. But, if there's a sequence of lives, then the good and bad would at least average-out, right?

And still speaking for myself, I can say that, with a lot of help from parents, culture, and peers, I thoroughly botched my early life, from as early as I remember, didn't know what I was doing, how to interpret, regard, and conduct life.

You, Schopenhaur1, sound like you, too, have had a rather sour experience with life. What happened?

...and what do you expect, and what would you prefer, after this life? Quiet sleep? But do you feel calm, quiet, completed, resolved and restful enough for that to be likely?

Michael Ossipoff

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I looked up the metaphysicses of George Kelly, and of Piaget, but I couldn't find the part where they state what their metaphysicses take as fundamental or primary.

All I could find there were articles about psychology, and educational and theraputic technique.

If you meant that experience is primary, I've agreed that it is, in a meaningful sense, because it's fundamental to our life-experience possibility-stories. Above all, everything is true as we experience it, and our experience is the center sand subject of that possibility-story.

And, as you suggested, what our life-experience story requires is merely that it be self-consistent. But that's logic. The requirement that a proposition not be true and false.. Experience has a logical requirement, and logic has authority over experience.

As we experience a closer study of our physical world, what we experience is physical quantity values and their relations defined by physical laws, in abstract if-then facts--facts that must remain self-consistent and mutually consistent.

I said that the abstract fact "If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4", and said that that's so even when referring to a world with no conscious inhabitants...if there were people to count things, and things to count. ....or, in that uninhabited world, if wind or erosion caused two rocks to roll down a hill and come to rest next to two other rocks.

Likewise, from our perspective in this world, we can say that the Slithytove & Jabberwockey syllogism is an inevitable abstract fact, in any world, inhabited or not. ...because it doesn't need there to really be any Slithytoves or Jaberwockeys.

...or without a world, because of course it doesn't even need that, for that abstract fact's truth. I emphasized the independence of abstract if-then facts, and systems of them, from any outside context, medium, or permission..

Michael Ossipoff

What is the most common sexually-transmitted disease?

Birth.

I sometimes suggest that it would be impossible to prove that a world or a life-experience story is inconsistent, because there could always be some un-discovered physics that will consistently explain something that presently seems inconsistent.
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…as was the case with the black-body wavelength-energy curve, the Michaelson-Morely experiment result, the planet Mercury’s anomalous rotation of apsides, etc.
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And now there’s the apparent acceleration of the recession-speed of the more distant galaxies. Past experience suggests that there’s a system of physics that will make it consistent with currently-known physical facts.
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But say your house is locked and sealed, and you look away from the tv for just a second, and when you look back, there’s a Bengal tiger in the room in front of you. It just appeared in the second during which you looked away. Suppose things like that are happening all the time.
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Arthur Clarke said that sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. Sure, but what if blatant inconsistencies like that were happening all the time, in everyday life? …and not just at the frontiers of physics, because there isn’t any evident consistent physics in the first place.
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You’d have no reason to believe that a particular apparent inconsistency will later be shown consistent with previously-known things. The most reasonable presumption would be that the world, or your life-experience , is inconsistent. Of course you could always explain it by hallucination or amnesia, I guess…if you already had some reason to believe that the world is consistent in the first place.
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An organism couldn’t survive in an inconsistent world? Of course it can, in a cartoon for example. The survival of an observer might seem inconsistent with an inconsistent world, but there’d be no reason to expect that consistency either.
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But the world seems consistent. The relatively few seeming inconsistencies have shown a tendency to be explained by new physics.
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So why should the world/experience be so self-consistent?
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That’s why I said that it seems as if logic is in charge of experience.
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I’m going to read more of or about what was said by the authors that you named in your previous post. Maybe I’ll be able to understand the kind of metaphysics that they’re proposing. But it sounds complicated, and a metaphysics that’s more complicated, with unnecessarily-many complicated rules, is harder to justify.
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You seemed to be agreeing with that position that says that logic is secondary to minds.
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But if there’s human-like life on another planet, in this or any universe, then mathematics is the same for them as for us (…though of course they might pursue some different areas of mathematics—in addition to some same ones.).
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Logic too. Those things aren’t subject to the whims of minds.
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…and if that human-like life is reasonably nearby in this universe, then they’ll find the same laws of physics too.
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Anyway, even aside from that, I don’t understand how anyone can say that logic is only the result of minds.
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“If all Slithytoves are brillig, and all Jabberwockeys are Slithytoves, then all Jabberwockies are brillig.”
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Of course that inevitable if-then fact is true even if neither of its premises is true, and even if there are no Jabberwockeys or Slithytoves.
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It can be shown that if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers (…and of the rationals and the integers) is true, then 2+2=4.
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(…with a reasonable obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition.)
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That would be true even if there were no sentient beings. Even then it could be said (if there were anyone to say it) that if the additive associative axiom is true, and if there were someone to count, and some objects to count, and, if he put 2 objects next to 2 other objects, then there would be 4 objects together there.
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It’s an inevitable if-then fact.
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It’s evident that this universe’s mathematical physical laws have been operating for billions of years (unchanged, or nearly so, in recent billions of years, in our part of this universe), long before there were any minds. Mathematics is a logical subject. Logic evidently has been valid all that time too.
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Abstract if-then facts don’t, for their validity, need anything external to them. Likewise a system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts.
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As I said, among the infinity-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, there inevitably is one that matches the events and relations of this “physical” universes. There’s no reason to believe that this universe is other than that.
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Materialism, or any other relatively complicated or unexplained metaphysical theory, could of course also obtain, alongside, and duplicating the events and relations of, that logical system, but it would be an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition—and , at least in the case of Materialism, a brute-fact.

Our experience is a phenomenon and an inevitable possibility-story within that infinite set of complex logical systems.
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Anyway, I’ll look up those authors you referred to, and their metaphysicses.
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Michael Ossipoff
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To me it's not a question of logical consistency in the formal sense, but of self-consistency, of the relative inferential compatibility of new experience with our system of understanding.
A new event that appears inconsistent with our way of making sense of things will be handled in a number of ways. We can find a way to modify our previous understanding such as to make the challenging event consistent with our values. Or we can try and force the abberant meaning to comply with what we think it should mean. This usually doesn't end well. Or we can be left in a situation of crisis.
When we encounter experience that is wholy outside our ability to make sense of it, to accomdate our system of understanding to make room for it, we simply are unable to assimilate it. Our negative emotions respresent these sorts of transitional phases in our experience, when our world threatens to become chaotic and incoherent. Some psychologies argue that we do incorporate conflicting ideas and then cope with this by hiding from ourselves the internal conflict(cognitive dissonance, Freudian repression).

That would be better, because I didn't want to believe that impersonal abstract logical facts are metaphysically fundamental.

But then how do you explain the fact that our experience seemingly must always be logically self-consistent, never self-contradictory? Doesn't that suggest that logic is really in charge? ...that underlying logical rules govern our experience?

Michael Ossipoff

Brief preliminary partial reply:

Although you're trying hard not to, I think you're putting the cart before the horse in placing abstract logic before the world. — Joshs

Yes, a purely subjective experiential metaphysics would be neater, and, and as you said, i wanted that, and propose it as a our local metaphysical subset. But, as a whole metaphysics, it seems to run into problems--as I was discussing--and I couldn't justify it.

Will reply again after I study your post and its references.

Michael Ossipoff

"No, I say they're distinct, because they're unrelated to eachother, and completely independent of, and irrelevant to, and inaccessible to, eachother, with no connection of any kind to eachother." — Michael Ossipoff

Russell and Whitehead came very close to deducing all of mathematics from logic only (Principia Mathematica). Perhaps mathematical facts are not so independent as you might think? — Jake Tarragon

Mathematics from logic doesn't sound surprising to me. I've been regarding mathematics as a logical subject. A mathematical theorem is an abstract if-then fact whose "if " premise includes (but needn't be limited to) a system of axioms (geometric or algebraic).

And some mathematical systems, algebraic structures, like the system of the real numbers and its axioms, or more generally, the groups, fields, rings, & lattices, etc., could be regarded as a big inter-related system (but not a world or universe).

Because mathematics is a logic subject, I have no doubt that the same mathematics obtains in every possibility-world, and in every life-experience possibility-story.

Michael Ossipoff

Sorry this reply took so long, but it’s a long reply.
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I'm wondering how your model of if-then abstractions as a description of reality accounts for what it is that these abstractions are derived from. I don't mean an external world of material objects. I mean the moment to moment experiences that constitute all of our awarenesses, of changing perceptual features, of affective valenced dispositions and inclinations, of fragments of meanings, etc. Aren’t these building blocks of the abstract facts that populate your system in some sense more real than the concepts derived from them?

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Yes. Experience first. It seems to me that it comes down to our experience (but that's the bias of an experiencing-being). Each of us is the center, the primary and essential component, of our world, our life-experience possibility-story and, secondarily, the possibility-world that is its setting.
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I guess the main requirement of our experience is that it not be self-contradictory*, because a proposition can’t be true and false. For each of us, our own system of consistent inter-referring abstract if-then facts is subject to that fundamental requirement.
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*But it isn’t obvious to me why that is. If there are infinitely many (consistent) possibility-stories, aren’t there also infinitely-many (inconsistent)impossibility-stories too? It seems to suggest that maybe logic is metaphysically-fundamental after-all.
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We and our experience are what give meaning and relevance to the logical facts. …and that experience-story is more fundamental, as I mentioned above. …for us anyway, because, as animals, purposely-responsive devices, response to our environment is what we are.
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Nisargadatta said that we don’t create the word, but we make it relevant. But, when “relevant” means relevant to us, and we purposefully-responsive devices are billed as the bestowers of relevance and real-ness, doesn’t that sound circular, and give un-due self-importance to us purposely-responsive devices? That’s what I call an “animal-chauvinistic”view.
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And then there’s the fact that the abstract facts constituting our life-experience possibility-story aren’t really different from all the other ones. (…just as our bodies’ atoms aren’t different from those of our physical environment. We, our bodies, are part of the physical world, and likewise, in the same way, our life-experience possibility stories are part of the logical world.)
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…and the fact that our life-experience story seems to have to be logically-consistent, not self-contradicting—suggesting that abstract logic governs, has authority over, personal experience.
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And there couldn’t have not been abstract logical facts, because an abstract if-then fact, or a system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, doesn’t need any outside justification, context, continuum, medium, or reality or existence in an outside context. It need only be self-consistent, within its own context.
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So there couldn’t not be abstract facts, because each of those facts, and each system of inter-referring abstract facts, is independent of outside context, and needn’t be real or existent in any context other than its own. …and doesn’t need a medium or continuum in which to exist or be. …doesn’t need some sort of global permission that could be negated by a global fact that there are no facts.
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Someone pointed out that if there were no facts, then the fact that there are no facts would be a fact.
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But someone else pointed out that there could obtain a fact that there are no facts other than that one fact that there are no other facts.
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…but such a fact would be a special brute-fact, in need of explanation, but not having it (how could it, if there are no other facts?).
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Besides, for the reasons that I mentioned above, an abstract fact, or a system of inter-referring abstract facts, is completely isolated and independent of anything outside it, and doesn’t need a global permission that could be denied by a global fact like the one suggested in the 2 paragraphs before this one.
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Those are reasons why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.
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For all these reasons, I feel that the Anti-Realist metaphysics that I propose can’t really be complete, even metaphysically. But I propose it anyway, because it’s still locally valid, as a subset of what metaphysically is.
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…because, as I was saying before, a system of inter-referring abstract if-thens about hypotheticals that is my life-experience possibility-story is just as valid as any other abstract facts. And, because, from the special point of view of purposefully-responsive devices, our own experience is central, then our experience possibility-story is primary. …locally from out point of view, as purposefully-responsive devices.
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So Anti-Realism makes sense locally, in the world of purposefully-responsive devices, but can’t be taken to obtain generally and objectively.
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One other thing that I’ve got to say: One instance where I disagree with what Tegmark has said, is where he said that his metaphysics explains reality. No, a metaphysics can only explain metaphysical reality (where “metaphysical” means “describable and discussable”).
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I don’t think any metaphysics can describe or explain Reality, and I don’t think Reality can be discussed, described, or explained.
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I guess I'm wondering how your world changes and evolves. Is it through trying on for size new ways of talking about the world?

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Isn’t that what philosophy is? Metaphysics is my main philosophical interest, though I don’t think it or its subject is everything.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'm perfectly fine with a position stating there is nothing outside of this universe — Joshs

By my metaphysics, this universe is one of infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals. Among the infinity of such systems, there must be one that matches the events and relations of our physical universe.

A set of hypothetical physical-quantity variable-values, and a physical law (consisting of a hypothetical relation among those values), are part of the "if" premise of an if-then fact.

...except that one of those physical-quantity variable-values could be taken as the "then" premise of that if-then fact.

A mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose "if" premise includes, but needn't be limited to, a set of mathematical axioms (geometric or algebraic).

There are infinitely many systems of inter-referring abstract logical facts, including systems of facts of the types described above. As I said above, among that infinity of such systems, there must be one that matches the events and relations of this physical universe. There's no reason to believe that this physical universe is other than that.

Instead of one world of "is", infinitely-many worlds of "if".

Could the Materialist's objectively existent physical universe superfluously exist alongside with, and duplicating, the events and relations of that system of abstract facts? Sure, I can't prove it doesn't. But the suggestion of that is an unverifiable and unfalsifiable proposition that posits a brute-fact.

Anyone would agree that Materialism posits a big brute-fact.

My metaphysics (which I briefly outlined above, and will fill in better in about an hour) makes and needs no assumptions, and posits no brute-fact.

The issue for me is what sort of materialism is up to the job of taking into account phenomena relating to the subjective, the mental, consciosness etc.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Many or most (but not all) Materialists perceive that illusory problem. There's no problem.

We're animals. There's no such thing as Mind, Consciousness, etc., separate from the body.
We're animals, and animals are unitary. No separate Consciousness or Mind.

An animal is a purposefully-responsive device. ...like a mousetrap, a refrigerator-lightswitch, or a thermostat. ...but more complex, and influenced by its natural-selection origin.

Consciousness or awareness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device.

A purposefully-responsive device's experience is its surroundings and events, in the context of its purposes, as a purposefully-responsive device.

If you are against all materialisms, what sort of philosophical account do you think deals with reality better?

I briefly outlined it above. I have to prepare dinner for my 2-person household now, but in about an hour or so maybe there'll be something to add, that I've left out.

...but, in the meantime, I invite comments, disagreements or questions.

In pre-existing terms, my metaphysics could be called an Eliminative Ontic Structural Anti-Realism.

Michael Faraday suggested the principle of that metaphysics in 1844.

Since then, as you probably know, Wittgenstein has been quoted here, as saying that there are no things, just facts. ...which seems to agree with this metaphysics.

(...if "things" means "things that aren't facts", or maybe "physical things". ...as opposed to its more general meaning: "Things are whatever can be referred to.")

Tippler and Tegmark have made similar proposals, but it seems to me that they've both missed the mark in various ways.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, because there are infinitely many systems of inter-referring abstract facts, including life-experience possibility-stories, then, for any particular life-experience possibility-story, and for any particular part of it, there must also be infinitely many other life-experience possibility-stories that share that part in common with that story.

That's why I suggested that my metaphysics implies reincarnation. So I shouldn't say that different life-experience possibility-stories are necessarily entirely unrelated and inaccessible from eachother.

But they don't need a global continuum or a medium.

Michael Ossipoff

I emphasize that there's no continuum or medium that contains, and is shared in common by, all the abstract facts and systems of inter-referring abstract facts.

Michael Ossipoff

...and that's why I don't agree with Tegmark referring to the set of possibility-worlds as a type-IV "multiverse".

Michael Ossipoff

All the distinct systems of inter-referring abstract facts are irrelevant to eachother, — Michael Ossipoff


Yes, providing they are indeed distinct. I think we agree that this is debatable... — Jake Tarragon

No, I say they're distinct, because they're unrelated to eachother, and completely independent of, and irrelevant to, and inaccessible to, eachother, with no connection of any kind to eachother..

Though they have something in common, because they're all abstract facts, and members of the same set of similar things, they don't share a continuum. They aren't parts of the same universe together. Just because they're a set, doesn't mean that they're a universe. A universe has a common continuum.

In what way aren't they distinct from eachother?

Michael Ossipoff

Physics is the science of the fundamental constituents of reality and their interactions. — tom

...if you're a Materialist, and believe that this physical universe is all of reality.

I don't think there are many Materialists here.

Michael Ossipoff

But as I say, who gets to choose? A "subset" might be a mathematical abstraction, but it seems faintly silly to assign a universe or whatever to each one. Surely any mathematical underpinning of existence isn't based on Venn diagrams??!! — Jake Tarragon

Of course someone can refer to the "Universe" of all abstract facts.

But I'm not talking of arbitrarily dividing it into subsets.

There are systems of inter-referring abstract facts. Our physical universe is one such. (I always emphasize that there's no reason to believe that it's other than that).

The whole universe of all abstract facts is not an inter-referring system.

For any particular system of inter-referring abstract facts, all the other abstract facts that aren't part of that system are irrelevant to it.

All the distinct systems of inter-referring abstract facts are irrelevant to eachother, and isolated from eachother. They don't need eachother and aren't real in eachother's context. None of them needs anything outside itself. None of them has or needs reality, existence, meaning or relevance outside itself.

...and doesn't even need a medium in which to exist or be.

Michael Ossipoff

Sorry about this reply being in the afternoon instead of the morning. I've just finished spending the entire morning straightening-out some aggressive Materialist Atheists at another forum. ...and debating about the Parker Solar Probe.

I should have checked here first, because discussion here is more serious and conscientious.

"If we want to speak generally and objectively, then absolute Anti-Realism is out."--Michael Ossipoff

I thought you were on the right track there with your 'relevant and valid' criterion for the individual experiencing subject. But I was hoping you would extend it to what is referred to as third person objectivity.
In other words, scientific fact as culturally contingent pragmatic truth. — Joshs

Pragmatically, there's something cultural about scientific fact, but, what it really comes down to is individual experience.

What the physicists find, what they have a consensus on, comes into your experience when you read about their findings or consensus. In your life-experience possibility-story, what happens is that it comes into your experience.

Because all we know about the physical world is via our experience, that's why I suggest that it's more meaningful for a metaphysics to be about our individual life-experience possibility-stories.

The system of abstract facts making up that life-experience story are as valid, in their own context, as any other abstract facts or system of them.

But then I emphasize that I don't take that all the way to absolute Anti-Realism. ...because, just as the system of abstract facts consisting of our life-experience possibility-stories are just as valid as any other...It's also true that all the other abstract facts are just as valid as, and not different from, those in our life-experience possibility stories, and can't be ignored, for a completely general and objective account of what metaphysically (discussably, describably) is.

...even though I feel that the inividual-experience point-of-view makes the most sense for a metaphysics about our lives.

So I think it can be regarded either way (Realist or Anti-Realist), depending on what it's about--Our lives, or completely generally and objectively.

If I've misunderstood what you said, let me know. I always want to answer objections, differences and I'm always willing to better clarify what I mean.

Michael Ossipoff

No I can understand the words and phrases; it how they all hang together to support your conclusions that I don't get — Janus

Then that's different. It isn't that you don't understand what I said. It's that you think that I said something that I didn't support.

...but you regrettably are unable to specify which conclusion(s), in particular, it was :D

That's ok, but of course I can't be expected to answer a disagreement with an unspecified statement or conclusion.

. In any case it's off-topic as far as I can tell.

"What does it mean to say that something is physical or not?"

You asked about the matter of physical and nonphysical things. I answered that it's possible to explain "physical things" by nonphysical things. (Not unheard of with Idealisms :D). I mentioned that as part of my answer to your comment about whether saying that there are physical things and nonphysical things implies Dualism--a matter that you'd brought up.

Michael Ossipoff

I'm sorry to say none of this makes any sense to me Michael. I've tried a few times to understand your metaphysics and failed every time. Perhaps I'm simply not intelligent enough for the task. :) — Janus

Yes. In fact it's worse than that. You aren't even able to say which statement, word, term or phrase you don't understand the meaning of.

Michael Ossipoff

So the whole universe is an abstraction your view? I don't think that standpoint is going to be of much help. — Janus

What were you wanting it to help with?

It's helpful as an explanation. ...an explanation that doesn't make any assumptions or posit any brute-facts.

In fact, not only is it explanatory--It's inevitable fact.

As a system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, the metaphysics that I described doesn't say anything that anyone would disagree with. Which part of it do you disagree with?

So it's a completely uncontroversial metaphysics.

Maybe I should add a little detail:

A set of hypothetical physical-quantity variable-values, and a physical law, consisting of a hypothetical relation between those values, are parts of the "if " premise of an if-then fact.

...except that one of those variable-values can be taken as the "then" conclusion of that if-then fact.

A mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose "if " premise includes (but needn't be limited to) a set of mathematical axioms (algebraic or geometric).

A physical system is an inter-referring system of such abstract facts. As I said, there's no reason to believe that our physical universe is other than that.

But the if-then facts needn't only be mathematical. If there's a traffic roundabout at the corner of 34th & Vine, then it's also a fact that, if you go to 34th & Vine, you'll encounter a traffic roundabout.

Any fact about our physical universe corresponds to an if-then fact.

We're used to declarative grammar because it's convenient. But I suggest that we're unduly believing our grammar. Conditional grammar is all that's needed to describe our physical world.

Instead of one world of "is", there are infinitely-many worlds of "if".

I mentioned physical laws because, when we more closely examine the physical world, that's what we find evidence for. ...then that's the form taken by our experience of the physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

Saying that there are physical things and nonphysical things isn't Dualism if you acknowledge that the "physical" things are just an aspect or description of more fundamental nonphysical things (such as a system of abstract logical facts).

Our physical universe is explainable as a system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals. ...one of infinitely-many such systems. There' s no reason to believe that it's other than that.

It's unprovable and indeterminable whether or not the Materialist's objectively-existent physical world superfluously exists alongside, and duplicates, that system of abstract facts. A claim that it does would be an unverifiable, unfalsifiable proposition, positing a brute-fact.

Michael Ossipoff

Perdidi Corpus said:

It is a problem if you are trying to have a discussion with someone and they keep throwing the word or the idea of "subjectivity" as a way to keep the discussion indiscussible - if one is to get to any conclusion (even if such a conclusion has if´s and but's.). I believe that the idea of subjectivity is at the heart of the reason why philosophy is regarded as a waste of time." — Perdidi Corpus

Probably so.

In metaphysics, in academic philosophy, and here too, probably due to academic influence, there seems to be a notion of relativism, indeterminability, indeterminacy, unknowability and inconclusiveness. ...even about metaphysics. One person's guess is as good as the next person's guess.

Sure, there is such a thing as unknowability. I don't believe that all of Reality is discussable and describable.

But I'm sorry, but there are facts that aren't in question. There are inevitable abstract facts. And there are metaphysicses, such as the one that I propose, that are entirely based on those inevitable abstract facts. Metaphysics isn't indeterminable or inconclusive.
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T. Clark said:

@Aurora, Michael Ossipoff, and I were having a discussion on another thread about opinion vs. fact. It seems to me this is the same issue.

It may very well be.

Every statement made by a person is a subjective opinion.

How can you say that? Do you think that no one lies?

Alternatively, in my subjective opinion, every statement made by a person is a subjective opinion. In my opinion, those statements are equivalent.

They most certainly are not.

Sure, when you state a fact, your statement might be false.

If the fact that you're stating isn't already obvious to the rest of us, then, from our point of view, maybe it isn't a fact, and your statement is false..

Can we even say that it's your opinion? No. You might be lying. Not only might your statement be false;. It might not even be your opinion.

If you state an opinion about a fact, instead of a fact, then you're acknowledging that it might not be a fact, but you're claiming (truly or falsely) that it's your opinion.

Stating a fact, and stating your opinion about a fact are entirely different statements..

What you seem to be saying is that, if the rest of us, at least so far, don't have other information other than your say-so, then your statement of a fact can only be regarded as an opinion, not a fact.

You're partly right: Your statement about a fact might be false, because, though your opinion is that it's a fact, you're mistaken. But, as I said, it might not even be your opinion, if you're lying.

So, if we don't yet have other information on the matter about which you make a statement, all that can be said with certainty is that your statement is a statement.

But the reliability, or lack of reliability, of what you say is a whole other matter, different from the matter of whether you're stating a fact or stating an opinion.

"Stating a fact" doesn't mean making a true statement about a fact. That's where your main error is.

When you state a fact, you might be stating a genuine fact, and you might not. Whether your alleged "fact" is genuine or not, it, either way, might or might not be your opinion that it's a fact.

The truth of your statement, and the matter of whether it really expresses your opinion, are two separate matters. The former is undecidable if we don't have other, reliable, information about the matter. The latter remains undecidable anyway.

But stating a fact, and stating an opinion about a fact, are two entirely different statements. ...even though both statements give us equally little information. You're confusing the statement with the information that it gives us.

What you're really saying is that people's statements aren't reliable (maybe mistaken, maybe lying). No argument there.
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Of course you (and the person you quoted) might really be discussing the larger Realism vs Anti-Realism issue.

I've discussed that, and stated my position on it, a number of times.

Very briefly:

Anti-Realism makes sense for a metaphysics, because, as we'd all agree, our experience is from our own point of view, and all that we know about the physical world is from our experience. ...and the system of abstract logical facts consisting of our individual life-experience possibility-story is as valid, in its own context, as any other system of abstract facts.

That's why my metaphysics is an Anti-Realism.

But that Anti-Realism mustn't be taken too far. The abstract logical facts that make-up your life-experience possibility-story aren't really different from any other abstract logical facts. ....for objectivity and generality, which philosophy is supposed to have,

We can say that what's relevant and valid is only what an experiencing being (us) experiences...where "relevant and valid" means relevant and valid to an experiencing being. That sounds animal-chauvinistic. If we want to speak generally and objectively, then absolute Anti-Realism is out.

Michael Ossipoff

I'm curious about your background ... occupation / life phase ... answering is totally optional, of course :)

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Life-Phase: Age 72
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Retired
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Background: As my mother used to say, "Don't get me started." :D
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Theist. Vedantist.
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I’ve like science, but I disagree with the religion of Science-Worship.
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My metaphysics differs from those of the 3 usual versions of Vedanta, but they differ greatly from eachother too.
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I've never understood the writing that I've encountered about Buddhist metaphysics, but there are evidently some mutually-conflicting versions (as is the case with Vedanta too).
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But I'm not criticizing or disagreeing with Buddhist metaphysics. To the extent that I understand what's said about its metaphysics, the differences seem likely to be largely definitional.
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Buddhists have a good point, when saying that we aren't the person that we were at an earlier time of life. I don't know the person I was, in elementary school, junior-high, or highschool. ...when it comes to how I arrived at and justified the misguided motivations, values, and purposes, and view about my life.
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(…but I suspect that I had lots of help from parental, cultural and schoolground bullying.)
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Well, because I’m not the person I was then, then of course I needn’t blame myself for “my” role in what happened.
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Likewise, because that person wasn’t me, then I’m not the one who missed-out because of all that.
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Saying that reminds me of Quintero, in Enemy of the State, when he said, “That ain’t me.”, when shown a video of him violating his conditions of probation by meeting with labor-officials.
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Everything that happened previous is just a “given”, not meaningfully evaluatable as good or bad, loss or gain, or regrettable.

In a meaningful sense, the situation now is all.

It seems to me that Tolle emphasized that too--regret about the past, as well as postponement to the future.
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In the song “Rock & Roll Gypsies”, they say, “The winner takes nothing, and the loser gets all that remains.”
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Nisargadatta said, “From the point of view of the sage, nothing has ever happened.”
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I wasn’t going to get into background, but, once I get started…
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But anyway, even though we aren’t the same person we were at a much earlier time of life, isn't it obvious that, as a practical matter, in a meaningful sense, we're the same person we were yesterday?
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I don't claim to know enough about Buddhism to know whether they're saying that, metaphysically, there isn’t anything, but there’s no reason to believe that there’s anything by the Materialist's meaning of something.
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But I'm not a Materialist, and even though there’s no reason to believe that there metaphysically (discussabley, describably) is anything other than insubstantial, ethereal abstract facts, that structure or system of abstract facts is a person’s life-experience story and the possibility-world in which it’s set. I don’t call that “nothing”.
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So maybe my view that there isn't just "nothing" gives me more in common with Vedantists than Buddhists, as regards metaphysics. But I admit almost complete ignorance about Buddhist metaphysics.
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The subject of facts is of interest to me, because obviously there are inevitable abstract facts. For instance:
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1)
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If all slithytoves are brillig, and all jabberwockeys are slithytoves, then all jabberwockies are brillig.
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That inevitable abstract if-then fact is equally true if none of the slithytoves are brillig, or if none of the jaberwockeys are slithytoves, or if there are no jaberwockeys or slithytoves.
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An abstract logical if-then fact can be true even if its premise is false (of course then its conclusion isn’t true). …or even if the things referred to in the premise and conclusion don’t objectively exist.
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An abstract if-then fact need only have validity or reality in its own context. An inter-referring system of such facts needn’t have validity, existence or reality other than in its own inter-referring context.
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2)
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Definitions:
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Let “1” mean the multiplicative identity, specified in the multiplicative identity axiom of the real numbers.
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Let “2” mean 1+1
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Let “3” mean 2+1
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Let “4” mean 3+1
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“If ” premise:
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If the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true…
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”Then “ conclusion:
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…then 2+2=4.
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That, too, is an inevitable abstract if-then fact.
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A hypothetical set of physical-quantity variable-values, and a hypothetical physical law consisting of a hypothetical relation among those variable-values, are parts of the “if “ premise of an abstract if-then fact.
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…except that one of those variable-values can be taken as the “then” conclusion of that if-then fact.
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A mathematical theorem is an abstract if-then fact whose “if “ premise includes, but needn't be limited to, a set of mathematical axioms (algebraic or geometric).
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There are also infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract if-thens like those. Inevitably, one of those infinitely-many logical systems has events and relations that are identical to those of our physical universe. There’s no reason to believe that our physical universe is other than that.
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That metaphysics is based on inevitable abstract logical facts. None of its statements have anything to disagree with. It’s a completely uncontroversial metaphysics, and I state it as fact.
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Regarding the matter of facts, this discussion got me started on something that I have a lot to say about.
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Michael Ossipoff








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