Four stellar paragraphs. Thanks.

One possible terminological consideration would be to cast the debate in terms of the contrast between 'contingent' with 'unconditional' rather than between 'relative' and 'absolute' (or 'foundational'.) — Wayfarer

Indeed, I was actually going to raise this but thought I had done enough damage already. :up:

nterestingly, the 'cartesian anxiety' is a theme taken up in The Embodied Mind, where it is proposed that this anxiety is a strong motivating force in current culture. But they see it as a false dilemma which needs to be overcome. — Wayfarer

That resonates with me.

Their analysis is too lengthy to summarise here, but it's one of the source texts for enactivism, a key theme of which is the transcending of the subject/object, self/world division. — Wayfarer

If I were of a more scholarly cast I think this is precisely where I would go looking for a coherant model of thought in this space.

Nevertheless I think there's a real gap in philosophical discourse where the unconditioned should be. If everything is contingent, then the best that can be hoped for is a kind of social consensus or inter-subjective agreement. But then, if we're part of a flawed culture, there's no reason that either will provide us with a proper moral foundation. — Wayfarer

Wow! The sting in the tail is the last sentence. I think this can be the problem, and perhaps ultimately why anti-foundationalism is often resisted. By "proper" I am assuming one that allows for flourishing, solidarity - you might also include higher contemplation?

We might still be subject to Descartes' 'evil daemon', meaning that what we've gone through life thinking is real and substantial might in the end be illusory. I think that's a legitimate cause of angst. — Wayfarer

Hmm, I've been pondering this since I was 7 or 8.

The question of whether anti-foundationalism allows moral assertions depends on whether we believe morality requires a metaphysical foundation. — Astorre

Yes, and that's the quesion I am posing.

moral norms can be justified not through eternal truths, but through intersubjective practices, the goals of shared life, and the ability of norms to work cooperatively. Anti-foundationalism then doesn't boil down to relativism—because norms may not be "absolute," but still rational, critiqued, and improveable. In this understanding, a "position" arises not from metaphysics, but from the practice of reasoning. — Astorre

I think we are in agreement about the possibility of this lens.

But there are likely to be good arguments against it too.

Nice. I think this is a rich source for further discussion. The matter of pure reason is interesting. I understand reasoning, I’m not sure what “pure” adds to it. I guess Kant meant by this an entirely a priori understanding. Like you, I tend to think the role of affect and experience has a significant role in reasoning but I’m no expert. Many seem to think a sound morality is a form of rationalism.

So, as above, you could rationally say, "If you share my premises then it is wrong for you to hold slaves," but it would be irrational for you to simply say, "It is wrong for you to hold slaves." If there is no reason for anyone else to share your premises, then we have the same problem I pointed out in my first post. In other words, I would want to ask why anyone should share your values in the first place. That is the key question, and your claim that you can justify the conclusion of an argument to those who agree with (or share) the premises is not at all controversial. (Incidentally, this is what Rawls eventually admitted about his work, namely that it is not capable of reaching out beyond his own cultural context — Leontiskos

Good. Exactly. I think this is the key issue we should explore. I'd need to think though how to answer thsi without making a mess of the reasoning. I'm not ideally placed to do this. :wink: We really need an experienced anti-foundationalist.

Best I can do is this; and I'm going the long way around. An anti-foundationalist might argue that in a society caring about solidarity ("inclusion" to use the trendy woke term) is not about metaphysical necessity, it’s about practical consequences and shared aims. Cultures that reject solidarity tend to produce fear, domination, and instability. They undermine trust and cooperation, which woudl seem essential for any functioning society. So even without universal moral facts, there are strong pragmatic reasons for solidarity: it helps communities flourish, reduces harm, and supports mutual security.

Now you can respond, “So what?” And I woudl say such a quesion is morality in action. Do we want to find ways of working together or not? Sure, we don’t have to. We could create a culture of death, pain, and suffering if we wanted. But who would really support that? Human beings are social animals who cooperate to attain goals and thrive. That's morality right there, pragmatic and unfounded on anything beyond human experince.

Seems to me that without moral facts I can still argue that slavery is wrong if I believe it is not an effective way to achieve the goal of overall flourishing. If you ask me why we should care about overall flourishing, I would say: because flourishing reflects the kinds of lives and communities we have reason to value. Lives with less suffering, more security, and greater opportunities for cooperation and mutual respect. These reasons don’t depend on eternal truths; they grow out of human experience and the practical need to live together.

I think that's the best I can do with this for now.

What if they instead claim morality is just an opinion and proceed to rely on their own opinion? When we evaluate whether an opinion is “valid,” we can only do so through our own judgment; hence in that sense, yes, morality always comes back to one's own opinion.

There's no one else to blame. — Banno

Yes. As you say that's a differnce sense of subjectivity that the first account.

What interests me most in these discussions is how people believe they can ground their morality.

But he insists that his view is not relativist but ethnocentric: we always reason from within our own inherited practices, vocabularies, and moral sentiments. For Rorty, the key point is not that “anything goes,” but that justification is always to someone, to a community with shared norms, without implying that all communities are equally good or beyond criticism. — Joshs

For me this view just seems inherently common sensical. But I'm always somewhat fearful when something seems like common sense.

Heidegger rejects relativism because he doesn’t think the disclosure of Being is a matter of subjective or cultural “points of view.” Historical “worlds” are not interchangeable frameworks chosen by agents; they are ontological conditions that shape what can count as intelligible at all. The difference between epochs is not a difference between equally valid beliefs, but a transformation in how being itself is revealed. — Joshs

There's a lot in this to unpack but I see where it's headed. Sounds promising.

What unites these figures is that they reject foundationalism, the idea that morality needs an ahistorical, metaphysically secure ground, while also rejecting the relativist conclusion that norms are therefore merely subjective or interchangeable. The label “relativism” is typically applied by critics who assume that if universal foundations are unavailable, then only relativism remains. But these thinkers reject that forced choice. They are trying to articulate forms of normativity that are historical, situated, and contingent without collapsing into “anything goes.” — Joshs

That's a helpful summary and pretty much what I've been attempting to describe. Appreciate your reply.

Just as a preliminary point, I don't think I've ever said anything like that. I don't even know what "foundationalism" or "anti-foundationalism" are supposed to be. On TPF "foundationalism" is often used as a kind of vague slur. It is one of those words that is applied to one's opponents but is never adopted by anyone themselves. — Leontiskos

Good to know and apologies if I have made some assumptions. I've tended to view myself as sympathetic to anti-foundationalism.

So then the question remains: Is it possible to make moral claims from the position of "anti-foundationalism"? That depends on what you mean by "anti-foundationalism," but in a general sense I am more interested in what you yourself believe than what so-called "anti-foundationalists" believe.

But I will try to revisit this when I have a bit more time. — Leontiskos

Fair points. If you get a chance, yes please. I think your perspective on this will be useful.

Cool, please have your say on that thread too. I may be more of a Hobbsian and have always disliked Rousseau, but I suspect that more than anything it's one's disposition that informs this choice.

You make your points well and I thank you for your patience. I apologise that I seem unable to see this. I have read Lewis' book (many years ago) but I not yet convinced. I'm going to start a thread on relativism versus anti-foundationalism. I think there is a more nuanced position to take than simple relativism.

Is slavery wrong? I can definitely see how it would be wrong from a human values perspective. If you essentially accept the Western tradition, that life should be about values like flourishing and freedom and well-being and the minimisation of suffering, then slavery is not an ideal way to go about it.

Morality to me seems to be a code of conduct, and we can argue about what conduct best achieves goals like flourishing, cooperation, and the minimisation of suffering. I can't see how we can have a moral fact that floats free of human values, but that does not stop us from reasoning within the values we share.

If someone wants to claim that all morality is just an opinion and all opinions are equally valid, then they undermine their own ability to debate moral positions. But if we instead treat morality like a system with aims and constraints (something like a game with rules and goals) then we can meaningfully explore what strategies best achieve those aims.

If the main criticism is that my view has no ultimate, metaphysical foundation for right and wrong beyond human context, then yes, I agree. But I do not see why that means we should abandon having views on how to organise society. Human beings still have needs, vulnerabilities, and preferences, and these give us more than enough ground to reason about better or worse ways to live together.

But is there something here, some other understanding of "an aspect of reality beyond our known reality" that I'm missing?

if not, then this appears to be a classic case of language leading us astray. — Banno

I think then, that you and I are in agreement. We certainly know that the phrase, beyond our known reality, is often code for the Platonic realm or any number of alternate worlds. Let's not go there.

This issue may simply be to difficult for me.

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago? — Tom Storm

If the question asks is there a possibility that there is an aspect of reality beyond our known reality, how could we rule this out? I don't think this is a useful frame however since hypothetical aspects of reality are moot.

How do we know there isn’t anything beyond our reality?

Because reality is what there is.

To posit something "beyond reality" is to posit more of what there is. It is to extend reality.

This is why the extent of our language is the extent of our world. — Banno

This makes sense. But from my perspective reality is a vexed term to begin with. What exactly do we mean by this word - the totality of facts, not things?

In a not untrivial way, some people's reality (on account of language acuity and education) is definitely larger than others who have more limited capabilities. I don't think this is an equivocation on the word, but you may think so?

Is it not the case that what we call reality today is "beyond" what we called reality 500 years ago?

This got complicated. For the non-philosophers, is there a 2 or 3 sentence answer to the OP from your perspective? From my perspective we can’t ‘know’ but I guess it depends upon what’s meant by know… or ‘beyond’.

Of course, if aliens are not just carbon-based, that should make alien life more abundant and increase the likelihood that we hear from aliens in a less massive time frame.

Final thought: each day that we do not detect aliens strengthens the case that aliens are carbon-based lifeforms only, like us. — NotAristotle

Fair. My own view is that if there’s intelligent life out there, distance may not matter given technologies that would look like magic to us. We can imagine that the laws of physics we currently cherish might have 'workarounds' we simply don’t yet understand. And how would we determine that they aren’t visiting, or even aren’t here now? The usual assumption is that we’d be able to detect them and that they would announce themselves, but I don’t see why that follows.

or perhaps they have already been here but we never noticed it — javi2541997

Exactly, see above.

That said, I have no good reason at present to believe they’re here, or even that they exist.

It's definitely about the role of government, but they want a government that recognizes people's rights. They want a social safety net. — frank

I'm a fan of welfare safety nets and we have reasonable ones in operation here in Oz. Rights based thinking is not as interesting to me and I am often turned off by activists.

Honestly, identity politics is heavily embedded in the older black people I know. They'll go to their graves that way. — frank

Good to know. I have had almost zero contact with black folk, so there's that. I know a lot of First Nations Australians and what you say is true there too.

The older left (people my age) here are often somewhat snooty about identity politics. Needless to say they are mainly white. They see it as what happens when the reformist left is undermined by corporate power and replaced with a form of politics that atomises or divides people into smaller interest groups, which ultimately serves those in power rather than challenging them en bloc.

I can see all these arguments and am unsure what I personally believe any more. The older I get, the less certain I am. And the less I care, to be honest...

Where people stand politically is often a reflex action. How committed they are to the actual implications of their beliefs may be an entirely different matter. I know plenty of left-leaning people who might march on behalf of the homeless, yet if a homeless service tried to open a low-cost apartment building on their street, they could be even more vigorous in opposing it.

My point was if you look at the rudder of a progressive boat, it's compassion. We shouldn't just let people suffer when we can help, and the government is the best way to coordinate that care. — frank

Maybe it’s less about compassion then and more about the role of government in society?

But now that they're older, they're actually irritated by the complaints of young people. Maybe it's obvious why. — frank

Could it be that the complaints have changed and that identity politics is annoying to them?

All that is required for what I've said is that someone thinks it is true that everyone should not be intolerant. Whether this is a 'fact' is not very important. — Leontiskos

That's helpful.

But is it valid to say, "Humans generally try to reduce suffering, therefore it is true that everyone should try to reduce suffering?" — Leontiskos

I’m not sure. I’d say humans generally find suffering unpleasant and therefore try to avoid it. And because we’re social animals, we also often try to reduce suffering for members of our own tribe, community, or culture. I’m not convinced many of us care much about the welfare of strangers or the suffering of people we don’t like. Personally, I have a strong dislike of suffering and wouldn’t want even my enemies (not that I really have any) to suffer, but that’s just my own emotional preference. I suppose I’d like others to try to reduce suffering as well, but I have a mental block when it comes to calling it “true” that we should all reduce suffering. I’m not sure in what sense I can say it is true.

My point about "fruitful dialogue" has to do with reason-giving in moral contexts. So if someone thinks their moral utterances are true, require reasons, and can be rationally engaged, then the problem I've pointed out dissipates. But at the prevailing meta-ethical level this simply isn't true on a cultural level. — Leontiskos

:up:

When someone brings up tolerance there is usually an accusation at play. There is usually the premise, "One should not be intolerant." Now it surely does not make sense to say, "One should not be intolerant," while at the same time being undecided on whether there are moral "facts," no? And emotivism of whatever variety will be of no help unless one believes that emotions are sufficient grounds for binding moral norms. — Leontiskos

Thanks, I see what you’re saying, but it never occurred to me that moral positions require objective facts. This deserves its own thread. As a non-philosopher, my view has generally been that humans are social and cooperative: we seem to try to reduce suffering and promote well-being, and our moral views tend to reflect what supports those goals. Moral discussions are simply humans attempting to find the best ways to achieve this.

Conservatives are usually willing to let nature take care of social problems. They think that when we interfere with nature (due to an overload of compassion), we inevitably undermine a process that leads to social health and well-being. This process happens to be brutal, but conservatives are ok with that. This is because compassion isn't their driving value. — frank

Just thinking out loud. Isn't the way conservatism functions different across cultures and contexts? There are conservatives on the left, for example, old-school class warriors who dislike the identity politics of the current left. They hope to conserve the left of the early to mid 20th century. In Australia, political conservatives generally support community welfare programs, such as pensions, unemployment benefits and free healthcare, while the radical right (a small boutique group) might oppose such programs. Perhaps the majority of Australians actually favor a form of progressive politics, so conservatism here may resemble the left in countries with a more libertarian (?) ethos. I'm not sure many lefties I know are especially compassionate. How does one gauge that? I don’t always go by their politics. I go by their behaviors toward others in real life. I think a lot of the left take a kind of rights-based perspective, which is somewhat separate from compassion.

Secondly, the point originally being made about Crisp is a moral claim (hence the words "fear and resentment"), and yet the people who tend to make such claims also tend to deny moral realism, which logically takes all the sting out of their reproach. ...It's remarkable to me that on TPF moral realism is so thoroughly repelled that members regularly fail to provide any rational justification for prohibiting even the most grievous offenses, such as the slave trade, but on the other hand this has been par for the philosophical course for centuries. — Leontiskos

I’m don't know if there are moral facts or if morality is grounded in anything beyond emotional responses, perhaps emotivism is correct, of which, presumably, there are more and less defensible versions.

Interesting you see Crisp as making a moral claim. I didn’t think of it like this. I think the idea that people fear and resent 'the strange' is human nature. I know I do. I don’t consider this to be located in a specific moral framework, more a vague aesthetic/emotional one or one wherein we find ourselves unable to make sense of something. I also don't know if Crisp is right in his view. It seemed like an interesting position to raise in the context of the discussion, since it tackled tolerance differently.

"I am homosexual/trans/etc." is classified and understood as a "sin", — Moliere

I’ve often thought that sin and mental illness are connected for many people. The notion that one is going against nature/god.

I do too, tho I've also been disappointed by face-to-face interactions in real time as well. — Moliere

All interactions can disappoint. For me there are always distinct advantages to being face to face someone in real time. But perhaps not for everyone.

Sound to like you’ve thought a lot about these themes and have acquired wisdom.

Perhaps we here can attempt to create this "much better" conversation? — Moliere

I doubt it. I think we need face-to-face discussions in real time, not the anonymous often polemical world of forums. But who knows?

I don't like the romanticizing of mental illness. — Moliere

The issue for many people is that normal behaviours have previously been described as mental illness; homosexuality, even feminism. Of course, many religious folks might still agree. And now trans identities… even many progressives view this as mental illness. But let's not go there.

? As in, we need better public conversations about mental health and mental illness. — Moliere

Yes, but it depends upon what "much better' means. For instance, if a socialist says we need much better conversations about economics and money, then where do you think this will head? If we are not careful "much better" can mean "much closer to my biases". But I'm in favour of enhanced conversations on most subjects.

I agree that there's something to the notion that cultural desires for individualism run against the need for psychiatric help. It also doesn't help that in culture at large people talk about the mentally ill as if they ought have less rights than others. — Moliere

People also talk about mental illness as if it is romantic and needs to be defended as merely a kind alternative lifestyle that the evil mainstream can’t handle.

Does that defend it from the charges of anti-psychiatry? — Moliere

Well, it depends on the charges and claims made. I’m not interested in revisiting this fairly intractible debate, but I will say that if a particular psychiatrist takes the view that they are not infallible, that patient rights should be upheld, that medication is not compulsory, and that the patient should have a say in all treatment (which is how it works here for the most part), then I think we're mostly good. But no doubt there are people so hateful of psychiatry that nothing will ever excuse or redeem it. And there have been awful practices. Not to mention instances of people with a mental illness and absolutely no insight into their harmful behaviours towards self or others. The Foucauldian charge of social control, will always be popular. I feel this way about interior designers. :wink:

Pardon me if my last response was rude. — Paine

No worries. I wasn't entirely sure what you were saying, so I didn't come to any conclusions.

What Crisp is saying does reflect what is is happening here but is actively being opposed by efforts that want to have power over the next generation. — Paine

Indeed. In Crisp's time, the conservative mainstream rigorously controlled the narrative already, so there weren’t safeguards to dismantle. I think boredom will probably win. But who knows?

Is there a similar struggle going on in the Down Under? — Paine

Not really. But I don't follow my culture very closely. Our main problem is a tendency towards neoliberalism and the notion that the market should be the arbiter of culture and society. Our culture war is in slow motion compared to yours, which seems to be a cold civil war when viewed by outsiders. In our country voting is compulsory, and younger people with more progressive views seem to make up much of the voting block, so reactionary views really only find support among the older, the 'crazies' and country folk.

've been exposed to some arguments of anti-psychiatry, but I'm not invested enough in the project of psychiatry to want to really dig into them. I agree that it's not as objective as people are tempted to believe. — Moliere

There is no single project of psychiatry. It's also worth noting that the anti-psychiatry gurus are often psychiatrists themselves; people like Thomas Szasz, R.D. Laing, David Cooper, Franco Basaglia, Peter Breggin, and Giovanni Jervis. There's a lot of self-criticism built into the profession. I've worked with many psychiatrists over three decades, some brilliant, some dullards. None of them have ever held a view that what they do is objective. They would see thier profession as a mix of science, art, culture and intersubjective agreement. I think psychiatry probably arouses more hatred than almost any profession (even lawyers and politicians). How often is psychiatry the tool of oppression and anti-individualism in movies; from One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest to Girl, Interrupted? And god knows, like priests, lawyers, doctors, soldiers, police and politicians, shrinks have often done questionable things over time.

Nice.

I wonder what qualifies as a moderate leftist. Here in Australia someone like Biden would be seen as a centrist or possibly a conservative.

I have conservative (not right wing) friends who are certainly more forgiving of people's foibles and differences than some of my left friends, who seem to reach for morality every time they disagree with someone.

Tolerance is a terrible word. To be 'tolerated' sounds judgemental.

Quentin Crisp said something I have often agreed with. Tolerance does not create acceptance. Boredom does. When people experience and are exposed to certain lifestyles or people again and again, the fear or resentment often lifts and what was formerly perceived as divergent just becomes another shade of grey in our lives. I suspect this will happen with trans issues over time.

If I had to guess, philosophers who really took the content they were writing very seriously (like Plato) are the ones who have lasting fame. I'm thinking about how to tell the difference between the sophistic BS and the "deeper truth" philosophers, I'd appreciate if you elaborated because I don't know what you mean entirely. I think some deeper truths tend to get brushed aside either because people don't want to hear them or don't understand their importance. What makes a truth more important than another truth? — ProtagoranSocratist

If people find concepts difficult to understand, and if the content seems to contradict their core beliefs, they tend to dismiss it as "bullshit." We see this on the forum: if someone's worldview seems strange to another person, they are often accused of being a troll or lying. Incomprehension and a lack of values alignment seem to promote antipathy.

Why are some philosophers more prominent than others? Sometimes it's the result of a dominant culture that for generations has tirelessly promoted figures like Plato. Not that anyone today cares much about classical philosophy, except for those few with quirky hobbies.

Is philosophy about truth, or is it about generating elegant and satisfying fantasies that provide consolation? Do we actually look for views different from our own, or is philosophy mostly about us acquiring more and more sophisticated justifications for views we hold emotionally?

Sounds like usual 'alpha male' rhetoric. — unimportant

Except that it is not uttered by so called "alpha males'. So perhaps this is a deflection? Curious.

There’s a plethora of “ways out,” but I’m not confident in any myth-building that borrows from quantum mechanics. I have no expertise in the area. Based on the OP, it’s Jack who seems to be looking at ways to address or overcome the residual subject–object split that structures contemporary thinking.

In the last few years I feel like the only guarantee is life will get worse and worse so what is the point?

"Just because" is usually the reply or some prettied up version of it.

My parents are elderly and either they or their peers are talking of an ever growing list of health issues. You can do very little of what you used to enjoy so why wait to reach that stage? "Just because".

The live fast die young adage seems better. Also from an evolutionary perspective we weren't 'meant' to live past our 30s anyway so pretty much fighting against the tide. You can say it is part of our nature to fight against our nature, but, as above, why? if the only reward is worsening health. — unimportant

I've come to think that almost everything in life depends upon how you decide to look upon it. Old age can be a shipwreck or it can be rewarding. I've known plenty of old people (and worked with many), and how it plays out is almost entirely dependent upon attitude. It's easy to focus on losses, negatives and infirmities. My father, who lived until he was 98, considered his last 10 years amongst the best in his life. And even when his mobility was gone, he enjoyed reading and talking to people and was never bitter. He used to say that the old folk who complained most about old age were likely the same folk who began whinging in their teens and never stopped.

Maybe you need to go broader. Try phenomenology which understands the subjective and objective not as two separate realms but as mutually intertwined aspects of lived experience. It begins from the subjective, meaning our embodied and felt first-person encounter with the world, yet it stresses that this subjectivity is always already directed toward things that appear as objective. What we call objective arises when appearances become stable, repeatable, and shareable across different subjects. At the same time, our subjective experience is shaped by the structures, norms, and possibilities of the world we inhabit. In this way, phenomenology treats the subjective and the objective as co-constituting rather than opposed, each making the other possible.

At least that seems to be the framing. What does this add? For me it just reminds me that we get stuck in conventional dualistic thinking and there may be other ways out.

However, as writers of contemporary history, we have the opportunity to find out the answer to this question: can a person live peacefully with a private understanding of truth, instead of global narratives? — Astorre

Yes. Isn't one of the present problems that people have private understandings of truth instead of global narratives? Isn't it individualism versus community? Isn't it the atomistic nature of society and the small bubbles of intersubjective agreements and communities of truth that have replaced shared visions? At least that's what we often hear.

And they came to similar conclusions:
Outside of this, my education left me with a view that certainty is there to be overthrown and the world is chaotic.
— Tom Storm
and
Now, Order is perceived as a short-lived, fragile, localized accident amidst universal, fundamental Chaos.
— Astorre — Astorre

Well I’d say the conclusion is a reasonable one. But it isn’t the new order it’s been the consistent one.

You may be on to something. It is sobering to consider that I’m one of the first males in my family not to be affected by war or drafted to fight. So for me in my prosperous patch of the West it’s actually been nothing but prosperity and peace.


Fair.

Perhaps I received an outdated education, but it taught me that gender is an objective biological fac — Astorre

I was never taught anything about gender. Nothing I remember. There’s a bunch of threads on the more recent understanding here already.

I might add that we were also taught that if you want a higher chance of certainty and predictability in your world, you need to be rich. Predictably is a by product of power and wealth is how you obtain control. I think that has a certain logic to it, though it never left me with a motivation to make money.

Outside of this, my education left me with a view that certainty is there to be overthrown and the world is chaotic. And our flawed democracy was hard won and fragile.

The picture of the world that is still being taught today (I can see this from my children’s textbooks) looks roughly like this:

1. A problem has one correct answer.
2. Facts are objective.
3. The world is linear, comprehensible and obeys rules. — Astorre

Maybe this varies. The education I had (1970’s-80’s) was borderline relativism. We were taught that things appear different depending on who you are in society and that often there is no wrong answer. In history we were told that facts were interpretations and that history evolves over time, only the dates tend to stay fixed. I paid no attention in maths or science class as those subjects didn’t interest me, but I am assuming from the little I heard that established facts were more critical there. The overarching message of my schooling was “find out for yourself” - read diverse views and come to your own conclusions.

I don’t think we live in capitalism as such, more a capitalist inspired clusterfuck of earth raping corporate barbarism. In theory it is possible to have more compassionate capitalist systems that avoid destructive oligopolies. But in practice I think we’ll need a nuclear holocaust before there’s change. But I’m a pessimist, a defeatist and an indolent former wannabe Marxist who is too tired to spend time on such grandiose themes as world economic reform.

Nice. I’m not sure anyone can escape meaning or purpose. What we may not encounter is a transcendent purpose - a purpose above and beyond anything human. But I would suspect most theists don’t find this either.

We’re not all post-modern mercurial geniuses down here, I can tell you.

It is the distribution of evil - the child born into a short lifetime of extreme pain, for example - that is 'unfair', and thus God is rejected by many atheists, myself included.

And, of course, an omnipotent God who creates a human who will never be exposed to God's word, therefore never saved, therefore condemned to eternal hellfire, is potentially evil himself. — Jeremy Murray

Yes, I think those are fairly reasonable and conventional views. I tend to think about the problem of suffering (evil is such a limiting word). I think the more cartoon like and fundamentalist your God, the more the problem resonates. Surely a personal god (the magic sky wizard) with whom one has a relationship can do better?

But the more mystical or apophatic your theology is, the less things need to be explained and God remains unknowable. My favourite explanation for the existence of suffering is that because an apophatic God is beyond all attributes, we have no basis to expect the world to lack suffering.

He was banned 3 years ago.