People unnecessarily make trouble for themselves. — Michael Ossipoff

What do you mean by that Michael? — Posty McPostface

People make trouble for themselves by calling likes or preferences "wants", or even taking them to be needs.

Did we need to be conceived? Did Schopenhauer think so?

So, if, ultimately, nothing was really needed, then any likes that are there for us are extra and positive.

From the physical standpoint, we're purposefully-responsive devices designed by natural-selection to pursue preferences and likes.

In other words, we're here to do our best (toward our likes and preferences), as opposed to being here for things to happen to.

In other words, what can happen really matters at (only) the time when we have a choice to make (...such as a choice about how to avoid a less-preferred outcome). What we're about isn't outcomes that have already happened. ...or, in general, things that we can't influence.

That we aren't about outcomes after they happen is suggested by something similar said in the Bhagadvita.

Similar things are found in Buddhist writing.

Regarding the above, remember the "Desiderata" saying, which says to do our best about what we can, and accept (disregard) what we can't.

...and, as for our choices, they're determined, are made for us, by our preferences and our surrounding-circumstances, and therefore aren't even really our choices. Our role in those choices is merely to make a best-guess about what will best serve our preferences, given the surrounding-circumstances.

I don't know what your metaphysics is, but the above is all applicable even under Materialism.

Michael Ossipoff

Right, but they experience that making of unnecessary trouble as necessary at the time. — macrosoft

Yes.

Michael Ossipoff

"It isn't possible to achieve all likes. No problem." — Michael Ossipoff
— Posty McPostface

Big problem. We live in strife over trivialities in life.

...self-made strife.

Often we do, but we needn't.

If Schopenhauer said that, he was speaking only for himself (...and admittedly for a lot of other people too)...but his attitude toward life is unnecessary and guarantees artificial self-imposed unhappiness.

People unnecessarily make trouble for themselves.

Michael Ossipoff

Want's can not all be satisfied — Posty McPostface

Wants could better be called "preferences" or "likes". We achieve our likes as well as feasible in a world that isn't custom-made for us. No problem.

Needs? Things that are needed in order for continued pursuit of likes.

Ultimately, what was really needed?

We live with a constant
perceived deficit in life. — Posty McPostface

It isn't possible to achieve all likes. No problem.

But, isn't that pointless? — Posty McPostface

How so? What's wrong with achieving what you like when and to the extent feasible?

How much do we really need?

Merely to do our best, toward our likes, and toward a considerate, harmless, beneficial lifestyle.

Michael Ossipoff

Maybe you're conflating two different meanings for "objective":

1. More than contextual

2. Unbiased or based on observation

Michael Ossipoff

You said:

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I agree with this: ". . . [Existence or real-ness] means something only in and with respect to a specified context,"

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…and then:
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the physical world in question is the objective world

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Objective existence is the opposite of only-contextual existence. So the 2nd statement of yours that I quoted above contradicts the 1st one.
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Our physical world is what we observe, experience and are part of. That doesn’t make it objectively-existent.
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Also, that's not really addressing what I was trying to get you to address.

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I answered your questions as best I could interpret them. If, by your questions, you meant something other than what I answered, then feel free to re-word your questions. I don’t evade questions or refuse to answer them.
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Michael Ossipoff

I haven't the faintest idea what you're saying in most of that, unforunately. — Terrapin Station

Fair enough.

If you don't ask what I mean by at least one passage, word, phrase, sentence, etc., that's your choice, and none of my business.

But, saying that you don't understand what I said, without specifying a particular passage, word, phrase, sentence, or meaning--obviously isn't an answerable objection or a convincing objection.

But, (Rhetorical question only--Don't feel obligated to reply.) which part of this don't you understand?:

It's meaningless to speak of objective existence or objective real-ness.

Existence or real-ness means something only in and with respect to a specified context.

Believing in such a thing as objective existence and real-ness is a common error of academic philosophers and people at this forum.

This physical world, the setting for our experience, is undeniably real and existent in its own context and in the context of our lives, and it would be meaningless to say that it's objectively existent.

Michael Ossipoff

And where is "their own inter-referring context"? — Terrapin Station

If you mean spatially, this universe (...which I mean to include the entirety of any physically-inter-related multiverse of which our Big-Bang-Universe is part) isn't in any space external to it. For it, the only space is the space that's an attribute of it (including, of course its overall spatial system, and the particular spatial-systems of its sub-universes such as out Big-Bang-Universe).

In other words, our universe isn't in external space.

If you don't mean spatially:

For the complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things, that is your life-experience-story, "[its] own inter-referring context" is (only) among those abstract-implications, propositions and hypothetical things.

Where with respect to anything else? No relation to anything else. Each such system is entirely separate, isolated and independent from others (...which, by definition, aren't inter-referring with it) and from any putative (but nonexistent) continuum or medium in the ipcd realm.

By "the ipcd realm", I mean "The totality of all the systems in which there is ipcd logical structure* ".

*not that there's any other kind of logical structure.

...including, for example, your experience-story and the physical world in which it's set...even though of course your experience isn't ipcd, except in specific respects regarding certain aspects of your surroundings....like the logical relations among its events and things, and the sorts of physically-perceived "facts" that can be written down.

After I posted my most recent reply, I felt that I should clarify that there's a big ontological/metaphysical error among academic philosophers if they think there's such a thing as "objective existence" or "objective real-ness" in the ipcd realm. There isn't.

It's meaningless to speak of "objective existence" or "objective real-ness" in that realm.

Existence and real-ness there are only meaningful in and with respect to a specific context.

Other than in that realm? How would I know.

Michael Ossipoff

No, not how you'd say they're demonstrated. What you think the ontological source of them is

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None. None needed. I’m not saying that any of it is real or existent in any context other than in their own inter-referring context.
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I assert that existence and reality, in the ipcd realm, only have meaning with respect to and in a specified context.
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--basiscally, where do you think it comes from?

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No need for reality or existence in any context external to it
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”Abstract implications can be about propositions that are about hypothetical things.” .... — Michael Ossipoff
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So you're thinking that aboutness is in . . . some person-independent abstract realm or something?

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I don’t claim that any of it is about anything real or existent.
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It could be argued that even abstract-implications are a meaningless notion without someone to be aware of them, and that there’s no such thing as person-independence. …but what if that person is complementarily built-in to the system? That satisfies the need for an observer. Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark have said that too. …have said something to the effect that the observer whom the logical system is about, gives it whatever apparent (to that observer) existence it needs (if it needs any). (…even though Tippler and Tegamark were Realists.)
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It seems to me that Nisargadatta, too, said something to the effect that you didn’t make this universe, but you give it its “reality” (…such "reality" as it has, or seems to).
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I’m saying that the person, the experiencer, the protagonist of the experience-story, is complementary with the abstract-implications. It’s a whole complementary system that’s independent of anything external to it, and doesn’t need any reality or existence.
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In what external context does any Materialist believe that this physical universe (including any physically-inter-related multiverse that it’s part of) exist or have reality?
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What we know is that our physical world is real and existent in its own context, and that of our lives. What other reality or existence does it need? In what other ipcd context could it have existence and reality?
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Michael Ossipoff

”There's already too much philosophical talk that doesn't express the speaker's actual position.” — Michael Ossipoff
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When it comes to philosophy, why is the speaker's personal opinion a matter of importance?

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Because, though debates and rhetoric can be of interest, just for their own sake, discussion-space is unnecessarily cluttered if people argue for positions that aren’t theirs. Maybe that’s why philosophy hasn’t been getting anywhere. So I say, it’s better to pare it down to what we feel can truly, correctly and supportably be said. In in-principle-completely-describable metaphysics, that would be easy, if people were willing to abide by science’s desiderata in metaphysics. In such matters, I try to say only things that are uncontroversially-supportable.
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”Why should there be a limit on questioning a widely-held potentially-incorrect assumption (...that you don't agree with)?” — Michael Ossipoff
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Well, some perspectives are highly offensive to some people. As example, the victims of Charles Manson probably don't want to hear his side of the story, even if some person who is clever with words and ideas could make such a case.

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My metaphysical proposal seems to generate a lot of anger, but it isn’t intentional. I’m not trolling or chumming. But honesty calls for sometimes saying things that people won’t like.
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As for moral topics, I avoid those, except when, a few times, I’ve mentioned that societal-improvement is quite impossible. People understandably want to have hope about it, and that hope has been expressed for many decades—and how successful have our best societal-improvement efforts been?
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There’s nothing wrong with letting Charlie Manson have a good legal defense, because, when legal fairness is denied to the (at least perceived) guilty, that amounts to pre-judgment without a trial, whenever someone has a feeling that someone is guilty.
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As for philosophers arguing in Manson’s favor, no there’s no reason to do so unless they believe what they’re saying.
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Michael Ossipoff

Also, by the way, what would you say that has to do with aboutness? X is about y? — Terrapin Station

First, let me suggest an abbreviation:

I'd like to abbreviate "in-principle-completely-describable" as "ipcd".

Facts needn't be about anything that exists in some preferred context. Abstract implications can be about propositions that are about hypothetical things. ....things that are only in "if" clauses.

...and none of a system of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things needs to exist in (or be about anything in) any context other than its own inter-referring context.

That's what my metaphysics discusses. I propose that there's no reason to believe that your experience of the ipcd aspects of your surroundings, the logical relations among the things and events of your surroundings, are other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things.

I suggest that experience is primary to all that, but the ipcd aspects of your experience have to be consistent, because there are no mutualiy-contradictory facts, because there are no true-and-false propositions.

That consistency-requirement is what brings logic into your experience. But I suggest that experience comes first. Inevitably, among all the abstract-implications and systems of them, there's one about the ipcd experience of someone who is you.

As I said, experience, and a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about propositions about hypothetical things, together comprise a complementary system, which is a logical system to the extent that experience of ipcd things must be consistent, for the reasons that I mentioned.

Existing only in their own contexts, such logical systems (with their built-in observer) are inevitable.

It needn't be a question of which came first, experience or the logical system of the ipcd aspects of experience-of-surroundings. They're complementary, part of a whole complementary inter-referring system that needn't be real or existent in any context other than its own.

Michael Ossipoff

And in your view the source of those facts is? — Terrapin Station

It's been said in these forums, and (though I'm not an authority) it seems right to me, that abstract logical facts are demonstrated by showing that they're tautologies. Certainly an implication-proposition could be proved by showing that its antecedent and consequent are just two wordings of the same proposition.

For example, the proposition:

"There isn't a true-and-false proposition."

...can be shown to be a tautology.

Tautologies don't need any proof. For example, the source of the truth of a tautological implication is the fact that it consists of two ways of wording the same proposition. (The above-stated proposition in quotes can be worded as an implication.)

Michael Ossipoff

Should philosophers seek to understand and articulate highly unpopular points of view, even if they don't personally share such perspectives? — Jake

No. If a position isn't popular, and you don't agree with it, then let it be advocated by people who do agree with it. There's already too much philosophical talk that doesn't express the speaker's actual position.

It seems philosophers can serve a useful function by exploring the boundaries of the group consensus, because what is widely assumed to be true is not always so, and correcting such mistakes seems constructive where possible.

What are the limits of such a process? When should a potentially incorrect widely shared assumption be challenged, and when should it be left alone? — Jake

Why should there be a limit on questioning a widely-held potentially-incorrect assumption (...that you don't agree with)?

Speaking for myself (I've been questioning a widely-held metaphysical position), the only limit is the amount of time that can be spent on discussions.

Michael Ossipoff

So, I asked you what the non-human source for what those discussions are about is.

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How about my Slitheytoves example:
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If there were Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys, and an attribute called “brillig-ness”, and if all Slithetytoves were brillig, and all Jaberwockeys were Slitheytoves, then all Jaberwockeys would be brillig.
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I don’t have any emotional reaction to Jaberwockeys, Slitheytoves or brillig-ness. But the above paragraph states a fact, whether or not you, I or anyone cares about it. …even without there being such things as Slitheytoves, Jaberwockeys or brillig-ness.
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That discussion, in that Slithetytoves paragraph isn’t about anything that exists in the context of our physical world, and it doesn’t need to be.
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Michael Ossipoff

In other words, tell me which phrase of mine you're asking about when you ask what it's supposed to be.

Michael Ossipoff

Did any of that tell me what non-human aboutness is supposed to be? — Terrapin Station

It's your phrase. So, if I haven't answered your question, it's because I don't know exactly what you mean by it. Tell me what you mean by it, and I'll tell you what it is (or is supposed to be), if I can.

Michael Ossipoff

Teleology is a projection of nature that explains its processes in terms of ends or goals.

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“Nature” is an unfortunate word to use, because, to many, it refers to this physical universe (…and you’ve used it that way). I don’t think that teleology is always meant in that way, in that context, on that scale.
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Intent as the basis of how things are—Yes.
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I agree with those who say that good intent is the basis of how things are, and that, in fact, Reality is Benevolence itself.
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People who demand evidence seem to forget that evidence needn’t be proof (and there can be no proof in matters regarding the nature or character of Reality).
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Evidence is concisely defined by Merriam-Webster as “outward sign” (which could be more wordily called “reason to believe something based on its influence or effect on something else”).
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Evidence’s convincingness is a subjective individual matter, and a matter of degree. The validity of evidence doesn’t depend on it being liked by or convincing to you.
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Of course such matters, on the scale of how things are, overall—the matter of the nature or character of Reality--aren’t provable or meaningfully assertable or debatable.
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I define faith as trust without or in addition to evidence. The convincingness of reasons or justifications for faith are at least as subjective and individual as is the convincingness of evidence.
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1. It assumes vitalism, some extra life force beyond the laws of nature.

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That objection assumes that the laws of physics rule all, and that this physical universe is all that there is, or at least that all else supervenes on it. I’ve answered that belief in other threads. But, anyway, from Merriam-Webster’s definition of Vitalism, teleological influence doesn’t depend on Vitalism.
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4. It is “mentalistic,” assuming mind in nature when there is none.

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That depends of which meaning of the vague word “Nature” is meant. This physical universe?
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Some feel objection to the notion of Reality having intent. Presumably that objection comes from the fact that people are used to a mechanistic, intent-less physical world. But it’s a mistake to assume that Reality is necessarily like the physical world (…or even like the logic-governed, in-principle-fully-describable, metaphysical world). …or even that such an assumption should, for some reason, be more likely, or the default assumption.
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Dfopolis said:
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…mechanistic and teleological explanations are not in conflict.
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[…]
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Since mechanism focuses on means, while teleology focuses on the consequent ends they are not opposed, but complementary.
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[…]
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3. This objection is based on irrational either-or thinking. As noted earlier, finality and mechanism are not op¬posed, but related as ends and means.
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[…]
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Mechanisms can serve ends and ends require means.

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Yes, and all of that is something that I was arguing to Dfopolis in a previous thread of his.
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It’s desirable, if possible, to explain something at the lowest possible level of explanation, before appealing to or invoking a higher-level explanation.
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Explain it physically if possible. Or explain it via an in-principle-fully-describable metaphysical “mechanism” if possible. …before invoking the indescribable, and positing something that appears, at the in-principle-fully-describable metaphysical level, as a brute-fact with no in-principle-fully-describable explanation.
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For example, it isn’t necessary to say that God created the Earth and the human species in contravention of the laws of physics.
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Likewise, a metaphysical “mechanism” (such as I propose) for there being our lives this physical world, as inevitable and metaphysically-self-generating, is NOT in conflict with Theism.
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And, speaking of teleology, an advantage of my metaphysics is that it explains this physical world without positing that it (including its bad-parts) was created by Benevolence.
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One thing that the Atheists are right about is their “Argument from Evil”.
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Yes, as we’ve agreed, what-is, is overall good. …very good, in fact. The bad parts are temporary. So yes, there’s good reason to believe that Reality is Benevolence.
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But what about those bad parts, temporary though they may be? Do you really think that Benevolence would make there be those?
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So, it’s questionable to try to explain the (in some cases extremely) bad-parts of some lives as something created by the Uncaused Cause or First Cause. Why would those bad times be created by Benevolence? They wouldn’t.
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I’ve been proposing a metaphysics that uncontroversially explains our lives and this physical universe as inevitable and self-generated …but things are still as good as they can be, given that inevitable system’s inevitable bad-parts.
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Theists are used to the notion that God created this physical world, and that Theism requires that belief. But not all Theists agree with that. The Gnostics don’t, and neither do I.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'm arguing for the independent existence of God from time in terms of God being equivalent to the Greatest Conceivable Being. — adhomienem

Of course. Time is just an attribute of this physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

I've made some edits to the last paragraph of my post before this one.

Michael Ossipoff

”Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions.” — Michael Ossipoff
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What the heck would non-human aboutness be?

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Good point. That’s why my metaphysics is Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism (as opposed to OSR).
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(I’m not saying that there aren’t hypothetical objective world-stories, in addition to hypothetical subjective experience-stories. But it’s the subjective experience-stories that are (tautologically) about our experience. The hypothetical objective world-stories have no relevance to us. Admittedly, someone could question the reality of those objective world-stories, except that even their abstract implications can, in principle, be evident to us and aren’t different in kind from the abstract-implications comprising our subjective stories.)
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Each of us is central and primary to our experience-story. …a hypothetical story about our experience, a story for, and centered on, each of us.
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“There are” the abstract facts of logic, in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred-to. What they’re about is abstract in the sense that you’ve referred to as non-human aboutness, independent of human feelings and impressions.
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You could say that even the abstract-facts are things in our experience and dependent on our experience. Of course, there’s a complementarity between the abstract-implications, the complex system of inter-referring abstract implications that is your experience-story, and you the experiencer and protagonist of that story.
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It’s all one big inter-referring mutually-complementary system that needn’t have any reality or existence in any context other than in its own inter-referring context.
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“Reality” and “Existence” are very misunderstood and misused words. Like “speed”, they’re only meaningful with-respect-to a frame-of-reference, a context.
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Something can be said to be real or existent (only) in and with-respect-to a context.
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There’s no need to say that this physical universe is real or existent in any in-principle-fully-describable context other than its own, and that of our lives. When you realize that, you realize that the Materialist is needlessly insisting on believing that this physical universe exists in some unspecified other, larger, context that’s part of the in-principle-fully-describable realm (…as it must be, because he also is convinced that there isn’t what’s not in-principle-fully-describable).
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(I use that awkward wording starting with “what’s…”, because I don’t want to say “something” or “anything” in reference to what’s not in-principle-fully-describable, because my definition of ‘thing’ includes in-principle-fully-describableness.)
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That unsupported belief in that unspecified larger context sounds to me like a religion believed in by the Materialist.
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When I say that, I should clarify that I consider myself religious too. I don’t disagree about a larger context, and I don’t specify it either. But I don’t say that it’s in-principle-fully-describable.
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And, differing with most other Theists (but not so much with the Gnostics), I suggest that this abstract-implications-comprised physical world of our experience, as the setting of our experience-story, wasn’t created from a higher level. As the protagonist of our experience-story, and the "Will-To-Life", we’re the reason for our life and therefore of our world. That complementarity is self-generated. As the Atheists argue (They’re right about that much), Benevolence wouldn’t and didn’t make there be this physical-world. (the World, but not this physical-world.)
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This reply has been a bit far-ranging, but one topic brings in another.
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Michael Ossipoff

And what that's about is not determined by how people think of it, in your view? — Terrapin Station

Yes, I'd say that. Some discussions like that are just about the relations among named propositions--in particular, the relations among their truths and falsities that are needed if a true-and-false proposition isn't permitted.

I've discussed why it's tautological that there can't be a true-and-false proposition. ..implying that there are no two mutually-contradictory facts.

Human impressions and feelings aren't involved in those starkly-simplified abstract discussions.

Someone here said that proving the truth of a logical proposition comes down to showing that it's a tautology. So, from what that person said, for example, showing the truth of proposition about an implication (an implication-proposition) amounts to showing that its consequent is just another way of saying its antecedent.

Michael Ossipoff

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about- — Michael Ossipoff


What would be an example of that? — Terrapin Station

Logic discussions.

MIchael Ossipoff

As for epiphenomenalism, I think it's a misguided idea.

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Yes, it’s nonsense.
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…as is the notion of a “philosophical zombie”.
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…as is the whole “Hard Problem Of Consciousness” or "Mind-Body Problem" that this thread is about.
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Humans are animals. Animals are biologically-originated purposefully-responsive devices. Which part of that don’t people understand?
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Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device sufficiently closely-related or similar to the speaker for hir (him/her) to feel kinship. (A chauvinistic definition to fit our arbitrary and chauvinistic feeling about what’s conscious.)
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We were all taught that in pre-secondary school (which has also been called junior-high, or middle-school). What we were taught about that was correct. Academic philosophers seem to have forgotten what they knew in pre-secondary school.
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Our experience is the experience of being an animal. It’s “what it’s like” to be an animal. Of course there’s that experience. …purposes, surroundings in the context of those purposes, and choices to make, based on purposes and surroundings. Of course each animal or other purposefully-responsive device has purposes and choices to make, whether it be a Roomba or you.
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Michael Ossipoff

Yes, and that's why I said that even ordinary everyday experiential reality isn't completely describable.

But there can be limited discussions in which there indeed is a word for everything that that discussion is about--everything that figures in that discussion--and a correspondence between those words and those elements of that limited discussion. The topic of such a discussion is completely describable.

Michael Ossipoff

Which is the "complete" idea, but that idea is nonsense in my view.

We don't even have to get into the fact that the idea of "everything about x" is nonsense.

The mere fact that descriptions are sets of words, where what's described (unless it's a self-referential case of descriptions of words) is not (the same) words, makes nonsense of the idea re leaving versus not leaving something out.

Descriptions are sets of words that individuals take to tell something about, charactize in some way, etc. various things about something else. That's all they are. — Terrapin Station

Maybe I should call that "completely describable" and "completely describable thing". Something is completely describable if, at least in principle, humans could describe it without leaving out anything about it.

The smell of mint isn't completely describable, and, in fact, no experience is.

But there are limitedly-defined completely describable aspects of our surroundings and experiences.

It would be presumptuous in the extreme to say that Reality itself is or might be completely describable, when even everyday experiential reality isn't completely describable.

Michael Ossipoff

"Those folks are engaged in practices"

"What sort of practices?"

"Gardening practices"

--you just described something. — Terrapin Station

Yes, and, if "describing" something merely means saying at least one thing about it, that's why I said that, by "describable things", I mean "things that humans can, in principle, describe without leaving out anything about them."

Michael Ossipoff

Quick definition: The belief that an objective value/knowledge/morality is non existent — khaled

I don't claim that anything describable is objectively existent. In fact, I don't think that "objective existence" is even metaphysically-defined.

Is there, at all, that for which "objectively existent"means something and can be said? Is there what is objectively existent? You're sure that there isn't. That means you're sure about Reality as a whole.
can be known and described by humans.

How can you be sure of that?

And if Reality even might not be knowable and describable by humans, that means that it definitely can't be reliably known and described by humans.

So you can't know for certain what you say that you're sure of.

Michael Ossipoff

"Gardening practices" isn't a description of something? — Terrapin Station

No. It's the name of a topic, not a description of one.

Michael Ossipoff

”I don't think that it's unmeaningful to speak of what can defined, and referred to, and can be, in principle, described in all their aspects. (even if those aspects can't always be counted or enumerated.)” — Michael Ossipoff
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I wouldn't say that it ever makes sense to talk about "all aspects" of anything.
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…and, to avoid that objection, I later said:
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What's completely describable is what doesn't have anything about it that can't, in principle, be known and described by humans.
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”Of course. I'm modest enough to admit that there are all sorts of topics with things that I'm not qualified to describe. For example, I'm pretty much entirely ignorant of gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar.” — Michael Ossipoff
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But you just described "gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar,"

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I named a topic. I only said one thing about "gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascars”. I said only I don’t know anything about it.
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If you call that a description, that certainly expands the number of things you can “describe”. :D
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…so that would be something you believe in that you can describe.

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So, according to you, even by saying that you can’t describe something, you’re saying something about it, and thereby describing it. You know that that makes nonsense out of the word “describe”.
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”Just as there are the abstract facts” — Michael Ossipoff
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The only "abstract facts" there are are things like "Joe has formulated an abstraction (in other words, he's done something mentally, his brain has been in process in particular ways) re a concept of 'love'."

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Say it how you want. You seem to just be saying what I said. (…when I said that there are abstract facts at least in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred to).
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But I also said that I make no claim for “existence” or “reality” (whatever that would mean) of abstract facts, or for anything else describable. (…unless you call what I referred to in the paragraph before this one “existence”.)
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Reply to your next posting:
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”…wouldn't convey what it's like, to someone who hadn't smelled mint.” — Michael Ossipoff
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It's a truism about descriptions that they never convey what anything is like, experientially, to someone who hasn't experienced the thing in question. That's not a flaw of descriptions, it's a property of them. After all, they're just sets of words that people assign whatever personal meanings and concepts etc to. That's not going to amount to what any experience is like to anyone. Experiences aren't like words, or meanings, or concepts (especially not those formulated on other experiences) or other, different experiences that someone has had in general.

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Yes, a wordier way of saying what I said.
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Yes, you can say something about the smell of mint. For example, you can “describe” it by saying that you like it, or that it’s present in a mint-leaf, or that you notice it in the air. …or even by saying that you can’t describe it.
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You can’t fully describe it, for the reason that you talk about in the paragraph of yours that I quoted above.
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Because you can’t fully tell someone else what an experience, such as the smell of mint, is like, it’s fair to say that you can’t fully describe it. That’s a fair meaning for “fully describe”: To fully describe something is to tell about it without leaving out anything about it.
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There are things that can, in principle, be fully described, as defined immediately above. I call them describable things. (Of course they don’t include experiences, but they include aspects of one’s surroundings, the logic-governed consistent physical world that we experience.)
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All this reminds us of the limitations of definitions. As I said, no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words. …making nonsense of any claim that words can describe Reality, or even everyday local experiential reality. (…as you agreed in the above-quoted paragraph.) Things can be said, but it’s questionable to put faith in the completely objective validity or meaning of what’s said.
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…all the more reason why it’s better to not claim “objective existence” or “objective reality” for describable” things.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'd like to answer this again:

Yeah, "complete description" just seems like a nonsensical phrase to me (hence why I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions"). — Terrapin Station

What's completely describable is what doesn't have anything about it that can't, in principle, be known and described by humans.

As for the smell of mint, it's obvious that any description you could give wouldn't just be "partial". It would be completely inadequate, and, other than crudely and roughly likening it to something else that's really quite different, wouldn't convey what it's like, to someone who hadn't smelled mint.

Michael Ossipoff

Yeah, "complete description" just seems like a nonsensical phrase to me (hence why I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions"). — Terrapin Station

I don't think that it's unmeaningful to speak of what can defined, and referred to, and can be, in principle, described in all their aspects. (even if those aspects can't always be counted or enumerated.)

What I was asking you wasn't as broad as what you paraphrased. I asked if you personally believe in anything you can't describe. — Terrapin Station

Of course. I'm modest enough to admit that there are all sorts of topics with things that I'm not qualified to describe. For example, I'm pretty much entirely ignorant of gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar.

Additionally I don't claim to be able to describe Reality itself (which of course isn't a thing).

So that would suggest the answer to my question is "no."

I wouldn't say that. See above.
— Terrapin Station

Would you say there is a describable metaphysics of nonphysicals?

Just as there are the abstract facts of your hypothetical life-exerience-story,in a physical world, there are likewise other abstract facts that aren't part of anyone's life-experience possibility-story, but which are nonetheless abstract facts not unlike those comprising your experience-story.

Their relevance is admittedly questionable, but I feel that it would be animal-chauvinist to deny that there are such.

But, my metaphysics, Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism is only about the experience-stories, of which the experiencer, the protagonist, is central and primary.

As I say, you're in a life because you're a protagonist in such a story. First it was the Will-To-Life, and the fact that there'd be the experiences you needed or wanted, if... and away it went, a story of "If" set in a world of "If".

That's the meaningful subset of the abstract facts.

I don't usually talk about abstract facts that aren't part of such experience-stories, but, now that you bring it up, of course there are such.

Michael Ossipoff

How would those abstractions be undescribable? — BlueBanana

They wouldn't.

And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?

Just its facts. Abstract implications in particular.

I propose that all that this physical universe consists of, is the setting of your hypothetical life-experience-story, which is a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

That universe, and your life, are real enough in their own contexts. In what other context would you like or believe them to be real &/or existent (whatever that would mean)?

I suggest that you're in a life because you're the protagonist in a hypothetical life-experience-story (as described in the paragraph before this one).

What you can be sure of is your experience. All you know about anything else is from your experience.

Your life is hypothetical. It starts with: "I'd have the experiences that I need or want if...". And then away it goes--your hypothetical life-experience-story consisting of a story of "If", set in a world of "If".

Obviously the one requirement of your hypothetical life-experience-story is consistency. ...because there are no such things as mutually-inconsistent facts...even abstract ones.. That brings logic, and a system of mutually-consistent abstract-implications, into your experience of your "physical" surroundings.

Michael Ossipoff

...and I've said that I don't assert about the character or nature of Reality as a whole.

I don't claim that authority. I only assert about describable metaphysics.

Michael Ossipoff

But there could also be what one can only minimally speak of. ...can only say one or a few things about, with those statements being necessarily incomplete. But I don't claim to speak authoritatively about that either..

Michael Ossipoff

Vacuous because there's no way to quantify "aspects." — Terrapin Station

If so, then there are no reliably, meaningfully, complete descriptions. Okay.

Why aren't you answering the question I asked you, by the way?

...about whether there's what can't be even partly known and described by humans, about which absolutely nothing can be said or known by humans, even in principle? I admitted that I don't know.

Michael Ossipoff

Potentially yes. And I don't know how I'd believe that there are things that I can't describe. I don't know how to make any sense of that. What would I believe, after all?.Some vague I don't-know-what? — Terrapin Station

...such as, to use my example, the smell of mint.

And what I said about dictionaries shows that description is a questionable thing anyway.

I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions." I don't know what that would be referring to. What makes a description "comploete" versus "incomplete"? — Terrapin Station

How about this: "A description is complete if it describes every aspect of what it describes."

You can't even describe every perceived aspect of the smell of mint.(...but I guess all of a smell consists of some thing or things perceived.)

So how about the question I asked. Do you believe things exist that you can't describe? — Terrapin Station

Of course. I'm not qualified to describe the things of all subjects.

But if you mean are there things that are indescribable in principle, then of course not, because describability in principle is part of my definition of "things".

Is there what's not (even partly) describable and unknowable even in principle? How would I know? I don't claim to know about such things.

Must mail this before the Internet-connection freezes-up. More later if Ii missed replying to anything. (Usually I write replies in Word instead of directly in this reply-space.)

Michael Ossipoff.

You believe things exist that you can't describe? — Terrapin Station

You believe that words describe everything?

Write down a complete description of the smell of mint, or of what it's like to step on a tack.

Additionally, the notion of words describing everything is shown to be silly, by the fact that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.

Anyway, as I said, even if you claim that Reality might be desribable, then the fact that you admit that it might not means that it isn't reliably describable, and any attempt at such description is speculative at best.

MIchael Ossipoff

Yajur quoted you saying this: "Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff"

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That's what I was referring to re the first part.

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Yes, it seems fair to say that someone who says that the notion of an objectively-existent physical world has been laid to rest, doesn’t believe in Materialism.
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I admit that I don’t know how many physicists don’t believe in Materialism. I’ve read of, &/or from, two who said that QM contradicts, or lays-to-rest, the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. Of course two isn’t most. But I didn’t claim “most”. I said, “…many or most…”. A few who say it in popular writing suggest that there may well be a fair number like them, but who don’t write popular books and articles.
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But we needn’t quibble about how many “many” is, or about whether it’s really “many” or just “some”.
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Re the other part, if they're not materialists, they must think that some things that exist are nonphysical.

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I’m not a Materialist, but I don’t make any claim about anything describable (and describability is part of my definition of “thing”) existing.

Existence other than that of describable things? Not only do I not use "exist" or "existent", but, if I did use them, I'd only apply them to describable things.
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“Exist” and “real” are your nonsense-words, not mine.
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But, again, if you want to attribute beliefs to physicists, then you’d need to ask them.
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So I was wondering what the heck those things [“some things that exist [and] are nonphysical”] would be

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Don’t ask me—I don’t claim that anything describable (which includes any thing) exists.
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But people speak of and refer to nonphysical things all the time, such as numbers, logical facts, abstract words, etc. I re-emphasize that I don’t claim existence for anything physical.
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In fact, I don’t use “exist” or “existent”. So you’d need to ask someone else about what they claim exists.
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…, just how they'd figure that nonphsyical things even make sense, etc.

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Then maybe you should ask them.
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“Things”, as I use that term, are what can (at least in principle) be defined, referred to and described.
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The word “maybe” is a thing. Is it physical?
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Of course if you define “things” as “What are physical”, then it would be nonsense to speak of a nonphysical thing.
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(I define and describe “maybe” as an adverb indicating uncertainty regarding the veracity of the statement made by the verb that it modifies.)
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Of course, among all the abstract logical implications, there are many hypothetical things that they’re about-- things that no one claims are other than hypotheticalhose. Those hypothetical things include hypothetical propositions—propositions that aren’t claimed true--and the hypothetical things that those hypothetical propositions are about.
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And of course it goes without saying that abstract-implications, and all abstract-facts, are things too, as I define “things”.
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The metaphysics that I propose is about complex systems of inter-referring abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
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Especially in metaphysics, it’s essential to answer about when requested, and to be consistent about, what we mean by the words that we use.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'd be curious re the source of the data re whether most physicists are materialists — Terrapin Station

I'm not aware of a census or survey that tells what percentage of physicists are Materialists. Perhaps you're confusing me with someone else, if you think that I made that claim.

What I said was that some physicists who specialize in quantum-mechanics, and who are recognized authorities on the subject, have said that QM lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

. . . And curious, for that matter, how they'd attempt to even describe what a nonphysical existent is supposed to be

Are you referring to religion? It's common knowledge that, not only are not all physicists Materialists, but also that some are religious. As for what they'd attempt to describe, you'd have to ask them, wouldn't you.

But I certainly didn't say that physicists describe God, if that's what you're asking. Some things, a subset of Reality, are describable. Metaphysics is about those things. Reality isn't describable. You say it might be describable? But, even if it merely might not be describable, then it certainly isn't reliably describable.

(...as I define metaphysics. Some use "metaphysics" with a much broader and unrealistically-ambitious meaning, expecting metaphysical discussion and debate to cover all of Reality.)

But if you think that physicists will describe God for you, then go for it, and ask them.

..., how we're supposed to know about it, etc.

Metaphysics, as I define the term, is about the knowable and describable subset of Reality. Did I say that you were supposed to know about a nonphysical existent.

But, by the way, as I said before, the word "which" and the square-root of two are nonphysical.

As for "existent", the use of the silly and meaningless words "existent" and "real" is responsible for millennia of philosophical befudlement and confusion.

Michael Ossipoff

Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff


By Quantum Mechanics I assume you mean Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle aka the observer effect.
— Yajur

I don't claim to be qualified in or have the answers about quantum-mechanics, but, from what I've heard, the uncertainty-principle is a consequence of QM. But I claim no authority on QM.

I want to clarify how the observer affect or anything in Quantum Mechanics isn't in contradiction with materialism.

I don't claim any authority or qualification about QM. I was just quoting something that has been said by some physicists who specialize in QM.

Michael Ossipoff