It seems you didn't read the whole thing:

And so, if we continue like that, we could say that the simplest and therefore most likely (infinitely more likely) scenario was that nothing existed at all. — Amalac

They would not argue that a universe without a rock or without the sun or the milky way is infinitely simpler, they would argue: the less things there are in it, the simpler the scenario is. And it reaches its simplest state when there is absolutely nothing in it, where infinitely many things don't exist (or at least where a huge amount of things don't exist).

The barber (B), a philosopher (T) who doesn't shave himself, and a mathematician (M) who does.

We have all and only men who shave all and only men who don't shave themselves.

1. M is never a member of R because he shaves a man who shaves himself.
2. P can't be a member either because he doesn't shave himself, so he'd have to shave himself to be a member, but he doesn't.
3. What about B? He would have to shave P and not M. No problem. If he shaves himself, he'd be out, like M, but if he doesn't, he'd be out like P. So B can't be a member no matter what he does.

So R = { }. No one shaves all and only men who do not shave themselves, therefore the barber does not shave all and only men who do not shave themselves. The three cases are exhaustive, in fact: no one can be a member of R whether they shave themselves or not.
— Srap Tasmaner"

First things first, some things need to be clarified:

Are B, T and M each categorized/defined (for example when M is categorized as one who shaves himself), before the hypotetical shavings are done or after they are done? I'll asume first that it is after the shavings are done:

If M shaves himself, he shaves himself and can't be a member.

Does «The philosopher does not shave himself» mean: He hasn't shaved himself until know and never will? If so, by definition he can't ever shave himself, and therefore can never be a member since he can never shave someone who does not shave himself.

Since Srap says that the implication: if the philosopher shaved himself, then he would be a member is true, we'd have to say: if he shaved himself he would shave someone who does not shave himself. But if it were possible for him to shave himself, then he would in that case have shaved someone who shaves himself (since after he shaves himself, he is someone who shaves himself) and therefore he would not be a member. So the implication can't be true if P shaves himself.

However, it's impossible for him to shave himself by definition, and therefore he can never be a member. This means the implication «If he shaved himself, he would be a member» is true, since it could only be false if he both shaved himself and wasn't a member, which can never happen since the antecedent is impossible. So what Srap says up to this point appears correct if we interpret it like this.

Or does it mean: He hasn't shaved himself until know, but may shave himself in the future? If so, he would shave someone who shaves himself (since after he shaves himself, he is someone who shaves himself) and therefore not be a member. So this can't be what it means if Srap is right.

As for the barber: If he shaves himself he will shave someone who shaves himself (since after he shaves himself, he is someone who shaves himself) and therefore not be a member.

If he shaves M, if M already shaved himself before, then the barber would shave someone who shaves himself, and not be a member. If M hasn't shaved himself yet, then he would shave someone who doesn't shave himself, and be a member. So it must be the case that M already shaved himself in the past if Srap is right.

If B shaves P, then he shaves someone who doesn't shave himself, and is therefore a member of R.

This is problematic, because according to this interpretation since P does not shave himself, the barber would shave someone who does not shave himself, and therefore the barber would be a part of R, which contradicts what Srap says: that R is empty.

Nonetheless, this interpretation does show that if he shaves himself, he would not be a member of R.

Let's now assume they are caracterized *before* any of the hypotetical shavings used in the previous reasonings happen:

If M shaves himself, then if M shaved himself in the past, then he shaves someone who shaves himself and is not a member. This must be the case if Srap is right.

If he hasn't, then he shaves someone who doesn't shave himself (yet) and therefore is a member. This can't be right if Srap is right.

If P shaves himself, then he shaves someone who doesn't shave himself (yet) and therefore is a member. According to Srap, this too can't be the case.

Unless we include in the definition of P that he never will shave himself, in which case it's impossible for him to shave someone who does not shave himself, and therefore he can never be a member of R, and the implication “if P shaves himself, he would shave someone who doesn't shave himself (yet)” would once again be true because the ground/ antecedent is by definition always false. This must be right if Srap is right.

If the barber shaves himself, and if he hasn't shaved himself in the past, then he would be shaving someone who does not shave himself, since before he shaves himself he hasn't shaved himself. Therefore, he would be a member. This can't be the case if Srap is right.

If the barber shaves himself but has also shaved himself in the past, then he shaves someone who shaves himself, and is therefore not a member. This must be so, according to Srap.

If the barber shaves M, then if M shaved himself in the past, then he shaves someone who shaves himself and is not a member. This must be the case if Srap is right.

If M hasn't shaved himself in the past, then the barber would be shaving someone who does not shave himself, and therefore would be a member, which can't be the case according to Srap.

If B shaves P, then he shaves someone who doesn't shave himself, and is therefore a member of R.

And so we have the same problem as before.

So it seems that in either case R is not empty because the barber belongs to R.

Unless I made a mistake somewhere, of course.

By the way your professor was being vague and imprecise when (s)he spoke of "infinitely more likely." I don't know what that means and neither did they. That's why I like the example of a trillion coins. That's an experiment that's physically realizable. We don't need to appeal to infinity to see the essential mystery. Any particular sequence of coins is extremely unlikely, but some outcome must occur. — fishfry

Like I said in my OP, I think the reason he, like Martin Gardner, says that is beacuse of an argument like this:

Their opponents, however, could retort that their intuition is that the «scenario» of the universe not having existed is «simpler» than the «scenario» of the universe having existed, and therefore more likely. From this, they could then say that it is always more likely for anything to not exist, rather than for it to exist, and that this is also true for the whole universe. This seems to also be the position of Martin Gardner in «The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener» where he talks about the ontological argument, he says: «There is nothing that exists, Hume said, including the entire cosmos, whose non-existence entails a logical contradiction. The idea that everything would be simpler if nothing existed may leave us in deep anguish, but there is nothing inconsistent about it.» — Amalac

In a response to another comment I gave an example: A universe that was just like the actual one, but where a rock didn't exist would be simpler than the actual universe, and therefore more likely to exist than the actual universe. And a universe where both a rock and the sun didn't exist was even more likely, since it's even simpler. And so, if we continue like that, we could say that the simplest and therefore most likely (infinitely more likely) scenario was that nothing existed at all.

Unless we are to say that it does not follow that something is more probable just because it's simpler, or we deny that it is simpler.

Kolakowski argued that we are incapable of conceving the non-existence of the universe which implies absolute nothingness, and that therefore we have reason to believe that something exists = necessarily, something exists. Now I wonder if one could say as a response: some people can't conceive of it while others can.

One thing seems certain though: It is impossible to picture the absolute nothingness implied by the world's non existence in the mind's eye (one where there wasn't even darkness nor empty space). But it's not clear if arguments of the form: «X is unimaginable, therefore X is impossible» are always valid.

I think one possible objection to your view would be that if nothing means not something, then nothing can't be thought of as «something» without violating the Law of Contradiction.

And if «nothing» does not mean «not something», then what does it mean?

And if this nothing is «thought of as something», then when asking: «Why is there something rather nothing?» then «something» in the question seems to include your idea of «nothing», and then the question would turn into: «Why is there something rather than something?» which makes the question meaningless.

What is your analysis? If logic breaks down here, does it break down in your argument by implication? — Gregory

If I were to look at that here that would get us off topic (specially since after reading your thread it's still unclear to me how the argument is related to the barber paradox).

Is it possible for me to send you a private message in this site, or should I post in that old thread?

I remember what my wife said in defense of the button: "If the end goal of this journey is happiness, and that button makes you truly happy, why not do it? Journey complete."
My horrified reaction: "But that's cheating!"

Now, I think that what my wife means by "truly happy" is something different than what the button can produce, which is just raw physical pleasure. — RogueAI

1. What does it matter if it's «cheating» or not? It seems to me like that's unimportant in comparison.

2. I do think that happiness is obtained only from pleasure, as well as from other «good» sensations in the mind (tranquility, peace of mind, joy, etc...) which I assume could be included in «pleasure», for how else would you «feel» happy?

it only takes a press of this button, in a completely conscious person, to remove it from its virtues and morals, making it become an empty shell. Therefore, the choice must be cut - "No" is the only answer possible -. — Gus Lamarch

I gotta say I honestly don't understand people who think like you. (Not that there's anything bad with thinking like that, I just don't understand them)

Why should one value not being an empty shell more than being happy? What's the point of not being an empty shell if you are not perfectly happy?

The way I see it, being happy is infinitely more important and valuable than being «human» or whatever. I don't think there is anything intrinsically better about not being an empty shell rather than being one, if one gets happiness in the former case.

Maybe one of the answers is based on a prejudice, or maybe both are. Who knows.

But at any rate, is this really all that important? The idea that we could ever build such a button seems completely fantastic, so it's just a hypotetical scenario that probably will never happen.

Balancing both truths is important and the bottom line is people will always disagree with each other. — Gregory

I quite agree.

If you contradict something my heart knows is wrong, I will contradict you — Gregory

Fair enough.

I don't know if your argument just works for you but is incapable of working in other minds, keep in mind that other people have different logical aparatuses and that you argument may never work for some people, and not to their fault. — Gregory

You sound kind of like a relativist here, since you say people «have different logical aparatuses», which sounds a lot like Protagoras' doctrine that «each man is the measure of all things».

I don't mind, but is that really what you are saying?

I thought most people just took things like the Law of Contradiction or the Law of the Excluded Middle for granted, just as they take it for granted that they are not constantly deceived. Wouldn't you say it's possible that each logical apparatus can at least have something in common with the others?

So if I understand you correctly, you deny the transcendental notion of truth (like Husserl's for example), according to which an assertion is true independently of the fact that we think that it is true or even come up with the idea of the assertion. Interesting.

As for your question, if we use the word existence in such a wide sense and deny the transcendental notion of truth, then I suppose nothing would exist.

But if «exists» implies «outside the mind» (which is how the term is usually used), then it can't be said that a concept like «existence» exists, unless we hold the kind of platonic realism according to which the universal concept «existence» exists beyond space and time.

Would you say the proposition «Planet earth exists» would not be true if there were no humans on earth then?

I am asking if you think the proposition «The universe could have not existed» is true, false or meaningless. Is there something selfcontradictory in that proposition?

I was just trying to emphasize the ideas and things I was talking about to avoid confusion, and thought it unnecessary to use the quote function for that.

But ok, I'll stop that.

Descartes tried and he ended up using the ontological argument to get out — Gregory

Well, I don't know if I should argue with you about that, since that would get us slightly off-topic, but I'll only say this:

It seems to me like Descartes was inconsistent when he thought that that argument was a certain proof of God's existence, because that seems incompatible with his previous attitude of doubting everything.

First, because his argument against the Evil Demon deceiving us based on the fact that God exists and is good, begs the question: He already assumes that he is not deceived by the Demon when he starts and ends to reason about the existence of God, and assumes that his argument proving God's existence cannot be flawed in any way. It seems odd that he doubted that 2+2=4 or that a square has 4 sides, but not that.

Then there is this other inconsistency:

(Descartes') reasoning that we can trust our cognitive abilities on the basis of the truthfulness of God is far from convincing, not only because his arguments for God's existence are flawed, but because he assumed that the reliability of our perception and our logical instruments was based on God's moral perfection and the resulting certainty that He cannot deceive us. But God's goodness and omniscience do not necessarily mean that he can never mislead us. It cannot be excluded a priori that the truth, let alone the whole truth, is harmful to imperfect creatures and that in some cases it is good for us to be misinformed. In any case, there is nothing obvious in the assumption that truth cannot conflict with other goods; this would have to be demonstrated separately.

Leszek Kolakowski

I see, my question for you would be: Do you think it was logically possible for the universe not to have existed? Or do you think that very question is meaningless?

Well, in my universe these two are two sides of the same coin - to answer one is to answer the other, no? Why is there something rather than nothing? = Why not nothing rather than something? — TheMadFool

I just wanted to emphasize that I wasn't asking for an «explanation» or a «why» of the universe, rather the question is: Is it meaningful to even assign a probability to such «scenarios» (so to speak)? But anyway, this is not too important.

Perhaps you missed the part where I said that the "something" in your question refers to physical stuff and with respect to the physical, vacuum is nothing or, if not, is the closest "thing" we have to nothing. — TheMadFool

But see, you don't disagree with what I said: the «nothing» Krauss speaks of is not the same as the «nothing» of the metaphysicians. The «closest thing we have to nothing» is not the same as that «nothing».

We may need to give your idea a closer look because one could argue that, in a way, nothing ain't that simple. I don't know if this helps but consider nothing in math, zero. At first glance it has that outward appearance of simplicity - it's nothing and it's been given a symbol of it's own "0" - but try dividing by it and, supposedly, all hell breaks lose. I'm simply offering you what to me is a good starting point to make the case that nothing may not be simpler than something. — TheMadFool

I sort of get what you are saying, maybe it's not the case that the non-existence of something (so to speak) is simpler than it's existence. I'm not sure.

I know about Descartes' Evil Deceiver argument. And so far as theory is concerned, I am a philosophical sceptic, so I am not concerned with refuting it (which seems to me to be an impossible task anyway).

In practice, however, no human being can pretend to act doubting the most self-evident a priori truths of logic and mathematics, and also to survive more than 5 minutes or not act like a lunatic.

I was under the impression that for the sake of the discussion we took for granted the most obvious truths of logic, because if we don't, then there is no point to this discussion at all. You can't criticise whatever flaws you think the argument has because you may be deceived about that, and the same goes for me.
What's more, if we don't accept the law of contradiction then there's no reason why we should have not both asserted and denied everything that we have said thus far.

You have the idea of God and the idea that existence is perfection. — Gregory

The idea of God (defined as the subject of all perfections) and the idea that existence is A perfection (one among other perfections).

Because you have a thought of God, does it have to correspond to what it represents? — Gregory

When saying «The subject of all perfections can be conceived», that implies «The subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind» just like a unicorn exists as an idea in the mind, and so my «thought» is: the idea of «the subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it exists outside the mind or not).

Does it «correspond» to the subject of all perfections, that is: to a subject that exists not merely as an idea in the mind but also outside the mind? That depends upon the validity of the argument: If it is valid, then yes, meaning: it is the idea of that subject which exists both as an idea in the mind, and also outside it. If it's not valid, then it refers to something that exists merely as an idea in the mind, and does not refer to something that also exists outside the mind.

you are (im sad to say) presenting muddle in order for people to have faith in your logic. — Gregory

I never claimed that people should have «faith in my logic». I myself already said many times that I don't hold that it is certain that the argument is valid nor do I even hold that it is more likely to be valid than not. I try to follow Aristotle's maxim:

It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.

You still need to argue that existence or non existence are perfections, after all, maybe there are no perfections at all, or maybe perfection is inapplicable to either existence or non existence. — jkg20

By definition they are, because the perfections the subject of all perfections possesses are all those things can can be predicated truly about it. If existence or non-existence can be predicated about it, then necessarily one of them must be a perfection, since otherwise they would not be predicates of the subject of all perfections.
If you are going to say that there are no perfections, then you must hold that you can't conceive of a subject of all perfections, meaning that you must hold that the subject of all perfections is impossible even as an idea.
The definition of perfection given by Leibniz is: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express». Are you going to say that there is something logically selfcontradictory contained in that definition? There might be, but I've yet to see what that is. I don't affirm nor deny that there is not anything contradictory about it.
As you say, maybe the very concept of «perfection» is a mistake, I'm open to the idea that someone could prove that it is.

I should like to point out that the question isn't exactly «why is there something rather than nothing?», rather: «What was the likelihood of there being nothing rather than something?».
It brings into consideration also philosophical probability.

Lawrence Krauss, physicist, science educator, has written a book titled "A Universe From Nothing" that's supposed to, in Krauss' opinion, answer your question. I believe Krauss' starting premise is that the total energy in the universe is zero. It must be mentioned though that his book has met with some criticism with other scientists, philosophers, etc. alleging that Krauss hasn't actually explained why there's something rather than nothing. — TheMadFool

It seems to me that what Krauss is refering to isn't the philosophical «nothing», but rather to «vacuum» or «void». The philosophical «nothing» means, I think, «absolutely nothing», not even vacuum with energy or empty space.

My personal opinion, for what its worth, is that we have to start from what is obvious viz. that something exists. — TheMadFool

Would you agree with Kolakowski then in thinking that «something exists» = «necessarily, something exists»? Why or why not do you agree/disagree?

How would you then respond (if you do agree) to someone who argued like this?: It is always more likely for anything to not have existed, and this is true not only of every particular thing, but also about the whole universe. A universe that was just like the actual one, but where a rock didn't exist, was more likely to exist than the actual universe because it is simpler. And so, if nothing existed at all, that's as simple a scenario as it gets, and therefore not only is it not impossible that nothing should have existed, but it was in fact infinitely more probable.

1. That an event x occurs implies that x was liklier than not-x. That Stephen Hawking was given the Lucasian Chair Of Mathematics, that it happened, implies that it was likelier than Stephen Hawking not being given that honor - Stephen Hawking had what it takes to get that position. Likewise, that something is rather than nothing should mean that something was likelier than nothing. — TheMadFool

Does it though? Something may happen in spite of the fact that it is improbable. For example: It was unlikely for many people to be struck by lightning, but it happened anyway.

If I flip a coin and I get heads, it doesn't imply that heads was likelier than tails - the probability of either is equal at 50%. Ergo, that there's something (I get a heads on a coin flip) and not nothing (I get a tails on a coin flip) doesn't mean that something is likelier than nothing. — TheMadFool

In fact, those who argue it was more likely for nothing to exist would say that that is so because the «scenario» or «possible world» where nothing exists is infinitely simpler than the «scenario» or «possible world» where the actual universe exists. They would not compare it to a coin flip.

I do think your use of the word "strange" conveys an unwarranted negative value judgment — charles ferraro

Strange as in unusual, since when many philosophers use that term they usually mean something different from what you say. Didn't want to convey anything negative.

Experience = whatever I can encounter. I can encounter objects as objects. I can encounter my consciousness (thinking) as an object. I can encounter my consciousness (my thinking) as a subject.

But, I cannot encounter the other's consciousness (the other's thinking) as a subject. — charles ferraro

Like I said, I don't disagree, unless you are saying at the end that encountering God's (the subject of all perfections') consciousness = thinking that God exists necessarily. If you are saying that, I think you are wrong: what I would be experiencing in that case would not be God's thinking, nor God's necessary existence, nor necessary existence, rather I would be experiencing a thought (of mine, not of God's), namely the following: «I think the subject of all perfections exists necessarily». The thought about the idea of «the subject of all perfections» is not the same as that subject which may exist outside the mind, meaning when saying that, I am not «experiencing» that subject, but rather an idea of it.

If we phrase it according to the notion of existence used in the argument, then you could say that I hold that God exists as an idea in the mind, and that therefore I must, in some sense, experience God (as an idea in my mind), then in that sense what I would be experiencing isn't God, but rather a thought about the idea of God. Now, if you are going to say that experiencing that is impossible, you should add your reason for thinking that.

So if you are going to say I can't even experience an idea of that subject in the way that I have described, I ask: Why not?

your use of the term "the subject of all perfections" reminds me of the term "the great wizard of Oz." I think my ability to experience your "subject of all perfections" (by the way, how do you define a subject and perfections?) is less likely than my ability to experience "the great wizard of Oz." — charles ferraro

1. When I say subject I don't mean «person», I mean it as in «the subject of X, Y, Z... predicates». By definition, all the predicates that can be truly asserted of said subject are the perfections it possesses. (Though you are right that I forgot to add this in my OP)

2. You don't need to «experience the subject of all perfections» for the argument to be valid. Like I said before, this is not an experiential ontological argument.

So, let me see if I understand correctly. I must believe that some, or all, ontological arguments are capable of convincing me of the truth of the idea that a purported subject of all perfections exists necessarily, but I can't verify the truth of this idea empirically because I can't have a personal experience of it's perfect thinking and its perfect existing in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

You can't verify the truth of the idea empirically and you don't need to, beacuse the argument is a priori. Just as you don't need to verify empirically that 2+2=4. All you need to know that that's true is to analyze the meaning of «2+2» and «4». And as I said, you don't need to have a personal experience of perfect thinking and/or perfect existing.

What the argument says is: If God didn't exist and it is admitted that existence and non-existence are predicates, then by analysis we would see that that implies a logical contradiction (if the argument were valid). At no point in the argument is there a need to experience anything. No more than you need to experience the «4» that is eternal, and exists beyond space and time (if indeed platonism is correct, which I neither affirm nor deny) to know that 2+2=4.

Ontological arguments claim that necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

No, they claim the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, that is not the same as «necessary thinking and existing can also be experienced by human beings, in the first, present tense mode».

If not necessary thinking and necessary existing, then what would an ontological argument argue for? — charles ferraro

They argue that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily, «The subject of all perfections exists necessarily» ≠ «necessary thinking and necessary existing»

I'm not trying to PROVE the existence of anything! You are! — charles ferraro

No, I'm not trying to prove anything either, I only mention that this is an argument that can be presented, I don't maintain, like some theists who defend some form of ontological argument would, that it's certainly valid or even more likely to be valid than not.

All I'm saying is that the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

1. That the occurrence of necessary or divine thinking cannot be experienced by a human being is obviously true, since said «occurrence» could only be experienced by God, in God's mind (which is doing the «necessary thinking») (if he exists). But the argument does not imply that one has that experience.

2. You use the term «experience» in a strange way:

I may experience pain or a cold sensation for example. But if, hypotetically, I said that I can prove the existence of the subject of all perfections a priori, and that it exists necessarily, does that mean I am «experiencing necessary existence» or «experiencing necessary thinking» in the same way as I experience pain or a cold sensation? No, because «I can prove that X exists necessarily» does not equal «I am experiencing necessary existence» nor «I am experiencing X's necessary existence», nor «I am experiencing necessary thinking» (where «necessary thinking» means «God's thoughts») in the usual sense of the term «experience».

If by «the occurrence of NECESSARY thinking and existing cannot be EXPERIENCED by a human being in the first person, present tense mode.» you mean « It can't be the case that a human being thought or conceived as an idea that the subject of all perfections exists necessarily», then once again I say you must give a basis for the claim that that is impossible.

So now I need to know what you mean by «experience» in order to make the discussion clearer.

Though I already know about the barber paradox, I will check out your thread when I have the time.

1. The occurrence of my personal thinking along with the simultaneous occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. In this sense they are both contingent. — charles ferraro

I agree, but I don't see what that has to do with the argument.

2. No one knows why the occurrence of my personal thinking and the occurrence of my personal existing are open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence; i.e., are contingent. They just are. — charles ferraro

How does that relate to the argument exactly?

3. I am "only open to this kind of thinking;" viz.; contingent thinking, because I cannot engage in any other kind of thinking. All my thinking is contingent. If I could engage in necessary thinking, which I cannot, I would be divine, because my existence would also be necessary. — charles ferraro

Oh, so that's what you meant by that. I thought you meant that you only accept the «kind of thinking» that rejects right off the bat that the existence of anything can be proven a priori.

Now, if what you are saying is: The existence of something cannot be proved a priori using «contingent thinking» (meaning, someone whose thinking can cease to exist cannot prove the existence of anything a priori) , but only through «necessary thinking», i.e. that only God (if he existed) could prove his existence a priori, then:

1. I ask: how do you know that that is true?

2. It seems to me that such a view leads to the kind of paradox that Leszek Kolakowski pointed out as follows:

The reason Thomists were opposed to the (ontological) argument was that it seemed to endow our fallible intellect with too much power: we can, in fact, conceive of God as non-existent, the Thomists say, not because his existence is not really included in his essence, but because of the weakness of our reason; In short, we are so mentally weak that we can be atheists. It might be suspected, although St. Thomas did not say it in these terms, that St. Anselm's reasoning exhibited a certain hubris, an unacceptable confidence in the skill of philosophy; In Thomist terms, the only path that leads to God and that is within the reach of natural lights (that is, apart from revelation and the rare gift of mystical union) begins with the imperfection and non-self-sufficiency of creatures and not by our knowledge of the nature of God.

It might even be appropriate to say that for thomists the ontological argument is valid, but that only God can understand its validity (which, however, seems to lead us to an antinomy, just like a statement of the form 'A is valid but only God can know why "implies" I know that A is valid, but I cannot know that it is. "Thus, the content of the sentence would be negated by expressing it, in a way not very different from what would happen if we said:" I am unable to say a single word in English "or" I'm mute ").

(Source: If there is no God...)

Unless of course you accept that the existence of God has not been proved yet by any argument at all, as I do.

the question makes little sense and answering it makes not a wit of difference to anything. — SophistiCat

I agree with you

By the way, if you put an extra space between paragraphs, your posts will look less like an unappealing wall of text. — SophistiCat

Thanks for the advice, I think it looks better now.

"If existence and non-existence are predicates, then either existence is a perfection or non-existence is a perfection."

Existence is a perfection — Gregory

"1. Either nonexistence is a mark of greatness OR Existence is a mark of greatness [premise]"

Existence us — Gregory

But do you accept that those disjunctions are true? If you do, then either p or not p must be true, where p is «Existence is a perfection» and not p is «Non-existence is a perfection».

"Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far — Gregory

If the proposition «the subject of all perfections does not exist» is true, and you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then said subject (precisely because it does not exist) must have the predicate «non existence» (non existent subjects have predicates too). But what is it that has such a predicate? The subject of all perfections, and it follows from the definition of perfection that said predicate, since it is a perfection, must be expressed without any limits, and if that's true, then necessarily it can't also not not exist as an idea in the mind, for otherwise it would not have that perfection, meaning non existence would not be a predicate of it, which contradicts either the disjunctions or the Law of the Excluded Middle.

How can you deny that when you yourself accept premise 3?:

3. If nonexistence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [premise]"

Yes — Gregory

And since God exists as an idea, that is a fact that contradicts the idea that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of non-existence (since he does exist in that way: as an idea in the mind). Whence it follows that the assumption that non-existence is a perfection must be false. And because of the disjunction, the only possibility is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject must exist not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.

"Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind."

FALSE. It exists only in the mind so far — Gregory

What leads to that conclusion is the assumption that non-existence is a perfection, and since God exists «only in the mind so far», that can't be the case. Therefore, via Reductio ad Absurdum (Proof by Contradiction), we conclude that the only possibility , in view of the disjunctions and the Law of the Excluded Middle, is that existence is a perfection, from which it follows that said subject exists not only as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind, for to say that the subject of all perfections exists only as an idea in the mind is to deny the only possibility that we have left.

"But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction."

NO. The idea that it exists as perfection exists in the mind but there is no argument so far that absolute perfection must exist — Gregory

1.Do you deny that the subject of all perfections exists as an idea in the mind? If you don't, and you accept the previous premises and steps, you must also accept what you have quoted right there.

If you do, then you must hold that the subject of all perfections is inconceivable. But the fact that we (or at least I) can understand the proposition «There is a subject of all perfections» contradicts that claim. Unless you say that you don't understand that proposition, in which case this argument won't convince you.

Remember that the notion of existence (the one used in Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, which you accepted) I mentioned implies that what exists as an idea in the mind also, in some sense, exists (with said predicate either being a perfection, or not; in the latter case whatever has that predicate only exists as an idea in the mind, but not in the former case) and the same applies, the other way around, to non-existence.

2. Again, the argument does not attempt to prove that «absolute perfection» exists, rather it attempts to prove that «the subject of all perfections» exists.

"And therefore this assumption must be false. From which it follows that God has the perfection of existing, that is: He exists."

So why are you now retracting and saying you are no talking about God. — Gregory

I am not retracting, when for example I said that the subject of all perfections might be a «state», I meant that God (defined as the subject of all perfections) might be a «state» (until I read one post of yours that I skipped, and realized that you were talking about a «mental» state.)
I am not assuming that God must be a person, as I said previously.

"This also answers the objection that not-existing might be better than existing, and that therefore non existence might be a perfection."

(...)Non-existence of a good is not a perfection (...). — Gregory

1. «Non-existence of a good»? Non-existence of the subject of all perfections is what that part of the argument asserts.

2. Do you deny the disjunctions then? If you say non-existence is not a perfection, either you deny the disjunctions or you accept that existence is a perfection. If you deny the disjunction, then you must hold that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, that it is meaningless/nonsense.

If you say that existence is a perfection and don't deny the disjunction, then necessarily the subject of said perfections must exist (for the reasons given above: it follows from the definitions that you have accepted and the remarks on this comment). To reject this is to reject the definitions of «perfection», «the subject of all perfections» and/or «exists».

"4. The greatest being cannot exist in any way possible [2, 3, Modus ponens]"

Outside our thoughts, yes — Gregory

1. If you mean that the greatest being can exist outside our thoughts, remember that what the argument asserts here is the following: IF non-existence is a perfection, then the greatest being cannot exist in any way possible. IF that's true, then obviously it can't exist outside our thoughts either.

If you mean that It only cannot exist outside our thoughts but may exist in our thoughts, If it cannot exist in any way possible (If you accept 2, 3 and Modus ponens), it can't exist in our thoughts either, for then he would exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the definition of non-existence as a perfection, since it would then be limited and not a perfection.

And if you deny that non-existence could be a perfection while accepting the disjunctions, then you must, as I said, accept that God must have the perfection of existence, that is: He must exist.

"7. If God cannot exist in any way possible then God cannot exist as an idea"

THERE is the problem. You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection. God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection. HOWEVER, it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate — Gregory

You go from saying God can't exist in any way is non-existence is a perfection.

No, the argument says: IF non-existence is a perfection, THEN God cannot exist in any way possible, not the other way around. This is setting up a Reductio ad Absurdum.

God exists in our thoughts and the thought is that his existence is a perfection.

No, «God exists in our thoughts» means: we can conceive of the subject of all perfections, which means we can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it's true or false). It does not mean: «God's existence is a perfection».

it does not prove he is outside our thoughts to say we have the thought of him existing even is non-existence cannot be a predicate

It does if you accept that the disjunctions are true, and if you accept the definitions.

"12. Existence is a mark of greatness [1, 11 Disjunctive syllogism]"

Obviously

"13. If existence is a mark of greatness then the greatest being must exist [premise]"

FALSE — Gregory

If you accept 12 you must accept 13, for to deny 13 while accepting 12 is to deny either that existence is a perfection or a mark of greatness, or the definitions given. Remember that the «greatest being» is in the argument synonimous with «the subject of all perfections».

The argument (in summary) is that if the proposition «The subject of all perfections does not exist» were true, then necessarily non-existence would be a perfection of said subject, which would imply a logical contradiction, which would then imply that the proposition «God does not exist» must be false.

As a human being, the only kind of thinking I can have both an idea of, and a direct personal experience of, in the first person, present tense mode, is a kind of thinking that is open to the possibility of complete cessation and non-existence. — charles ferraro

1.The complete cessation and non-existence of what? Of anything?

2. Why are you only open to that kind of thinking?

But logical thinking, which is human after all, cannot enable me to have also a direct personal experience of this kind of necessary thinking, in the first person, present tense mode. — charles ferraro

The argument is a priori, which means precisely «independent of any experience», just as I don't need experience to know that 1638373783 is an odd number. The difference is that unlike mathematical truths it is not nearly as self evident, and I don't know if it is valid. But if you are going to say the argument depends upon the experience of the divine, it seems to me you are mistaken. That applies only to experiential ontological arguments. Earlier you said:

The point being that your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true. — charles ferraro

Then when I asked you why if the argument is not a posteriori then it can't be valid, you just repeat that it can't be. Seems to me like circular logic.

Logical thinking is not divine. Logical thinking has its limits, and this is one of them. — charles ferraro

And how do you that it has a limit that makes the argument invalid?

I am not pretending to know God's essence. What I am speculating about is one way in which divine thinking might differ from human thinking, if the divine existed, by extending certain basic principles derived from Descartes' epistemology. — charles ferraro

Did I say that you claimed to know God's essence? No, I said:

If, on the other hand, you mean that God's existence cannot be proven a priori because we do not know God's essence (like Aquinas maintained) it is not enough to say that that is so, if you want your position to be convincing. Tell us how you know that we DO NOT know God's essence. — Amalac

But Divine thinking is the idea of an: "While I think necessarily, I exist necessarily," which idea I cannot experience in the first person, present tense mode

That is not «divine thinking», that's just Descartes' cogito, and it's not relevant to the argument.

You say (1) we have the idea of perfection. — Gregory

I first gave a definition of perfection, then I said we have the idea of the subject (or a subject) of all perfections.

(2) existence is a perfection "which would imply that it would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind. Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind" — Gregory

Which would imply the subject of all perfections (not perfection) would not only exist as an idea in the mind, but also outside the mind.

Youre just playing with logic. We can think that we have an idea of perfection. But again, does that idea have a consistent form in our minds and does it accord with something outside our minds? You don't have the crucial form of an argument because you use a linguistic trick. You haven't laid out a clear argument really for anything — Gregory

Once again you are trying to say that I say perfection=God, but what the argument says in that regard is:

1. There is more than one perfection.

2. A subject of all perfections can be conceived.
That we (or at least I) can conceive of a «perfection» (perfections rather) is shown by the fact that I understand the definition of it given by Leibniz: «A simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express», and in fact can understand it without the need of clarifying it further.

If you don't understand it, then there is nothing I can reply to that.

If you think there is something self-contradictory about that definition, I will listen to that contradiction.

you have not given a reason to think we can turn all our ideas of good into a single subject. — Gregory

I'm open to the possibility that there may be more than one subject of all perfections, provided we define that subject also as one such that nothing more perfect or better can be conceived.

But if such a subject is defined as also being greater than all other beings without exception, then clearly there can only be one.

The argument you used in the OP to "prove" this subject exists is just a "bait and switch" linguistic tactic and it's not going to fool people who read philosophy — Gregory

Again you just make assertions and don't give a reason to accept them. It may be that it is only a linguistic trick, but it is not enough to say that it is, you should give a reason to accept that claim.
And like I said before, I only mentioned it because I thought it was a curious idea. I don't claim that I know with certainty that it is valid.

You're version of it is not stronger than Anselm's or Descartes or Malebranches's or Leibniz's. You just choose a different way to try to trip up the reader, AND I don't say this to put you down but just to be objective. You obviously like these kinds of ideas/arguments and I do to. But again they say much about the mind but say nothing about what is outside the mind. — Gregory

1.I never claimed it was. It may or may not be weaker, stronger or as strong. That's what I want to find out.

2. Don't worry, since I don't think the argument proves that God exists, it doesn't put me down. (That is to say, I don't assert that it is certain that it is valid)

3. As for your claim that they say nothing about what is outside the mind, once again: give a reason for accepting that or it's just a bare assertion. At worst, it still says «much about the mind» as you say, and it may help clarify some logical and epistemological matters.

"But the order of things is the best it can be, since the power of the first cause does not fail the potency in things for perfection." — Gregory

Fair enough, then it's a question whether Leibniz is right or whether Aquinas is right (given some assumptions).
I'm open to both possibilities. What reasons does Aquinas give for accepting that? You can just tell me where you got the quote if you don't want to put it here.

To try to list perfections and increase them to infinite in order to assign it to a subject is very suspect. — Gregory

Why is it suspect? I'm all ears.

To try to prove this subject exists as you create the idea of it is worse. — Gregory

Again, why?

your argument is false precisely because you do not recognize that it must depend upon that experience in order to be true.

1.An argument may be invalid or valid, but not true or false. The conclusion of the argument, on the other hand, may be false. But that's not what you are trying to say, is it? You are trying to say it is invalid.

The basis for this claim is that the Cogito Sum performance, when executed by a human being in the first person, present tense mode, would be able to prove the existence of a Necessary Being IF AND ONLY IF it had access to a kind of thinking which was inherently closed, rather than open, to the possibility of complete cessation (i.e., a necessary or divine, rather than a contingent or human, kind of thinking) --which, unfortunately for your argument, it does not have access to and never will. — charles ferraro

2. No, it is not the case that the argument is valid if and only if the «cogito sum performance» had access to «divine thinking». All it needs is the tool humans use to think: logic. Unless you are going to call logic «divine».

3. If, on the other hand, you mean that God's existence cannot be proven a priori because we do not know God's essence (like Aquinas maintained) it is not enough to say that that is so, if you want your position to be convincing. Tell us how you know that we do not know God's essence.

Now hold on a second, if by state you mean a mental state, then the problem that I have with that view is that if a mental state could be the subject of all perfections, then it would also have to exist outside the mind, since otherwise the predicate existence would be limited, and therefore not be a perfection. But then it wouldn't be merely a mental state.

Because the subject of all perfections isn't the only subject that can possess a perfection. For example, we (according to the argument) possess the perfection of existence since we exist both as an idea in the mind and outside the mind, but unlike God we do not possess other perfections, such as wisdom and power.
And according to the notion of existence used in the argument from the eternal truths of Leibniz in combination with this argument, a unicorn does not have the perfection of existence, even though it does have the predicate «existence» ,and therefore it is limited to existing only as an idea in the mind. Or alternatively: it has the predicate «non existence», but not as a perfection, therefore it need not not exist as an idea in the mind. You can pick whichever you like.

«It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.»

Source: Leibniz' Monadology

Leibniz tried to say a person was the subject of perfection. Again, are you only saying there is a perfection in the universe?

Since Leibniz was a christian, he probably did. But I am not trying to defend what Leibniz says, I only borrowed some of his definitions, and his proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible.

But once again, the argument, if valid, does not prove the existence of a «perfection», rather the existence of «the subject of all perfections».

So your argument proves exactly what then?

I never claimed it proves its conclusion (unless it's valid, which I don't claim), I only mentioned it because I wanted to see how people in a philosophy forum would refute it in order to clarify to what degree (if any) it is valid. I certainly don't rely on it nor advance it.

You have to provide an example of something proven a priori and one proven so conclusively

That is what the argument is trying to do.

Subject doesn't mean person in your usage. So you're saying you can prove, but not conclusively, that something perfect exists but not necessarily a person. Is that your position? Again, I said it could be a state, but do you reject that? And on what grounds?

1. Yes, I mean subject as in «subject-predicate».

2. I never claimed I can prove anything, I only mentioned an argument that might, if valid, prove that God, defined as the subject of all perfections, exists. It is purely due to intellectual curiosity and epistemological interest.

3. I don't reject that the subject of all perfections could be a state.

As for the difference between «the subject of all perfections» and «the subject of all perfection», with the latter definition you are trying to equate God with perfection, and also seem to imply that there is only one perfection, which is not what the argument states.

Yet you go on to define your argument as proving perfection, not a person.

The argument, if valid, would prove that the subject of all perfections exists, not that «perfection» exists. The subject of all perfections is not the same as those perfections. Once again, see the argument as stated by «TheMadFool».

(...)But why are you using the word God then?

Because God is defined as the subject of all perfections in the argument, which is what it intends to prove, not «perfection».

Your argument says "I can think of God so he exists"

2. If you think that is equivalent to the argument, which was formalized by the user «TheMadFool», then this is clearly a strawman.

It doesn't seem strange to you that you believe you can tweek that idea into proving a priori a being's existence?

3. First of all, I am not advocating the argument, I am only mentioning it. I don't think it's conclusive.

Second, it doesn't seem strange to me (and even if it did, that's irrelevant). You may argue that it is impossible to prove the existence of anything a priori, but it is not enough to state that it is, you should also say why you think that is so, unless you don't care enough to do it.