1. You said

For most Eastern philosophy infinite perfection is a state that humans can attain.

Notice what you are defining here isn't «God», but rather «perfection»

Then I replied:

I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.

and once again, I was refering to «perfection», not «God».

But the subject of all perfection is God and that is core to your argument. Whether it is a reasonable philosophical concept in itself has not been defended by you.

The subject of all perfections (plural) is how God is defined in the argument. There is a difference between saying the subject of all perfections and the subject of all perfection.
If you are saying that maybe the subject of all perfections isn't a «person», that's fine, it may be something else. I have no interest to defend the notion of a personal God as is presented in many religions.

You should provide the argument yourself in your own words instead of sending people on a goose hunt

It is not about «sending people on a goose hunt», I said merely that if you want to see a defense of the possibility of God's idea you can look it up, if you don't care about it, then don't look it up, that's fine.
Now, I could present his proof (or attempt at proof) with my own words, but it would not be as clear or as detailed as what Leibniz presented. I don't see what could be gained by me repeating what others have already expressed better than I can.

it is inherently impossible for the arguer, a human being, to have "a concrete personal experience of divine thinking.

Like I said, the argument does not depend on that «experience», if you could tell me why you think it does, that would help.

Only the occurrence of such an impossible experience by a human being would constitute a legitimate, concrete verification of the existence of that abstract divine being which he falsely claims to be able to prove.

What is the basis of this claim? The argument I mentioned (which is not Descartes', but anyway) holds that if existence and non-existence are predicates, and a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then it's non existence implies a logical contradiction. It has nothing to do with any «experience».

But I am! Is the greatest thing possible a person or a state?

It seems you misunderstand the argument. It doesn't state that God and perfection are synonyms, rather it states he is the subject of all perfections. A perfection is a quality/predicate, and some perfections, such as existence, can also be asserted of things other than God.
Perhaps you think I hold that view because I mentioned Aquinas' idea that God is, literally, truth; but I mentioned it only to point out to the user I was responding to that his conception of God is not the only possible one, I don't hold that Aquinas is right or wrong nor am I defending his views.

Amalac's argument has philosophical assumptions because not only is the existence of God not proven by his method but the idea of God being a real, consistent concept, has not even been truly defended.

You are right about that, one should prove that the idea of God is possible first.

If you want to read a proof (or at least attempt of proof) of that, lookup Leibniz' proof that the idea of God, as defined, is possible (the one he showed to Spinoza).

Let me clarify (even thought I already did since my first post):

I am not talking about «moral perfection», but rather, as I stated at the beggining of the argument, about: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite.», or if you prefer: «A simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.». I am using the term «perfection» in this sense given by Leibniz. So no, I am not talking about a state one can attain.

I forgot to respond to this statement of yours:

Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.

But if God is nothing and can't be anything at all, doesn't that imply that «God does not exist» is true? But I thought your view was that both «God exists» and «God does not exist» were meaningless, neither true nor false.

At any rate, if «God does not exist» is a true proposition, then non-existence must be a perfection and we get into the same difficulties.
Would you say the statement «The round square does not exist» is true, or would you say it is meaningless?

Let's see... if one admits that existence and non-existence are predicates, and that a subject of all perfections can be conceived, then said subject must either have the perfection of existence or that of non-existence.

Why? Because, unless we hold the view that the proposition «God exists» is neither true nor false, but meaningless/nonsensical, either the proposition «God exists» is true, or the proposition «God does not exist» is true.
Since «God exists» means, according to the argument, «The subject of all perfections exists», then if «God exists» is true, then necessarily existence, which is one of God's predicates, must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.

Likewise, if «God does not exist» is true, then the predicate «non existence» must be a perfection when it is asserted of God.

I think the following article, although lengthy, constitutes a direct response to your OP.

No it doesn't. The argument does not rely on the «divine cogito» nor on the experience of «necessary thinking activity», nor on the idea that God gives us an idea of the infinite.
The user «TheMadFool» formalized the argument in premise-conclusion form, if you go back on the thread you can see it, and you'll see it's not like the argument that article criticises.

(Ignore accidental post, I don't know how to delete it)

What you quoted is how Leibniz defines «perfection» in his Monadology.
I wrote:

Leibniz' definition of perfection is: «The magnitude of positive reality, taken precisely, beyond the limits or boundaries in the things that have them. And where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. "

I don't see how that's «nonsensical»

«Someday when after a hard day's work you have a earned for yourself a great appetite, you must visit and I'll serve you a wonderful logical and non-contradictory dinner! But i wonder if you might not arise from table hungrier than when you sat. Logic is the use of tools on things, itself neither the tools nor the things. With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve.»

I have no idea what you mean by this. «With logic you can all day long prove the existence of God, but that existence no more substantial than the logical dinner I serve». What do you mean by that? Could you be a bit more specific about what you mean when you say «that existence is no more substantial...»? What do you mean by substantial?

«if you think Anselm's proof provides it, then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely.»

First of all, I am not mentioning the original ontological argument as formulated by Anselm, but rather a different form of it. I already explained this in my previous reply to you.
Second, I never said I consider the argument I mentioned to be valid, nor invalid. I do not assert either claim, nor does it convince me that God exists (nor does any argument I have seen yet).

I mentioned it for purely logical and epistemological purposes, such as clarifying the errors (if any) that the argument has, because it seems to me that the answers to the argument I've seen thus far are not very convincing, except perhaps Kant's objection that existence is not a predicate, and Russell's theory of descriptions.

Third, you say: «then you haven't understood and you need to read it more closely». Assuming I did affirm the argument is valid, am I supposed to believe that just because you say so?

«it seems to me you make a fatal mistake in not distinguishing between a thing and the idea of a thing. Indeed I would agree that we can have an idea of perfection, even perfect perfection in any way conceivable, but those would be merely ideas of that perfection, and not in any way the perfection itself.

I can have ideas all day long of my perfect dream house, but dreaming doesn't make it so - except in dreams - nor can I live in an idea.»
Your argument then is in line with Gaunilo's argument of the perfect island, correct?

But there is an important difference: one may say, following the notion of existence of Leibniz' argument of the eternal truths, that the «perfect island» or the «perfect dream house» have the predicate of non existence, but in said subjects that predicate is not a perfection, since subjects other than the subject of all perfections posses only some perfections, and therefore there is no logical contradiction arising from denying the existence of the «perfect island» or the «perfect house» outside the mind. We may say the «perfect island» has the predicate of non-existence, but that since its non existence is not a perfection it is limited, and thus it does not follow that said island must also not exist as an idea in the mind if it does not exist outside the mind.

And the argument I mentioned holds that if God did not exist, that would imply a logical contradiction. It is not argued that: «We have an idea of God as existing, therefore God exists», rather it is argued that: «If God (defined as the subject of all perfections) did not exist outside the mind, he would also not exist as an idea in the mind, which contradicts the fact that he does exist as an idea in the mind.»

And I already gave you my response, to which you have yet to respond:
Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.
Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things according to his image and likeness.

You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.

Like I said, argument A is only valid if we accept premise 2. Why should we accept it?

If the propositions «God exists» and «God is conceivable» are neither true nor false, then they must be meaningless. Is that what you are saying? In that case, that's only true if argument A is valid, and I'm unsure it is.
If your argument A is not valid, then the conclusion «God does not exist» does not follow.

Or perhaps I misunderstood you, and you are taking a view similar to Kant's, i.e. that it is an antinomy. Now what concerns me about that is that what is beyond words and logic would surely also be inconceivable, isn't that right?

At any rate, I don't see why I should accept the second premise of your argument A.

«2. If God is the greatest being then nothing can be God's equal in any respect, anywhere and at any time [premise]» Why should I accept this premise? See my previous response again.

«God exists and also God doesn't exist given that God is the greatest being. God, if God is the greatest being, is beyond words and beyond logic.» While I understand that some, like Nicholas of Cusa, might adopt that view, if we adhere to the view that God can't do or be anything contrary to the laws of logic, then this plainly is a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle, according to which if the proposition «God exists» is false, then its negation «God does not exist» must be true and viceversa. The same applies to the proposition «God is conceivable».

«First, we have to understand what is abstract concepts as "perfection" "limits" and "God" What if you never heard of these? Well welcome to extreme empiricism. It is just impossible to give characteristics to something or someone that we do not even know yet.»

Like you say, for those who are radical empiricists that follows. But I am not.

As for your point that we can't give characteristics to something or someone we don't yet know, it seems to me that sometimes scientists can deduce the existence of some things they don't yet know, and give characteristics to these hypotetical things, which sometimes turn out to exist.

I am not saying «God exists and God has this and that attribute», I am saying: «If God exists, then God might have this and that attribute».

«Ergo, god is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, god can't be anything at all if god is the "...greatest being..." Is god nothing then? I'll leave that for you to ponder on.»

How is this not a violation of the Law of the Excluded Middle?

«If god exists as an idea then god is conceivable. An ant, ping pong ball, a dog, etc are all conceivable. Ergo, being conceivable doesn't seem the right attribute that can put the required distance between lowly things such as ants, ping pong balls, dogs and a "...greatest being..." such as god. Hence, a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.»

Leibniz already responded implicitly to that view: «It follows also that creatures have their perfections by the influence of God, but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits. This is why they are distinguished from God.» (Monadology)
Now, there is an ambiguity in the passage, when Leibniz says: «but that they have their imperfections by their own nature, incapable of existing without limits» he might mean that they don't have the perfection of existence, or he might mean that some of their attributes (wisdom, power,...) cannot exist without limits in finite creatures.

Could we say that creatures that exist both as an idea in the mind and also outside the mind have the perfection of existence? Yes, I don't see why not. They would have that perfection, among others, by the influence of God, as Leibniz says, but they would not have all the perfections, and that is what would make them different from God. And that some conceive that God must have something in common with other things, can be seen in the Christian doctrine that God creates things in his image and likeness.

You say: «a "...greatest being..." shouldn't be conceivable because to be so would put it in the same category as other things equally conceivable and a "...greatest being..." must, by definition, exist as a one of kind, unique, and should have nothing in common with other things such as ants, ping pong balls, and dogs. To get right to the point, god can't exist as an idea and there is no longer a contradiction.» But I don't see why the fact that God, if he existed, would have to be unique implies that he cannot have anything in common with other things. I don't see how that follows.

«Maybe ultimate goodness is a place and feeling we experience when we die, not some God out there watching us» So you are arguing that non-existence might be a perfection? What is your response to this part of the argument then?: Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. And therefore this assumption must be false (TheMadFool formalized the argument, there you can see clearly how this step works).

«It is said when talking about the "problem of pain" that God cannot create free creatures who can gain virtue without allowing them pain. However, since God was always happy, couldn't he create creatures more in his likeness (without having to allow pain)? God doesn't face struggle to find happiness. His act of existing is blissful I thought. So we have an infinite deity who loves infinitely but does so with bliss and necessity. And we have his creatures who have animal natures which earns its way in life through strain of their muscles and wits. Doesn't this seem strange to you?»

Like I responded to another user, yes, that might contradict God's omnibenevolence. But the opposing argument, let's take Leibniz', would argue thus: «One of the most characteristic features of that philosophy (Leibniz') is the doctrine of many possible worlds.  A world is "possible" if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of  possible worlds, all of which God contemplated before creating the actual world. Being good, God decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which  had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it  would not have been so good as the actual world. That is because some great goods are logically  bound up with certain evils. To take a trivial illustration, a drink of cold water when you are very  thirsty on a hot day may give you such great pleasure that you think the previous thirst, though  painful, was worth enduring, because without it the subsequent enjoyment could not have been so  great. For theology, it is not such illustrations that are important, but the connection of sin with  free will. Free will is a great good, but it was logically impossible for God to bestow free will and  at the same time decree that there should be no sin. God therefore decided to make man free,  although he foresaw that Adam would eat the apple, and although sin inevitably brought  punishment. The world that resulted, although it contains evil, has a greater surplus of good over  evil than any other possible world; it is therefore the best of all possible worlds, and the evil that it contains affords no argument against the goodness of God.» Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy.

Now, I don't say that things are just as Leibniz' says here, I am only saying that it is not logically impossible nor incoherent that they should be like that.

I'll be eagerly waiting for when you find what is off then.

Yes, even better stated.

Yes, that is a good formalization of the argument.

You should only add a premise that 2 is true because that is what is implied by non-existence being a perfection, and by the subject of all perfections having that perfection.

1.Let's hear those assumptions then.

2. Again, I don't see what «ultimate goodness» has to to do with the argument. I don't mention goodness even once in the argument I mentioned. The perfection with which the argument deals is «existence» not «goodness».

Plus, perfection doesn't just involve «good». Goodness is only one among other perfections, such as existence. The argument depends on «existence» as a perfection, not of «goodness».

1. «All that we know of good is beauty in the world, the goodness of children, and virtue in adults. Trying to conceptualize a being having all those "to infinity" or whatever is not a sound philosophical move» Because you say so?

2.«You can't prove the first step of your argument»

The first step? Do you mean the first premise?:
«A subject of all perfections can be conceived.»
If so, I already clarified what I meant by that:
A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».

Do you deny that we can understand that proposition?

If that is not the «step» you meant, then please point out to me which step it is that I cannot prove.

3. «Descartes implicitly admitted the ontological argument doesn't work unless the idea of God is clearer than all other ideas.» Well, I am not Descartes, so that's irrelevant. (Edit: I now noticed that this is not a reply to me, so ignore my reply if you meant this as a general comment).

4. «I'm saying it's the least clear of all our ideas so the argument doesn't get off the ground.»

How do you know that it is the «least clear of our ideas»?

1.«Yes, but those philosophers are confused and did not have the benefit of being exposed to my argument. I have been exposed to theirs, but not they to mine. And mine is better, is it not?» Is your conception of God better? I don't know, I merely pointed out that it is not the only possible conception.

2.«Yes, so God is 'all powerful', and that is one meaning of the word 'omnipotence'. And thus God is omnipotent in that sense of the word.

Now, if someone comes up with another meaning of the word omnipotent - such as 'being able to do all things it is logically possible for one to do' - then that's fine, but the word can no longer correctly be used to characterise God.»
Only if you hold the dogmatic view that yours is the «true» definition of omnipotence, does «but the word can no longer be used to characterise God» follow.

It's possible that God has the property of omnipotence according to that other meaning, and that you are wrong in thinking that he had omnipotence in an absolute sense. Just because someone defined a term first, that doesn't mean theirs is the «true» definition of a word.

But at any rate, if that bothers you, we may just say: Maybe God does not have the property of being omnipotent, but rather this other property (call it whatever you like) which is like omnipotence but with some limitations. And this may be used to characterise God.

« I have no idea what that means. "Positive" - what does that mean? Does it mean exists, perhaps? I just don't know what that definition means.»

«Leibniz argued that, since perfections are unanalysable, it is impossible to demonstrate that perfections are incompatible— (...)» (Source: Stanford Enciclopedia of philosophy)». «Positive» also cannot be analyzed, because it is a simple quality. But we can understand some words without the need of definitions (otherwise, it would be impossible to understand any word due to the ad Infinitum regress which results from defining the words that define a word).

But if that still bothers you, let's use this definition instead: a simple quality which is absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.

1. «A being who is constrained by the laws of logic is less powerful than one who is not. Thus an all powerful being is not constrained by the laws of logic. An all powerful being makes the laws of logic what they are - for how else could such a being not be constrained by them?

Thus, God, being all powerful, is not constrained by the laws of logic. He can do anything, including destroying himself.» That is one possible conception of God, yes. But many philosophers would not accept it. For instance, Aquinas would retort that it makes no sense to say that God is constrained by the laws of logic, because God didn't «create» the laws of logic, he is those laws, just as he is, literally, truth (once again, according to Aquinas and other philosophers).

2. «Note how absurd it would be to suppose that I have a power that an all powerful being lacks. I can destroy myself, but an all powerful being cannot? That is a contradiction, surely, as plain as day.» Well, if we follow the notion of omnipotence according to which omnipotence does not involve the ability to do what is logically impossible, then the ability to kill oneself would only make one less great, and to affirm that God cannot kill himself amounts to affirming that God cannot cease to be omnipotent. So no contradictions there (at least I don't see any).

3. «No good simply noting that some 'define' omnipotence in such a way that a being who is unable to do things that I can do qualifies as omnipotent. After all, I can define omnipotence in such a way that I turn out to be omnipotent. Here: an omnipotent being is a being who is writing this post. Well, that's me. I'm omnipotent according to that definition. I mean, I can't do anything - there's very little I can do, in fact - but I'm still omnipotent according to that definition. And I can define omniscience and moral perfection in ways that will guarantee that I am those things too. And thus, bingo, I am an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. And furthermore, I clearly exist. But that is patently not a way of proving God exists, it is rather just to play with words.» True, but all one needs to do to avoid equivocation is to clarify the meaning of the terms used.

I don't hold the view that there is such a thing as the «true» definition of omnipotence, only that some definitions are more useful than others for given purposes.

Not to mention, how do you know that it is more likely that it is impossible to prove God's existence a priori and from his notion alone?

1. «The subject of all perfections» is the definition of God I take from Leibniz.

2. No, I am not using the words «perfection» and «exists» as synonimous. What makes you think that's the case?: «a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.» that's the definition I use, Leibniz's. Existence is only one among other perfections, and certainly does not mean the same as that.

3. «Is 'existence' a perfection? No, not necessarily. For what it is for something to be perfect, is for it to be maximally good - maximally approved of by God. Yet the non-existence of many things could maximally be approved of by God, could it not? And thus we cannot say that existence is always and everywhere good, for it is good for some things not to exist» Fair point. But as I said before, The Law of the Excluded Middle states that the subject of all perfections must either have the perfection of existing, or that of not-existing. And if he did not exist, he would have the perfection of not-existing and consequently be inconceivable, which contradicts the fact that he is conceivable.

Also, see my reply 2 on the previous post.

4. “And as God will value himself (for he's omnipotent and if he disliked any aspect of himself he could simply change so as to be as he wants) then God himself will be maximally perfect.” Then he would not be immutable nor pure act, properties many philosophers often atribute to God.

When you say the subject of all perfections does not exist, then if you admit that existence and non-existence are predicates, then that subject must have the predicate of non existence. But in the subject of all perfections, by definition, all predicates that can be asserted truly of him are perfections.

Therefore, non-existence must then be a perfection. But a perfection is "a simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." But if God merely didn't exist in reality, and didn't also not exist as an idea in the mind, then non-existence would not be a perfection, since it would have limits. (Remember I used the notion of existence in Leibniz's argument from the eternal truths, according to which ideas also exist in a mind which apprehends them)

Therefore, to reject that non-existence being a perfection entails a contradiction amounts to rejecting the definition of «perfection».

1. “First, why would it be impossible to conceive of God's non existence? ” «Let us assume that the subject of all perfections does not exist: then non-existence is a perfection, and in the subject of said perfection said attribute must be expressed without any limits, which would imply that not only does it not exist outside of the mind, but neither does it exist as an idea in the mind. Therefore God does not exist as an idea in the mind. But God does exist as an idea in the mind, therefore the assumption that the subject of all perfections has the perfection of not-existing led us to a contradiction. »

2. “God is morally perfect. But one might think that a God who is morally perfect would not be responsible for having created anything less than perfect - such as this world - and so conclude that God does not exist, and conclude this 'from' his moral perfection.” That is a fair objection. It may be, however, that only God (if he exists) knows the reason why it is morally better to create something imperfect rather than not to (see Leibniz's doctrine of compossibles and also his proposed solution of the problem of evil) (Notice I said «it may be» that way, not that God exists and it is in fact like that).

3. «But even if that kind of reflection is confused and properly conceiving of God does involve conceiving of him existing - which seems quite dubious - that would not conclusively establish his existence, as it is possible to conceive of things that are impossible. For instance, when I mistakenly think that 4 x 93 is 374 I am conceiving of something impossible (for it is not possible for 4 x 93 to equal that figure).» That's an interesting argument. However, you can only say that it is impossible after reflecting upon it. It may be impossible that the subject of all perfections exists, but it is not enough to say that it is, as you say. Whether it is so is still a matter of debate.
Perhaps I can give a clearer picture of the argument with this passage concerning Leibniz:
«(...) Leibniz wrote out a proof that the idea of God is possible (...) This proof defines God as the most perfect Being, i.e., as the subject of all perfections, and a perfection is defines as a "simple quality which is positive and absolute, and expresses without any limits whatever it does express." Leibniz easily proves that no two perfections, as above defined, can be incompatible. He concludes: "There is, therefore, or there can be conceived, a subject of all perfections, or most perfect Being. Whence it follows also that He exists, for existence is among the number of the perfections."» (Source: Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy).

4. «the problem is that God is not a necessary existent, for God is omnipotent and thus can do anything, including taking himself out of existence.» If you define omnipotence like that, then that is obviously correct. But in order to inquire epistemologically into the most coherent and logically viable notion of God (and also to abide to the principle of charity), we should look at all notions of omnipotence that seem as plausible as possible. For instance, one may define omnipotence as the ability to do anything except what is contrary to the laws of logic. That God cannot kill himself may only confirm his omnipotence, since some also define him as immutable, and dying would imply that he could change (if he existed) which is impossible by definition.

5. “Thus those who - like me - believe in God, must conclude that nothing exists of necessity.” See my response to 1, it is a reductio ad absurdum.

1. “Why do you think a subject of perfection is conceivable?” A subject of all perfections can be conceived means: We can understand the proposition: «There is a subject of all perfections» (regardless of whether it is true or false). This passage by Bertrand Russell ilustrates what I mean: «(...) This proposition is composed entirely of intelligible words, and the words are correctly put together. Whether the proposition is true or false, I do not know; but I am sure that it cannot be shown to be selfcontradictory».

2. “Secondly, it's extremely Platonic to think of virtue as some kind of substance that can exist as an infinite nature. ” I never said anything about virtue.

3. “infinite such persons would be greater than say 3 so you would have to say there are infinite divine persons in this "perfect" substance.” Perhaps, that depends on how you define God. If by the «greatest conceivable beaing» we mean «A being greater than all other beings» then it is inconceivable that there should be more than one of them, since then there would be a being that is not inferior to the «greatest conceivable being», namely: the other greatest conceivable being (s).

If, on the other hand we mean only that no greater being can be conceived, then if the proof were valid, there may be more than one, I don't deny that possibility.

4. “To clarify, "supernatural" means divine. "Spiritual" means "of the soul". We can understand the soul because we all have a psyche and the psyche, when operating correctly, is "soul". When people feel "grace" that is what the Chinese call "chi" or "qi". When under the influence of grace your will often feels like someone is giving it to you, but rationalizing about this "person" comes at it from the perspective of philosophy and reason, and this gets into a lot of difficulties. ” That sounds like the experiential ontological argument, which is not the one I have mentioned.

5. “since we can't really form a proper idea of this divine person or persons, the ontological argument really fails” What is the basis of your claim that «we can't form a proper idea of this divine person or persons»? And before that: what do you mean by «proper idea»? I think that needs to be clarified.

6. “Also remember that if we look at the Jesus story as ancient literature we have the person in history who was more convinced of anyone that he knew or could prove there was a God, yet as he suffered death he too said God had abandoned him” What the bible says is irrelevant unless it is proven beforehand that it is divinely inspired, and that Jesus, if he existed, was in fact how the gospels depict him. That is a matter for another discussion.