The problem is that morality never occurs as anything other than something internal. — Terrapin Station

So my morality is internal to you?

How could you internalize morality (where presumably it wasn't something internal prior)? — Terrapin Station

Practice. Or perhaps a whip?

I understand if it doesn’t interest you. The results are typically surprising.

Maybe you'll feel differently after the meds kick-in.

You're going to hate me for saying this; but, if it comes down to a decision between Biden or Trump, I would pick Trump. As others have said Biden is Hillary with a penis. — Wallows

So why is Hillary (or Biden with a vagina) worse than Trump?

I suggest you try some of the harvard.edu implicit association tests to maybe get a feel for your own ignorance:
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html

A socially conditioned moral sensibility that is not properly understood by the individual could be a case of moral dumbfounding. That would be the result of one's own ignorance regarding the adoptive morally relevant portion of her/his/their initial(original - pre-reflective) worldview. — creativesoul

Ignorance of conditions (instinct) or conditioning (early development), I would guess.

Maybe that makes sense in context?

I would not agree that one can acquire knowledge of morals without evidence. — creativesoul

I’m not sure what you mean by this.

Just because one may not be aware of the ground, does not mean that there is none. Just because one may not be capable of arguing for their belief, it does not follow that it is not well-grounded. Just because one may be able to argue for their own belief, it does not follow that it is well-grounded. Coherency alone is insufficient for both, solid ground upon which to base subsequent inference and truth. — creativesoul

Right. The point is that individuals may have roughly the same intuitions but they can be developed differently depending on cultural influences. If true, that’s relevant to the project of investigating the source of morals.

Never mind.

It’s not clear to me how you distinguish between moral judgments that, on examination, ‘thought/belief’ can be clearly articulated and judgments where they cannot (as when dumbfounded).

Moral dumbfounding is believed by some to be evidence for moral intuition.

I'd be happy to intentionally analyze moral intuition. What is it? — creativesoul

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethical_intuitionism

Are you suggesting that you don’t believe in moral intuition?

I think you might be taking the belief in fiction thing a bit too far, in seeing things that aren’t there.

he does say that the present world needs a new fiction to believe in. — christian2017

So, what part of the video does he say something like that? How many minutes/seconds into it?

I finished the book and indeed the author makes no claim that the world needs a global ideology, religion, or whatever. He makes the basic claim that what allows sapiens to coordinate on a large scale is via some unifying ideology (of any sort).

In the chapter on happiness, he doesn't claim that it's the most important thing. He makes the case that despite all the developments that have occurred since the time of hunter-gatherer society our subjective happiness or life satisfaction hasn't improved. The belief that wealth, status, and pleasure-seeking leads to happiness or life satisfaction is, sadly, a myth. In that regard, we are all idiots to some degree.

Second to the last chapter he makes the interesting point that we basically have unlimited energy and resources at our disposal, but we're too ignorant to use it responsibly.

Last line of the book:

“Is there anything more dangerous than dissatisfied and irresponsible gods who don’t know what they want?”

It’s ideological in the sense that people believe that wealth will make them happy. The evidence shows that it makes little difference, unless you’re really struggling.

Perhaps we should approximate where the notion of authority first arrises. — Merkwurdichliebe

Highly relevant in regards to considering the source of morals. IMO.

I've some senior graduation ceremonies to attend in real life this weekend. Great 'kid'. — creativesoul

Happy travels and congrats to the kid. :party:

Of what use are those notions [intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious] in this context?
— creativesoul

Yes, me wants to know too. — Merkwurdichliebe

In the context of moral dumbfounding? Plenty, in my opinion.

Dumbfounding is indicative of an implicit evaluation or conditioned response that is beneath conscious awareness.

The term 'prelinguistic' has been used a lot in the topic and I thought it might be helpful to clarify what is being meant in its usage. It can mean developments prior to language acquisition for our species or for children. The former might be considered instinctive or innate, but not the latter.

Regarding the source of morals, a distinction might be made between our innate condition, early pre-linguistic childhood conditioning, cultural conditioning (part of childhood conditioning), and whatever conditioning we might intentionally impose on ourselves.

I love philosophers who are courageous enough to speak oddly on occasion. — Merkwurdichliebe

You are a brave soul, Merk.

That’s another term for it, yes.

...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief.
— Merkwurdichliebe

Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul

So intuitive, non-linguistic, subconscious, whichever you want to call it then?

I don't hold prelinguistic thought/belief to be ethically charged. — Merkwurdichliebe

It might be helpful, to me at least, to distinguish between prelinguistic (instinct) and, I’ll call it non-linguistic (subconscious), thought/belief or intuition.

‘Moral dumbfounding’ may strongly indicate the existence of either or both, and attest to it charge.

I was reading a little about Mao the other day. Talk about a faulty circuit.

I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here. — creativesoul

I think that I may have figured it out, and in the process identified a basic flaw in the project of attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing, which is essentially that we may be blind to morals frameworks (and their particular sets of values) that differ from our own.

The value of morals, I believe, is in their capacity to promote and regulate cooperation in large groups. Large groups of people cooperating as a unit appears to be a highly successful adaptive survival strategy, to put it in evolutionary terms. With this in mind, I'll reconsider the claim that 'all moral things are about considering behavior towards others', starting with the premises that:

• Morals are always part of a moral framework or culture.
• A moral framework or culture always consists of people (others).
• A moral framework has value.
• There are categories of moral intuitions.

As I've tried to previously show, the fox in the Fox and the Grapes fable considers itself a failure for giving up and not working hard to go beyond its natural reach and tries to console itself for being a failure. It tries to save face. This indicates that it has adopted or has been inculcated by a culture with a particular moral framework that values industriousness. By not living up to the expectations or ethics of its culture it has failed its culture. It has failed others. When considering giving up on the grapes (considering behavior), the fox was considering being faithful or unfaithful to (towards) its culture (others).

If I consider being unfaithful to my wife, I'm considering being unfaithful to another person. If I were unfaithful, my wife, or anyone else, may never be aware of it.

Loyalty/betrayal may be a moral intuition that you are not considering, creativesoul, possibly because, as you've mentioned in another topic, you're "pretty damn liberal," and liberalism tends to devalue the moral intuition of loyalty/betrayal.

Again, I’ve just been trying to figure out your distinction. I’m satisfied now and I agree with you.

I guess that I have a habit of being too loose in my interpretations, or I’m just slow.

Not at all -- the opposite, in fact. What you recognise when you recognise an apple, is a type, which can then be generalised to all such types, and a superset of types. — Wayfarer

This is not clear. You’re saying there’s a nonphysical representation of ‘apple’ that is subdivided to match the physical world as need be? If so, it is still completely redundant, unless you’re saying that there is no matter and everything is mental, but that’s just the inverse of materialism, which would be materialism in all but name.

I’m just trying to understand your distinction between behavior towards others and behavior not towards others, as it relates to morals.

If you don’t want to cooperate that’s fine. It’s entirely your choice.

There’s a basic principle which I think defeats ‘brain-mind identity’ theory. This is that symbolic representation and abstraction literally cannot be understood as a physical process. They can be instantiated physically, which is how written symbols and codes are possible (not to mention computers and calculators). But the fundamental intellectual acts that form the basis of abstraction, logic and rational inference inhere wholly and solely in the relations of ideas. They are purely and only intellectual in nature, they are not physical. — Wayfarer

Sense data is processed as patterns. The patterns are processed to form invariant representations. An invariant representation or concept of an apple, for instance, is comprised of sense data from various senses, like color, shape, texture, smell, taste, etc., as well as the various kinds of apples and states (such as fresh or rotten) of apples. All of that just to form the simple concept of ‘apple’.

For there to be some kind of nonphysical apple concept, it would need to perfectly mirror the physical world, like a nonphysical world matching and perfectly aligned with the physical world. The ultimate redundancy.

So what if instead of a grape the Fox was unsuccessful in seducing a potential mate who rebuffed him?

You agree that there is at least one moral to the story. That's all I'm saying here. — creativesoul

Not exactly, you’re also saying that it’s not about considering behaviour towards others. You must see that that’s where we disagree, or I don’t follow your meaning.

I imagine it should be simple to explain. You might describe your meaning and perhaps give examples of moral ‘behavior towards others’ and real-life moral behavior not towards others.

The longer the range of a plan, the more widespread and deep its consequences are likely to be. — frank

Good or bad consequence?

The emperor has no dough.

In some years it's reported that Trump lost more money than any other tax payer.

That MF praxis never addresses me. — Merkwurdichliebe

Good day to you, Sir. :razz:

Considering one's own personal outlook in a situation where there are no others around - such as is the case with the moral of The Fox and the Grapes - is not considering behavior towards others. — creativesoul

I'd like to resolve this, but it's fine if you'd like to move on.

I've identified two morals in the fable, which are insufficiencies in self-reflection and a good work ethic. The traditional interpretation is that it's just about a good work ethic, I understand. I believe the lack of self-reflection is the more significant moral, personally.

Regarding the traditional moral, there is nothing wrong with seeking low-lying fruit. In fact, it may be more ethical to stay within your natural niche, rather than working hard to expand it, because you may be disrupting the natural balance. Other species, and perhaps eventually yourself, could pay a price for disrupting the natural order too aggressively.

The implied work ethic that we should work hard to exploit natural resources beyond our natural reach is obviously cultural in origin, and actually rather disturbing. And it's meant to program children!

That the fox considers itself a failure means that it has adopted the work ethic and has failed to live up to it. So, not its own outlook and not failing itself but the expectations of those who imparted the ethic. The failure only matters in relation to others, because as I've previously mentioned, her energy might be better spent moving on and seeking low-lying fruit elsewhere. Her lack of industriousness is of concern to society and not necessarily to herself.

Incidentally, there's a compelling argument that hunter-gatherers had to be forced into agrarian life because it sucked compared to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle, at least for many hundreds of years.

We might also consider the meaning of "behavior towards others." Clearly, we can express behavior towards others that are not in the vicinity of ourselves, and our successes and failures effect others. It might be claimed that the fox's failure doesn't effect anyone else, but if that's the case, why does the fox need to contrive the fiction that the grapes are sour? If it's to console himself, why does he need consolation? We don't console ourselves with comforting fictions every time we feel frustration and failure. The fox is attempting to save face, to put it colloquially, and this relates to others. If there are no other actual witnesses it could just be an ego driven habit. If the fox were truly a solitary animal it would have no such habit, or it would eventually fade away if the fox became truly solitary.

The fox's moral code includes a particular work ethic that it betrayed. It doesn't matter if anyone else witnessed it or was directly effected. It's like breaking a promise that you've made to the society that you belong to. If it's a good promise to make then you've let down your community in whatever actual benefit the promise is supposed to encourage. You've also diminished the value of the promise itself by your unfaithfulness. The community bond is weakened.

A correct report will take account of it's original meaning. The meaning is the moral of the story.

I cannot explain this in many more ways...

Are we in agreement yet? — creativesoul

I don’t think this line of thought is important to the project of determining the source of morals. I’ve found it interesting though.

What determines whether or not The Fox and the Grapes has the moral that it has been said to have since it's very inception? — creativesoul

The depth of consideration and values of those interpreting it.

Your agreement isn't necessary here... is it? — creativesoul

Never.

If you had a hundred billion Chinese people, each of them could simulate a neuron, and provided they used the same algorithms as a human brain, it could simulate a human mind, if a glacially slow mind.

I think the problem is that the CPM (Chinese people mind) would be too slow to match temporal reality and therefore consciousness could not be achieved, or rather ‘felt’.

For example B, instead of adding water, what if you separated the sugars, coloring, etc. in the cup of orange juice. Then not only would it no longer be, as you say, orange juice-y, the orange juice would no longer exist at all.

Same principle with the other examples.