Rather, one that is closer to my stance is that it is wrong to force unnecessary impositions on people. Recently, I have been using the term "dealing with" situations (I'll just call DWS for short since I'll probably bring it up a lot). To force someone absolutely into DWS, is wrong to do. Absolutely here is defined as not needing to experience a DWS instrumentally to get a more desired state, but simply put people in DWS unnecessarily and by force. — schopenhauer1
You'll just get stuck on the causality issue any way so it doesn't matter how you formulate it. The main point of the metaphysical part is that we need to be sure we are comparing something with something and not nothing with something, to avoid the contradiction that something exists that doesn't exist, etc.
There's also some issues with the loaded language of "force" and "impositions" which are assumptions but since it doesn't matter for the end result I'll leave that as it is.
The easiest way is to simply say that until all causal chains of suffering are worked out, it is not worth risking that suffering onto someone else. If we knew the world was a utopia without suffering, then we are in the clear. Otherwise, as you point out, we don't know every avenue of the causal chain, so precisely the reason to not impose the causes onto someone else. One need not know which cause to know that all causes are not resolved. Even if we are to weight some causes as "not as bad as others", there are some really bad causes out there that are indeed bad. — schopenhauer1
We don't need to know the avenue of all causal chains because it's obvious that living is not a sufficient condition. Just being alive doesn't cause suffering. If your point is it does, then suffering is intrinsic to life
and therefore an ethical moot point because living doesn't cause suffering if it's intrinsic. We should be dealing with the
proximate and
sufficient conditions for suffering to resolve it.
However, that's not even a main argument. My main argument against this reasoning is in regards to the idea that suffering is unique. While I agree, each instance of a particular brand of suffering is suffered individually by humans, certainly there are categories that can be distilled down that are well known sources of suffering. Further, I do agree with philosopher's like Schopenhauer that life isn't just instances of contingent harms (that is to say situational, probabilistic, contextual, etc.) but rather there are necessary forms of suffering as well. Necessary here meaning, sort of "baked into life". These baked in forms of sufferings are overlooked for the more immediate (I'd characterize as Western) ideas of suffering (physical torture, hunger, disasters, disease, illness, emotional anguish, etc.). However, I do take seriously that we are imposed upon to "deal with" survival, finding comfort, and existence itself (overcoming one's own boredom). These are forms of suffering in the form of deprivation. There is always a lack of something to be overcome. Now add the usual (Western) forms of contingent harm that we must deal with and overcome and the bigger picture of an existence of both necessary and contingent harms comes into focus. All of these are DWS imposed upon the person born. — schopenhauer1
I find philosophical pessimism totally irrelevant to this discussion as pointed out before. If suffering is intrinsic to life than living doesn't cause suffering. It reveals a misunderstanding of what causality is.
As far as the first part, one of the main reasons antinatalists are against birth is the idea that there is no possible consent, so this is an important part of most antinatalist claims. Certainly if consent is a factor for birth, it is also a factor for death. — schopenhauer1
I don't ask for consent of animals to breed them, to kill them or to eat them. Ethically totally fine. Yet the idea of killing every animal on the face of the earth seems to be an issue.
Now, as far as your idea bout no moral actors, this I find not a good argument. There's two ways to address this.. — schopenhauer1
Probably because you misunderstood the point.
1) Let's say it is almost 100% certain a baby that would be born would get tortured. Your reasoning would conclude, "Well, the baby would have to be born in order for there to be a person in the world to be tortured, so considerations of the baby being born don't matter until they are born". Clearly, that is faulty reasoning to say that the baby needs to be born so that torture exists so that we can say torture should not exist. — schopenhauer1
Quite obvious this is not what I said nor does it follow from what I said.
2) No suffering in the world means no people who suffer, nor people deprived of happiness. The instant a person is put into the world, the antinatalist position becomes valid. You do not need people to exist in order to recognize that the "good" of not existing is taking place. All you need is the fact that if someone does exist, the position becomes valid at that point. We can have millions of years of nothingness, and then this position would be sort of "activated". Once something exists where suffering would take place, then it becomes valid. — schopenhauer1
But your "no suffering the world means no people who suffer" actually means "nothing who suffer". You're just camouflaging bad metaphysics and bad language. Of course we need moral actors to exist. Without moral actors to experience "good" there is no good or bad. If we are in a position where we cannot ascribe propositions such as "people are suffering" or "people are not suffering" then the absence of suffering is not a moral good because it's not enjoyed by anyone.
I don't think the argument that living logically entails suffering is one anyone reasonably makes. — Hanover
These arguments usually don't start that way until you raise the issue of causality and then all of a sudden life equals suffering because no life is without suffering, etc. etc. So it does come up and I just highlight that the argument goes nowhere. Of course, there are more roads to Rome and more ways to skin a pig to reach the same point.
This doesn't do justice to distinguishing between happiness and pleasure and so we are left with suffering being the counter to happiness. This becomes more clear when you provide examples of how we ought to find the sources of suffering so that we can eliminate them so that we can increase happiness. If I suffer from hunger, I'm sure I will be happier if I am fed, but I don't know you've made any real progress toward making me happy in the holistic sense typically needed to truly declare me happy just because you tended to my needs.
What this means is that happiness is not alleviation of suffering and that suffering is not incompatible with happiness. In fact, considerable wisdom, growth, perspective, and gratitude arise from suffering, all of which are traits of someone who is happy. — Hanover
I don't disagree. I'm constraining myself to how antinatalist often argue their case to hopefully demonstrate that the philosophy is inconsistent and therefore wrong.
I see this as a stab at creating a formula for societal harmony, but I don't see it as eliminating suffering entirely. I also see this as only half the solution for creating societal harmony. The half you provide is that those who have more should be generous and giving. The other half of this would therefore be that those who have less should be humble and gracious. This societal harmony is achieved I would think only upon recognition that everyone is both of these halves. — Hanover
Good point. It's my priviliged upbringing and position that probably got the better of me here and as you know I'm devoid of humility and grace so at the same time I have no clue what you're talking about.
My point being that I don't see suffering as demonic, devoid of all light, joyless, and evil. I see suffering as a necessary component needed to fully achieving one's full potential. This obviously means that I'm placing an intrinsic goodness to life itself and its promotion and development. I'm not entirely sure you can avoid pessimism about life if you're not able to posit the intrinsic value of life. — Hanover
There's certainly a value to philosophical pessimism. I don't believe in progress as much as the next because of philosophical pessimism. I think we're all basically barbarians and that the relative peacefulness of Western societies is only a very thin veil of civilisation that is easily disturbed. I don't consider Holocausts or genocides unthinkable or as something that will never happen again. I don't believe we've fundamentally evolved morally speaking. In fact, I agree with most conservatives that there's a lot of "happiness" eroding due to social and technological pressures. I disagree with them how these should be dealt with. I think social media, deep fakes and the information apocalypse will make the world worse off by... a lot, and we've only seen the beginning with the latest (further) fragmentation of US society.
But I also see that getting a pandemic under control requires us all to work together and that nothing we do is done without the context of what came before and what exists as a society around us. Even this thread would never exist without a disagreeable anti-natalist. So in the end I believe in the Hegelian
aufhebung, that we will find a way upward in these conflicting forces... it's just going to get messy.