No, I asked where 'this' stops. I never said 'building'. — noAxioms

Are you really sure? ...

Where does the building stop? — noAxioms

Still, purpose is defined by the humans that find utility in the 'object'. The topic is about an object in absence of such ideals such as purpose. — noAxioms

I agree. Human convention defines 'purpose,' and the building exemplifies this. What I don't understand is why you wish to eliminate such principles. As far as I can tell from this thread, most objects and things are defined by human conventions or other categories that make them 'interesting.' Are you arguing that there could be an intriguing object that lacks human ideals?

I don't think a beam of energy say 'knows' anything about human purpose. — noAxioms

Obviously, and I don't think it is necessary to go too far. What I tried to argue is that there are objects which are dependent upon others just for need. The furniture, walls, ceilings, etc. are attached objects to the principal which is the building. Otherwise, where would you put furniture? In middle of the forest? That would be senseless. You claim this is due to human purpose, but I think those 'objects' know the destination of its utility.

The word invokes a convention, and the convention typically includes all those parts, but how about the piles or the utility hookups? Where does the building stop? Does it include the furniture and people? That question was asked in the OP where I explore the concept of what you weigh, and exactly when that weight changes. — noAxioms

Yes, I follow you and the sense of your OP. I remember when we talked about chopping the twig off, for instance. I know that it would sound silly to say that without a twig, the tree no longer exists, and therefore, the forest either. But this is exactly the trace I want to keep up! I think the example of the house is better.
You asked me: Where does the building stop? Does it include the furniture and people?
Of course, it includes furniture and people. :smile:
What would be the point of constructing a building, then? The building, as an object, precisely stops when it lacks everything above. The combination of the walls, furniture, ceiling, roof, and people makes the 'building', and when an element of the set is left, the building as an object is senseless. I wish I could go deeper regarding the example of the twig and the forest because I still see symmetry in both cases. 

But in the absence of language, how does anything 'know' that 'building' is the object of interest? — noAxioms

The object of interest is inherent in the building. The remaining 'things' are attached to it. They ‘know’ that the building is of interest to them.

That example was meant to demonstrate the opposite. If I reach out and touch the bark and ask how large 'this' is, am I talking about the twig, branch, tree, forest, or something else — noAxioms

I think I understand you better, mate. But it surprised me when I read that, according to your view, the Midas example proves the opposite of what I say. Well, yes, if we talk about measurement, and you ask me how large the bark is, we are in different physical objects independent of each other then.
Nonetheless, I think we should not dismiss the fact of the “set” of the physical object “tree” and the physical group “forest”. I still claim they are all a dependent set. If there is no twig, there is no bark either to measure.
Imagine a building for a second. This structure encloses walls, roof, floors, columns, etc. If I talk about a “building” I also refer to all those elements, right?
Well, the same happens to a tree and therefore the forest. Whatever part I am referring to, it includes the sum of the set.

If there was a physical convention, there'd be an answer to that. There seemingly isn't. — noAxioms

Why does it appear like there are no answers?

I know those questions are for @noAxioms, but they are so interesting that I want to dive into them as well.

Does “convention” equal “A way in which something is usually done in accordance with an established pattern.”? — ucarr

I think it does. But the point here is to know to what extent things exist or not due to universal convention. I would like to use the example of a few pages before: a twig is followed by a tree and then the combination of these two makes the forest. This set is interesting. I personally believe a set of different things are dependent on universal convention, for instance. Furthermore, if we are focused on non-material “things” like time, justice, property or democracy.

Are “convention” and “utility” the antecedents for “things.”? — ucarr

ucarr, what do you mean by “antecedents” here? I think convention and utility are attachments to physical objects.

Are you saying ‘object’ is a non-physical construction of the mind? — ucarr

This is a great question. I would like to know the answer of @noAxioms. When I exchanged some thoughts with him, he claimed everything object is connected to something. I guess he was referring to the construction of the mind.

Is ‘object’ the antecedent of ‘it.’? — ucarr

Ahh, which came first? The classic golden question. I think an object is a representation of reality which holds both primary and secondary qualities. I mean, we call the “object” the thing that can be measured, seen, colored, compared, etc. and other types of properties which make the object an “it”. So, even if I might be wrong, I would say “object” came first than “it.”

Does infinity actually mean that there is always one more, or does it just mean the possibility of it? — Sir2u

I think Plato means that there is always one more dog. If we take this to maximum, it could be, somehow, plausible, and I guess I have to agree with Plato.
But I cannot see it in regression. It is not plausible to think that there is always one dog who eats less than the previous one. Yes, I know that Athena stated there was enough food for every dog. But my point is that, sooner or later, we will reach the bottom and there will finally be a dog who eats less than all the “infinity” intermediate dogs. I think this is more plausible than to think that there will always be one dog and another in both extremes continuously in a loop.

Full Democracies

…

Austria

Malta

Spain — Wheatley

Funny to read an assertion like that. You put us at the bottom. I guess that means we are closer to a flawed nation than a real full democracy like Ireland or Austria.

Plato doesn't accept the existence of Zeno's dogs. — ssu

and @Metaphysician Undercover @Sir2u

I guess that’s why he [Plato] explained again to Zeno that there cannot be a dog that eats the most, because there is always a dog that eats more. I am still confused regarding Plato’s argument. Yes, it is clear to me that Plato roots for infinity counting of dogs, but I think he forgets two basic dogs: the one who eats the most (the dog at the peak) and the dog who eats the least (the dog at the bottom). I think the argument of Zeno is more plausible. On the other hand, Plato argues that there cannot be a dog that eats the most, because there is always a dog that eats more. He sees infinity towards the maximum. But what about the dog who eats the least? If there is always a dog that could eat less, there will be a dog who will eat nothing at all. How can it be possible to find a dog who will eat less than previous dogs and so on? I think this has to be switched and follow Zeno’s point of limited counting: Zeno's least eating dog eats < any other dog there exists eats, and then start to count. Agree?

Zeno could have said, "let me know when you get to the dog that eats the most, and the dog that eats the least", and Plato could have said "OK". Problem resolved. Instead, Zeno said you are "forgetting" these two dogs. But Plato is not "forgetting" them, he has not yet found them, so there is no need for them to have ever entered his mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it. Zeno completely comprehended Plato's reasoning, although he did not convey the correct response. Instead, Zeno assumed that Plato had forgotten two elementary dogs, which is incorrect. Plato merely dismissed them as irrelevant to his argument. However, those two dogs, the one that eats the most and the other who eats the least, exist for both Plato and Zeno. Right? :smile:

I wholeheartedly agree with everything you wrote in your post. It is funny and interesting to debate about this, and I appreciate your effort to explain it to me. 

And then, if you think that there's just two Zeno's dogs, how about then all the transcendental dogs between them. — ssu

Exactly. As you mentioned, the rest of the dogs are simply transcendental in the situation. What I know for certain is that there will be at least two dogs: one that eats the most (let's call him dog >) and one who eats the least (let's call him dog <), but I'm not sure who dog b is, because the latter is just transcendental to the scale. What I can't do, if I understand Zeno correctly, is start counting by dog b or another random dog "x" because my numbering will be irregular due to forgetting those two dogs. The one who "starts" and the one who "ends," or, to put it another way, the one at the bottom and the other at the top.

Interesting example, friend. I now understand this tricky game a bit more. But I still don’t understand why you state that ‘Whether there is a hottest or coldest possible temperature is irrelevant to this alternative way of scaling.’ Are you suggesting that it is irrelevant to Plato whether there is a dog who eats the most and another who eats the least? Well, maybe. But the rules stated by Athena say: ‘All the dogs eat the same food, which is divisible, and there is enough of it for every dog’ but Zeno argues (and I agree with that) that by randomly picking up a dog and then starting to count from it the various quantities other dogs, was missing at least these two dogs, one that ate the least and one that ate the most.

And the second rule states that there are no constraints on quantity (physical or otherwise), and hence on dogs. So Zeno is right here. There will always be one dog who eats the most and another who eats the least, which I believe is relevant to this issue, and Plato overlooked these two dogs in his counting.

and @Metaphysician Undercover

You both had a very interesting exchange. I am sorry, ssu. His reply to me and Elephant was awesome, but I didn't know what to answer back because I do not have a big background in math and logic. The replies by MU are pretty good too.
Under my very basic sense of logic or math, I still root for Zeno because of the following: by randomly picking up a dog and then starting to count from it the various quantities other dogs, was missing at least these two dogs, one that ate the least and one that ate the most. After all, didn't their amounts that they ate differ from all the other dogs?

I agreed. Even if the dogs are uncountable, at least one will eat the most, followed by the least. But this is only a very basic concept of mine. I can't keep debating with logic or numbers, as you did. But, sure, I believe Zeno's two dogs must exist since there is always a "most" and a "least," correct?

Laws, legistlation & jurisprudence correspond to "social control". — 180 Proof

Control? I thought the police department was responsible for 'controlling' us, and that the laws served as a guide to how we should behave. Even the jurisdiction and courts ought to control the 'controller' (police officers, militaries, politicians, jail officers, etc.).

In all moral issues it's the ultimate goal of each side to enforce themselves on a legal or political level. — Judaka

I agree. That is a good point. Law enforcement is one of each state's primary tools for upholding a moral code of conduct. It reminds me of when the Spanish government declared same-sex marriage legal in 2005. A section of Catholic groups opposed this because they believed it was unethical. Nonetheless, the Congress chose to enact legislation to protect the freedom of same-sex couples to marry since it was morally from a civil standpoint. Two opposing moral viewpoints were confronted. Fortunately, the law passed over the religion.

Moral principles

As far as I can see, all formal moral philosophies, and certainly any philosophy that specifies how other people should behave, is not moral at all, or even really a philosophy. It’s a program of social control - coercive rules a society establishes to manage disruptive or inconvenient behavior — T Clark

Moral principles are part of the roots of each civilisation. From Orthodox or Christian moral values to Taoism. All of them have some pillars that guide people on how to behave properly in society. You understand them as 'coercive rules' but I personally believe it goes deeper than that. Moral principles are part of our culture. 

I believe one example of my argument is the 'sacred' standard of respect for family members. In general, children owe respect to their parents, and vice versa. When this essential moral principle is broken, members of this community experience despair, existentialism, and even nihilism, among other things, because one of these moral (Christian) principles (or 'codes', if you prefer) is no longer present.

They are embedded in us. It is difficult to imagine a community that could survive without those. Dostoevsky discusses this dilemma and sorrow in the majority of his books. But we've previously discussed this excellent author in our email correspondence, Clarky. :smile:

Falkirk Wheel (Scotland).

includes reorienting AI development towards ethical goals, educating and empowering individuals, promoting holistic economic models, and advocating for supportive policies — Pantagruel

All of those goals were set by mankind once, but only a few nations ever pursued them. Now, it appears that most people have given up on themselves and are thinking, "Let's try to be more supportive or ethical towards others using AI," because it is evident that we will not be able to achieve such goals.

Zeno is right. Not by reason of counting. Rather, by rule #2, the one that eats "the most" and the one that eats "the least" are conceptual quantities that differ from any other quantities already given. — L'éléphant

I agree. I had identical thoughts, but I couldn't find the perfect words to express them as you did. :sweat:
Yes, I am one of the 60% of voters that chose the second choice.

Then come up with a definition of 'connected' that doesn't make everything into one connected thing. — noAxioms

To be honest, I believe we are mixing up distinct notions here. 'Connected' means to be joined to something else. For example, when I connect the red wire to the red port or connect the electricity and water supply to my home. It appears (to me) that some elements are linked to one or two things at most, but not to everything.
While 'interdependent' (as I used in my argument) refers to groups that are dependent on one another. We may say that if every element is interdependent, then everything will turn gold with the touch of Midas. Nonetheless, I still disagree. There are some elements dependent upon one another (twig + branch + tree = forest. All these are a common and interdependent set) while others don't. I can't see how the air or the clouds could be golden too, according to your argument.

But everything is connected, or nothing is. I mean, everything interacts via fields of force (as jkop put it). What is a connection if not that? — noAxioms

I agree. What I'm trying to say is that the interaction is dependent on a collection of 'things' or 'objects'. Your example began with a twig and continues as follows: a twig + the tree + the forest. These three elements combine to form a common set. If Midas touches one of the elements, the set turns gold. However, because 'everything' is connected, we may believe that the ground and then the earth will become golden as well. I disagree with the latter. I don't get how if Midas transforms a forest into gold, the Sahara Desert becomes linked to the same chain. There are no trees in the desert, thus I don't understand how it is dependant on the first set of twig + tree + forest.

Everything is not necessarily connected.

I thought you said Midas touched a twig, not a forest. Why do you think the entire forest becomes golden? By this logic, wouldn't literally everything on Earth become golden when a twig is touched. I don't understand your reasoning here. — NotAristotle

At first, I thought the same thing. According to his (@noAxioms) theory, everything would turn to gold with Midas' single touch. But I believe the essential point is that it only impacts things that are connected to one another. The twig, the tree, and finally the forest turn golden because they are all interdependent. However, Midas' touch will eventually lose its effectiveness. For example, consider the Sahara Desert and Antarctica. There are no woodlands there. The twig was the intended object, and the forest got golden on purpose because they are interdependent. Midas cannot turn Antarctica into gold with a single twig.

For this reason, I personally believe there is the possibility to stop the forest from becoming golden. If I chop the twig with the axe or rip out the roots, the process ends. Well, if I remove one element of the set, the magic of Midas is over.

Midas touches a twig. What turns to gold? The twig, branch, tree, forest? The word 'tree' was never conveyed. The intent might not even be there. The touch may have been unintended. — noAxioms

The twig is a portion of the tree, and the set of the latter is the density that makes up a forest. If Midas touches a twig, everything turns gold unintentionally because each element is interdependent. It would be different if Midas cut a twig with another object (like an axe) and then touched it. Once an element has been lost, the chain of turning into gold is no longer present.

What then is an uninteresting phenomena? — jkop

Good question. I believe uninteresting phenomena are those that lack primary qualities such as bulk, figure, texture, motion, and so on. As a result, our senses have little ability to recognize them. I'm aware that this argument sounds rather Lockian...

Is love real? The United States of America? One of my dreams? — T Clark

A feeling, a country, and a state of mind. Clarky, I assume those exist by common convention, but I'm not sure how 'real' they are. Yes, the United States has a specified territory, but isn't this acknowledged as convention rather than reality?

Symposium, Nikos Kazantzakis.

Vacaciones en el Cáucaso, María Iordanidu.

Again, don't miss Greek literature! It's pure and beautiful.

It's traditional music of Smyrne, an old city of Turkey (hence the music) part of which has been inhabited by Greeks. — Alkis Piskas

Interesting. I appreciate it for letting me know. I discovered another cool fact today because of you! :smile:

@Alkis Piskas Hello, Alkis. I was listening to some versions of 'milo mou kai mandarini' yesterday afternoon. I'd want to share the ones I enjoyed the most with you. I suppose you'd like to listen to them whenever you have time. What a beautiful and charming tune this Greek traditional song has. :flower:

RIP Donald Sutherland. Sublime actor. I remember his characteristic role of 'Atilla' in 1900. This movie is great. Good drama and magnificent actors.

I am not usually happy in summertime. I don't like this season. It is full of days with high temperatures and sweating is disgusting. But June is being acceptable this year. We have been having 'summer storms' since this past Monday in Madrid.

Yet I am still negative towards summer. July and August will be like a boiled pot...

A partir del momento que podemos decir "El multiverso no es real", "real" no tiene solamente sentido en contexto metafísico, tiene sentido en contexto físico también. — Lionino

Sabía que esto ocurriría tarde o temprano, y más utilizando la lengua española (como cualquier otra, aparte del inglés). Efectivamente, Austin olvide en su ensayo el contexto con el cual las palabras son utilizadas y además, está enfocado a utilizar la palabra "real" desde la perspectiva anglosajona. Pero incluso en este punto, Austin sigue siendo testarudo y afirma que "real" es dimensional. Es decir, qué generalmente se utiliza dicha palabra para el mismo contexto y la mayoría de las persona tienden a escoger esta palabra antes que otra del mismo ramo (sus sinónimos). Esto pasa lo mismo con desaparecido. Creo que jamás he encontrado a una persona que haya usado la palabra "exangüe"
Al final, la gente tira para lo fácil. Para la fachada. Van a seguir usando la palabra "real" aunque su significado varíe mucho dependiendo del contexto.

El uso de las palabras, de la lengua, no es tan misterioso ni complejo. Palabras se refieren a cosas en la mente de las personas, a menudo dos personas no piensan la misma cosa con la misma palabra; — Lionino

Te encantaría leer a Austin, sin duda. :smile:

¿Pero "ir allá de lo básico" no se aplicaría también a todas las palabras que son dichas "ambiguas"? Ese argumento me parece ser un chivo expiatorio. — Lionino

Efectivamente, pero muy pocas veces se cae en ello. Al final ambigüedad, según la RAE significa: Que puede entenderse de varios modos o admitir distintas interpretaciones y dar, por consiguiente, motivo a dudas, incertidumbre o confusión.

¿La palabra "real" ocasiona dudas o confusión a la gente? Yo pienso qué no. Creo que la mayoría tiene una opinión vaga de lo "real". Sin embargo, si a alguien le digo: La ciudad de Lisboa es sublime...
Si esa persona no es muy letrada, no me entenderá, tendrá confusión y no sabrá lo qué digo. Por lo tanto, le tengo que decir: La ciudad de Lisboa es muy bonita. "Bonita" absorbe a sublime ya qué la primera no da lugar a ambigüedades.

Sí, como un poema cualquiera. ¿Se supone que es un trabalenguas o algo así? — Lionino

No, no. En efecto es un poema infantil básico. Pensé que a los niños les resulta más sencillo los poemas porque en su mente le es fácil seguir las vocales. Supuse que por eso las vocales son naturales y el núcleo de la lengua. Si cambio ese poema y lo hago haiku o sin rimar, sus mentes infantiles no me seguirían en absoluto porque su cerebro todavía tiene que madurar...

Ante todo, gracias por responder Lionino. Lo agradezco.

No he leído "Sense and Sensibilia", o cualquiera obra de Austin, talvez puedas enseñarme; — Lionino

Entiendo. Mira, aquí está el link a su PDF gratuito: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/download/3620/Sense and Sensibilia - Austin.pdf @Antony Nickles nos los pasó de forma gratuita hace unos meses, y hay una entera conversación empezada por Banno qué a lo mejor te puede interesar.

Si queremos decir que una palabra "no es ambigua", en el contexto de Austin, ¿qué significa exactamente? — Lionino

Tal y cómo yo comprendí, Austin clasifica algunas palabras como no ambiguas, porqué por sí solas no crean confusión en la mayoría de los hablantes. Él (Austin) uso cómo ejemplo la palabra "real". Siguiendo su tesis, sugiere que la mayoría de nosotros tiene una noción básica de lo que significa real y se utiliza en casi todos los contextos posibles. No ocurre así con algunas palabras, como "sublime" la cual es muy ambigua, y rara vez comprendida por la mayoría de los interlocutores.

Más o menos ese eso lo que he sacado de Austin. No obstante, no me hagas mucho caso :sweat: A lo mejor he perdido algo en el camino...

Porque, bien, un interlocutor A puede decir que "Papá Noel es real" y "Naves en el Triángulo de las Bermudas desaparecen", y mucha gente cuestionará "¿Pero real en qué sentido? ¿Es basado en una persona real, o es real como una idea, o real en el sentido ficticio?" y "¿Desaparecen cómo? ¿Desintegran espontáneamente? ¿O hunden en el mar?". Por tanto esa es una confusión que puede surgir — Lionino

Eso es lo que plantea Ayer, y a su vez, es lo qué critica Austin en su ensayo. Alguno filósofos han dado a entender qué ciertas palabras como "real" sólo tienen sentido en un contexto metafísico. Ciertas preguntas cómo ¿pero real en que sentido? sólo suelen preguntadas por personas que van más allá de lo básico. Sin embargo, para la mayoría de la gente, la palabra "real" se asocia por sí sola a su valor intrínseco al carecer de ambigüedades. Si Papá Noel es real o no ya va implícito en lo que es "real" para el sentido aceptado generalmente. No se van a parar a pensar si es "tangible", si se aprecia por los sentidos, si está en nuestra conciencia, etc...

Lo leí normalmente. — Lionino

Entiendo que sin dificultad. Interesante.

@Moliere @Lionino @Philosophim and others who would like to enjoy this thread about the magic of Spanish language.

I was thinking about what to discuss now and then, a lot of poems by Gloria Fuertes came to my memory randomly. It is true that Gloria is known for writing children's literature. She was one of the main pillars of my childhood. Some years after, and reading her poems again, I realised that they have a philosophical (or "philosophy of language") content.

Os dejo información sobre ella (también está en inglés): Gloria Fuertes

*

El juego de las vocales (vowels) es muy curioso y hace que la mente esté atenta cuando están en cadena: A, E, I, O y U.
Todavía más cuando eres solo un crío. Mientras se aprende, creo que es más sencillo si todo "rima" en vez de unir versos abstractos. No obstante, esto no significa qué tengan menos calidad filosófica.

Por ejemplo, en este poema de Gloria Fuertes, los niños quedan alucinados porque cada verso termina en la vocal A. Se nota bastante que están esperando a qué el siguiente termine en la misma vocal, y así sucesivamente.

Este es el breve poema:

Nací en Madrid. Soy gata.
Soy gata neta y nata.
Mi comida es una lata.
Mi vida es una lata.
Siempre meto la pata...
Y nunca cazo ratas.
Me gusta la nata.
Aunque nunca hocico la cata.
¡Miau!

¿Cómo habéis seguido el poema vosotros? ¿Ha llegado un momento que vuestra mente esperaba que la vocal A fuese seguida de otra A? :grin:

La fonología se ocupa de la organización de las sílabas y de sus combinaciones para formar palabras y grupos fónicos. No abarca, por tanto, todos los sonidos que el ser humano es capaz de articular, sino solo los que poseen valor distintivo o contrastivo en las lenguas. RAE

White Nights; Netochka Nezvanova by Fyodor Dostoevsky.

Good and interesting points, Tobias. Thanks for this friendly exchange. :smile:
I just wanted to share the perspective using the legislation of my country and I realised that the legislation of our nations has common legal principles thanks to the European framework.
Here the "existence" of the mortgage depends on its record in the land registry. Even when the guaranteed amount is paid, the cancelling of the registry is needed. Because one thing is extinguishing the loan by paying and the other the guarantee on the house.

Article 1:149 of the Dutch civil code mentions that a marriage can be dissolved on a number of grounds. These grounds are summed up limitatively which means that only those grounds have legal force. The eradication of a registry is not among them. Therefore I can only conclude that under Dutch law the marriage is not dissolved. — Tobias

It is not dissolved, yes. The marriage remains, and the spouses maintain basic obligations, as we noted before. Our legislation foresees two basic procedures to dissolve a marriage in the 85th article of the Civil Code: the death of one spouse and "divorce". The latter requires a lot of formalities or ceremonies. Public deeds, spouses consent, authorisation by a legal public worker like a Notary or Judge and then... its record in the civil registry to prove the date of dissolution. :sweat:

Interestingly perhaps under Dutch law we know the figure of the 'natural obligation'. That is an obligation that cannot be enforced but is still there. — Tobias

Yes, I am aware of the existence of natural obligations in Dutch civil law. Our jurists demand more framework over these obligations, because they are there, even though it cannot be forced. It is true that some articles in the book "Obligations and Agreements" contain, briefly, references to natural obligations. For example, the articles 1755 and 1756 say: Interest is not due unless it is stipulated. A borrower who has paid interest that is not stipulated may not charge it to the principal.

The most prominent example of it is when a thief becomes the owner of a certain good due to the statute of limitation. Since he became owner the original owner cannot revindicate his or her property. Yet, the thief/owner is still under a natural obligation to return the good to the person he/ she stole it from. — Tobias

I like it. It reminds me of the figure of proxies and agents. When the principal resolves the authorisation to act in his name, those have the natural obligation to return him the deed where the authorisation is.

Say a nuclear weapon wipes out all the registries, then there is no evidence of my marriage anymore, but I am still married. I still have the legal obligation to care for my partner. There is just no evidence for the marriage and if I walk away from my obligation it cannot be enforced by a court. That though does not make the obligation somehow disappear, or the marriage somehow annulled. — Tobias

Sorry to intrude myself in your debate, but since I am also a law graduate and I work for the land registry in Madrid, I think I can make some useful points:

As you previously stated, Tobias, it depends on the legislation we are taking into account, but since you and I live under the "umbrella" of the European Union, there is a basic principle: the company does not exist if it is not recorded. If the company is not recorded, it becomes irregular and the stakeholders respond with their goods and not with the company's goods. I mean, without a registration, the company lacks of "affectio societatis"

On marriage and its registration. It is interesting that you state that if the civil records get destroyed, the marriage remains.

Well, yes and no...

It is obvious that you still have some obligations to your spouse, but your marriage becomes "insufficient" as the legal codes of my country says. Specifically, the 61st of the Spanish Civil Code says: For the acknowledgment of the marriage it ought to be recorded in the civil registry.
If it is not registered, or you lack some certificate, you can lose some advantages. For example, in terms of taxes, it cannot be proven you are a family unit. In terms of perceiving a pension from the state, there could be problems of evidence that marriage existed, etc.
With the aim of preventing unfair results, the Civil Code provides basic rights and principles between spouses, but these are very basic.

So, more or less, your marriage remains, but it is insufficient. I would say it mainly exists between you and your spouse, not to the state, me (if I am a creditor) or the judges.

Wow! What to drink? — frank

Water. :smile:

I don't like alcohol because I got hooked a few years ago. But I am open to drinking sake or wine often.

I think I'd have a nice salad. — frank

You like to stay healthy until your last sigh, huh?

Say you're being executed, what would you order for your last meal? — frank

Jamón serrano (well and perfectly sliced) with a large baguette accompanied by olive oil from Córdoba.

I think a suicidal person doesn't think "he should die" but "he wants to die," which, I guess, is pretty different. Should die reminds me of a big overwhelming. Like if someone is regretted for past actions or suffers from a guilty feeling, and the only escape is to commit suicide. This has often happened with Samurai committing "seppuku." But that's not the usual case. I no longer see suicide as a rare fact... Their rates are higher than ever.

But its rare that anyone in any stage of their healthy life thinks they should die. — Philosophim

Why is it rare? I think you are misunderstanding "should" with wish. There are an important number of people out there who are healthy but wish to die for many reasons.

Love is a queer thing, — Moliere

Only if you're gay... — Benkei

I don't get what you mean, Benk.

Just playing devil's advocate with some more 'scary' thoughts... — jasonm

You feel a lot of anxiety about trying to get attached to life as much as you can. Your thoughts are not "scary." You feel the overwhelming thought of realising that, sooner or later, we will all leave this world without being aware of it. There will be neither a trace nor an "afterlife."